

Brill's Companion to the Reception of Ancient Rhetoric

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Brill's Companion to the Reception of Ancient Rhetoric

Edited by

Sophia Papaioannou
Andreas Serafim
Michael Edwards



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Athens and Staines-upon-Thames, November 2021

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Making the Past Present: Ancient Rhetoric across the Ages, Cultures, and Topics

Sophia Papaioannou, Andreas Serafim, and Michael Edwards

This volume aims to offer a wide examination – wider than in any other work in current scholarship – of the ways in which ancient rhetoric has been adopted, adapted, imitated, contested, admired, and criticised in representative genres, cultures, and spatio-temporal contexts, from antiquity through Byzantine culture, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment to the 21st century CE. This approach to the reception of ancient rhetoric is meant to cover the broadest possible spectrum of considerations that revolve around and focus on the totality of rhetorical species (i.e., forensic, deliberative, and epideictic) as they are applied to diversified topics (including, but not limited to, language, science, religion, literature, theatre and other cultural processes (e.g., athletics), politics and leadership, pedagogy, and gender studies) and cross-cultural, geographical and temporal contexts.

The volume offers a large scale critical (re)examination and (re)assessment of how the reception of ancient rhetoric benefits interdisciplinary scholarship. In this regard the volume identifies two key contributions: first, the enhancement of the knowledge and understanding of the convergences and divergences between ancient rhetorical theories and practices, and their application in a wide range of contexts; and second, the rebuilding from the ground up of current approaches to the reception of ancient Greek and Roman traditions. This rebuilding is necessary due to the mostly fractured and simplistic ways in which scholars have hitherto tended to investigate the relationship between rhetoric in Greek and Roman antiquity and other periods, either past or present.

This volume adopts a distinct approach to the enterprise of examining the reception of ancient rhetoric. It does not tritely exaggerate or idealise the ways in which ancient rhetoric affects and permeates cross-cultural, temporal, and spatial contexts, but rather privileges the critical examination of these influences, raising some uncomfortable questions about them in the process. Nationalism, imperialism, colonialism, cultural elitism, and social exclusion (based on class, ethnicity, and sexual or gender statuses) are some of the inheritances passed from the Graeco-Roman past to people, cultures, and societies

in other periods that need critical re-examinations and reassessments. By adopting a critical approach to classical reception, this volume aims to open a new page in the examination of the ways in which ancient culture in general – and rhetoric in particular – pass through times and cultures to the contemporary era. For, as Mary Beard rightly points out, “ancient Rome [together with ancient Greece, we would add] still matters – mainly because Roman debates have given us a template and a language that continue to define the way we understand our own world and think about ourselves, from high theory to low comedy, while prompting laughter, awe, horror, and admiration in more or less equal measure.”¹

1 Definitions: (Ancient) Rhetoric and Reception

Let us start the discussion about the reception of ancient rhetoric with definitions for two of the most fundamental terms for the purposes of this edition: (*ancient*) *rhetoric* and *reception*.

What is *ancient rhetoric*? Or, first, what is *rhetoric*? Rhetoric is a protean term, complicated and with a wide range of applications, as the great diversity of ancient and modern attempts to define it indicate:

Plato, *Phaedrus* 261a–261b: “Socrates asks, ‘Must not the art of rhetoric, taken as a whole, be a kind of influencing of the mind by means of words, not only in courts of law and other public gatherings, but in private places also? And must it not be the same art that is concerned with great issues and small, its right employment commanding no more respect when dealing with important matters than with unimportant?’”

Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1355b: “Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in each case, to see the available means of persuasion.”

Cicero, *De inventione* 6: “The function of eloquence seems to be to speak in a manner suited to persuade an audience, the end is to persuade by speech.”

Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 2.15.34–36: “The definition which best suits its real character is that which makes rhetoric the *science of speaking well*. For this definition includes all the virtues of oratory and the character of the orator as well, since no man can speak well who is not good himself.”

1 “Why ancient Rome matters to the modern world,” *The Guardian*, 2 October 2015; <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/oct/02/mary-beard-why-ancient-rome-matters>.

Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*: “The most characteristic concern of rhetoric [is] the manipulation of men’s beliefs for political ends, the basic function of rhetoric [is] the use of words by human agents to form attitudes or to induce actions in other human agents.”²

Roland Barthes, *The Semiotic Challenge*: “The rhetoric under discussion here is that metalanguage (whose language-object was ‘discourse’) prevalent in the West from the 5th century BCE to the 19th century CE. We shall not deal with more remote efforts (India, Islam), and with regard to the West itself, we shall limit ourselves to Athens, Rome, and France.”³

Terry Eagleton, *Literary Theory: An Introduction*: “Rhetoric, which was the received form of critical analysis all the way from ancient society to the 18th century, examined the way discourses are constructed in order to achieve certain effects. It was not worried about whether its objects of inquiry were speaking or writing, poetry or philosophy, fiction or historiography: its horizon was nothing less than the field of discursive practices in society as a whole, and its particular interest lay in grasping such practices as forms of power and performance.”⁴

George A. Kennedy, *Aristotle on Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*: “Rhetoric, in the most general sense, is the energy inherent in emotion and thought, transmitted through a system of signs, including language, to others to influence their decisions and actions.”⁵

All these definitions of rhetoric point to its capacity to affect, win over, or manipulate the audience by means of language and other *non-verbal communication*.⁶ Rhetoric, as also indicated in ancient sources and modern scholarship, has to do with images: either those conjured up by language descriptions

2 Burke (1969) 41.

3 Barthes (1988) 12.

4 Eagleton (1996) 205.

5 Kennedy (1993) 7.

6 Non-verbal communication is “a useful umbrella, or covering term for all human acts and responses capable of communication – conscious, intentional, voluntary, or otherwise – and including gesture, posture, body-talk, paralinguistics, chronemics, and proxemics. Events include somatic, vocal (non-verbal), dermal, thermal, and olfactory messages, and experiences” (Lateiner [1995] xix). Lateiner (1995) 1016 categorises the use of means of non-verbal communication in Homer: first, “ritualised and conventional gestures, postures, and vocalics” (i.e., grasping sceptres, gestures during ceremonial instances such as oaths, invocations, and prayers to the gods); second, emotional signs that reveal the psychological situation of an individual (i.e., laughter, cringing, facial expressions that reveal emotions); third, “objects, tokens, clothes (external adaptors)”; fourth, “social manipulation of space and time”; and finally, gestures, vocal ploys, and posturing. Cf. Boegehold (1999) 12–28.

or those created by the use of the speaker's body in all the settings for speaking to an audience. This is called *hypocrisis*: the notion refers to matters that have to do with vocality (pitch, volume, intensity, articulation, stress, quality, resonance, speed, and rhythm)⁷ and posture (gestures, bodily movements, and facial expressions).⁸ Rhetoric can be seen, therefore, as referring to the study and uses of written, spoken, and visual language. Rhetoric is about how to organise and maintain social groups, construct meanings and identities, co-ordinate behaviour, mediate power, produce change, and create knowledge. Rhetoric may be constitutive (shaping and being shaped by reality), dialogic (it exists in the shared territory between self and other), closely connected to thought (mental activity as "inner speech"), and integrated with social, cultural, and economic practices.

Conventionally, there is a tendency to distinguish between rhetoric and oratory – despite the increasing inclination towards the interchangeable use of the two notions in scholarship (as, for example, in *Oxford Classical Dictionary* s.v. *rhetoric*, *Greek*). *Rhetoric* is considered the theoretical basis for the art of *oratory*, that is, all the information, conveyed by ancient treatises, about the stratagems the speakers used to persuade, win over, or manipulate the audiences in political, forensic, and epideictic texts and contexts. *Oratory* is instrumental and practical, as distinguished from poetic and literary composition, which traditionally aim at beauty and pleasure. This distinction is eloquently described in Thomas Habinek's *Ancient Rhetoric and Oratory*:

Oratory is formal public speechmaking. It is the characteristic political act of ancient city-states and of later political entities that draw their inspiration from them. Rhetoric is the study of available means of persuasion. It came into being as a distinct intellectual and social enterprise because of the prevalence of oratory in classical antiquity. Rhetoric analysed successful instances of oratorical persuasion and derived from them principles that could be applied in new situations.⁹

For the purposes of this volume, the notion of *rhetoric* bears a twofold capacity, both the theoretical and the practical. The various chapters examine aspects of Greek and Roman rhetorical theory and practice from the 5th century BCE

7 Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1403b26–31 and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Demosthenes* 39.

8 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Demosthenes* 53; *Rhetorica ad Herennium*: voice quality 3.20–24 and physical movement 3.26–27; Cassius Longinus, *Ars Rhetorica* 567. For a detailed and updated discussion of *hypocrisis*, see Serafim (2017).

9 Habinek (2005) vi; cf. Schaps (2011) 137.

to the 1st century CE. Particular attention has been paid to the examination of the ways in which Aristotle, the Attic Orators, Cicero, and Quintilian affected the reception of rhetoric transhistorically and transculturally.

What is *reception*? In the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the term reception is defined as “the acceptance of ideas or impressions into the mind. Its root is given as the Greek word αἴσθησις, ‘perception,’ and the Latin verbs *recipero*, ‘to recover’ or ‘regain’ and *recipio*, ‘to recover,’ the latter being the one that linguistically generated our modern term of reception.” This definition indicates that, even semantically, reception is closely linked to Graeco-Roman antiquity.

In providing the theoretical framework for reception studies, our discussion focuses inevitably on the importance of the reader within the triangle of writer-text-reader. As Anastasia Bakogianni rightly notes:

Reception studies draw on reader-response theories that originated in Germany in the 1960s, particularly the work of scholars like Hans Robert Jauss, Wolfgang Iser and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Reader-response criticism focuses on the pivotal role played by the reader in the formulation of meaning. Each reader receives a text in his/her own unique way, depending on his or her education, life experience and agenda. Reception theory rejects the existence of the one, original, objective and fixed text that has to be examined as a pure art form as new criticism and many postmodern theorists would argue. In reception we speak rather in terms of “texts,” plural because each time a text is read it is being received and interpreted in a new way. This has proven to be of particular value for the study of classics, where the texts and the material culture of the ancient world survive only in fragmentary form. Classical texts are often incomplete, disputed, recovered from a variety of sources, and re-interpreted by each generation of classical scholars. Classical reception focuses on the way in which the classical world is received in subsequent centuries. The difference between reception and the study of the classical tradition is that reception offers an all-inclusive model of the study of this phenomenon and one that does not offer a canonical reading of the classical model to the detriment of its reception. Reception is about our dialogue with the classical past, whatever form that takes; it can, therefore, be seen as a two-way conversation rather than as a monologue prioritising one or the other.¹⁰

Several, sometimes antithetical, attempts have been made to define the notion of reception. In Lorna Hardwick and Christopher Stray's introduction to their edited collection, *A Companion to Classical Receptions*, we read that "by 'receptions' we mean the ways in which Greek and Roman material has been transmitted, translated, excerpted, interpreted, rewritten, re-imagined and represented."¹¹ Charles Martindale suggests, in *Classics and the Uses of Reception*, that "reception within classics encompasses all work concerned with post-classical material, much of which in other humanities departments might well be described under different rubrics: for example, history of scholarship, history of the book, film and media studies, performance history, translation studies, reader-response and personal voice criticism, postcolonial studies, medieval and Neo-Latin and much else besides."¹² Ahuvia Kahane proposes another interesting definition which makes tragedy the main conceptual field of reception. Kahane points out that "reception studies subsume many geographic, temporal, national, political, ethnic and gendered categories. They cover performance, interpretation, appropriation and the re-appropriation and reuse of Greek tragedy at all times."¹³

Some of these pivotal attempts to define the notion of *classical reception* include some inevitable limitations. The first definition by Hardwick and Stray, for example, seems to privilege the written aspect of reception, while the definition of Kahane points to an inclusive approach both in terms of geographical, racial, political, and gender differences as well as of medium and chronology, but it focuses merely on ancient tragedy. Boiling down the defining features of classical reception that all of the above-mentioned definitions indicate, paying attention to its multidisciplinary character that is highlighted in Martindale's definition, while also adding some ingredients that reflect our wide approach to the reception of ancient rhetoric in this volume, is seen as encompassing *all the ways* in which ancient rhetoric has been adopted, adapted, imitated, contested, admired, and criticised in selected contexts, ranging from antiquity to the Byzantine period to the Renaissance and the Enlightenment (18th and 19th centuries) and on to the 21st century CE.¹⁴ In this respect, this volume is concerned both with the reception of works of classical rhetoric beyond

11 Hardwick and Stray (2011) 1.

12 Martindale (2006) 5.

13 Kahane (2014) 844.

14 The definition of reception that we propose in this volume is close to the definition the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (s.v. *reception*) suggests: "reception-history are studies of the reading interpretation, (re)fashioning, approbation, use and abuse of past texts over the centuries."

antiquity – across time, genres, and disciplines – and with the reception (and evolution) of rhetoric in the context of an individual work, genre, or more broadly cultural framework, inside classical antiquity.

2 Perspectives and Approaches to the Reception of Ancient Rhetoric

Rhetoric has continually been at the centre of political and cultural processes and outcomes and has imbued or determined the policies and practices through which political crises, wars, and financial upheavals have been addressed. Politicians across the centuries have been using rhetoric to persuade or dissuade people, to unite or divide them, to lead or mislead them. Ancient rhetoric has increasingly become part of academic curricula in universities around the world, while independent departments of rhetoric and composition have been created in universities, mainly in the United States, with the scope of conducting research about the multicultural and interdisciplinary rhetorical traditions from the classical to the contemporary era. Activists, journalists, and writers use rhetoric to disseminate ideas, create thought-provoking manifestos, and invite people to think and act. Rhetoric continues to inspire theatre producers, film directors, and other practitioners of popular culture. Memorable examples of this inspiration are the powerful speeches of Al Pacino in *Scent of a Woman* (1992) and in *Any Given Sunday* (1999).

The reception of ancient rhetoric, however, has received only embryonic and sparse interest, despite reception of other classical genres being one of the fastest-growing areas of research within the broader area of classical scholarship. An invaluable book-length treatment of the reception of ancient rhetoric, *The Contemporary Reception of Classical Rhetoric: Appropriations of Ancient Discourse* by Kathleen E. Welch, dates to the early 1990s. Inevitably then, this book does not take full advantage of the new trends in classical scholarship (such as performance studies) and has little to offer on many topics that a modern reader would expect to see covered. The chapter that is most pertinent to the character and research agenda of the present companion is chapter 6, “Classical Rhetoric and Contemporary Rhetoric and Composition Studies: Electrifying Classical Rhetoric.” Welch, by engaging with the work of many prominent scholars in literacy-orality studies, as well as in media studies, provides an integrated appraisal of the relatedness of these fields and of the insights ancient rhetoric has to offer. As she points out, “the unusual adaptability of classical rhetoric and its preoccupation with producing discourse

and not merely analysing it after someone has produced it, makes it one of the most powerful discourse systems that we have.”¹⁵

Two books by Ruth Webb, *Demons and Dancers: Performance in Late Antiquity*, and *Ekphrasis, Imagination and Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practice* also put flesh on the bones of theory about the transcultural and transhistorical reception of rhetoric. In her first book, Webb examines the ways in which theatre in the imperial period (eastern empire, from Greece to modern-day Turkey and Egypt, between the 2nd and 6th centuries CE) interacts with rhetoric. She succeeds in combining “the study of mime and pantomime as performance arts with the analysis of the rhetorical strategies of the ancient discussions of the theatre.”¹⁶ In her weighty book on *ekphrasis*, the fullest and most informative study of the capacity of descriptive passages in speeches to conjure up images before the eyes of the audience, Webb looks at all the relevant treatises from the 1st century CE through to the 6th century.¹⁷

Recently, Stratis Papaioannou introduced an insightful examination of rhetoric in Byzantium. In a volume, entitled *Michael Psellos: Rhetoric and Authorship in Byzantium*, Papaioannou unravels the often-misunderstood Byzantine rhetoric, its discursive tradition, and the social fabric of an elite Constantinopolitan culture that rhetoric addressed. The book offers close readings of Psellos’ personal letters, speeches, lectures, historiographical narratives, and analysis of other early Byzantine and classical models of authorship in Byzantine book culture, such as Gregory of Nazianzus, Synesius of Cyrene, Hermogenes, and Plato. It also details Psellos’ attention to authorial creativity, performative *mimēsis*, and the aesthetics of the self. Simultaneously, it traces within Byzantine rhetoric complex expressions of emotion and gender, notions of authorship and subjectivity, and theories of fictionality and literature.”¹⁸

Several new important articles and book chapters continue to deepen the research of the reception of ancient rhetoric. Of cardinal importance are the chapters by Todd Penner and Caroline Vander Stichele (“Rhetorical Practice and Performance in Early Christianity”), Peter Mack (“Rediscoveries in Classical Rhetoric”), and John Henderson (“The Runaround: A Volume Retrospect on Ancient Rhetorics”) in Erik Gunderson’s *The Cambridge Companion*

15 Welch (1990) 164.

16 Webb (2008) 18.

17 Webb (2009).

18 Papaioannou (2013) i.

to *Ancient Rhetoric*.¹⁹ Our companion is indebted to the stimulating work that has already been done, but adopts a distinctive approach as it lays the framework for a more nuanced and wide-ranging treatment of topics. Its aim is to explore anew several aspects of ancient rhetoric – including, but not limited to, emotions, persuasion, performance, language, and style – and discuss their employment in a variety of cultural contexts across time and space that have been informed and defined by linguistics, performance studies, and ancient scholarship (notably rhetorical treatises and handbooks). The chapters in this companion examine *what* other cultures knew about ancient rhetoric and *how* they treated that knowledge. Their “ancient rhetoric” was convergent to and simultaneously divergent from ancient rhetoric. This implies both continuity and variation: ancient rhetoric was fertilised by ideas, conceptions, and perceptions held by another community. In this context, how then was rhetoric received and repackaged? What were its purposes? How did multiple audiences receive rebranded ancient rhetoric, and what did they know about its archetypal form? Or is ancient rhetoric, when taught and reused, completely de-historicised because it forms part of the Western culture?

The thematic broadness and the interdisciplinary approach of this companion offer insights into the transformation of rhetoric during the periods of classical antiquity when rhetoric turned from a means of performance and persuasion into a literary genre, and enhance our knowledge and understanding of the ways in which ancient discourse has shaped our sensibilities transhistorically, transnationally, and transculturally in later eras. With the incorporation of modern strands in theory and research, this companion proceeds even further to investigate broader cultural frameworks. Its ultimate goal is to demonstrate that the past is always part of the present: in the ways in which decisions about crucial political, social, and economic matters have been made historically; or in the organic presence of literature, philosophy, and culture at the core of the foundational principles of Western thought and values. The issues investigated in this companion are considerably diverse, yet the concern for focused exploration and the constraints of size necessarily associated with the composition of companion volumes impose limitations on the chronological, generic, and geographical spectrum of our reception studies. We hope that the present collection successfully elucidates the reception of ancient rhetoric in representative contexts, and that the output will establish a framework within which further work will be undertaken.

19 Penner and Vander Stichele (2009) 245–260; Mack (2009) 261–277; Henderson (2009) 278–290.

3 Ancient Rhetoric across the Ages, Cultures, and Topics

This volume consists of two parts, named after the scope and content of chapters as “survey chapters” and “thematic chapters”; the second part is further articulated in six sections. The two parts of this volume are designed to work together to offer the fullest possible coverage of the reception of ancient rhetoric in post-classical eras and cultures, in the widest possible spectrum of multidisciplinary texts and research contexts. “Survey chapters,” on the one hand, provide information about how rhetoricians or theorists from diversified geographical and cultural backgrounds worked on, reshaped, and redefined ancient rhetoric, or about the ways in which varied aspects of ancient rhetoric were adopted and adapted in a massive span of time (i.e., one chapter is on late antiquity and two more on the Enlightenment, and in the 18th and 19th centuries). “Thematic chapters,” on the other hand, explore themes and topics that lie at the heart of interdisciplinary research, including literature, theatre, cultural processes such as sports, politics, pedagogy, gender, religion, and science – areas of modern epistemology that shape popular attitudes towards important matters of life and socio-cultural organisation.

The first of the three chapters that fit within part one, chapter 2 of the whole volume, is by Alex Petkas, entitled “The Reception of Greek Rhetoric in the Late Antique East.” It is argued that, although Christianity and evolving administrative structures offered alternatives, classical Greek rhetoric retained its key importance in the eastern Roman Empire of late antiquity. Many individuals from diverse geographical and religious backgrounds achieved success through rhetorical training and skills. They include Gregory of Nazianzus, Libanius, Julian, Themistius, and Synesius of Cyrene. The rhetorical education system and the sophistic culture of *paideia* it served ensured the continued relevance of the classical Greek canon. Letters, in particular, are a vast and under-studied database of evidence on the way rhetoric functioned in daily life in late antiquity. Plato and Demosthenes continued to be key models for contemplation and imitation, both in theory and in practice.

The second survey chapter, chapter 3 of the whole volume, is the contribution of Dietmar Till, “The Reception and Transformation of Rhetoric in Germany during the Eighteenth Century.” This contribution examines five “transformations of rhetoric”: institutional disintegration, epistemological reorientation, disciplinary reorganisation, linguistic vernacularisation, and reorganisation of the public sphere. During the 18th century, rhetoric as a school subject gradually loses its influence. Professorships of rhetoric were dis-established (for instance at the University of Tübingen in 1752 in the context of an organisational reform), new school subjects like pedagogy, literary studies

("Nationalphilologie"), and classical studies emerge. The Enlightenment may be characterised by a process of rationalisation that started around 1600 with Descartes. In the 18th-century rationalistic philosophy and its ways of reaching truth by logical deduction replace rhetorical argumentation based on probability and the application of topical schemas. The result is a harsh criticism of rhetoric. While rhetoric as a discipline slowly vanished during the 18th century, we observe the emergence of new disciplines like aesthetics, stylistics, pedagogy, literary studies, etc. These new disciplines absorb, reorganise, and adopt rhetorical knowledge. For instance, rhetorical categories play a decisive role in the constitution of modern "aesthetics" starting with Baumgarten in 1750. At the end of the 18th century the French Revolution provides the basis for a return of political rhetoric. The 19th century will then be a century of revolutions and the fight for freedom of speech and freedom of press. During the late 18th century, there is a growing interest in establishing a free press, the founding of newspapers, etc. This can be interpreted as a transformation of the public sphere from the very limited and restricted public spheres of the courts and politics to a more universal and inclusive public sphere.

Chapter 4, the last of the survey chapters, belongs to Dragutin Avramovich and bears the title "The Beginning of Rhetoric among Serbs: Pioneering Manual in Eloquence by Avram Mrazović from 1821." The 19th century brought to light three Serbian manuals in rhetoric (1821, 1844, and 1855). The first one was written by Avram Mrazović in Buda (the western part of Budapest) during the time when Serbs who lived in the Habsburg Empire mostly used manuals in German (different abbreviated versions of Quintilian), Hungarian (Grigely's adaptation of Quintilian), or in the Russian language (Lomonosov). Avramovich argues that the influence of Lomonosov's book is neglected in Serbian literature, whereas the influence of Grigely's manual is indisputable. In the scarce available literature, the dominant opinion is that Mrazović was strongly influenced by Quintilian. Avramovich also explains the ambiguous meaning of the old Slaveno-Serbian and Russian word *krasnorečije*, which could be translated as rhetoric, oratory, or eloquence.

Part two comprises six sections, each of which discusses different areas of knowledge and strands of research. Unity across the volume is maximised by three clusters of topics that bind chapters from different sections together: the first examines topics that revolve around the reception of the rhetorical work of ancient statesmen and orators (chapters 7 on Pliny, 9 on Aristotle, 10 on Longinus, 12 on Quintilian, 17 and 24 on Demosthenes, and 25 on Augustine); the second cluster consists of chapters that explore the ways in which post-antique/modern personalities deploy and exploit ancient rhetoric (chapters 14 on Shakespeare, 15 on Cacoyannis, 18 on Machiavelli, and 19 on Choate); and

the third cluster of contributions discusses varied themes and topics about the reception of ancient rhetoric.

Section one, the longest of the companion, is entitled "The Genres, Techniques, and Features of Rhetoric"; it comprises eight chapters, all of which discuss features and techniques of the ancient Graeco-Roman art of speaking. Chapter 5, "The Persuasive Potential of Epideictic Rhetoric: Ancient Past and Contemporary Reception" by Takis Poulakos, discusses the contemporary reception of ancient epideictic rhetoric in two ways: first, by examining the most important configurations the genre underwent in the hands of Protagoras, Gorgias, and Isocrates; and second, by identifying these same configurations in contemporary uses of the genre and exploring their continuity with and change from the past. The first part of the chapter examines how the ancient rhetoricians tapped the constitutive potential of language to form new collectivities at the level of the ideal (Protagoras), the possible (Gorgias), and the actual (Isocrates). The second part of the chapter examines how two famous speakers in America during the radically changing times of the 1960s, Martin Luther King Jr. and Ted Kennedy, used epideictic rhetoric to form new socio-political collectivities at all three levels and towards a single purpose, thereby enhancing the genre's persuasive potential.

Chapter 6, "The Reception of *Paradeigma* in Late Greek Rhetorical Theory" by M. Carmen Encinas Reguero, focuses on the study of the *paradeigma* or example and its essential role among the rhetorical proofs as they are recorded and analysed in the rhetorical treatises of the classical period, specifically, the *Rhetoric to Alexander* and Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. As Encinas Reguero points out, there are essentially three aspects of the *paradeigma* which hold the attention of the authors of rhetorical treatises, namely, its function, its contents (including the relation between *paradeigma* or example and *parabolē* or comparison), and its methods of refutation. She further shows how, in comparison with the handbooks of the classical period, the methods of refutation are expanded in the treatises of the late period. Encinas, then, singles out the relation between *paradeigma* and *parabolē*, announced by Aristotle but omitted in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, and traces the function of the *paradeigma* from the classical period to the end of antiquity by showing that *exempla* in the classical period served mainly argumentative purposes, yet by the imperial period they were employed for exhortations, and this use will later prevail in the medieval period and undergo further elaboration.

Chapter 7, "Reading Pliny's *Panegyricus* Within the Context of Late Antiquity and the Early Modern Period" by William J. Dominik, maintains that the reception of Pliny's *Panegyricus* by writers of late antiquity and the early modern period not only demonstrates its critical, even seminal, role in the history of

the genre of panegyric but also serves to illustrate the potential functions of the *Panegyricus*' own narrative. The reception of Pliny's *Panegyricus* reflects its formative role in the development of panegyric in late antiquity, as reflected in the *Panegyrici Latini*, and in the early modern period, as shown in the panegyrics of such writers as Erasmus and Dryden. Pliny's *Panegyricus* seems to accord generally with the practice of imperial panegyric. As Dominik notes, the necessity of flattering emperors such as Tiberius, Gaius, Claudius, and Nero for fear of the consequences is well attested, for example, in Tacitus, whose comments on the use of praise during the empire are especially instructive for reading the *Panegyricus*. Dominik points out how other strategies available for reading Pliny's *Panegyricus* are based upon the various functions of epideictic in the social, political, and literary contexts of the Greek and Roman worlds. One hitherto neglected approach to the reading of Pliny's *Panegyricus* is the way in which manifestations of panegyric during late antiquity and the Renaissance suggest further possible functions of the *Panegyricus*' narrative. Although the function of the *Panegyricus* is indisputably laudatory on the surface, Dominik argues that later reiterations of panegyric suggest other functions that can be applied to its narrative: ceremonial and celebratory; authorially self-positioning and self-fashioning; exhortative and admonitory; and potentially admonishing and critical.

In chapter 8, "Psogos: The Rhetoric of Invective in 4th Century CE Imperial Speeches," Alberto J. Quiroga Puertas seeks to explore the rhetorical mechanisms and the conceptual framework of rhetorical invective (*psogos/vituperatio*) in late antique literature. Indebted to the theoretical prescriptions of classical authors (mainly, Aristotle and Quintilian) and inspired by a literary canon full of *psogic* passages, late antique authors resorted to invective to deal with pressing religious and cultural debates. Particular attention is paid to the examples of *psogoi* in the works by the pagan sophist Libanius of Antioch and the church historian Socrates Scholasticus. In both cases, rhetorical invectives played an important role in their writings as a fundamental part of an argumentation that addressed ongoing issues.

In chapter 9, "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in Italy (1250–1400): The Latin and the Vernacular Traditions," Fiammetta Papi explores the reception of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in late medieval Italy. Her chapter consists of two parts: the first part is devoted to the three Medieval Latin translations of the text, and to the circulation of Moerbeke's version in particular. It also considers the earliest commentary tradition, paying attention to Giles of Rome's commentary (1272–1273). The second part examines the vernacular reception of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Although much research has been carried out on vernacular Aristotelianism from the 15th century onwards, thanks also to two recent international

projects, “Vernacular Aristotelianism in Renaissance Italy (c.1400–c.1650)” and “Aristotle in the Italian Vernacular: Rethinking Renaissance and Early-Modern Intellectual History (c.1400–c.1650),”²⁰ the dissemination of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* in the vernacular in the earlier centuries still deserves further investigation. Three 14th-century vernacular versions of the *Rhetoric* are described in the chapter – one of which has only been discovered recently.

In chapter 10, “Dionysius Longinus, *On Sublimity*,” Malcolm Heath examines how *On Sublimity* was incorporated into the reception of Graeco-Roman rhetoric in the 150 years after its first publication. This treatise was not widely known before the first printed editions by Franciscus Robortellus (1554) and Paulus Manutius (1555). The superiority of Manutius’ edition was due to the unacknowledged contribution of Franciscus Portus to the improvement of the text. The newly published treatise rapidly gained in prominence, and Petrus Victorius’ identification of its author (in the manuscripts “Dionysius Longinus”) with the 3rd-century polymath Cassius Longinus was not challenged until the early 19th century. Interpretation of the treatise was impeded by Renaissance syncretism of Hermogenean stylistic theory, the Latin tradition of three *genera dicendi*, and the equation of sublimity with the *genus grande*. In the 17th century, the established premise that great thought must correlate with a grand style prompted Petrus Daniel Huetius, renowned French Jesuit scholar of the 17th and early 18th century and founder of the Delphin Classics series, to deny, in his *Demonstratio Evangelica*, sublimity to Longinus’ citation of Moses, on the grounds of its stylistic simplicity. By contrast, a century earlier, the famous Dutch Renaissance classicist Daniel Heinsius in his 1627 treatise *Aristarchus Sacer*, a commentary on the paraphrase of St. John’s Gospel made by Nonnus of Panopolis, had recognised sublimity in the citation despite its stylistic simplicity. Boileau also maintained the sublimity of Moses’ stylistically simple expression of great thought, and his vernacular translation and commentary made the treatise accessible to a much wider audience.

Chapter 11, “Ancient Rhetoric and the Early ‘Italian’ Commentaries on the *Poetria nova*” by Domenico Losappio, aims to verify the presence of ancient rhetorical works in the other ancient Italian commentaries on the *Poetria nova* (those by Pace of Ferrara, Bartholomew of San Concordio, and Benedetto da Cividale) and compare these commentaries with the one composed by Guizzardo of Bologna, in order to define the cultural environment in which

20 More information about the first project, “Vernacular Aristotelianism in Renaissance Italy, c.1400–c.1650”, can be found on the following website: <https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/ren/researchcurrent/vernaculararistotelianism>. The other project, “Aristotle in the Italian Vernacular: Rethinking Renaissance and Early-Modern Intellectual History (c.1400–c.1650)”, is an ERC funded project, whose webpage is the following: <https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/335949>.

they were composed, to highlight links between them, and to shed light on the teaching of rhetoric in Italian schools in that period. The *Poetria nova* written by Geoffrey of Vinsauf at the beginning of the 13th century was soon used in Italy by relevant authors. For example, parts of it were translated into Italian by Brunetto Latini, and Bene of Florence used the *Poetria nova* as a major source for books VII and VIII of his *Candelabrum*. From the manuscript tradition, it seems that the first complete commentaries in Italy on the work of Geoffrey were composed between the end of the 13th century and the beginning of the 14th by teachers like Pace of Ferrara, Guizzardo, and Bartholomew of San Concordio. Not much is known about these commentaries and, in particular, about links between them: only one of them has received a critical edition, the one by Guizzardo. This teacher shows many debts to Aristotle, as well as to the Latin rhetorical tradition. The main purpose of his commentary is to make clear the difference between *rhetorica*, *dialectica*, *poesis*, and *sermo ornatus*; this is necessary considering that some people do not know the difference between them. To make this distinction, Guizzardo uses as an *auctoritas* the “Philosophus,” that is, Aristotle. Pace of Ferrara too tries to outline a distinction between *rhetorica* and *poetica*. To show it, he explains that Aristotle wrote two different works: the *Poetica* and the *Rhetorica*.

In the last chapter of section one, chapter 12, “The Reception of Quintilian’s Theory of Gesture: Rhetorical Elements in Pantomime Acting,” Chrysanthi Demetriou explores Quintilian’s relationship with the most popular spectacle of the imperial period (from the end of the 1st century BCE onwards), whose popularity spanned and increased through late antiquity (until the 6th century CE): pantomime. Although the rhetorician makes a sharp contrast between the system of gestures used in oratory and the one used in *saltatio*, it seems that, like other aspects of rhetorical education, Quintilian’s proposed system of gesture is not alien to that of pantomime performance. Although the rhetorician regards the use of “mimetic” gesticulation as the basic characteristic of pantomimic performance, it seems that pantomime is not unaware of the use of symbolic gesture. Demetriou proposes that pantomime shows a certain interest in “natural” and “symbolic” gestures, as these were mainly evident in rhetorical practice. By examining the basic textual evidence of pantomimic performance (beginning with Lucian and Libanius), Demetriou explores the extent to which Quintilian’s categorisation eventually becomes a part of popular performances of late antiquity, confirming that, under the strong influence of rhetoric in various aspects of public life, the boundaries between rhetorical and theatrical performance were anything but sharp.

Section two has the title “Literature, Theatre, and Culture” and comprises four chapters, the first of which, chapter 13, by Richard Leo Enos, has the title “Rhetoric, the Dorian Hexapolis, and Knidos: A Study of the Reception of

Ancient Rhetoric in the Greek East and Its Impact on the Second Sophistic.” One of the features of ancient Greece is that individual city-states often united to form leagues or confederacies. Greek cities formed such alliances not only for military reasons but also for religious, economic, political, and cultural/social bonds. The uniting and strengthening of these bonds often were built upon shared ethnic and religious foundations. Regular gatherings included celebratory festivals where competitions were held to honour the gods and reaffirm shared values. These unifying functions were instrumentally facilitated by the reception and assimilation of ancient rhetoric into such festivals. This chapter examines how one such confederacy, the Dorian Hexapolis, and its festival site at Knidos, has the potential to provide new insights into the performance of rhetoric in ancient Greece, the schools of instruction, and the cultural consequences of how such a reception of rhetoric contributed to the foundation of the Second Sophistic.

In chapter 14, “‘A Feast of Languages’: William Shakespeare’s Reception of Ancient Rhetoric,” Michael J. MacDonald, analysing the plays alongside seminal works of Renaissance rhetorical theory by Thomas Wilson, George Puttenham, and Richard Sherry, examines how Shakespeare “figured and disfigured” (*The Taming of the Shrew*) the models and principles of classical rhetoric drubbed into him as a boy at the King’s New School. In addition to examining how Shakespeare in his dramatic art deploys the five arts of rhetoric (*inventio*, *dispositio*, *elocutio*, *memoria*, and *actio*), the chapter investigates Shakespeare’s tragic and comedic staging of persuasive strategies, including topical invention, the opportune moment of persuasion (*kairos*), the performative power of speech as a deed, and the art of arguing two sides of an issue (*argumentum in utramque partem*). The chapter also addresses the neglected topic of sophistry in Shakespeare’s plays, including speech as a drug (*pharmakon*), the ontological problem of non-being (“and nothing is but what is not ...” [*Macbeth*]), rhetoric as an art of entrapment (verbal “toils,” “snares,” and “double devices”) and others. Along the way, the chapter shows how Shakespeare dramatises classical rhetoric and its Renaissance reception in a way that invites the audience to entertain a plurality of conflicting perspectives on the *ars rhetorica*. In the fictional worlds of Shakespearean plays, the “sweet smoke” of rhetoric can be both toxic and intoxicating and infect the mind with “pestilent speeches” as well as “ravish like enchanting harmony” (*Love’s Labours Lost*).

Chapter 15, “Ancient Rhetoric on the Silver Screen: Performing *Agōnes* in Michael Cacoyannis’ Euripidean Trilogy,” by Anastasia Bakogianni explores one of Euripides’ favourite rhetorical devices: the *agōn*. This intense battle of words was, for ancient audiences, one of the dramatic highlights of watching a

Euripidean play. But can these scenes, which rely so heavily on the audience's ability to listen carefully and quickly weigh up different points of view, be successfully transplanted into the primarily visual medium of cinema? For the Greek-Cypriot film director, Michael Cacoyannis (1922–2011), Euripides was the most modern of the three ancient Greek tragedians. The director made it his personal mission to adapt Euripides for the modern medium of cinema, thus ensuring that the tragedian continued to “speak” to new audiences. He completed three films modelled on Euripidean dramas: *Electra* (1961–62), *The Trojan Women* (1970–71), and *Iphigenia* (1976–77). This chapter focuses on Cacoyannis' reception of the ancient theatrical device of the *agōn*, the dramatic version of an ancient formal debate. It offers a close analysis of the cinematic transformation of Euripides' dazzling stage rhetoric into a new format that remains accessible by modern viewers of his trilogy. Notably, Cacoyannis refined his approach to the adaptation of Euripides' *agōnes* over the course of his cinematic trilogy: from the emotional battle between Electra and Clytemnestra in the first film, to Hecuba's rhetorical victory over Helen in the second, to the simmering violence underlying Clytemnestra's words during her quarrel with Agamemnon in the final film. Over the course of the trilogy, the director gradually moved from a theatrical to a more filmic mode, introducing some increasingly distinctive changes in his reception of the ancient dramas. The choices Cacoyannis and his collaborators made during this process of transformation allow us both to reflect on the popularity of ancient rhetoric in the 5th century BCE Athenian theatre and to examine how rhetoric can be used to manipulate an audience's reactions.

Chapter 16, “Sport and Peace: Panhellenic Myth-Making and the Modern Olympics” by Jacques A. Bromberg, examines the reception of ancient Greek rhetoric in the modern Olympic Movement and, in particular, in the reshaping of ancient expressions of Panhellenism into modern expressions of world peace. The promise of international sport to foster peace and unity remains the most persistent value across the international sporting community, and this promise has deep roots in influential readings of ancient Greek rhetorical texts. This chapter explores the creation and reception of Panhellenic rhetoric in three stages: (1) how the rhetoric of Panhellenism emerged in response to the horrors of the Peloponnesian War and the perceived dangers posed by Philip II of Macedon; (2) how these appeals to cultural unity against foreign enemies were shaped by ancient writers into an influential narrative about the origins of the Olympic truce; and (3) how modern historians and, following them, the organisers and administrators of the modern Olympics embraced these narratives and transformed them into a powerful argument for the global phenomenon of sport.

Section three, "Politics, Leadership, and Public Speaking," includes chapter 17, "The Demosthenic Model of Leadership Revisited by Libanius: The Revival of Philip in the Funeral Oration over Julian," in which Styliani Chrysikou explores aspects of the Demosthenic model of leadership and how this is revived by Libanius. To this end, a vignette of Philip II and Julian the Emperor, the portrayals of whom dominate Demosthenes' and Libanius' work respectively, is discussed. The *Funeral Oration over Julian* is taken as the reference text, juxtaposed with Demosthenic passages centred on Philip's portrait. Using Malosse's schema to understand Julian's psychological profile, the chapter detects in the *Epitaphios* the Demosthenic portrayal of the ruler whose many virtues Philip embodies. The chapter comprises three parts: an introductory discussion on the traits that primarily unite Libanius' and Demosthenes' societies, which leads to an explanation of the affinities between the two orators. The second part of the chapter examines the historical context, which underlines the leading role of the two orators in the public affairs of their cities and reveals the reasons why Julian was chosen by Libanius to incarnate his model leader. The last part of this chapter examines the parallel portrayals of Julian and Philip, seeking to establish a link between the Demosthenic model and its revival. The comparison of Julian with Philip is followed by a conclusion which attempts to explain the motives that drove Libanius to construct an image of his ideal leader. To what extent does Libanius draw the traits of his emperor from the Demosthenic description of the Macedonian monarch or complete his idealised portrait with reference to the model democratic leader? Chrysikou's chapter is an attempt to answer this question.

Chapter 18, "Rhetoric, Aesthetics, and the State in Renaissance Political Thought" by Peter Stacey, explores two terms, *forma* and *materia*, which have a central role in Renaissance intellectual history and particularly in Machiavelli's political philosophy. In both *The Prince* and the *Discourses*, Machiavelli furnishes us with an account of how individual and social bodies lock together to form political associations called *stati*, and he repeatedly resorts to the binomial *forma* and *materia* to describe this process of state formation. To illuminate Machiavelli's particular understanding of the terminology in question, we need to turn not to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, as scholars have long supposed, but to the Roman rhetorical tradition, far removed from any such Aristotelian commitments. In their accounts of the *ars rhetorica*, Cicero and Quintilian routinely rely upon the language of *materia* and *forma* to describe the subject matter of a speech and the artful shaping of its content to make it conform to one's purposes. But they also use the terms when talking about the formative role which education plays in turning human subjects into good orators. That is to say, in their pedagogy they treat human beings in the same way that they

treat literary works: as bodies of *materia* which need shaping. From Petrarch onwards, Renaissance readers of the Roman rhetoricians applied this theory to pedagogical and increasingly to political matters, and the aim of this chapter is to bring a greater measure of historical depth and conceptual precision to the pre-Machiavellian career of these ideas to illuminate what Machiavelli is doing with them.

Chapter 19, "The Last Orator: Rufus Choate and the End of Classical Eloquence in America" by James M. Farrell, examines the education and public career of Rufus Choate of Massachusetts (1799–1859), focusing on Choate's embracing of the role of orator. Educated in classical rhetoric, this remarkable public figure, largely forgotten today, in his time was considered one of the most talented trial lawyers in America. He also served in both the state and federal legislatures and was an accomplished and popular ceremonial orator. Choate, therefore, serves as a paradigmatic American case of the persistent influence of the ancient rhetorical tradition in each of the three classical genres of speech: forensic, deliberative, and epideictic. In addition to a close study of exemplary speeches in each genre, this chapter discusses Choate's own public remarks on rhetoric and oratory, and reviews how his public character as an orator was remembered by those who eulogised him after his death.

In chapter 20, "Metaphors in Rhetoric: From Ancient Greek to 21st-Century Politics," Jakub Filonik discusses the place of metaphor in ancient and modern political rhetoric. This chapter starts with the idea of metaphor in classical rhetorical and stylistic theories and juxtaposes it with modern cognitive theories, to note that the differences between Greek theorists' and modern linguists' views have often been misconstrued and overemphasised. It argues that the cognitive aspect of metaphor, well represented in Greek theorising, was sidelined in Roman and later tradition. It also analyses examples of some prominent types of metaphors in classical Athenian and recent rhetorical practice, including Cold War rhetoric, and discusses their real-life impact (including metaphors of states as structures and containers, personifications, body politic, and war as a sporting competition).

Section four, "Pedagogy and Gender," discusses the relationship of ancient rhetorical theory and practice to the principles and influential theories of modern gender studies in intercultural teaching environs. In chapter 21, Christian Kock examines "The Reception of Ancient Rhetoric in Modern Argumentation Theory and Pedagogy," in the Renaissance and Enlightenment down to the 21st century. Emphasis, in this chapter, is placed on selected major works about rhetoric that devote substantial treatment to argumentation proper, since argumentation is not considered a subject in its own right during these eras. As for later treatments of argumentation, much of it is found in works placing

themselves squarely in the logical tradition. These, almost without exception, either ignore ancient rhetoric or only refer to it in a hostile way. A new strand in philosophical work on argumentation begins with Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca and Toulmin, and much rhetorical argumentation theory and pedagogy is inspired by them. In the 1980s argumentation theory becomes a field. Scholars in this field have increasingly acquainted themselves with ancient rhetoric, and initial skepticism or hostility has evolved into a spirit of positive inquiry.

In chapter 22, “Ancient Forensic Rhetoric in a Modern Classroom,” Sima Avramović and Gerhard Thür explain the principles of their teaching method of introducing ancient rhetorical theory and practice to students through simulations of court cases from Greek antiquity. This approach helps the students to understand how important the role of rhetoric was, not only in the politics of ancient Athens but also in court and in everyday life. Students improve their rhetorical skills, realising the complex way in which ancient legal practice influences the contemporary enactment of law (e.g., the witnessing process). Performance – a term that broadly refers to the use of body, voice, and non-verbal stimuli that are exploited by the speaker to express arguments and display emotions – draws on the ancient rhetorical tradition, both theory and practice. The two authors argue that their teaching method is filling a gap within central European legal education by exploiting the treasure trove of ancient Athenian court speeches, and helps students to understand the permanence and vitality of ancient rhetoric. Ancient court speeches are not theoretical academic demonstrations, but rather take the form of struggles for personal recognition. Studying the antique technique of “manipulating the facts,” on the one hand, tempts one to sophisticated lying, but on the other, helps decode/understand messages in politics and advertising – the antithetical problem of rhetoric since antiquity.

In chapter 23, entitled “The Rhetoric of Gender in the *Heroides* of the French Renaissance: Revisiting Female *Exempla*,” Stella Alekou aims to explore the reception of Ovid’s *Heroides* in the French Renaissance, arguing that that Ovidian collection of letters, the composition of which is attributed to women, is reshaped and revisited in order to serve the pedagogical ends of humanist education as a series of rhetorical models and moral examples. In Ovid’s text, which is profoundly influenced by the classical rhetorical tradition, the rhetoric of writing about women is interwoven with the rhetoric of women as fictitious writers. The turbulent preoccupation with the place of women in society is inevitably embraced by the literature of the Renaissance, where the dynamics of persuasion are conflated with prejudices of gender and nurtured by a rhetorical culture that informs the language of misogyny. The thread of the discussion unwinds across two different readings of Ovid’s epistles in their

early modern transmutation: the creative reception of female *exempla* in the epistolary description of male triumphs and the exploration of ancient *anti-exempla* in epitaphic writing.

In section five, “Religion,” two chapters shed light on the ways in which the religious discourse that is incorporated in ancient rhetorical speeches and treatises is reshaped and used in a variety of post-antique contexts. The connection of rhetoric, one of the fundamental sustaining institutions of ancient societies, with religion is, in a certain sense, indisputable. Rhetoric in its broad sense – i.e., a reference to words spoken in a context or written for an audience – is used to address the divine, to invoke the gods, to talk about the sacred, to express piety, and to articulate, refer to, recite, or explain the meaning of hymns, oaths, prayers, oracles, and other signs. The intermingling between religion and rhetoric or, more broadly, the institutions of the *polis*, permeated every aspect of life in the Athens of the 4th century BCE, and can be described by the heuristic concept of “*polis*-religion” that was coined by Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood.²¹ The theory of “*polis*-religion” was further exploited in Walter Burkert’s *Greek Religion* and Louise Bruit Zaidman and Pauline Schmitt Pantel’s *Religion in the Ancient Greek City*. Both studies examine the religious structures of the Greek city-state in two periods of Greek history, the archaic and the classical periods.²² Since these preliminary studies on the relationship between religion and the social, political, and rhetorical aspects of life in the ancient *polis*, an extensive bibliography has emerged to focus on and tease out some aspects of the theory of “*polis*-religion.”²³ Despite the progress that has been made in understanding religion as an agglomeration of civic, political, and rhetorical variants, chapters 22 and 23 shed a more nuanced light on the topic.

In chapter 24, “Christians, Ottomans, and Emperors: Demosthenes in European Politics,” Maria S. Youni examines the extraordinary impact of and the various ways in which a particular kind of religious discourse in Demosthenes’ *On the Crown*, the oath, was perceived, transmitted, and used to defend or oppose certain ideas and theories. The reactions of Graeco-Roman orators, scholars of the Second Sophistic, and fathers of the church range from

21 Sourvinou-Inwood (1988) 259–74; (1990) 295–322.

22 Burkert (1985) 335; Zaidman and Pantel (1995) 92–101.

23 Bremmer (1999); Hedrick (2007) 283; Evans (2010) 35–62; Horster (2010) 179; Parker (2011) 57–63 – all arguing for the authority that the constitutional organs of the state exerted over religion discourse and practices; and Deacy (2007) 221–235 and Serafim (2021) two works that shed welcome light on the manipulative use of religious discourses and practices by partisan politicians.

devoted admiration (e.g., Aelius Aristides) to outright polemics (e.g., Clement of Alexandria). From Seneca the Elder and Ps.-Longinus to Engelbert Drerup, from Gregory of Nazianzus and Cyril of Alexandria to Joseph Rhakendytes, from Plutarch and Lucian to Georges Clemenceau, this chapter discusses and analyses the different ways in which the oath in Dem. 18.208 influenced rhetoric, philosophy, the history of ideas, and politics worldwide from antiquity to the modern era.

In chapter 25, “Augustine’s Christian Eloquence,” Hanne Roer presents Augustine’s Christian rhetoric, with the aim of showing how later rhetoricians discussed his *translatio rhetoricae*. Augustine’s writings related to rhetoric, *De catechizandis rudibus*, *Confessiones*, *De doctrina Christiana*, and *De civitate Dei*, transformed this classical discipline into a theory of Christian eloquence. His meta-rhetoric was based on the dualistic distinction between an inner and outer language, reflecting the Christian dualistic relation between body and soul, life and death. He legitimised the use of rhetoric, claiming that it is a universal technique necessary for the Christian teacher and preacher. Thus, references to Augustine served as legitimation for ancient rhetoric in the following millennium. In the Renaissance, the 17th and 18th centuries, writers on preaching and Christian eloquence often discuss Augustine’s views on rhetoric as well as his own style. This chapter demonstrates that in some periods the theological Augustine, who banished rhetoric to the servants’ room, dominated the scene, while in other periods the Ciceronian aspects of his rhetorical thinking came to the fore. The following writers serve as examples of this dynamic history of reception and transformation: Robert Basevorn, Francesco Panigarola, Carlo Reggio, Francois de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon, Giovambattista Noghera, and Kenneth Burke.

Section six, “Science,” contains two chapters. In the first, chapter 26, “Rhetoric of Mathematics: The Case of Diophantus of Alexandria,” Jean Christianidis and Michalis Sialaros explore the idea held in current scholarship that there is an intersection between ancient mathematical practice and the art of rhetoric. The two authors examine the case of Diophantus of Alexandria (c. late 3rd century CE) and, more specifically, the linguistic patterns and methodological approaches that appear in his most celebrated work, the *Arithmetica*. Almost all research on the *Arithmetica* has been conducted with an eye towards its apparent aim, namely, to provide solutions to a number of particular arithmetical problems. Without neglecting the importance of these studies, Christianidis and Sialaros propose a new reading of the *Arithmetica* in accordance with Diophantus’ own exposition in the introduction to the treatise. There, Diophantus explicitly states that the principal aim of the *Arithmetica* was to teach the reader how to employ his general method

(i.e., algebra) to solve arithmetical problems. Through this prism, the authors argue, the *Arithmetica* must also be read as a pedagogical treatise.

In the same vein as the previous chapter, chapter 27, “*Philosophia naturalis*: Ancient Rhetoric and Early Modern Science” by Johanna Luggin, aims to examine the intersection between Latin scientific texts and ancient rhetoric. Well-acquainted with rhetorical techniques from their school days, the authors of scientific treatises made the best use of them in order to present their complex and novel contents in an understandable, aesthetically pleasing, and emotionally touching form. They deployed the traditional arsenal of rhetorical techniques in a flexible way that did justice to their respective situations. Johanna Luggin examines these strategies in relation to the numerous genres in which early modern science presented itself: prose texts, dialogues, academic orations, didactic poems, and many more. The texts show a variety of styles, ranging from the dry enumeration of facts to lively descriptions (e.g., Copernicus, *De Revolutionibus*, 1543; van Helmont, *Ortus Medicinae*, 1649; Varenus, *Geographia Generalis*, 1650; Newton, *Principia*, 1687; Scheuchzer, *Ouresiphóites*, 1723). The chapter also shows how the limits of ancient rhetorical theory were stretched and, if necessary, broken to explain, disseminate, and promote early modern science.

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PART 1

Survey Chapters



The Reception of Greek Rhetoric in the Late Antique East

Alex Petkas

1 Introduction

“Should we send our boy to law school? But he is a strong lad, maybe he would make a good soldier. And yet, he is a gentle soul, perhaps a church schooling would suit him best. Or why not just put him to work managing the family farm to learn some financial skills? But then, what about having him study with that rhetorician?” Such thoughts probably occurred to many parents who ended up sending their sons to the rhetorician Libanius. Because rhetoric was the dominant focus of all literary education, the story of the reception of Greek rhetoric in late antiquity threatens to swell into a story of nearly all late antique Greek literature. To study with a teacher of rhetoric in one’s teenage years also implied studying a broader canon of classics, including Homer and the tragic poets, Menander, Aristophanes, and prose authors like Plato and Thucydides – not just the Attic orators. Many of these, Homer especially, would already have been encountered at the most basic level of education taught by the grammarian.¹ But above all, rhetoric was a system of approaching those texts, assimilating their dialect, content, and forms of expression through imitation, and giving evidence of that assimilation through a highly structured set of composition exercises. The imprint of this training may be felt, to varying degrees, in most Greek authors of the 4th and 5th century.

In the 4th century, however, rhetoric was not the only ticket to success in the world. In many cases aspiring young men would pursue additional education, adding on another skill such as stenography or expertise in Roman law.² Those with fewer resources or less patience might skimp on rhetoric or skip it altogether, going directly into the aforementioned fields of study. They could still have successful careers in imperial bureaucracy and government. Joining the army meant entering a world dominated by Latin and a network of relationships distinct from the civil bureaucracy (at the lower levels at least),

1 Cribiore (2001) 185–244.

2 Heath (2004) 259–267; Cribiore (2007) 206–213.

owing to the separation of civil and military administration in the late antique state. Philosophy was as important a cultural institution as ever, though those recognised as philosophers, with the exception of the increasingly rare Cynics and the increasingly common monastics (whose lifestyle was frequently called “philosophy”), generally had a thorough training in rhetoric.

Ecclesiastical functionaries, even lower-ranking bishops, could get by fine without much rhetoric. There were Christian alternatives to rhetoric focused on the exegesis and imitation of scripture rather than Homer, frequently using methods borrowed from “secular” (classical rhetorical) education and scholarship.³ When the many Christian authors of this period challenged the “worldly learning” of traditional education, this ideological challenge also amounted to an economic challenge as well, as Christian schooling siphoned off paying students from the rhetoric professors. The ranks of professional rhetoricians were, nonetheless, filled with Christians too.

Rhetoric was expensive. There were tuition fees to be paid, ink, papyrus, and books to buy – not just timeless classics, but also dry technical manuals, sometimes composed by the teacher himself.⁴ There was the opportunity cost of lost labour as able-bodied young men spent their time hacking through drills, dozing through lectures, or carousing the streets with their friends. This was, in fact, probably the most significant cost of all.⁵ Studying rhetoric frequently implied a family sending their pride and joy to another, sometimes faraway, city, where his lodging and provisions could require a significant cash outlay. Travel and/or epistolary communication might amount to a substantial additional expense, to say nothing of the increased risks which travel posed to one’s health.

Considering the costs, and the appeal of the many alternative paths to success that did not rely on much formal rhetoric training, or dodged it almost entirely, it is worth asking, why did people still pay for it? What return did stingy fathers hope to get on their investment? I first propose answers to this question in the form of many examples of individual life success that depended on a thorough command of traditional rhetoric. I then offer a more focused treatment of what was in the 4th century the most socially important written genre of rhetoric, the personal letter. Letters, with their frequently high register and allusiveness and near-infinite generic flexibility, also offer a promising and under-studied database for examining how classical rhetoric was still used on a day-to-day basis in this great period of Christianisation.

3 Young (1997).

4 Cribiore (2001) 127–159.

5 Saller (2012).

2 The Professionals

Who were the professionals? For many provincials, the rhetorician or “sophist” (the more common term) held a position worth aspiring to. The word “sophist” could designate anything from a local schoolteacher of modest means to an internationally famous superstar, drawing huge audiences and taking on a limited group of elite students as mentees. “Sophist” could still be used in certain contexts as a negative epithet, going back to the classic critiques of rhetoric in texts such as Plato’s *Gorgias*. Christian writers since the early apologists (Justin, Athenagoras, and Clement) had drawn on this very tradition in their criticisms of pagan learning. But despite many rhetorical challenges to the role of the “sophist,” these people still commanded great moral authority. This is most clear in the emperor Julian the Apostate’s rescript in 362, outlawing Christians from teaching rhetoric.⁶ The emperor speaks of sophists in strongly moral terms as “teachers of character” and their craft as “political philosophy” (Wright 36, 422D), i.e., philosophy in service of the citizenry (*polis*). The point of such a decree was precisely to rob Christians of the widespread respect shown to sophists.

Libanius of Antioch devoted himself early on to mastering the Attic dialect of the great authors like Demosthenes. As he tells us in his *Autobiography* (*Oration* 1), he travelled to Athens in search of the best professors, but was frustrated with the low quality of those he could find. Thus, he distinguished himself by setting a personal example of excellence, religiously reading and imitating the best classical authors, whom he preferred to claim as his main teachers. He ended up winning publicly funded professorships in Constantinople and Nicomedia, and eventually settled back in his home city of Antioch. Libanius’ letters – more than 1400 of them in florid Attic Greek – document his assiduous upkeep of contacts and his efforts to promote those within his network, especially his students. Although he had been born into an upstanding provincial family, Libanius used his school to build his circle of influence beyond that usually attained by provincial nobles. He enjoyed the friendship of many of the greatest figures of the age, and indeed the emperor Julian himself.⁷

Like Libanius, other talented rhetoric students could hope to win coveted posts in centres of learning and establish themselves among the local gentry. Himerius travelled from his native Bithynia to Athens to complete his studies. It was probably there that he met the future emperor Julian; Julian had studied

6 On the edict, see McLynn (2014).

7 Criboire (2007); Watts (2015).

in Athens in the mid-350s. Later on, Himerius travelled to Constantinople to deliver an address to Julian as emperor in 362. In his years of teaching at Athens, Himerius developed an extensive local patronage network, eventually holding civic offices like that of Polemarch.⁸ He delivered a wedding speech, an *epithalamium* (*Oration* 9), for a student of his named Severus, a local Athenian aristocrat. The speech is filled with allusions to and paraphrases of Sappho and Anacreon, among other classical poets, and illustrates the flexibility of the genre of epideictic rhetoric in late antiquity, in which authors could take great creative license and pack a whole range of intertexts into a single speech.⁹ Thus in late antiquity, epideictic rhetoric frequently returned to its generic origins in classical festival poetry. The many subgenres of epideictic may be studied today through the rhetorical handbooks by Menander Rhetor.¹⁰

Some transplanted sophists maintained healthy ties with their home countries. Prohaeresius made his way to Athens from faraway Armenia.¹¹ Recruiting new students was a constant challenge even for a well-established sophist, especially in a competitive market like Athens. Prohaeresius solved this problem by maintaining his reputation in his home country, probably at least in part through letters, and students came to Athens from Armenia expressly to study with him. Unfortunately, none of Prohaeresius' writings survive, but he was well known to the emperor Julian, who wrote a letter to him praising his eloquence and comparing it to that of Pericles (perhaps thinking of Thucydides' Periclean speeches). The letter (Wright 14), dated shortly after Julian's troubled accession, offered Prohaeresius a dossier of the emperor's letters if he would promise to write a history of Julian's rise to power. This shows one of the ways a sophist might be thought of by his contemporaries as able in other genres, a useful man of letters for hire. Prohaeresius seems to have declined the offer. Prohaeresius was also a Christian, and counted Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianzus among his students at Athens. Julian, out of great esteem for the man (whom he probably met in person in Athens) offered him an exemption from the edict banning Christian teachers of rhetoric. Prohaeresius, in a bold statement to his contemporaries, declined the offer out of solidarity with his co-religionists.

Although Eunapius is generally hostile to Christians, he had met Prohaeresius when he was a student in Athens and held him in high regard. He dedicates a disproportionately large section of his *Lives of the Philosophers and Sophists* to Prohaeresius' biography (§485–493), which he wrote upon returning to

8 Penella (2007) discusses Himerius' life and work (with translation).

9 On epideictic in general and this speech in particular, see Petkas (2018).

10 Russell and Wilson (1981).

11 Watts (2006) 48–78.

his native Sardis. Eunapius' work is interested in sophistic contests and declamations, like his generic predecessor Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists*, but also displays a more characteristically late antique fascination with the mysterious and often occultist personalities of Neoplatonists like Iamblichus and Aedesius. His *Lives* incidentally show the close professional parallel between sophists and philosophers. Many people who would prefer the title and career of a full-time philosopher ended up supporting themselves by taking on students in rhetoric, as even Eunapius says of himself. Thus, someone who was a philosopher by calling could also be a sophist by profession – a trend to some extent visible already in early imperial figures like Dio Chrysostom (e.g., Philostratus *Lives of the Sophists* 487 ff.). We discuss the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy in more detail in what follows.

The vast majority of sophists of course did not enjoy glittering careers or discourse with emperors. If they did not have income from other sources such as family landholdings, they might be financially in a rather precarious position, subservient to students whose tuition they needed desperately, nervous about parents paying on time. Synesius of Cyrene (ca. 370–415) draws a humorous, but sympathetic portrait of the provincial sophist:

The sophist has arrived bringing a charming and pleasant bit for his haughty little students, for whose sake he is miserable, although he pretends to be healthy. He bathed just before the important hour, and showed up on time, imposing in appearance and demeanour, in order that he might be a pretty sight; he grins at the theater; he is glad – yeah right!

Dio 12.7

3 The Rhetorical Education

So then, what did the late antique sophists teach? In the late antique East, as I have already suggested, public life was still influenced by the “sophistic” classical culture which has been better studied in the earlier Roman Empire. It all seems rather odd to us now. The great sophists of the Roman world won their fame by performing showpieces of “public discourse,” *politikos logos* – a term popularised by Isocrates and found in many imperial Greek authors from Dionysius of Halicarnassus onward.¹² Sophistic contests of *politikos logos*

¹² It was taken up by Dionysius of Halicarnassus as a blanket term for classical rhetoric (which he frequently also calls “philosophical,” as in *Vet. Or.* 1); Wiater (2011) 60–77. It can mean, in a narrower sense, forensic and judicial oratory as opposed to other genres of

were highly elaborated, maestro renditions of what were essentially school exercises widely taught and practiced among the upper-class youth in Greek society. These included declamations (μελέται), which were speeches that staged either generalised juridical situations or fictional historical situations with well-known characters.¹³ The characters, and even the political and legal system presupposed by these fictions, were nearly always from the 5th or 4th century BCE, or at least imagined to be so. The sophists would also train their students to deliver occasional speeches (epideictic oratory) for weddings, funerals, festivals, the arrival of an imperial official, the parting of friends, and so on.

Since students were encouraged to use classical allusions, language, and subject matter, rhetoric in this period can be thought of as a system designed to help students organise a very diverse set of traditional texts and content into a practical, persuasive repertoire. It was this sophistic culture that underpinned the continued relevance of classical texts in late antiquity as models for language, from the level of morpheme to that of genre, discourse, and ethos. Through these texts, the common language which this system inculcated in the upper classes bound the empire's elites together.¹⁴ The practice of rhetoric in both classrooms and public life thus represented the shared values that made cooperation and friendship possible across the enormous physical and cultural distances of the late antique empire. Producing and listening to such speeches was widely regarded as a culturally and morally edifying activity.

Across different rhetorical exercises, one of the persistent and useful goals was donning the character, *ēthos*, of another. This is clear in the case of declamations, which, together with epideictic, formed the content of the highest

prose; this is the distinction employed by the rhetorical writer Ps-Aristides (*politikos logos* is the subject of book 1, *apheles logos* the subject of treatise 2; Rutherford [1998] 43–47. Hermogenes (*Peri Ideōn* 2.10–12) uses it of epideictic as well. The 4th-century BCE *Rhetoric to Alexander* is prefaced by a pseudepigraphic epistle from Aristotle to Alexander, probably dating from around the 2nd century CE (Mayhew and Mirhady [2011] 452), which characterises the content of the treatise as *politikoi logoi* (1420a8; there are three γένη – forensic, deliberative, and epideictic: 1421b7; Cf Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1538b).

13 Russell (1983) is foundational; see 9–10 on the terminology for declamation. There is papyrus evidence for historical declamation as a formalised educational form in the 3rd century BCE (4). But as a literary practice, it has deep roots in Greek literature, and the ancient authorities (e.g., Quintilian, Philostratus) are probably correct in dating the basic conception to the late 4th century BCE (15–18). Later Greek genres are in significant ways continuations and reworkings of much older forms, including some poetry.

14 Brown (1992).

levels of rhetorical education.¹⁵ Declamations could draw on stock characters based on classical literature: familiar figures like the miser, the misanthrope, and the victorious soldier, for example, were available “pre-stereotyped” in comedy.¹⁶ They could also be based on imaginary speeches from historical figures at famous crisis points, such as the conflict between Demosthenes and Aeschines. Character portrayal was a key element of some of the exercises in the earlier stages of rhetoric too, called the preliminary exercises (*progymnasmata*), which included the “speech in character” (*prosōpopoiia* or *ēthopoiia*). The influence of character imitation on practical political rhetoric in this period is discussed at length in an example below.

4 Philosophy and Rhetoric

How were Plato’s critiques of sophists and rhetoric in, for instance, the *Gorgias*, taken in late antiquity? For one thing, it is clear that they were still subjects of discussion: Aelius Aristides (2nd century CE) composed a lengthy defence of the three Athenian politicians Socrates criticises in that dialogue (Pericles, Cimon, and Miltiades, 515d). His speech *Against Plato (On Behalf of the Three)* was still read and circulated in late antiquity, and several writers responded to it (e.g., Synesius, *Dio* 3.6, *Letter* 101; Olympiodorus, *In Alcib.* 2.96).

One approach to answering the above question is to look at what philosophers did rather than what they said: as we have seen, many of them were heavily involved in the study and teaching of rhetoric. Porphyry of Tyre (3rd century CE), normally thought of as a philosopher, was possibly the first person to write a commentary on a technical rhetorical treatise, a genre quickly taken up by others.¹⁷ Syrianus, head of the Platonic school in Athens around the beginning of the 5th century, wrote commentaries on Hermogenes’ *On Ideas* and *Staseis*.¹⁸ Synesius describes his friend Troilus as a philosopher (*Letters* 26, 49, 73), someone who, besides being an important political figure,

15 The starting point for theory in terms of sources is Hermogenes’ *On Issues (Staseis)*. See the translation and commentary of Heath (1995).

16 Russell (1983).

17 The evidence suggests that, like the *Homeric Questions*, Porphyry’s (fragmentary) commentary on Minucianus (a contemporary and opponent of Hermogenes) was dedicated to technical issues within its discipline and does not seem to have been particularly marked as a work of “philosophy”; Heath (2009) 147. Porphyry is praised by Eunapius not just for his philosophical acumen but also for his poly-generic eloquence (*VS* 457).

18 Caluori (2014) challenges their attribution to the Athenian scholar and contemporary of Synesius, but I find the case in favour of more compelling; Heath (2009) 144–145.

was also the author of a *prolegomena* to the rhetorical corpus of Hermogenes.¹⁹ Rhetoric provided a framework for many Platonists to think and discourse practically about political matters.

The rhetorical activities of the Neoplatonists can be explained, on the one hand, by economic realities: demand seems not to have been great enough for more than a select few to teach sustainably a curriculum devoted only to the theoretical aspects of philosophy.²⁰ As we saw above, sophists tended to be respected and upstanding citizens who performed a morally edifying duty. A philosopher thus might undertake the teaching of rhetoric with a sincere conviction that in doing so he was fulfilling a moral duty to the community.

Hermias, a philosopher working in Alexandria in the early 5th century, wrote an extant commentary on Plato's *Phaedrus*. In it, he concisely summarises the role of rhetoric in the philosopher's political life: the philosopher is a philosopher in the primary sense when he is contemplating intellectual being (e.g., the Platonic forms), but becomes a "political" philosopher when he turns his attention to the administration of the state. Since that role requires speaking, he will become a true rhetor as he addresses his rational discourse to the community (τὸ κοινόν), to persuade them to do the right thing (τὰ δέοντα), which is something he will determine on the basis of his philosophical contemplation.²¹

The role of "true rhetor" is thus a subset of the role of the political philosopher, and philosophers frequently did enter into politics, such as Themistius (see next section). Similarly, teaching rhetoric to the leading classes of the city did not make someone a philosopher, but it was nonetheless something that could be done in such a way that it was a practical application of philosophy – a philosopher-rhetorician thus might think of himself as a teacher of true rhetoric. Hermias was a student of the Athenian philosopher Syrianus; Syrianus' teacher, Plutarch of Athens (late 4th to early 5th century), in a fragment of his commentary on the *Gorgias*, defines rhetoric as "the art whose primary power is in discourse, which produces persuasion in *politikoi logoi* about any theme proposed, and of a persuasive, rather than didactic, nature."²² Not only then did philosophers practise classical rhetoric, both teaching it and using it, but they also theorised about it and occasionally justified its importance to philosophy.

19 Rabe (1931).

20 Heath (2009) 148–149.

21 Hermias, *In Phaedr.* 221, 11–18; cited and discussed in O'Meara (2003) 209.

22 'Εκ τῶν Πλουτάρχου εἰς τὸν Πλάτωνος Γοργίαν. "Ὁρος ῥητορικῆς κατὰ Γοργίαν [i.e., the dialogue] "ῥητορικὴ ἐστὶ τέχνη περὶ λόγους τὸ κύρος ἔχουσα, πειθοῦς δημιουργὸς ἐν πολιτικοῖς λόγοις περὶ παντός τοῦ προτεθέντος πιστευτικῆς καὶ οὐ διδασκαλικῆς" (Rabe [1931] 217, 13.33–34 [= Taormina fr. 73]).

5 Rhetoric in the Practical Life

Many figures used the toolkit of the sophist in public life but avoided association with the term. Themistius (c.317–late 380s), a native of Paphlagonia, began his career as a provincial teacher of rhetoric and philosophy, following in his father's footsteps.²³ He taught at Nicomedia and was probably employed as a teacher at Ancyra when he seized the opportunity of his lifetime. Sometime in the late 340s or 350s, the emperor Constantius was passing through the town – it lay on the main imperial road between Constantinople and locations on the troubled eastern front. Themistius somehow got the chance to deliver a *basilikos logos*, a speech to the emperor, before Constantius himself and his travelling court. His written copy of the speech is his *Oration 1, On the Love of Mankind* (*Peri Philanthrōpias*).²⁴

Though in genre and occasion the speech is in a standard form taught by the sophists,²⁵ Themistius distinguishes his own voice from the hundreds the Emperor had already heard by saying at the very beginning that now, for the first time, the emperor would hear “an independent speech and a truthful praise giver.” This is because Themistius is a philosopher and is, therefore, not willing to lie like the rest of the rhetors (1a). Themistius was a pagan, speaking to a Christian king (the son of Constantine the Great), and in this speech he shows his distinctive talent for weaving together traditional classical ideas and passages about philosophy, virtue, kingship, and divinity in a way that was acceptable to an imperial Christian audience.

Themistius' boldness paid off – he joined Constantius' entourage thereafter and became a court orator, holding mostly informal positions of influence near the throne. He worked his way so thoroughly into the emperor's trust that when Constantius wanted to expand the recently established senate of Constantinople in the late 350s, he entrusted Themistius with selecting a large number of the new members.²⁶ This commission ended up giving Themistius tremendous influence during the subsequent decades of his career, as he served as a mediator between successive emperors and the eastern senate. His speeches, with their deft and politic handling of classical themes and tendency to slip into a generic and accommodating monotheism, give a hint of what his style of political discourse must have been like in person. Rhetoric served

23 On Themistius, Vanderspoel (1995); Heather and Moncur (2001) (including text and translation); Watts (2015).

24 Heather and Moncur (2001) 69.

25 On the *basilikos logos*, see Menander Rhetor II.368.

26 Heather (1992).

Themistius very well, but throughout his career he preferred to be thought of as a philosopher, a feature apparent in both his public and private speeches.²⁷

Classical rhetoric was also one of the tools available to the very capstone of the political structure. Though Themistius occasionally praises them for their subtle wisdom or love of knowledge, most of the 4th-century emperors were gruff autocrats who were most at home among the soldiery: Constantius, Valens, Valentinian, Theodosius, and of course Constantine himself. Julian (reigned 361–363) was exceptional for his genuine and ostentatious interest in classical learning. In the earlier stages of his career, when he lived under the shadow of his distrusting cousin Constantius, he made typical panegyric orations in praise of his royal family members, following closely the customs identifiable in rhetorical handbooks.²⁸ He continued to use his classical rhetorical training in crafting a distinctive style as sole ruler. His *Misopōgōn*, or “Beard-hater” aimed at criticising the Antiochians for their disrespectful treatment of him when he visited the city; the speech as a whole is a clever inversion of the “praise of a city” genre found in the epideictic manuals and draws heavily on the tradition of classical Athenian oratory.²⁹ He preferred to be associated with the title of philosophy (though occasionally he modestly denied that he was himself a philosopher). Yet it was partly through the tools of classical rhetoric that Julian so effectively portrayed himself as a philosopher.

Traditional rhetorical education, with its polytheistic content, posed an ideological challenge for Christianity that the new religion handled in diverse ways. On the extreme end, a figure like the solitary Egyptian monk Antony the Great could profess that he rejected pagan learning, and that the content of the Christian scriptures alone sufficed for those interested in reaching the fulfilment of human nature. His biographer, the bishop Athanasius of Alexandria, is perhaps a better example of a highly literate and successful Christian who, as far as scholarship has been able to tell, had little if any traditional rhetorical education.³⁰ Athanasius, according to our sources, instead received an ecclesiastical education, which would have included training in biblical exegesis and theology. Though his writing lacked the allusive semantic density of an author like Gregory of Nazianzus, Athanasius nonetheless achieved a very fluid and rhetorically effective (for his day) style. When he portrays his hero Antony the Great successfully confounding the learned men of Alexandria (*Life of Antony* §§72–73), we can easily imagine Athanasius reflecting in similar terms

27 On the latter, see Penella (2000).

28 See, e.g., Tougher (2012).

29 Gleason (1986); Hartman (2017).

30 Barnes (1993) 10–11.

about his own remarkable persuasive successes against much more classically polished bishops in the highly politicised Christological controversies of the mid-4th century.

Of all the great 4th-century Greek Christian writers, Gregory of Nazianzus was the most beloved among the later Byzantine humanists, for combining service to the church and its intellectual tradition on the one hand, with deep practical competence in classical forms and thought on the other. He is now often thought of as a Christian Demosthenes,³¹ and like his classical forebear, Gregory had a talent for spinning political defeats into rhetorical victories. Demosthenes was celebrated by some critics for his protean ability to present the right version of his character and style at the right time (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Demosthenes* §8).

A similar thing could be said about Gregory's stance toward rhetoric. On the one hand, he can deftly use his classical rhetorical training to achieve his aims effectively in a variety of situations. At other times he can reproach the vanity of worldly learning and the inferiority of rhetoric to Christianity, as in a letter (*Letter 11*) to his friend Gregory of Nyssa (the younger brother of Basil of Caesarea). Nyssen had decided to pursue a career as a sophist, rather than following in the footsteps of his father and older brother toward the priesthood. Nazianzen reproaches him for "preferring the name *rhetor* to that of Christian" (11.24) (we can compare the later but more famous *Letter 22* of Jerome to Eustochium, in which Jerome sees Christ in a dream, reproaching him, "You are a Ciceronian, not a Christian!" [§30]). But in the same sentence, as he upbraids his friend, Gregory alludes to Hesiod (*Works and Days* 45, 629). Furthermore, he accuses Nyssen of following the path of "ambition, the worst of *daimones*." But in doing so, he quotes Euripides' *Phoenissae*, a late antique favourite.³² Such literary texturing was useful in winning over many late antique Christian audiences, such as his ambitious young addressee (Gregory of Nyssa did eventually capitulate and join the priesthood). From festival orations to personal poetry to literary letters, Gregory of Nazianzus' oeuvre shows how useful classical rhetorical training could be to an active 4th-century Christian bishop.

Though he falls toward the chronological limit of our scope, Synesius of Cyrene (ca. 370–415) is an important figure for our consideration as someone who enjoyed well-documented success both in the secular and the ecclesiastical sphere, both as a philosopher and a rhetorician.³³ As such he has been fruitfully compared to his near contemporary in the west, Augustine

31 Kennedy (1983) 50.

32 Cribiore (2001) 198–199.

33 For the life and career of Synesius, Cameron and Long (1993) is foundational.

of Hippo.³⁴ Synesius left his native Libya to study philosophy and probably rhetoric with the renowned philosopher Hypatia.³⁵ On his debut in public life as ambassador for his native land, he travelled to Constantinople and stayed for three years. There he composed an address to the emperor Arcadius in an extant philosophical speech *On Kingship*, which draws heavily on Themistius and earlier writers. Upon his return home to Cyrenaica, he spent his time managing his family estate, occasionally engaging in local politics, and keeping up an active practical correspondence with important connections in places like Alexandria, Constantinople, and Syria. His highly rhetorical and allusive letters contain many references to classical history and philosophy, and helped him maintain influence despite living in one of the more isolated provinces of the empire. Synesius was elected archbishop of all Cyrenaica (eastern Libya) in 410 and his letters, some of which take the form of manuscripts of public speeches, show the continued applicability of classical rhetoric in the episcopal office. They, nonetheless, reveal some of the strains the new professional realities placed upon his habit of keeping to a high Attic Greek style, as he handled theological and jurisdictional disputes and clashed with governors over the proper use of Christian holy places.

Synesius wrote several extant treatises, including a philosophical satire *Praise of Baldness* and a theoretical and rhetorical study *On Dreams*. His master work and literary manifesto, *Dio, or Life According to his Model*, begins with a literary-critical assessment of Dio Chrysostom's life and style. It builds into a sustained argument that philosophers need to read and emulate classical literature (in other words, practise rhetoric in its fullest sense) to live a full and well-ordered life. Synesius sent the treatise to his teacher Hypatia to circulate among Alexandrian learned circles.

6 The Contexts of Classical Rhetoric

From speeches at civic festivals to historical writing to biblical exegesis, the effects of classical rhetorical training can be felt across most late antique genres, many of which have been well studied.³⁶ For the rest of this chapter, I present some examples of how much we can learn about the context and reception of classical rhetoric from a massive genre which has not been

34 Lane Fox (2015).

35 Petkas (2020).

36 See the essays collected in McGill and Watts (2018).

studied from a literary and cultural angle until recently, that of the letter or epistle.³⁷

Late antique letters such as exist in the collections of Gregory of Nazianzus, Libanius, Synesius, and Julian were highly polished literary texts. Frequently authors wrote them intending, or at least acknowledging the inevitability, that they would be shared with audiences wider than the addressee.³⁸ This is occasionally made explicit, and there are traces of a vibrant letter-sharing culture, as in the case Synesius' *Letter* 101. Synesius, in Libya, received a letter from his Constantinopolitan friend Pylaemenes, and arranged a sympotic gathering of learned company to hear and appreciate the letter. He hints that he hopes for a similar reception in the capital for his own letters. In such a way, letters could constitute a kind of performance, conducted under many of the same assumptions as more public sophistic displays.³⁹ In Synesius' case here, both parties had much to gain from this friendly sharing practice.⁴⁰ A recipient's license to share was not infinite, and the appropriateness of sharing or not was probably in some cases somewhat unclear, though we should keep in mind that the epistle carrier, often a friend to one or both of the parties, could give relevant instructions.

The practice of letter sharing was of course not an invention of the late antique period. Letters were a tool which many earlier public figures integrated into their self-fashioning and reputation management strategies. Philostratus, in his history of the high imperial sophists, cites many letters to and from famous figures like Herodes Atticus, a teacher of Marcus Aurelius, which indicate that they were shared, talked about, copied, and intentionally designed to make a good public showing.⁴¹ For Greek figures of the earlier empire, nothing survives comparable in scale to the late antique corpora. There is, however, ample evidence of how the letters of philosophers and

37 See now Sogno, Storin, and Watts (2017).

38 Schor (2011) 35–37, 156–179; Storin (2011) 80–146; Bradbury (2004) 19–23.

39 Norman (1992) 30 summarises: "Throughout his correspondence without exception Libanius summoned gatherings of his friends immediately whenever he received any letter from the great and the good, to read it aloud to them and then to subject it to group discussion and critical appreciation." On the audiences of sophistic shows in the Roman Empire, see Korenjak (2000).

40 Cambron-Goulet (2017).

41 Philostratus, *VS* §490, Herodes to Favorinus; §512, the exchange between the sophist Niketes and Nero; §537, Herodes' letters describing Polemo's performance style; §543, Polemo to Herodes; §548, the father of Herodes to Nerva; §548, Herodes to Emperor Hadrian; §552–554, Herodes' rustic friend Agathion, nicknamed Heracles, described in a letter; §562–563, exchange of Herodes and Marcus Aurelius; §571, Alexander "the Clay Plato" writing to Herodes; §579, exchange between Philagrus and Herodes.

sophists fit into social life, or were imagined to do so.⁴² Letters occasionally became themselves the subject of sophistic declamations. Philostratus records a fictional letter composition which Julius Pollux declaimed as a speech – a letter from the son, sold into slavery, to the father who sold him.⁴³ One of the highest honours given to Greek sophists was a position as secretary of imperial letters (*basilikai epistolai*).⁴⁴

In short, because they were frequently public, concerned matters of government and political persuasion, and generally adopted a style as classicising as the author and audience could manage, letters can be considered *politikos logos* in the fullest sense. They are thus among the primary ends at which rhetorical training aimed, and there are several extant epistolary manuals from this period, though some of dubious practical use beyond a basic level (see note 45 below). Since they often report conversations or events which occurred in or directly pertain to key contexts for persuasion, such as assemblies and councils, letters can also give a hint of how classical rhetoric continued to shape discourse around real practical decision-making in the eastern empire.

One extended example from a letter of Synesius shows the continued impact of Demosthenes on political conversation at the provincial level. *Letter* 95 is addressed to Synesius' brother Euoptius and opens with an update on a recent political conflict Synesius has been involved in. Euoptius had written to Synesius: their old nemesis on the provincial council, a man named Julius, had finally come around to seeing things their way. Synesius writes back: not so, brother. He has just gotten report from another friend of theirs: Julius is back to slandering Synesius again. What is going on? One of the chief events Julius and Synesius quarrelled about politically was a certain embassy (πρεσβεία, 95.74).⁴⁵ The debate centred on how to deal with an increase in raiding activities by local nomads.

Synesius' letter is thus an epistolary counterattack to Julius' alleged epistolary slander.⁴⁶ The story becomes interesting for our purposes here because

42 König (2013) discusses letters to and about symposia in the imperial period.

43 VS 593; it is described as a μελέτη (declamation), and one which particularly reveals Pollux's character as a stylist (μελετώντος δὲ αὐτοῦ χαρακτήρα ποιῶμεθα τοὺς νησιώτας τοὺς τὰ γένη πιπράσκοντας). This humorous episode suggests a performance context for fictional epistolary compositions such as the letters of Alciphron.

44 See e.g., §524, Celer the *technographos* was good at his job as imperial secretary (keeper of the *basilikai epistolai*) but lacked skill in declamation; §571, Alexander "the Clay Plato" appointed in charge of imperial correspondence to Greeks; §590, Hadrian the Sophist appointed to the epistles by Commodus.

45 Liebeschuetz (1985) 146–154 on the political and military context of this letter.

46 Pseudo-Libanius offers some helpful terminology: it could be described as ἀντεγκληματική, a "counter-accusing" type of letter (Ps. Lib. *Epistolary Styles* [Foerster, *Libanii*

the context suggested to Synesius the clash of Demosthenes and Aeschines, which led to Demosthenes' famous defence of his partisan Ctesiphon, the speech *On the Crown* (Or. 18).

To begin with, Synesius frames the disagreement in ways that suggest a debate occurring in a Greek political assembly, using much of the language of classical democracy. He and Julius have "championed opposing policies" (τάναντία πεπολιτεύμεθα) in relation to their common fatherland; when it was necessary to vote on a course of action (ψηφίζεσθαι δέον), Synesius proposed (ἔγγραφον) that foreigners be exempted from military service. He reasons that transferring responsibility for the war effort back to the court of Egypt instead of local Libyan generals will prevent local abuses, and that is the only way to ensure that the military is strong enough to face the current threat.⁴⁷

But his description of the debate makes no mention of the Roman military officials who would have had a significant interest in the question, and probably more influence in the decision.⁴⁸ The provincial council could have some sort of say in the matter if they could get the attention of the Emperor – this was probably the motive for sending the embassy mentioned, likely to Constantinople.⁴⁹ Whatever the nature of the embassy, one of Synesius' main reasons for emphasising it here is that it evokes the quarrel of Demosthenes and Aeschines, which began to harden in the wake of several successive Athenian embassies to Philip of Macedon, recounted in Demosthenes 19 (*On the False Embassy*). As has been recently noted, the clash of these two politicians along with the speeches which resulted were foundational inspirations for much late antique invective.⁵⁰

Earlier in their careers, Synesius had in fact intervened on Julius' behalf, diverting the fury of a prosecutor who wanted to ruin Julius entirely over some

Opera IX §4 22]), though it is doubtful that Synesius made much use of that or similar texts beyond his basic education. Ps-Demetrius, *Epistolary Types* is less precise for this purpose, offering the μεμπτικός (Weichert 3) among others, though these are conceived of as being directed towards the addressee, which is not the case with 95. Both texts can be found, with translation, in Malherbe (1988).

47 His motives for all of these policies probably have something to do with preventing opponents like Julius and John from developing independent power bases loyal only to them.

48 Such as Anysius, known from other *Letters* (e.g., 34 and 94) as the *dux Libyae* during this period (Liebeschuetz [1985] 191) – or probably his superiors such as the holder of the office of *magister militum*.

49 Liebeschuetz (1985) is likely correct that the embassy herein is not Synesius' embassy to Constantinople earlier in his career but rather a later event.

50 Flower (2013) 47–55; Cribiore (2013) 95–105.

obscure charge.⁵¹ Synesius says that if Julius had been convicted, “an *Iliad* of woes would have beset our city” (κακῶν ἂν Ἰλιάς περιέστη τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν [95.29]). The famous phrase “*Iliad* of woes” comes from *On the False Embassy*.⁵² Cyrene would have been at great risk, he explains, because they would have had to deal with a powerful and vengeful man who had nothing to lose.

Despite Julius’ slander, Synesius does not now regret what he did: better to do an enemy a kindness than see many innocent people suffer. He suggests that not just Julius’ family but also the entire Cyrenean community would have been in danger. We do not have Julius’ side of the story; the way Synesius tells it is plausible, but is also just the sort of persuasive stance that training in rhetoric, and especially in late antique stylistic theory, was designed to inculcate. Hermogenes of Tarsus (2nd century CE) might say Synesius has succeeded in achieving the stylistic (or “ethical”) virtue of *epieikeia*, often translated “reasonableness” or “modesty.” Hermogenes discusses this specific characteristic in *On Types of Style* (*Peri Ideōn*) under the general heading of *ēthos*.⁵³

Hermogenes is one of the better-known representatives of a larger body of imperial rhetorical theory on style, some of which was going through a process in late antiquity of being codified for subsequent ages, as we saw with Syrianus’ commentaries on Hermogenes. Later ages of Byzantine scholars and rhetoricians added to this tradition. Such treatises and the commentaries written on them filtered and shaped which aspects of classical rhetoric were salient in later ages.

The influence of Hermogenes can be detected in Synesius’ letter to his brother. At the close, Synesius addresses Julius in a climactic *apostrophe* (a second-person address to someone absent). It is indeed likely that he expected

51 ὡς ἀδικούντα τὴν βασιλέως ἐστίαν (95.20–21); Garzya and Roques (2003) 347 discuss the uncertainty of the phrase.

52 Demosthenes, *On the False Embassy* 19.148: κακῶν Ἰλιάς περιεστήκει Θηβαίους. Though the phrase is found elsewhere in late antique prose, Synesius actually preserves the verb Demosthenes uses, while most other extant quotations of it in ancient authors do not: cf. Zenobius IV.43; Diogenianus V.26; Porphyry, *De Abst.* I.47.2.

53 “A passage that reveals a modest character is produced mainly by the thought and is created whenever anyone states that of his own free will he is aiming at less than he could attain” (trans. Wooten) (ἐπιεικής καὶ ἡθικός ὁ λόγος γίνεται κατ’ ἐννοίαν μὲν, ἥτοι ὅταν ἐκόντα τις αὐτὸν μειονεκτοῦντα δεικνύῃ) Hermogenes, *On Types of Style* 345 Rabe. Hermogenes is reformulating the relationship of *ēthos* and *epieikeia* which goes back to Aristotle: an orator persuades by *ēthos* when his speech is pronounced so as to make the speaker seem worthy of trust: τοῖς γὰρ ἐπιεικέσι πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ θάττον (*Rhet.* I.1356a). *Ēthos* in Hermogenes’ theory was associated with certain registers of style (*ideai*) that were “lower” in comparison with more emotionally charged registers (such as *akmē*). A talented speaker like Demosthenes would, in Hermogenes’ view, alternate between various *ideai* at different times within a single speech.

the contents of this epistle to reach Julius' ears – whether through report or direct reading – just as Julius' epistle had come to his own attention through their mutual friend:

“Ἀλλ', ὦ τᾶν” – ἄξιον γάρ διὰ σοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰρῆσθαι – “διὰ ταῦτα νῦν μὲν ἐπάρατος εἶ, τῆς κοινῆς τύχης ἐπὶ τάναντία πειρώμενος: εὐτυχεῖς γὰρ ἐν ἀτυχοῦσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ τῇ πόλει συνατυχῶ. Ἴσθι μέντοι σαφῶς ὅτι φύσεώς ἐστι νόμος ἐμπεριέχεσθαι τῷ καθόλου τὰ μέρη. Καὶ ὅταν πάνυ πολὺς ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος συμφορᾶς ὁ σπλὴν αὐξηθῇ, ἕως μὲν ἀντέχει τὸ ὅλον, εὐσθενεῖ τε καὶ πιαίνεται, ἀπολλυμένῳ δὲ συναπόλλυται. Καὶ σὺ τὸ παρὸν εὖ τιθέμενος, λήσεις τοῖς σαυτοῦ πολιτεύμασιν εἰμαρμένη τῆς πατρίδος τε ὧν καὶ σαυτοῦ. Μέχρι τούτου Λασθένης ὠνομάζετο φίλος Φιλίππου μέχρι προὔδωκεν Ὀλυνθον.⁵⁴ Τὸν δὲ ἄπολιν πῶς εἰκὸς ἐστὶ εὐτυχεῖν.”

Letter 95.95–107

“But, my good fellow,” (I can reasonably expect you to convey him the message) “you are cursed now for this reason that you are campaigning against our collective good Fortune: for you are a success amidst ruined citizens, while I on the other hand am ruined along with the city. Recall however that the law of nature is that the parts are contained within the whole. And whenever the spleen grows overly great from the misfortune of the body, it is strong and fat as long as the entire body holds up; but when that dies, the spleen dies along with it. Likewise you, though you are placed well at present, will by your policies become, unnoticed and unwittingly, the death of the fatherland and yourself. ‘Lasthenes was called a friend of Philip until he betrayed Olynthus.’ How likely is it that a cityless man succeed?”

The *gnōmē* about Lasthenes is drawn from *On the Crown* (18.48), where Demosthenes lists this man as the first in a series of paradigmatic city-betrayers to whom he compares Aeschines before the Athenian judges. These men enriched themselves by aiding Philip of Macedon at their own cities' expense, until Philip captured those cities and then these traitor-henchmen, no longer useful to him, were humiliated or banished. Moreover, Demosthenes had

54 Almost a direct quote from *On the Crown* (18.48), except for slight word ordering change, and the fact that either Synesius or the text he read inserted “Philip” (some MSS of Demosthenes (L, vulg.) add Φιλίππου, some Φιλίππῳ (S γρ.); see OCT ad loc.). Hermogenes' quote of the passage (see below) also includes Φιλίππου.

closed the earlier *On the False Embassy* with a reference to the same Lasthenes in a similar spirit. Synesius' quote thus doubly evokes the classic quarrel.

But this Lasthenes line is also quoted by Hermogenes (*On Style* 272), in his treatment of the *idea* (style) of *akmē*, "florescence." Synesius was familiar with Hermogenes' take on the passage: he cites it (without attribution) in his treatise *Dio*, probably composed before *Letter* 95: "Dio excelled (or "effloresced," *ēkmaze*) most of all in his speech *Against the Philosophers*, the very *quality which more recent authors call 'florescence' (akmē)* ... and indeed it is in such a style (*idea*) that he seems to have been most powerful among all his writings."⁵⁵ By imitating Hermogenes' example of *akmē*, Synesius' letter thus aims to exhibit a quality which Hermogenes found particularly characteristic of his own ideal orator, Demosthenes, and which Synesius also admired particularly in his own very different ideal orator, Dio Chrysostom.

Synesius explains what he means by "ruined along with the city" earlier in the letter: the nomadic raids have forced him to leave his own estate, in the vicinity of Cyrene (95.62–70). This "exile" might have been what inspired him to turn to *On the False Embassy* in the first place: as Philostratus recounts (*VS* 488), when Dio Chrysostom went into exile, he took with him only two books: Plato's *Phaedo* and Demosthenes' *On the False Embassy*. Dio's exile was an important paradigm for Synesius.⁵⁶

But being ruined along with one's city is also a dominant theme of *On the Crown*. From one perspective, Demosthenes' policies of opposition to Philip could have been seen as a failure, in retrospect, after the Athenian defeat at Chaeronea (that was Aeschines' argument: Chaeronea was a disaster and it was Demosthenes' fault). But in Demosthenes' view, the battle of Chaeronea was the Athenians' finest hour, when they risked everything for the freedom of Greece, keeping consistent with their most important values. Plutarch recognises this as well, discussing this speech in *How to Praise Oneself Inoffensively* (541E–542B): Demosthenes' self-praise was inseparable from praise of the Athenians. The city lost not because it chose a bad policy, but because of fate, and Demosthenes' speech was a rhetorical success because he repeatedly aligned his own fate (τύχη) with that of Athens.⁵⁷ Synesius' pithy formulation

55 Οὗτός τε ὁ Δίων ἤκμασε μάλιστα ἐν τῷ κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων, ἥντινα καὶ καλοῦσιν ἀκμήν οἱ νεώτεροι. καὶ μέντοι γε εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην ἰδέαν αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ταύτη κράτιστος ἔδοξεν (3.7) (italics mine). The reference to "more recent authors" refers to Hermogenes.

56 Synesius takes issue, in his own *Dio* (§1–3) with Philostratus' portrayal of Dio in the *Lives of the Sophists*. Synesius also alludes to Dio's exile in his own *Letter* 148, where Dio's *Oration* 13 (*On His Exile*) is an important intertext.

57 On fate in *On the Crown*, see Yunis (2001) 13–15; Serafim (2017) chapter 4. Plutarch's discussion of the text reminds us of another appealing aspect of *On the Crown* for late antique

(underlined in the passage above), εὐτυχεῖς ἐν ἀτυχούσιν, ἐγὼ τῇ πόλει συνα-
τυχῶ, employs a very similar strategy. In such a way, rhetoric allowed Synesius
to imagine himself in the role of a hero from the glorious classical past, and
gave him the tools by which he could invite others to share in his imagination
as well.

Given the high degree of polish and the apparent political significance of
the letter, Synesius probably intended it to be shared by his brother Euoptius.
His brother was frequently based in Alexandria (cf. Synesius, *Letter* 5), and
could have used it to consolidate support for their policies there. Power brokers
in Alexandria could have an interest in keeping the military decision-making
apparatus for Cyrenaica based in their own neighbourhood.

Readers or hearers who were not familiar with the Demosthenic intertext
would have no trouble following the basic point of the letter, and could at least
recognise that expressions like “*Iliad* of woes” had a weighty feel. The language
of public policies and democratic institutions affirmed the important role
Greek-speaking provincials played in the government of the Roman Empire
while making them feel rooted in their own great cultural tradition as well.
For the more learned among the audience familiar with the intertext, Synesius
could achieve a powerful and nuanced characterisation with just a few literary
brushstrokes. And by recounting a back-and-forth personal history between
the men with a concise immediacy, and especially with his final apostrophe to
Julius, Synesius staged this epistolary conflict as if it were a tense, face-to-face
confrontation, evoking the emotional immediacy of a live trial.

Classical paradigms were not just useful for elegant decoration and win-
ning characterisation but, as knowledge of the classical past was kept alive by
the rhetorical tradition, so too could people draw on that history to persua-
sive ends in major decision-making processes. Although the emperor Julian
is somewhat eccentric among 4th-century rulers, his letters nonetheless illus-
trate the continued practical relevance, at least in some circles, of myth and
lore. *Letter* 29 (Wright) urges the Roman governor seated at Corinth to free
Argos from its long-standing obligation to pay a tax to Corinth. In making his
case, Julian appeals to Argos’ role as the leading city in the Trojan war, as well as
its proud status as the mythical homeland of the family of Philip II of Macedon
and his son Alexander the Great. In his rhetorical training, Julian would have
been taught to employ such paradigms in speeches like the *encomium* of a city
(Menander Rhetor I.46).

Greeks: it was a well-known model for how a statesmen could inoffensively engage in
self-praise. Gleason (1994) 8–9 illustrates the importance of public ἀγών in sophistic self-
fashioning in the earlier imperial period.

It is worth keeping in mind that the emperor had the option of simply issuing a binding fiat. But like other autocrats Julian recognised that it was often more effective to use a softer touch, the arts of persuasion. The letter gives us a glimpse of what sort of arguments might be heard or produced in the imperial consistory. The consistory was the central decision-making body of the empire, in which the emperor heard arguments and took counsel from his ministers, and from which he theoretically issued his decrees.⁵⁸ Some discussion in it would have revolved not only around which policies were wise, but also how wise policies could be rhetorically packaged, in order to be received well by distant subjects. The sort of arguments which would have won favour or been produced by the court of a Julian might at times have been wildly different from those of a Constantius II, his Homoean Christian predecessor. But to be successful, emperors had to appeal to the many different constituencies among their subjects, and classical rhetoric would continue to be important for generations of provincial notables.

For some Christian writers, the structure of classical rhetorical education provided a framework for using old strategies to integrate new paradigms into areas of public discourse involving the church. Homilies survive from this period, many of them drawing extensively on the classical tradition of epideictic oratory. They sometimes draw on classical paradigms for contrast, often simply by using the familiar structures of *progymnasmata* (comparison, *khreia*, *ekphrasis*, etc.) for biblical themes.⁵⁹

But it was the theological controversies of the 4th century that injected the most life and urgency into Greek rhetoric of this period. The political stakes had never been so high for churchmen: the decision of a single church council, especially one which happened in the presence of or with the approval of the emperor, could make or break a man's career. If a bishop's theological party won, he could gain or consolidate a position of leadership which, even if it were not especially lucrative to him as a private person (though it often was), nevertheless implied control of often large financial resources and civic influence. Losers in these controversies might have few alternative paths to power and respect.

Alongside the many other sources on these matters, letters can give us insight into the rhetorical and political choices made by principal actors in church controversies. In the early 370s Gregory of Nazianzus, a minor provincial bishop at the time, wrote a letter to his friend and theological ally Basil, a

58 Jones (1964) 333–341.

59 See e.g., Young (1997); Banev (2015).

major bishop of the metropolitan see of Caesarea. Gregory wanted his friend's advice on how to respond publicly to questions about their theological position. Basil was a leader of the Nicene party, which had been out of favour with the emperors, more or less since Constantine the Great (with the exception of Julian, who promoted them in order to stir up trouble with their rivals, the leading Homoean or "Arian" bishops). One of Basil and Gregory's controversial doctrines was that not only was Christ fully God (something their opponents rejected), but also the third person of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, was fully God as well.

Gregory, in *Letter* 57, recounts a theological conversation he recently had at "a symposium." By situating the dialogue in this sympotic context, in fine Attic Greek, Gregory suggests that its subject matter was a worthy topic for learned gentlemen to debate. The conversation happened "before the drinking started," recalling the sober scene of Plato's *Symposium*, a text which had already been consciously imitated among earlier Christians.⁶⁰ At the party, the company consisted of their theological allies. But Gregory was approached by a certain monk who thought of himself as a "philosopher," who proceeded to rebuke Gregory and the absent Basil for not clearly proclaiming the divinity of the Spirit publicly, for all to hear.

Gregory responded that he himself was a relatively unknown figure, and was confident enough to "philosophise without danger," i.e., speak his true opinions on doctrinal matters in public, even though "I do not know what I say nor scarcely that I am even speaking." In saying this, Gregory alludes to Matthew 10:19–20, where Jesus sends the apostles out to proclaim his message, telling them that when they are put on trial, the Holy Spirit will do the speaking for them.⁶¹ Gregory thus implies that he speaks under the inspiration of the very force whose divinity is at issue, using his classical rhetorical training to evoke a strong paradigm through a subtle but important intertextual reference.

Basil on the other hand, he explains, is a public figure, with many enemies looking to twist his words so they can pry him out of office if he misspeaks. Without Basil's leadership, their cause could fall apart, and their enemies could take permanent root in the church. It is better, then, to wait and yield to the power of the heretics as they pass over "like a cloud" (ὥσπερ νέφει) which will soon be gone. The metaphor is well chosen, for it evokes a famous

60 Laval Norman (2019) on Methodius of Olympus.

61 "But when they deliver you up, take no thought how or what ye shall speak: for it shall be given you in that same hour what ye shall speak. For it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you."

passage of Demosthenes' *On the Crown* (18.188) in which the phrase appears. In *On the Crown*, the phrase refers to how Athens was saved from danger by an alliance with its former enemy Thebes. The phrase itself (ὥσπερ νέφος in the original) is treated at length by the earlier imperial critical treatise *On the Sublime* (39.4), where the author, Longinus, argues for the rhythmic perfection of Demosthenes' diction. In Gregory's letter, it lends the weightiness of public oratory to the style, but also the intertextual resonances hint at a great crisis facing the state. Gregory was probably familiar with Longinus' treatise; Basil's brother Gregory of Nyssa was.⁶² Books of Demosthenes were among the several texts present in Gregory's library.⁶³

7 Conclusion

After Julian's death Christian sophists went back to teaching rhetoric (many of them had surely never stopped). The writings of Procopius and Choricus of Gaza in the later 5th and early 6th centuries attest to a vibrant Christian sophistic culture there.⁶⁴ The 4th century was indeed a period of epochal change for Greek rhetoric. On the one hand, the monopoly of classicism over high-level discourse and education was forever broken, as Christianity began to subordinate classical rhetoric to a different set of needs and patterns of political control. Yet the achievements of many classicising Christian authors nonetheless ensured that through the later centuries of the Christian Roman Empire, classical rhetoric and learning would continue to be relevant and, indeed, rewarding. Studying the reception of rhetoric in some of its most brilliant 4th-century representatives nonetheless gives us a sense that, from their perspective, the future still seemed very much up for grabs. But the later success of rhetoric as a system of ideas and practices was only possible because it was built on the foundation of the individual successes it had produced for the enterprising souls who used it to achieve their own ends. In short, rhetoric went on because it still worked.

62 Heath (1999) 395–400.

63 Van Dam (1995) 135.

64 Amato, Corcella, and Lauritzen (2017).

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The Reception and Transformation of Rhetoric in Germany during the Eighteenth Century

Dietmar Till

1 The Double Marginalisation of Rhetoric

The history of rhetoric is often told as a simplistic narrative based on notions of rise, consolidation, and decline. After a “classical period” in Athenian democracy and the Roman Republic, rhetoric already begins to deteriorate in the imperial era. A phase of “medieval fragmentation”¹ then results, followed by a “Renaissance reintegration.”² The rediscovery of numerous ancient rhetorical treatises and other writings (such as Cicero’s letters) characterises the latter. The *early modern* period – i.e., the centuries that witnessed the development of the printing press, the Reformation, and the discovery of the Americas around 1500 up to the founding of the United States and the French Revolution at the end of the 18th century – are thereby viewed as a “macro-epoch,”³ one in which rhetoric exerted a shaping influence on a variety of cultural phenomena by virtue of its central position in the education system. Alongside poetry, two domains also emphatically affected by rhetoric were painting and music. The early modern apogee of rhetoric thereby comes into view as a monolithic cultural formation, one that stood completely under the influence of the classical tradition. Such a perspective, however, obscures a clear view of the crucial epistemic fractures with which the theory of rhetoric found itself confronted from the beginning of Renaissance humanism up to the end of the early modern period. This is the case not least because the early modern “Gutenberg Galaxy” (McLuhan) remains clearly distinct from antiquity and its oral culture. But orality did indeed play an important role in early modernity – and up into the 18th century – as a goal that oriented rhetorical training.

At the same time, however, textual production was based on cultural technologies of excerpting, collecting, and systematising already formed knowledge, all of which would not have been thinkable in the early modern period

1 Vickers (1988) 214.

2 Vickers (1988) 254.

3 Jaumann (1997).

without the printing press (though here, too, one can find ancient precursors). In this sense, early modern rhetoric is a rhetoric for textuality founded on textuality.⁴ This explains the central position occupied by topics as a means of world-disclosure via textual reading and collecting written material.⁵ Against this background, the popularity of a work such as Erasmus of Rotterdam's *De Duplici Copia Verborum ac Rerum* (1512; almost 170 editions appeared in the 16th century) becomes understandable.⁶ The central concept of *copia* designates here an abundance of possibilities for rhetorical formulation that should be readily available to the good orator. In his work, Erasmus discusses the individual rhetorical techniques and procedures by which this abundance may be achieved. *Copia* thus constitutes a key rhetorical concept of the early modern period.⁷ It was not so much rhetorical techniques of argumentation such as *enthymemes* (Aristotle) that were of central importance for contemporary rhetoricians, but rather the textual procedure by which one achieved such verbal as well as content-related abundance.

Such a form of rhetoric did indeed make use of the concept of "persuasion" in order to denote a speech's pragmatic goal, but persuasion in the more strict sense of influencing a change of opinions or beliefs was, in fact, not so much at issue.⁸ Rather, a more broadly conceived form of rhetoric, understood persuasion in terms of affirmation of already existing values and beliefs.⁹ The central rhetorical genre in the early modern period was epideictic speech, defined by its praise of an object deemed laudable. Political and juridical speeches, on the other hand, are in practice genres of subordinate significance. They did not play a central role in public life due to the character of social institutions like e.g., courts and their formal procedures. In the case of panegyric, a public audience needs not be convinced, for the object of speech is not doubtful (*dubium*), but indisputable (*certum*). The most important textual procedure for early modern rhetoric is, therefore, *amplificatio*, i.e., the variation, ornamentation, and emotional intensification of a given object of speech.

Accompanying these developments in the early modern period are two great fractures within the theory of rhetoric. Already in the 15th century (going

4 Schanze (1983).

5 Schmidt-Biggemann (1983).

6 Mack (2011) 76–103.

7 Sloane (1997) 56–79.

8 On the concept of persuasion as change of belief and opinion, Knappe (2000) 34.

9 Pernot (2015) 87–91. It is worth remembering that Kenneth Burke in *Rhetoric of Motives* started his famous discussion of *identification* with an analysis of epideictic rhetoric. Cf. Burke (1969) 70–71. Rhetoric seen as an inherent function of language "aims at promoting social cohesion" (43), which is a classical function of epideictic speech.

back to the practice of teaching *artes liberales* in late antiquity), a division of disciplinary responsibilities between dialectic and rhetoric comes about. The latter includes responsibilities for *amplificatio* (more generally for questions of style or *elocutio*), while dialectic is ascribed the task of proof (and thereby *inventio*). Authors central to this development are Rudolph Agricola and Petrus Ramus. These authors prepared the way for an epistemological break that took place in the middle of the 17th century. The *Logic* of Port-Royal by Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole (first published anonymously in 1662) vehemently rejects topics as an acceptable method of knowledge production. New epistemic standards hostile to rhetoric are also to be found in the sceptical epistemology of René Descartes. Topics, as a rhetorical form for fashioning an argument, are criticised and marginalised for the sake of philosophical and empirical, natural-scientific procedures of knowledge. Around 1700, logic and epistemology gain influence on theories articulated in rhetoric textbooks. Rhetoric is repressed in favour of logic; above all, the concept of a rhetorical deduction founded on probable premises comes to be rejected as no longer epistemologically adequate.

A second break can be identified in the realm of the theory of style (*elocutio*) and thus in the realm that since Agricola was seen as the genuine core of rhetoric. In his work *De l'art de parler* (1678), the French monk Bernard Lamy developed a theory of style based on Cartesian principles.¹⁰ For Lamy, style immediately represents the orator's inner emotional disposition. Figures are conceived as natural effects emanating from affective states, not as the result of calculated rhetorical operations. In his final analysis, Lamy thus criticises the foundational principle of classical rhetoric, namely that it is a teachable and learnable art, thus attacking the very concept of rhetoric as an *ars* or *technē*. Rhetorical education is now no longer necessary for the production of a rhetoricised text, given that the production of figures and tropes is a natural capacity of man. Affect and expression collapse together so as to coincide in this representational model.¹¹ Lamy's work was a considerable success on the European book market; his theories exerted a sustained influence in German-speaking lands up to the 1730s.¹²

In conclusion, then, early modern rhetoric is restricted: dialectic takes from rhetoric responsibility for *inventio* and argumentation. The theory of style (*elocutio*) is left to the domain of rhetoric and therewith the connected textual procedures of *copia* and *amplificatio*. In Lamy's work, an *anthropologisation* of

10 Behrens (1982).

11 Campe (1990).

12 A German translation was published in 1753 but apparently had only little influence.

rhetoric initiated by Cartesianism becomes manifest. Within this framework, style becomes a matter of natural disposition that eludes rhetorical systematisation and operationalisation. Before rhetoric *qua* school subject enters a disciplinary crisis in the 18th century, its epistemic status has thus already become critical. In sum, if one takes a comprehensive view of the alleged high phase of rhetoric in the 16th and 17th centuries, then one can make out a *double marginalisation*: on the one hand, in the realm of *inventio*, which is expropriated from rhetoric; on the other, in the realm of the theory of rhetorical art (*ars rhetorica*), which is rendered superfluous. Already *before* the 18th century, in which rhetoric's continued existence as a discipline in the education system for the most part ceased rhetoric already appeared by far much less stable than scholarship has continued to emphasise.

2 Classical Rhetoric and the Historicisation of Tradition

Enlightenment rhetorical theory obviously takes shape in an early modern tradition. The dissolution of rhetoric since the end of the 17th century and above all in the 18th century leads to a distancing from and questioning of ancient rhetoric's validity and, finally, to the abolition of "rhetoric" *qua* school discipline at grammar schools and universities in German-speaking lands. This process should not be described as one of decline, but rather as one of transformation.¹³ Significant progress in editorial philology accompanied the rise of book printing and the possibility of serially manufacturing identical copies of ancient texts. The quantity of rhetorical writings accessible on the book market thereby changed decisively the quality of textual editions. In Renaissance humanism, a series of ancient textbooks on rhetoric are either rediscovered or printed for the first time (e.g., Cicero *De oratore*, Quintilian *Institutio oratoria*, and Pseudo-Longinus *Peri Hypsous*; the Greek rhetorical tradition from the eastern part of the Roman Empire is also present). Others are, however, re-evaluated (e.g., Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, read as a treatise on ethics in the Middle Ages).

Other important factors are the comprehensive commentaries and – predominant since the 18th century – translations into German: e.g., of Pseudo-Longinus' *Peri Hypsous* (1737; translator: Carl Heinrich von Heineken); Cicero's *De oratore* (1762; translator: Johann Michael Heinze); Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria* (1775; translator: Heinrich Philipp Conrad Henkel; a heavily shortened translation of individual chapters). The standard textbooks of school

13 Cf. the model developed in Till (2004).

instruction, Cicero's *De inventione* and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, are first translated into German in the 19th century as part of the collection *Roman Prose Artists in New Translation* (*De inventione*: 1837; translators: Georg Heinrich Moser and Friedrich Heinrich Kern; *Rhetorica ad Herennium*: 1842; translator: Christian Walz). Translations were necessary, for Latin in the 18th century "was to forever lose its role as a pan-European means of communication."¹⁴ The project of a "German rhetoric," subscribed to since the 1730s, on the other hand, was bestowed no institutionally sustainable success in the long term.¹⁵

In comparison with its European neighbours, such translation activities in German-speaking lands take place relatively late. In exchange, the transition from Latin to a native tongue in German-speaking lands takes more radical shape than in other European countries: "Around 1700, Germany was the most Latinate of all central European countries; around 1850, the remnants of active Latin-use were smaller than in France, England, or Italy."¹⁶ Nevertheless, a number of Latin rhetorics emerge within the framework of so-called Neo-Humanism in the second half of the century. Above all, the widely circulated school rhetoric of the Leipzig professor of rhetoric Johann August Ernesti (*Initia Rhetorica*, 1750; many editions) – an influential proponent of so-called Neo-Humanism in Germany – deserves comment here. It led to a revived interest in Latinate rhetoric in the second half of the century and served for many years as the official textbook in the grammar schools of Saxony. Ernesti's nephew, Johann Christian Gottlieb Ernesti, published two volumes of a lexicon of Latin and Greek rhetorical terminology in 1795 and 1797 (*Lexicon Technologia Graecorum Rhetoricae*, 1795; *Lexicon Technologiae Latinorum Rhetoricae*, 1797). The philological-historical reappraisal of the rhetorical tradition – intensively carried out in the 19th century – vis-à-vis extensive editorial endeavours, commentaries, and translations into German had begun. In the epoch of historicism, comprehensive handbooks and histories of rhetoric were also composed, among them Richard Volkmann's *The Rhetoric of the Greeks and Romans in Systematic Overview* (1872, 2nd edition 1885) and Friedrich Blass' monumental presentation *Attic Eloquence* (*Die attische Beredsamkeit*, 4 vols. 1868–1880). These developments do not coincide, however, with a contemporary interest oriented around the actual production of texts: the inheritance of rhetoric comes to be understood as a historical one.

This historical orientation first changes with the rhetoric lectures held by Friedrich Nietzsche in the winter semester of 1872/73 at the University of

14 Fuhrmann (1999) 51.

15 Weimar (2003) 41–54.

16 Leonhardt (2011) 245.

Basel. The famous phrase “Language is rhetoric” can be found therein.¹⁷ With recourse to Gustav Gerber’s romantic philosophy of language (*Language as Art*, vol. 1, 1871), Nietzsche succeeds in developing a new and productive approach that has far-reaching epistemological consequences.¹⁸ Beyond language conceived as always already tropic and figural, there is, furthermore, no genuine knowing [*Erkenntnis*], for language and all forms of communication are always rhetorical. Nietzsche significantly expands this perspective in his essay *On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense*. This specific kind of transformation undergone by rhetoric was intensively received by 1970s poststructuralism and deconstructivism (e.g., Paul de Man) and it decisively departs from a classical conception of rhetoric as *technē*.¹⁹ One can thus say that the replacement of rhetoric with rhetoricity begins with Nietzsche and his view that there is no “pure” language beyond rhetoric, no world beyond language and thus no truth beyond rhetoric.²⁰

3 The Place of Rhetoric in the Educational System

In the context of higher education, rhetoric in the early modern period was a foundational discipline, and it remained one (with modifications) almost everywhere until the middle of the 18th century. According to Manfred Fuhrmann’s influential thesis, rhetoric enters a state of crisis with the repression of Latin, a crisis that manifests itself in the marginalisation of rhetoric within the educational system and, finally, with its abolition as a school subject altogether.²¹

Philipp Melanchthon and Johannes Sturm set the foundations for the development of the humanistic secondary school *qua* specifically Protestant academic institution in the 16th century. The formula *sapiens atque eloquens pietas* (a combination of piety, wisdom, and eloquence) will evince itself as powerfully influential. The central textbooks originate from Philipp Melanchthon (*Elementorum Rhetorices Libri Duo*, 1531) and the Dutchman Gerhard Johannes Vossius (*Rhetorice Contracta*, first edition 1621). Still in 1736, the Leipzig rhetoric professor Johann Christoph Gottsched praised Melanchthon’s educational efforts, above all his rhetoric: it contained the “soundest rules of true

17 Nietzsche (1995); cf. Nietzsche (1988).

18 Cf. Most and Fries (1994).

19 De Man (1974).

20 Bender and Wellbery (1990).

21 Fuhrmann (1983).

eloquence.”²² Vossius’ very important textbook, of which more than 21 editions appeared in the 17th century,²³ was still printed in the 18th century and individually printed even in the 19th. This shows how early modern textbooks still, after much time, possessed some sort of contemporaneity and were used for instructional purposes. An important educational goal of the Protestant secondary school was the practice of Latin (*Latinität*), which remained the instructional language in universities from the 16th century until far into the 18th century. It was also the conventional means of communication within the erudite Republic of Letters. Rhetorical instruction consisted in the triad of theory (*praecepta/doctrina*), the reading of exemplary texts by canonical authors (*exempla*), and students’ textual production conducted in imitation of the classics (*imitatio*). Ancient literature functioned as a source of normative authority, whereby the canon shifted in the course of the 17th century from “Golden” to “Silver Age” Latin.²⁴ Oral presentations (speech act) formed the conclusion of these kinds of exercises as well as school theatre performances, which facilitated practicing speech and body language in the representative public space of the city or school.²⁵ This tradition of oral performance came to be criticised in the course of the 18th century. At the same time, there are considerable regional differences: In Prussia, plays in school theatres were forbidden already in 1718. In the case of speech *actus*, at least in Brandenburg-Prussia during the first half of the 18th century, a quite rapid transition to German can be observed. Nevertheless, valediction speeches are still held in Latin into the 1780s in representative contexts within schools and universities (e.g., by Klopstock in 1745 and Fichte in 1780 at the secondary school of Pforta in Saxony). This practice continues into the 19th century, though it is more or less exclusively professors of classical philology who compose and hold such speeches, not the students from the rhetoric class. The speeches have a predominantly ceremonial character and are no longer part of the pupils’ training, as the speech *actus* was. Accordingly, professorships of rhetoric from the middle of the century onwards are progressively abolished (another phenomenon characterised by considerable territorial variation). At the University of Tübingen in the Duchy of Württemberg, for example, professorships in rhetoric were replaced with those in philosophy as part of a fundamental university reform in 1752.²⁶

22 Gottsched (1736) 22.

23 The number of editions is based on the figures provided by Knape (1992) 1287.

24 Barner (1970) 59–67.

25 Barner (1970) 281–321; cf. Nagel (2016).

26 Cf. Thümmel (1975) and Homa (2016).

Scholarship has repeatedly noted that the introduction of a written test for university entrance in Prussia in 1788 marks a kind of end for this rhetorical tradition. Since then, pupils' qualification in higher education no longer centres on the oral capacity for speechmaking in the context of an academic public, but rather the capacity for composing a written text within a limited amount of time.²⁷ The essay in German school instruction, then, inherits rhetoric from the 18th century onwards; many of the rules for the composition of an essay are adapted from the rhetorical tradition. Overall, these educational-historical processes vary widely from territory to territory and have been insufficiently researched.

The Jesuit educational principles as laid down in the *Ratio Studiorum* of 1599 are structurally similar to Protestant rhetorical instruction.²⁸ Orders such as the Benedictines generally followed this *Ratio*. In contrast to its Protestant counterpart, rhetorical training in Jesuit secondary schools within "lower studies" (*studia inferiora*) aimed at equipping students with the rhetorical tools for victory in the religious confrontations of the Counter-Reformation.²⁹ The most important rhetorical textbook is *De Arte Rhetorica* by the Portuguese Jesuit Cypriano de Soarez, which first appeared around 1560 and was widely distributed in Europe in countless editions in the 18th century. The Jesuit educational system proves itself more resistant to innovation than the Protestant secondary school. The transition to instruction in a vernacular, native tongue was not yet implemented, which makes the Jesuit secondary system appear evermore like an anachronism during the 18th century.³⁰ Since the beginning of the 18th century, the Jesuit order had recognised this problem. Theoreticians such as Franz Neumeyr (*Idea Rhetoricae*, 1748), for example, distanced themselves from the humanistic ideal of Ciceronian Latin, because its mastery in the middle of the century could no longer be assumed.³¹ Jesuit structures of education prevalent in Catholic territories at the same time, however, influenced the dissolution of the order in 1772 through the 19th century. New orientations that led to a departure from the Asiatic-manneristic style of the Late Baroque are to be found in the French discussion of homiletics, e.g., in the influential work of Balthasar Gibert (*Le bon gout de l'Éloquence Chrétienne*, 1702, reworked as *L'Éloquence Chrétienne*, 1715, translated into German in 1740 and 1759).³²

27 Bosse (1978), cf. Bosse (2012).

28 Barner (1970) 330–339; Jesuit rhetorical theory is covered in the seminal book by Bauer (1986).

29 Barner (1970) 327.

30 Fuhrmann (2001) 151.

31 Eybl (1998) 720.

32 Cf. Gibert (2004).

This kind of sermon, “purified” of the so-called bombast or hyperbolic style of the Late Baroque, found a positive reception even in the social circle that surrounded the Protestant Gottsched in Leipzig.³³

4 Classical Genres of Speech and the *Praxis* of Speech

In the early modern period, the humanistic theory of rhetoric constituted itself as a phenomenon of the classical tradition. That reception consequentially enters a state of crisis precisely when the communicative occasions codified in ancient theoretical texts, as well as the models and norms of rhetorical communication, are no longer applicable within present social, legal, and political institutions. The political world imagined by ancient rhetoric drastically differs from the communicative world of the early modern period. Wilfried Barner speaks of a “synopsis of the national constitution and eloquence” for the 17th century.³⁴ The tradition of ancient rhetoric, as it was found, for example, in the works of Cicero, stands in latent contradiction to the communicative realities of absolutism, which knew neither agora nor forum. It was first in the 18th century that this tension definitively tipped toward a rejection of ancient rhetoric that quickly became hostile. In his *Instructions for an Improved German Oratory* of 1725, Friedrich Andreas Hallbauer writes: “Aristotle and Cicero would not laugh at us, but hiss that we still lick at their spittle. They acted reasonably in giving us rules that led to a form of eloquence that was common in their republics: but we, on the other hand, act all the more unreasonably if we hold on to their rules, although our republic calls for a completely different kind of eloquence.”³⁵

This is the situation decisively influenced by the transformation of rhetoric during the transition from the Roman Republic to the Principate as well as the related functional transformation of rhetoric. During this changeover of political system, two of the three rhetorical genres (*genera causarum*) lost their social function, namely the political-deliberative speech of decision (*genus deliberativum*) and juridical speech (*genus iudiciale*). Gottsched’s 1736 *Comprehensive Art of Speech* (*Ausführliche Redekunst*) claims that an “entirely altered form of regiment” led to the fact “that in Germany, one no longer makes much use of both latter kinds.”³⁶ Philipp Melanchthon’s invention of a fourth

33 Eybl (1998) 723.

34 Barner (1970) 163.

35 Hallbauer (1725) fol. [a7]^r.

36 Gottsched (1736) 67.

rhetorical genre, the *genus didacticon* or *didascalicum* in his *Elementorum Rhetorices Libri Duo* (1531) had only limited influence.

Early Enlightenment rhetorics (e.g., those of Johann Andreas Fabricius, 1724, and Friedrich Andreas Hallbauer, 1725) marginalise juridical speech, which was the central genre for ancient rhetoric, or they do not treat it at all. Juridical speech and political speech of consultation were indeed still practised in educational contexts as part of declamation via historical and fictional examples, but barely played a role in the politico-juridical realities of the time. Both genres were further cultivated in the early modern period in the context of school *actus* and so-called *concertationes*, i.e., oral speech competitions of students. These rhetorical exercises stand in the tradition of ancient declamation that continues into the 19th century: Georg Büchner's speech in defence of Cato, held in his Darmstadt secondary school in autumn of 1831, is an example of this practice. Panegyric and ceremonial speech (*genus demonstrativum*) became the central genre, aiming at entertainment (*delectare*; Quint. *Inst. or.* 3.4.6) rather than the more narrowly conceived end of changing the addressee's attitude. This genre was cultivated, for example, in the form of praise for a ruler (*panegyricus*) or funeral orations (*oratio funebris*).

Poetry as well could be comprehended within the genre of speech of praise, for poetry was understood as "bound speech" (*oratio ligata*) in contrast to prose or "unbound speech" (*oratio soluta*). Poetry was hence seen as part of eloquence; poetics was taken as a special kind of rhetoric. Starting in the 1730s, this understanding changes insofar as prosody and stanzaic construction lost their significance as defining criteria of literariness.³⁷ In his *Meditationes Philosophicae de Nonnullis ad Poema Pertinentibus* (1735; in Baumgarten [1983]), Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten defines the poem no longer as bound, but rather as "perfect sensuous speech" (*oratio sensitiva perfecta*).³⁸ Immediately connected to such sensuous speech were concepts such as vividness (*evidentia*), the aliveness of poetic speech as well as emotionality. The last criterion then enters centre stage against the background of an emergent conception of "lyric" as a literary genre around 1800.

While the classical triad of genres articulated in textbooks during the early modern period was handed down as canonical, many theoreticians formulated objections that highlighted the deficient suitability of the rhetorical doctrine of genres for practical use. Beyond the rhetoric cultivated in secondary schools and universities, a "second rhetoric" completely oriented around oratory praxis developed. For communicative occasions occurring in "political life" (above all

37 Cf. Asmuth (1996) 626.

38 Cf. Asmuth (1996) 626.

in the context of court culture), the ancient tradition as transmitted in higher education had no serviceable transcripts at hand, for only rarely could long, polished speeches be held at court. Competence in improvisational speech, conducted via the short compliment barely articulated beforehand, was far more decisive for the orator's success.³⁹ Communicative competence in dialogical settings depends on various factors: situational pertinence, promptness of reaction, and last but not least wit and *esprit* – in German, but also in foreign languages such as French, but only rarely in erudite Latin.⁴⁰ Less at issue is the ostentation of erudition, which is increasingly felt to be unworldly and pedantic. Compliment books provided instruction for dealing with various communicative occasions at court, works of societal ethics and a literature of courtesy that drew on models of social entertainment formulated in Renaissance humanism (Baldassare Castiglione, Stefano Guazzo, etc.). From the 16th century, special institutions for the education of the aristocracy emerged in the form of “knight academies,” which partly stood in competition with more traditional grammar schools. These knight academies taught courtly forms of behaviour such as dance, fencing, or riding, but also modern foreign languages such as French. Rhetorical education was more intensively concerned with contemporaneity; students did not practise vis-à-vis subject matter drawn solely from ancient history, but also contemporary history.

The great number of books on complimenting and greeting emergent in the 17th and 18th centuries constituted a communicative model of rhetoric that deviated from that of classical rhetoric. Following Georg Braungart, one may call this alternative model one of *praxis* (centred on the production of speech in the performative consummation of speaking) in contrast to the pedagogic-rhetorical model of *poiēsis* (centred on the text of a speech in anticipation of a situation, temporally preceding the actual rhetorical performance).⁴¹ Within a society based on the idea of strict hierarchical classes, the central parameter in all speeches is the consideration of their appropriateness (*aptum*) with regard to social order, above all with a view to those hierarchically elevated, but also to equals or lower-stationed communicative partners. At issue are also questions of appropriate address (title) and style. Even here, around the end of the 17th century, these short forms of courtly speech begin to be integrated into secondary rhetorical instruction. The central reformer within late 17th-century pedagogy was the Zittau grammar school rector Christian Weise.

39 Till (1998).

40 Latin oratorical culture of “late humanism” around 1600 is covered in Kühlmann (1982) and Graupe (2012).

41 Braungart (1988) 59–60.

His attempt to grant the compliment a threefold structure (*antecedens – connexio – consequens*) oriented around the *Progymnasmata* textbook of Aphthonius (4th/5th century CE) was quite successful in the centuries around 1700 (and was much criticised in the generation following Weise, above all due to its template-like quality).⁴² A fundamental critique of the compliment was ignited in the first half of the 18th century, one representative of a general critique of rhetoric as such, which was accused of “contentless” formalism and “pedantry.” Authors criticised two aspects of the compliment: its status as a form of flattery (*insinuatio*) was deemed insincere and therefore ethically reprehensible. Religious-confessional and court-critical arguments played a role here, above all in light of a discourse of naturalness that emerged in the 1720s and 1730s. This discourse, as reflected, for example, in the epistolary doctrine of Christian Fürchtegott Gellert (*On Good Taste in Letters*, 1751), programmatically departed from the official stylistic ideals of the 16th and 17th centuries. In this context, central genres of Baroque occasional poetry such as the mourning poem (*epicedium*) were also abandoned, for the emotions articulated therein were insincere and not an authentic expression of “inner life.”⁴³ This is not the last socio-historical expression of a long-term societal reorganisation from a stratificational to a functional differentiation (earlier designated “bourgeoisification”).⁴⁴ As the core of courtly rhetoric, *aptum* based on social station enters a moment of crisis, as in, for example, Christian Thomasius’ *Short Sketch on Political Wisdom* (1720). Compliment books that formulated a specific behavioural ethic in communicative concourse with persons of equal or lower station were also published from the 1720s.⁴⁵ The endpoint of this development was reached with Adolph Knigges’ *On Dealing with People* (1788), which propagated a self-consciously bourgeois “societal eloquence” in contrast to the court.⁴⁶

The tradition of erudite speech also lived on into the 18th century, for which Gottsched in his *Academic Art of Speaking* (1759) created a special rhetorical textbook. In the realm of political speech, the comprehensive collections of speeches assembled by Johann Christian Lünig are published at the beginning of the 18th century: *Speeches Held by Distinguished Gentlemen, First Part* (1705) and the six-volume *Speeches Held by Great Gentlemen, Distinguished Ministers, and other Prominent Men* (1707–1722). This collection grants insight into the

42 Till (1998) 1215–1216.

43 Siegrist (1978).

44 Luhmann (1980) 7.

45 Till (1998) 1228–1229.

46 Cf. Ueding and Steinbrink (2011) 119–121.

praxis of speech during the German territorial absolutism of the 17th and beginning of the 18th centuries, which is intertwined with a procedure prescribed by courtly ceremonial formality.⁴⁷

That there was no place to be found within the ruling absolutist understanding of the state for public-political eloquence of the kind prevalent in ancient democracies first becomes an urgent problem for propagators of the late Enlightenment. An increasingly radical political critique can be observed within the context of an emerging “bourgeois public sphere” (Habermas). Relevant authors are, for example, Johann Gottfried Herder and Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart, who in his 1777 *Lectures on Belles Lettres* aggressively criticises the lack of public-political eloquence in his own time. At the same time, however, various substitutes can be made out: in journalism (Schubart’s *German Chronicle*, 1774/75), in theatre, literature and the pulpit (political sermon). It is first the influence of the French Revolution that led to the (temporally and spatially delimited) establishment of a political culture of oratory: a republic is founded in Mainz in 1792, and the Mainz Club of Jacobins (with Georg Forster as its most important representative) is essentially the first forum of a public-democratic culture of speech outside of the ancient world,⁴⁸ one that would remain without a successor for a long time.

5 The Complex Relationship of Rhetoric and Logic/Dialectic

Already in late antiquity (Boethius) and in the Middle Ages, rhetoric entered a relation of competition and tension vis-à-vis logic/ dialectic, its sister discipline in consortium with the *septem artes liberales*. Immediately with the formation of Renaissance humanism, dialectics such as the already mentioned work *De Inventione Dialectica* by Rudolph Agricola emerged as well as Melanchthon’s influential textbook of rhetoric and dialectic and the works of Petrus Ramus.⁴⁹ In varying manner, these theories called into question the validity of a rhetorical model focused on textual production (*officia oratoris*). Dialectic increasingly deprives rhetoric of the responsibility for finding arguments (*inventio*). Most radically, Petrus Ramus reclaims dialectic’s responsibility for *inventio and dispositio*; there remain for rhetoric but the doctrine of formulation (*elocutio*) and execution (*actio/pronuntiatio*). Examples of such Ramistic rhetoric textbooks are Omer Talon’s *Rhetorica* from 1548 or Johann Matthäus Meyfart’s

47 Braungart (1988).

48 Riedl (1997) 159–171.

49 Cf. Mack (2011).

German Rhetoric (*Teutsche Rhetorica*) from 1634, one of the first rhetorical textbooks in the vernacular.

The critique of rhetoric that René Descartes puts forward in his *Discours de la méthode* from 1637 also stands in this tradition of rhetoric's "reconsolidation"⁵⁰ into a doctrine of style. In the context of rationalistic philosophy, rhetoric is represented as virtually superfluous, for he who "has the sharpest understanding and [can] best publically speak his thoughts in order to render them clear and understandable" can "best convince people of that which he puts forward."⁵¹ The suspension of rhetoric under the influence of the representational ideal of *clare et distincte* itself guaranteed rhetorical success for the philosopher. In his *Critique of Judgment* (1790), Kant also argues along these lines, which make recourse to motifs from the Platonic critique of rhetoric: "Someone who sees the fertile imagination proficient in exhibiting his ideas and a heart vividly involved in the true good, is the *vir bonus dicendi peritus* [the excellent man and expert speaker], the orator who speaks without great art."⁵²

Already in early Enlightenment German philosophy, an influential opposition of *persuading* and *convincing* (in Latin: *persuasio* vs. *convictio*; in German: *Überreden* vs. *Überzeugen*) can be found. With "convincing" (*Überzeugung*) (comprehended under the concept of "transport" [*Überführung*]), the Halle philosopher Christian Wolff, for example, understood a rationalistic procedure for the communication of philosophical findings, one founded on the basic principles of logic and on the model of a "demonstrative performance of evidence." "Persuasion" (*Überredung*), on the other hand, was deemed an inferior procedure that operated with emotions, in the end deceiving man with the semblance of true knowledge.⁵³ The Platonic accusation in the *Gorgias* that rhetoric is but an art of mere illusion again comes into prevalence. At the same time, however, influence on man's will (ethics) only works by arousing emotions through the deliberate use of rhetorical devices. To this end, correspondingly effective textual procedures must be drawn from the arsenal of rhetoric and poetics, designated by contemporaries with concepts such as "intuitive knowing," "vital cognition," "sensuousness," or "aliveness." Within this rationalistic conception of rhetoric, rhetoric comes to occupy, on the one hand, a merely auxiliary role, as in, for example, Gottsched's *Critical Art of Poetry* (1736). On the other hand, however, no path toward the moral

50 Genette (1983).

51 Descartes (1960) 13, cf. IJsseling (1976) 60–70.

52 Kant (1983) B217.

53 Petrus (1994), Till (2012) 97–111.

improvement of man fails to lead one to rhetoric.⁵⁴ The Aristotelian conception of rhetoric had granted a central role to the category of probability in light of politico-social questions that could not be decided unambiguously. Over against this Aristotelian model, Wolff and his students emphasise that rhetoric is only necessitated when the orator “meets listeners of middling intelligence” (Gottsched 1736, 40). Truth is always thereby assumed; cognition (*Erkenntnis*) always precedes the effective communication of cognition. Gottsched thus heavily criticises the genre of juridical speech, because it operates with the means of proof based on probability.

Tied to the dichotomization and hierarchization of “convincing” (*Überzeugung*) and “persuading” (*Überredung*) is the radical devaluation of rhetorical topics (*Topik*) *qua* method for finding a suitable argument. Hallbauer ranks topics unmistakably as the “false sources” of invention.⁵⁵ For Gottsched, it is an art of rendering “everything probable,”⁵⁶ including the blatantly false and hence ethically objectionable. According to Hallbauer, however, topics prevents “free meditation,” i.e., independent thinking. The epistemological foundation of *inventio* thereby undergoes a significant change. No longer is recourse to a “societal imagination” (as Lothar Bornscheuer characterises rhetorical topics) at issue,⁵⁷ i.e., that which in a society counts as a socially accepted means of verbal influence. At issue, rather, is an argument’s logical power to convince another (*Überzeugungskraft*), which is valid even beyond its social situatedness. It is precisely an orator’s individuality that guarantees, then, the intersubjective validity of an argument. For Hallbauer, this form of argumentative invention has the advantage that the orator in this manner “writes naturally.” If one connects oneself to *topoi*, then one is “affected and compelled.”⁵⁸ Through naturalness and “informality” (*qua* counter-concept to *affectatio*), the early Enlighteners programmatically differentiated themselves from the stylistic ideals of late 17th-century mannerism.⁵⁹

The epistemological basis of this critique of topics is founded on a radical critique of prejudice, one that leads in the early Enlightenment to a questioning of the ancient tradition’s validity. As Gottsched puts it in his *Comprehensive Art of Speaking*, the theory of “the ancients should hence grant our rules no validation.” The ancient authors can only act as exemplary models because “they have configured their rules and exempla according to this prescription,”

54 Till (2014).

55 Hallbauer (1725) 270.

56 Gottsched (1736) 39.

57 Bornscheuer (1976).

58 Hallbauer (1725) 273.

59 Cf. Blackall (1966) 115–116; Polenz (1994) 309–310.

namely the founding of rhetoric on principles of philosophy.⁶⁰ The “classicism” that scholarship lately ascribes to Gottsched thus does not result from a programmatic attitude towards tradition.⁶¹

Beginning in the 1730s, one demand is continually posed, namely the call for a distancing from the ancient tradition and for a new foundation of rhetoric on the basis of principles drawn from rationality. Both developments lead to an altered representational form for rhetoric according to the procedures of demonstrative proof. The Swiss Johann Jakob Bodmer and Johann Jakob Breitinger announce in their text *On the Influence and Use of the Imagination* (1727) that “all parts of eloquence” are to be carried out “with mathematical certainty.”⁶² To that end, however, rhetoric is no longer needed. Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten will found the discipline that from the mid-1720s will instead be responsible for achieving this. That discipline goes by the name of aesthetics.

6 The Rise of Sentimentalism: On the Relation of Rhetoric to Aesthetics

In his *Meditationes Philosophicae de Nonnullis ad Poema Pertinentibus* (1735), Baumgarten defines the poem from an epistemological perspective as “perfect sensuous speech.” Poetry and oratory are thereby no longer distinguished from each other via discrete textual features (such as the presence of meter and versification), but, rather, via gradations of “sensuousness” (in contrast to the “explicit clarity” of rational cognition). Furthermore, poetry is no longer defined from the standpoint of speech, but through the criterion of sensuousness *qua* absolute ideal. This points to a paradigm shift from rhetoric to aesthetics, which is central for theories of art, of the “beautiful sciences,” and of “beautiful arts” in the 18th century: all arts (alongside poetry and rhetoric also music, painting, sculpture, dance and performative arts, and architecture) are now negotiated on the basis of a unitary aesthetic theory. In light of aesthetic theory’s prominence, rhetoric undergoes a concomitant loss of validity, which leads in the long run to a marginalisation of oratory, now comprehended within aesthetics. Particularly instructive with regard to this process is Charles Batteux’s comprehensive theoretical work *Les Beaux Arts réduits à un même principe* (1746, printed and distributed in numerous editions and various

60 Gottsched (1736) 43.

61 Grimm (1983) 586.

62 Cited in Till (2004) 399.

translations), which represented all arts under the conceptual rubric of imitation (*mimēsis*). Batteux here develops two “macro-sets”: on the one hand, the “beautiful arts,” on the other, the “mechanical arts,” which aim at mere instrumentality. For Batteux, rhetoric and architecture belong to an intermediary set, which synthesises autonomous beauty with purposiveness without effectively belonging to either “macro-set.”⁶³ The marginalisation of rhetoric in light of a nascent aesthetics of autonomy still constitutes an orienting model for August Wilhelm Schlegel’s lectures on aesthetics at the end of the 18th century.

Scholarship has continually attempted to highlight the part played by rhetoric in the development of modern aesthetics. The background here is formed by Klaus Dockhorn’s thesis from 1949, according to which modern aesthetics developed as an “interpretive exercise practiced on rhetorical texts, i.e., as an endogenous history of *Bildung*.”⁶⁴ This thesis has been conceptualised in the poetic theories of Johann Jakob Bodmer and Johann Jakob Breitinger as well as the aesthetics of Baumgarten and Georg Friedrich Meier, who in his German-language writings early on disseminated Baumgarten’s central insights.⁶⁵ In his *Critical Art of Poesy* (1740), Breitinger, in fact, draws extensively on the rhetorical tradition, above all Quintilian and Pseudo-Longinus, in order, for example, to describe the specific aesthetic effects of the “wonderful” (*das Wunderbare*). Breitinger leads this aesthetics of effect back to vividness (*evidentia*, *Anschaulichkeit*). The focus on such phenomena of reception obscures, however, the fact that Breitinger’s poetics, which in the end always aims at the production of texts, has an orienting goal clearly distinct from that of rhetoric. Unlike Gottsched in his *Critical Art of Poesy*, which was published just ten years before, Breitinger above all is concerned with the description and explanation of matters of aesthetic effect (*Wirkungsästhetik*). Critical interest thereby shifts from author to reader, who is elevated to the status of a decisive authority.⁶⁶ This socio-historical role that the reader comes to occupy can be observed in the context of a forced separation of author from public, a development necessarily concomitant to the dissolution of a humanistic concept of erudite poetry and the corresponding expansion of the circle of possible addressees. This can be compared to the similar case of Baumgarten’s *Aesthetica*. The Frankfurt philosopher relies on the tradition of rhetoric for the formulation of central components of his aesthetic theory, but these elements are then adjusted and integrated into an epistemological framework of

63 Batteux (1770) I, 21.

64 Dockhorn (1968) 94.

65 Cf. Bender (1980).

66 Weimar (2003) 63.

philosophical provenance. It is not satisfactory, however, simply to describe the resultant theoretical edifice as an “interpretive exercise,” for something conceptually novel here comes to the fore.

Two concepts central to 18th-century aesthetic theory are representative for these differentiated developments, which lead to a marginalization and then to the eventual disappearance of rhetoric *qua* discipline: taste and genius. Both concepts have immediate rhetorical precursors: *iudicium* and *ingenium*. *Ingenium* is the capacity to find arguments within the framework of *inventio* – a capacity largely innate, yet cultivatable through rhetorical schooling. *Iudicium*, on the other hand, is the capacity to judge the arguments found with a view to their persuasive power and thus usefulness for a concrete speech occasion. In the early Enlightenment, Jean-Baptiste Dubos relied on the rhetorical conception of taste and forcefully radicalised it. In his *Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et la peinture* (1719; see Dubos 1770), he elevated public taste to a pivotal criterion for judging whether an artwork was successful or not. This represents a radicalization insofar as the norms and rules that an artwork must follow in order to be seen as successful, rules that antiquity had negotiated within the framework of a rhetorical doctrine of art (*ars*, *Kunstlehre*), are now given up in favour of an exclusively effective-aesthetic criterion. Scholarship has rightly seen a “rhetorical” conception of literature in play here,⁶⁷ but one that ostentatiously breaks with a fixation of norms.⁶⁸ Such a process may be described as a *transformation of rhetoric*: the history of rhetoric appears sometimes as a succession, other times as a simultaneity of competing models of rhetoric. The figure of *rhetorica contra rhetoricam* thereby becomes the structural principle operative in the history of rhetoric.

The category of *ingenium* finally undergoes a comparable development. Classical rhetoric proceeded from the assumption that a correspondent disposition for speaking was innately present and then refined and cultivated in the course of a rhetorical education. Ancient authors describe this interplay between *natura* and *ars* as a dialectical one insofar as only the combination of *natura* and *ars* produces the perfect orator. In the Enlightenment, this relation is shifted in favour of disposition (*natura*); as Kant radically puts the definition in his *Critique of Judgment*: “Genius is the talent (natural endowment) that grants art the rule.”⁶⁹ A thus-understood relationship between genius and art outright inverts the dialectic of *natura* and *ars* as ancient rhetoric conceived

67 Gabler (1982); Fick (1996).

68 See Till (2004).

69 Kant (1983) B181.

it. The innately endowed capacity, *natura*, is instead posited as absolute, the dialectic thereby dissolved.⁷⁰

A correspondent emphasis on the individuality and emotionality of an artist understood to be autonomous also evinces itself via the advent of an *aesthetics of expression* (*Ausdrucksästhetik*) around the mid-18th century,⁷¹ which displaces the initially dominant aesthetics of imitation (*mimēsis*, *Nachahmung*). Around 1800, the notion of “expression” in aesthetic theory denotes a “spontaneous overflowing of powerful feelings,”⁷² which can barely be controlled by the poet-individual anymore. In German-speaking lands, this discussion begins in a specific context: the theory of the ode around 1750. Instructive in this regard are the commentary essays by J.A. Schlegel on Batteux’s theory of imitation from 1751. In these essays, Schlegel *et al.* put forward the thesis that “odes are often expressions of the true affectations of the heart”⁷³ and not merely imitated emotions. A demand for the poet’s unconditioned authenticity is thereby posed, one that stands diametrically opposed to rhetorical conceptions of the construction of texts and the affects – only simulated for strategic purposes – represented in them. Goethe argues in a similar direction in his 1819 “Notes and Disquisitions” on the *West-east Divan* when he designates the lyric as a “natural form” of poetry essentially defined by the fact that it is “enthusiastically excited” (“enthusiastisch aufgeregt”).⁷⁴ In the framework of so-called “lyric of experience” or *Erlebnislyrik* around 1900, this form of poetry today remains a lingering, anti-rhetorical paradigm for literature as such.

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70 Cf. Abrams (1978).

71 Till (2011).

72 Abrams (1978) 36.

73 Batteux (1770) II, 288.

74 Goethe (1998) 194.

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The Beginning of Rhetoric among Serbs: Pioneering Manual in Eloquence by Avram Mrazović from 1821

Dragutin Avramović

1 A Historical Overview

After the glorious period of medieval statehood (1219–1459),¹ Serbia fell under Ottoman rule that was to last for a few centuries, sharing the same fate as other regions of the Balkan Peninsula. Religion and the Orthodox Church were the principal guardians of Serbian national identity, culture, customs, language, and other features that constituted the medieval ethos. Monasteries were the only places to cherish national literacy and culture. As a result of the Ottoman occupation, the Enlightenment emerged in Serbia and in the entire Balkan region later than in the rest of Europe. Serbia was the first south-eastern European country to gain liberation from the Ottoman Empire and form its own government and political institutions. During the First Serbian Revolution of 1804,² the first public schools already were formed, including the Belgrade “Great School” for higher education in 1808, but the first textbook of rhetoric in Serbia appeared not before 1844.

Another part of the Serbian nation, located on the north sides of the Sava and Danube rivers, experienced a parallel and quite different history. Due

1 The history of the first Serbian dynasty goes back to 1166 when the Serbian grand prince Stefan Nemanja, founder of the Serbian state, came to the throne and established the prosperous Nemanjić dynasty. His son Stefan the First-Crowned in 1217 received the crown of Serbia from the Pope. His younger son Rastko (later known as St. Sava) gained autocephaly for the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1219 and received the title of archbishop by the Byzantine patriarch. He edited the first Serbian legal codification, *Nomocanon of St. Sava*. The medieval Serbian state reached its apex during the reign of Tsar Stefan Dušan (1331–1355), who was crowned as Emperor (Tsar) of Serbs and Greeks in the cities of Serres (1345) and Skopje (1346). In 1349 and 1354 he enacted a famous medieval legal compilation known today as Tsar Dušan’s Code. A few recommended, relevant books on medieval Serbian history are Soulis (1984); Pavlowitch (2002); Ćirković (2004); Bataković (2005).

2 This term is most frequently attributed to the German historiographer Leopold von Ranke based on the title of his book *Die Serbische Revolution* (published in 1829; English translation: Ranke [1847]). On the outlines of 19th-century Serbian history, see in English Vucinich (1982); Pavlowitch (1999); Stavrianos (2000) 230–269.

to the long conflict between Austria and Turkey, two great migrations of the Serbian population were led by patriarchs and the church in 1690 and 1739, whereby tens of thousands of Serbian families were moved to different parts of the Habsburg territory and received religious and political privileges.³ This part of present-day Serbia has been called Vojvodina since the 19th century. *Prečani*⁴ – Serbs “from the other side (of the rivers)” – ended up becoming a beacon of 19th-century Serbian culture. Many Serbian intellectuals from Vojvodina contributed to the state-building and nation-building process. They recognised that education and culture are equally as important as military successes. Thus, the first Serbian 19th-century manuals in rhetoric were the product of their work.

Specifically, the first Serbian manual in rhetoric/oratory/eloquence (“*krasnorečije*”) by Avram Mrazović appeared in 1821 in Buda (the western part of Budapest).⁵ The second Serbian textbook in rhetoric was written in 1844 in Belgrade, but again, its author was a Serb “from the other side,” Jovan Sterija Popović.⁶ The third Serbian 19th-century manual in rhetoric was published

3 The emperor recognised the Serbs as one of the official nations in the Habsburg Monarchy and granted them the right to territorial autonomy within a separate *voivodship*. Religious freedom was guaranteed to all Serbs in the Empire, as well as the right to elect their own *voivod*. The title *voivod* (duke, warlord) was offered by the Habsburg authorities to the Serbian patriarch who led the first Great Migration, to encompass his religious, military, and civil leadership. Vojvodina (“Duchy”) obtained its official historical name *Serbian Vojvodina* during the 1848 revolutionary political developments. It formally became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians in 1918, after World War I.

4 For all words in Serbian, Slaveno-Serbian, Russian, Church-Slavonic, and other Slavic terms originally written in Cyrillic letters, I use the table of scientific transliteration of Cyrillic into Latin script, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_transliteration_of_Cyrillic.

5 *Rukovodstvo k slavenskomu krasnorečiju, vo upotrebljenje ljubitelei slavenskago jezika* [*A Manual in Slavic Eloquence, for the Use of Slavic Language Enthusiasts*]. The Slavic word *krasnorečije* used in the title of Mrazović’s book was quite frequent among Slavic writers in the 18th and 19th centuries. According to the etymology of the two words that compose it (*krasno* and *reč*), it should be understood as “nice speaking,” “nice expression.” In this context, its nearest equivalent in English could be *eloquence*. However, due to its ambiguity, *krasnorečije* is often translated in English as *rhetoric*, *oratory*, or *eloquence*. An explanation of why I translate the old Slaveno-Serbian word *krasnorečije* as *eloquence* in English follows in section 5 of this chapter.

6 Jovan Sterija Popović was a Serbian comedy writer who is popular even today. He was also one of the first professors of law at the Lyceum in Belgrade in 1841. He had to quit his professorship when he became Minister of Education of Serbia in 1842. He reformed Serbian education, passing in 1844 the Law on Schools that unified the school system in the country. He also wrote two important academic textbooks (in natural law and rhetoric), but these were not published during his lifetime. His *Rhetoric* was first edited in the original Slaveno-Serbian language by Veselinov (1974) 539–629. It was not until 1995 that his two valuable texts were finally translated into the modern Serbian language and published in the same book, Popović (1995).

by Đorđe Maletić in Belgrade, in 1855, and was widely used by pupils during the next decades.⁷ Some scholars claim that the book by Mrazović was more advanced in comparison with contributions by his successors.⁸

2 Mrazović and His Manual in Slavic *krasnorečije*

The Serbs in the Habsburg Empire experienced more rapid and continuous educational development, particularly owing to the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II. Among other goals, Austrians wanted to secularise education and establish a centrally administered educational policy.⁹ Through cultural and educational policy, the Habsburgs tended to incorporate other nations more efficiently as well. In respect of the Serbs, it was considered essential to reduce Russian cultural and educational influence, as many of the textbooks used for the education of Serbian pupils came from Russia.

The school reform policy under the Habsburg monarchy included the increase of state control. Among other measures, it was stipulated that schools must have supervisors nominated by the state.¹⁰ So, by the end of the seventh decade of the 18th century, Avram Mrazović became one of the school administrators.¹¹ He was born in the free city of Sombor in 1756 and completed three years at the Slaveno-Serbian¹² elementary school and four years of “grammatical [grammar] school.” Mrazović continued his education in the Szeged

7 Maletić (1855). Maletić was also born in Vojvodina, in Banat (Bela Crkva). In 1838, he came to Serbia to serve as an assistant to the Kragujevac court secretary. In 1842, he became a public servant in the Ministry of Education when Jovan Sterija Popović was the minister. Maletić was for short [word missing here: time (?)] a private teacher in Belgrade and since 1848 he had served in the position of a professor in the Belgrade Gymnasium. Eventually, he became a director of the Belgrade Gymnasium until his retirement in 1878. His 1855 handbook in rhetoric had been used in schools for about thirty years.

8 Stefanović (2002) 116.

9 The intention was to diminish the role of the church in education (particularly of the Jesuit schools). Orthodox Serbian pupils also were educated mostly in church schools, and inclusion in the public schooling system was of great importance for their future development.

10 One of the most famous and controversial measures in controlling education was the establishment of the *Studien- und Bücher-Zensur-Hofkommission* in 1760. Maria Theresa introduced compulsory elementary education for pupils of both genders with a six-year curriculum and the use of the same books in all schools, as well as a unified system of teachers' education, mostly based on *Ratio Educationis* of 1777.

11 Kostić (1998) 30; see also Kostić (1961) 232–240; Svrkota (2002) 57.

12 Slaveno-Serbian language (or Slavic-Serbian, also Slavonic-Serbian) was mostly used by Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy. It combines elements of old, traditional Church Slavonic (Russian form), vernacular Serbian, and Russian.

Gymnasium by learning poetics and rhetoric. He went to Pécs and Pest (the eastern part of Budapest) to study philosophy and law, and to Vienna to study grammar and orthography. Finally, with the consent of the metropolitan (archbishop) of the Serbian Orthodox Church, in 1777, he continued his education in Vienna with a six-month course for directors of elementary schools.¹³ As soon as he completed this course, Mrazović was elected by the decree of Maria Theresa to serve as a chief supervisor (*studiorum direktor*) of the Orthodox schools in the school district of Pécs, encompassing all Serbian schools in the Bačka, Baranja, and Tolnai areas. Owing to his efforts new Serbian elementary schools were opened in 74 places in the Pécs school district during the years 1778–1791.

Seeking to establish a Serbian school of a higher level, in 1778 in his native city of Sombor he founded the first Serbian school for teachers, under a peculiar name – the “Norma.”¹⁴ He also became one of the first professors at “Norma” and held that position for more than thirty years (until 1811).¹⁵ During his professorship at “Norma,” Avram Mrazović wrote a few manuals.¹⁶ It took him ten years after leaving “Norma” to prepare the book that is a landmark in the history of Serbian eloquence and rhetoric. Mrazović modestly claims in his “Foreword” that he expected someone else to make such an effort, but, as no one did, he decided to write a book “necessary for our nation.”¹⁷ Indeed, it was a period when manuals were printed in many disciplines fostering education among Serbs. They were primarily intended to be used by Serbian pupils instead of textbooks in other languages (Latin, Russian, and German) but also to offer information in the national language to a wider public interested in different fields.¹⁸ One of those manuals was the first textbook in rhetoric in

13 Stepanović (2009) 267–297.

14 The terms “normal schools” and “normal courses” appeared then in contrast to education organised or supported by the church.

15 Kostić (1998) 37; Kostić, (2001) 94. Old “Norma” was closed in 1811 and replaced by a more advanced type of school with the same name. Mrazović kept his position as the city senator until his death in 1826 and remained a very honourable and authoritative person. He was decorated by three Austrian emperors (Joseph II, Leopold II, and Franz I) with gold medals. In 1792, he was awarded hereditary nobility with the right to bear a coat of arms.

16 See below n. 45.

17 In that time, in Serbian grammar schools, rhetoric was most probably taught according to the manual in Latin edited by Carlo Rumi (Prague, 1819), see Stefanović (2002) 114.

18 During all his life, Mrazović was eager to contribute to the affirmation of the Serbian national culture. He was encouraging the reform of the Serbian literary language to adopt the elements of living, national, folk speech. His attitudes and texts strongly influenced the famous Serbian philologist and linguist Vuk Karadžić, who has been celebrated as the chief reformer and creator of the modern Serbian language. Vuk Karadžić was the author of the first Serbian dictionary in the new, reformed language; he standardised the Serbian alphabet and introduced “one letter, one sound” approach (phonemic principle).

Slaveno-Serbian written by Avram Mrazović. It was published in 1821 in Buda as *Rukovodstvo k slavenskomu krasnorečiju* [*Manual in Slavic Eloquence*].

There has been much controversy about that book because no extensive research on it has been done yet, except for a few sporadic attempts. A reprinted edition of the original book by Mrazović was published in 2002, but it lacks a comprehensive critical commentary.¹⁹ In 2015, the book was translated into modern Serbian (it was originally written in Slaveno-Serbian, which is not easily comprehensible today). However, the translation was rightly criticised for being seriously flawed.²⁰ Therefore, the most important contribution to the analysis of Mrazović's manual remains the monograph (Ph.D. thesis) by Vojislav Jelić, although Mrazović was not a central topic in it. Jelić was primarily focused on the second Serbian textbook about rhetoric, written by Jovan Sterija Popović,²¹ and on Quintilian's influence on that book. He examines three forerunners of Jovan Sterija Popović's book on rhetoric in 1841. In that context, Jelić parenthetically analyses publications of Mrazović,²² Grigely,²³ and partially of Lomonosov.²⁴

But who influenced Mrazović? Is there anything unique about his book? And what is the meaning of the word *krasnorečije* in his title? What was his understanding of that concept? Was it a synonym, a generic term for rhetoric, oratory, and eloquence, or something else? Did Mrazović distinguish rhetoric

19 Stefanović (2002) 113–122 criticises this edition for having only a short general foreword instead of profound scholarly analysis. Popović (2004) 224–226 is another author who regrets that the publication's foreword is short.

20 Mrazović (2015). Tough criticism on the quality of the translation was expressed by Jelić (2016).

21 Jelić (1988b). On Jovan Sterija Popović, see *supra* n. 6.

22 There is also an article about Mrazović by the same author, Jelić (1988a) 427–433, and this is almost all on Mrazović's textbook in the existing literature.

23 Grigely (1760–1818) was a Hungarian gymnasium teacher of classical languages, who also wrote a number of school manuals for different subjects: Grigely (1796); Grigely (1806); Grigely (1807a); Grigely (1807b), including his *Institutiones Oratoriae* of 1814. This paper will refer to the edition of Grigely's *Institutiones Oratoriae* from 1823.

24 M.V. Lomonosov was one of the most important intellectuals in 18th-century Russia. He made immense contributions both in the natural sciences and in the humanities. Along with important achievements in physics, chemistry, mineralogy, and astronomy, he was a famous poet, educator (he was *spiritus movens* in establishing Moscow University), historian (he wrote the famous *History of Russia*), philologist, who reformed Russian literary language by combining actual Old Church Slavonic with colloquial national language, and who wrote in 1755 the influential Russian Grammar (*Rossiyskaya grammatika*). Lomonosov also wrote two texts, or rather, two versions of the most important Russian manual in rhetoric: see n. 39.

and *krasnorečije* at all? The answer to those and similar questions is not completely clear, although Jelić gave important hints to their understanding.²⁵

3 Mrazović and the Reception of Ancient Rhetoric

The influence of ancient rhetoric is an obvious characteristic of the first systematic manual of rhetoric in the Serbian language. Throughout his book Mrazović clearly draws inspiration from ancient writers, although he does not quote Aristotle, Cicero, or Quintilian frequently. One gets the impression that his few mentions of Aristotle (in four places altogether) are rather a kind of decoration. Overall, there are no traces of a more profound reception of Greek rhetoric, but it is clear that his book was influenced by the Roman rhetorical heritage.

Mrazović uses remarks from Cicero more often than comments by Aristotle. For example, Mrazović borrows the explanation and definition of *signs* from Cicero and refers to Cicero's thoughts on that issue.²⁶ He starts his explanation of *inventio* by saying that it means "finding true topics, or topics which look true, so that they could be sufficient basis for the speech," and quotes Cicero in that context. A few lines later Mrazović speaks about *loci rhetorici* and, by referring to Cicero, he defines them as "sources of proofs."²⁷ Explaining rhetorical descriptions, Mrazović stresses the importance of enumeration, metaphors, and linking many elements, pointing to the model that Cicero used in one of his speeches.²⁸ When Mrazović elaborates *enumeratio partum* he says that "by denying parts we deny the whole" and uses again an example from Cicero.²⁹ Speaking about the contrasts (*contraria*), he also calls upon Cicero's words.³⁰ In describing *affectus* Mrazović explains and repeats in the comment at the end of his chapter a famous academic remark by Cicero on emotions: if one wants the listeners to feel concern, hate, envy, fear, or to be moved to compassion and tears, those sensations should be felt and experienced by the orator himself.³¹ Likewise Mrazović takes over Cicero's definition of *narratio* almost word for word.³² The definition of *amplificatio* is also the same as in

25 Jelić (1988b) 257–269.

26 Mrazović (1821) 7.

27 Mrazović (1821) 20.

28 Mrazović (1821) 24.

29 Mrazović (1821) 26.

30 Mrazović (1821) 32.

31 Mrazović (1821) 64; Cicero, *De oratore* 2.189.

32 Mrazović (1821) 70.

Cicero, as Mrazović points out.³³ After his elaboration of *transitiones* Mrazović resumes and illustrates it with 25 examples taken from Cicero.³⁴

Although Mrazović quotes Cicero at many points as an example for different rhetorical notions, he more often uses Cicero's speeches and particular thoughts than his rhetorical theory. Quintilian had a more powerful impact on Mrazović than Cicero, although Mrazović does not refer habitually to Quintilian's work and mentions him only in a few places. Jelić, however, has convincingly proved that *Rukovodstvo* by Mrazović completely depends on the Hungarian (Grigely's) adaptation of Quintilian.³⁵ Namely, it is evident that Mrazović used extensively at least the abbreviated editions of *Institutio oratoria*, which were quite popular in 18th-century Europe, usually under the name of *Chrestomathia Quintiliana* or *Chrestomathia Quintiliana*.³⁶ The influence of Quintilian is clear and the only issue might be whether it was the result of first-hand borrowing or whether the influence came through an intermediary.

Mrazović sometimes uses the two chief Roman paragons (Cicero and Quintilian) hand in hand. He defines rhetoric as "a science that enables us to understand and learn *krasnorečije*" ("fine speaking"), supporting his definition by saying that according to Cicero "it is the book that teaches the skill of *krasnorečije*." A few lines later, he quotes Quintilian by saying that he asserts that rhetoric "is a science that teaches us how to speak clearly, pleasantly, importantly, and extensively, when it is needed." Finally, in the same passage, he also quotes Aristotle, in an attempt to define rhetorical skill, by saying that a *rhetor* is "a person who is able to speak about any suggested topic."³⁷ It is evident, however, that his quotations do not represent precise translations of the sources.

Although there are many specific borrowings, the structure of his manual is quite peculiar and does not represent an exact copy of any ancient model, although it comprises nearly all the relevant elements of the ancient rhetorical tradition. He starts his book with a general point that *krasnorečije* has three fundamental elements. The first one is grammar, the second is logic, and the third is rhetoric. The first two are elaborated in 19 pages, while the rest of the book (19–187) deals with diverse aspects of rhetoric. At the end of the book Mrazović places examples of different kinds of speeches (191–246).

33 Mrazović (1821) 72.

34 Mrazović (1821) 174–176.

35 Jelić (1988b) 259.

36 The most popular German condensed editions for the schools by the end of the 18th century were offered by Andres (1782) and Blass (1793). The latter was commonly used in German-speaking schools and Mrazović was undoubtedly quite familiar with it.

37 Mrazović (1821) 19.

He uses alternative Latin terms for almost all elements of rhetoric. Most frequently, he uses Serbian notions, adding Latin equivalents in parentheses. In the section about rhetoric, he arranges his presentation into four parts: *izobreteniji* (*inventio*), *raspoloženiji* (*dispositio*), *ukrašeniji* (*elocutio*), and *proiznošeniji* (*pronuntiatio*). These concepts are further broken down into key components. For example, as crucial elements of the last part (*pronuntiatio*), he mentions *pamjati* (*memoria*), *veščaniji* (*declamatio*), and *telodviženiji* (*gestus*).

Most of the structure, terms, and definitions in his book bear a great resemblance to those of Quintilian. But on several occasions, when he needs to provide interpretation of various issues, offer explanations, produce examples, and elaborate on other features, Mrazović generally follows his own peculiar path. It is not easy, therefore, to say that there was a systematic reception of Quintilian in his work. It seems that Mrazović was also strongly influenced by other sources, most likely more recent ones.

4 Probable Contemporary Sources-Borrowings and Variances

Besides Quintilian and ancient rhetoric, there are at least two contemporary sources that Mrazović might have used.³⁸ The first was the manual on rhetoric by Mikhail Vasilyevich Lomonosov, which became the forerunner of modern Russian textbooks on rhetoric.³⁹ It became an admired text particularly among Slavic scholars. Jovan Sterija Popović is explicit in his *Rhetoric*,

38 Mrazović (1821) 19 explicitly mentioned Scheler's *Rhetoric* as very influential.

39 Lomonosov composed two important texts. The first text of 1744 was entitled *Kratkoe rukovodstvo k ritorike, na polzu ljubitelei slatkorečija* [A Short Manual in Rhetoric, to the benefit of eloquence enthusiasts] (140 paragraphs, 56 pages), available in: Lomonosov (1952) 18–79. However, the piece received harsh criticism from G. Miller of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who recommended its profound revision. Lomonosov revised the text and produced a new version, significantly reworked and expanded, which was finally published in 1748. The revised version was published by the Imperial Academy of Sciences in 1748 with a different title, *Mikhail Vasilyevich Lomonosov, Kratkoe rukovodstvo k krasnorečiju. Kniga pervaja, v kotori soderžitsja Ritorika, pokazujusčaja obščie pravila oboego krasnorečija, to est oratorii i poeziji, sočinena v polzu ljubjaščih slovesniji nauki* [A Short Manual in krasnorečie, book one, containing rhetoric, which presents general rules of both sorts of krasnorečie, i.e., of rhetoric and poetry, for the use of those who admire verbal sciences] (326 paragraphs, 289 pages), available in: Lomonosov (1952) 89–378. The new book was widely embraced and reprinted in 1759 and 1765: see more in Kostin and Lemeshev (2017) 310–346. Those two texts by Lomonosov form an integral part of 18th-century Russian cultural, humanistic, scientific, and philological heritage and they constitute the first east European original research in oratory. See more in Kraus (2015) 200; Filippov and Filippov (2018).

written in Serbian in the 1840s, that he benefited mostly from Lomonosov's book. Lomonosov's influence upon Mrazović, though uncontested, is yet to be properly explored.⁴⁰

In contrast, the dominant opinion propounded by Jelić is that Mrazović used Joseph Grigely's book as his most important model and basically neglected Lomonosov's work.⁴¹ This view makes sense from scholarly, psychological, pragmatic, political, and many other perspectives. Grigely wrote a manual for the pupils in Hungarian grammar schools (*Institutiones Oratoriae in Usum Gymnasiorum Regni Hungariae et Adnexarum Provinciarum*, Budae 1814), and Mrazović was living in the Hungarian part of the Austrian Empire, where Grigely was widely used as the leading authority. This view was supported by many useful and convincing concrete examples of similarities offered by Jelić, particularly in the composition and structure of the two books.⁴² But Jelić labels Mrazović's text as a kind of condensed and abbreviated version of Grigely's model. He also claims that in some places Mrazović's manual may be considered as a loose translation of Grigely.⁴³ This assessment seems to be too one sided and simplistic; many elements in Mrazović's book attest to a considerable degree of originality and show important discrepancies between him and Grigely.

Let us start with reflections on Lomonosov. Besides the evident influence of Grigely upon Mrazović, it seems that Lomonosov, too, left his mark on Mrazović's book. The similar titles of the two texts bespeak their interaction. Lomonosov named his manual *Kratkoe rukovodstvo k krasnorečiju* [*A Short Manual in Krasnorečije*], and prefaced it with a detailed introduction on the content and purpose of the book.⁴⁴ Mrazović gave a similar title to his manual. The difference was that he omitted the adjective *kratkoe* (short) and added

40 Stefanović (2002) rightly states that it is not clear whether German influence on the 18th-century Serbian writers of rhetorical manuals came directly from the German sources or through Russian intermediaries. She briefly remarks that Lomonosov was also a German pupil like Mrazović. Even so, possible impact by Lomonosov upon Mrazović is still questionable and it is not investigated at all (117).

41 Jelić (1988b) 258.

42 Nevertheless, Jelić (1988b) 260 admits that there are discrepancies between Grigely and Mrazović, particularly regarding the general division of the book in its parts and chapters.

43 Jelić (1988b) 259: "One could almost speak about loosely translated text" of Grigely.

44 As already mentioned, the full title of Lomonosov's text was *Kratkoe rukovodstvo k krasnorečiju, Kniga pervaja, v kotori sodержitsja ritorika, pokazujusčaja obščie pravila oboego krasnorečija, to est oratorii i poeziji, sočinjena v polzu ljubjaščih slovesniji nauki* [*A Short Manual in Krasnorečije*, book one, containing rhetoric, which presents general rules of two sorts of *krasnorečije*, i.e., of rhetoric and poetry, for the use of those who admire verbal sciences].

the attribute *slavenskomu* (to Slavic) – *Rukovodstvo k slavenskomu krasnorečiju* [*A Manual in Slavic Krasnorečije*].⁴⁵ He used in his title the same two key words as Lomonosov – *rukovodstvo* (defining it as a kind of introductory handbook), and *k krasnorečiju* (using the same technical Slavic term *krasnorečije*). He also followed Lomonosov's manner of underlining the aim of the book already in the title (*vo upotreblenije ljubitelei slavenskago jezika* – “for the use of Slavic language enthusiasts”).⁴⁶

One further important indication of Lomonosov's influence on Mrazović is the purpose of the latter's book. In this case, Mrazović does not use the typical extended title formulation as in the rest of his manuals. In his other handbooks (textbooks on reading and writing, grammar, and mathematics), he clearly states that they have been prepared “for use in the national Slaveno-Serbian schools” (*vo upotreblenie slaveno-serbskih narodnyh učilišč*).⁴⁷ In case of his manual in *krasnorečije*, he opens up the book to a wider audience. Undoubtedly, it could also have been used as a manual for pupils. But the title formulation discloses his wish to offer the book to a broader circle of people who speak Slavic.

Mrazović's instruction in *krasnorečije* was written nearly a decade or more after his school manuals for other disciplines. His book was a piece of work completed by a mature writer, educator, and politician who, at that time, had not worked as a teacher for a decade. His scope seems to have shifted to focus more on a broader circle of readers, in particular his compatriots. The style, approach, and manner of the book disclose that, as an active politician many years after the conclusion of his teaching career, he wished to contribute to the increase of the general cultural level of the Serbian and Slavic peoples and educate them in “nice-speaking” (*krasnorečije*) in their native language.

An interesting fact is hidden at the end of the book where Mrazović records a list of customers.⁴⁸ He obtained the records of people who purchased

45 Other important manuals by Mrazović also use the adjective “Slavic” in their titles, in line with his desire to have textbooks in Serbian literary language used in Slaveno-Serbian schools: Mrazović (1806); Mrazović (1811); Mrazović (1821).

46 At that time available manuals in rhetoric in the Hungarian part of the Austrian Empire were mostly written either in German or in Latin. Their purpose of serving as a handbook for pupils was always clearly marked in the title.

47 See n. 45. Mrazović used to explain the purpose of his manuals in a similar way, and not only in his manuals on the humanities. He did the same in his *Rukovodstvo k naučje čislitelnoj, vo upotreblenie slaveno-serbskih narodnyh učilišč* [*A Manual for Mathematical Sciences, for the Use in Slaveno-Serbian Peoples* [*Double-checking-is Peoples possessive? Should it be “Peoples”*] *Schools*]. See Mrazović (1794), with seven additional editions until 1833.

48 Mrazović (1821) 247–248.

several copies of the manual and mentions them in the following order: 200 copies were ordered by Stephan Stratimirović, the archbishop and the metropolitan of Karlovci (in Srem), “for his diocese”; 200 copies were ordered by Mihail Levytsky, the metropolitan of Galicia and the archbishop of Lemberg (Lwow in Polish), “for his archdiocese”; 30 copies by Dionysios Popović, the bishop of Buda; 169 copies by Gedeon Petrović, the bishop of Bačka, “for his diocese”; 200 copies by Alexey Pochiy, the bishop of Munkács, “for his diocese”; 10 copies by Konstantin Stanić, the bishop of Križevci, “for himself”; 10 copies by the Seminarium in Zagreb; 10 copies by the Institute Slavic Jozška Krajinski; 33 copies by Sava Tekelija; 12 copies by Uroš Nestorović; 12 copies by the Gymnasium in Karlovci; 12 copies by the Gymnasium in Novi Sad; 42 copies by Luka Kengelac, director of schools in the region of Timisoara, “for his area”; 10 copies by Kosma Josić; 10 copies by Lazar Popanešković; 20 copies by the Municipality of Baja; and 10 by Lazar Kurić. It is significant that most purchases were initiated by high church officials (not only Serbian) and that only a few public educational institutions from Vojvodina ordered a limited number of copies (for example, two Serbian Gymnasiums in Karlovci and Novi Sad purchased just 12 copies each). Customers also included individuals, intellectuals from different parts of the Habsburg Monarchy, but not even one was from Serbia. This strongly reflects the fact that in the 1820s the significance of rhetoric as an intellectual discipline in Serbia was far from gaining wide public recognition. This does not mean, however, that Mrazović’s book did not reach Serbia and that it did not affect its cultural development. The influence of Mrazović’s book on the study of rhetoric in Serbia is well attested in the second Serbian book on rhetoric written by Jovan Sterija Popović in the 1840s.

By distancing himself from Lomonosov and Grigely, Mrazović adds extensive quotations of speeches and contemporary literature at the end of his book in a kind of appendix that spreads over more than fifty pages (190–246). In the subtitle he explains that part of the book is “a presentation of different speeches in prose and verse in accordance with the presented rules of *krasnorečije*, for practice by Slavic language enthusiasts.”⁴⁹ Along with some ancient and other examples of famous speeches, Mrazović, aspiring to make a book that would promote national spirit and culture, included a number of contributions by Serbian or Slavic authors, as well as his own pieces: *Pohvalitelna ja oda*, an ode of praise to the metropolitan Stefan Stratimirović, written by Mrazović himself (191); *Blagodaritelnoe slovo*, the speech of gratitude to the Russian Empress Catherine II by Platon, the archbishop and metropolitan of Moscow (197);

49 It is worth noting that he stresses once again that the book is intended for “Slavic language enthusiasts,” not only for pupils in need of a school manual.

Privjestvovatelnoe slovo, the inaugural speech of Petar Petrović, the bishop of Timisoara, to Josiph Jovanović Šakabenta on the occasion of his appointment to the seat of the diocese of Vršac (200); *Pozdravitelnoe slovo*, a welcome speech to Emperor Franz I during his visit to the free city of Sombor in 1805 (202); *Nadgrobnoe poema*, a funeral poem to Alexandra Pavlovna, Duchess of Austria (204); the speech of Petar Petrović, the bishop of Timisoara, to the Serbian delegation at the Great National Assembly in Timisoara in 1790 (213).

Mrazović takes an interesting and unusual stance toward forensic speeches. He does not analyse them in the theoretical part of his book. Nevertheless, in part II, chapter 2, he mentions three different types of speeches: *genus demonstrativum*, *genus deliberativum*, and *genus iudiciale* (115–116), though he elaborates only on the first two. Two decades later, Jovan Sterija Popović left judicial speeches out of his manual on rhetoric, although he was a law professor,⁵⁰ as Grigely had done before Mrazović. Stepping away from the models of Sterija and Grigely, Mrazović accommodates forensic speeches.⁵¹ In the last part of his book, he quotes examples of three types of speeches: *roda pokazatel'noga* (demonstrative/laudatory speeches, *genos epideiktikon*), *roda raziuditel'nago* (deliberative speeches, *genos symbouleutikon*), and *roda sudebnago* (forensic speeches, *genos dikanikon*). The selections that serve as examples for judicial speeches come from the Hellenistic and Roman world— they are distinctly peculiar and are rarely found in other manuals of rhetoric.⁵² The choice of speeches reflects the author's wish to offer moral instruction to his readers, not simply to provide scholarly and theoretical advice. There is nothing like this in Grigely.⁵³

50 The explanation is probably in the quite undeveloped legal system and judiciary in Serbia of that time, with a number of illiterate judges in the courts. Besides, Jovan Sterija Popović's book was strictly intended for students as a typical school manual.

51 In the foreword, Mrazović almost excuses himself for his treatment of forensic speeches (IV).

52 Mrazović (1821) quoted several forensic speeches from antiquity, with explanations in the titles: "Accusatory speech to soldiers by Alexander the Great against a high officer Philotes" (220–223); "Defence speech by Philotes on previous accusations by Alexander" (223–228); "Accusatory speech of Servius against the sons of Lucius Iunius Brutus, the first Roman consul, who were expelled from Rome to Tarquinia and who returned with the intention to overthrow the Republic; as the conspiracy was discovered, they were given to the court of his father and the court punished them by decapitation" (229–234); "Defence speech of Brutus' sons by Tullius" (235–241); "Assessment of Lucius Iunius Brutus against his sons" (241–246).

53 In chapter 3, Grigely (1823) writes *De Diversis Orationum et Oratiuncularum Generis* and groups them in three paragraphs. Paragraph I involves *De Orationibus nonnullis, quae pertinent ad genus demonstrativum, utpote: 1. De Oratione Panegyrica, 2. De Oratione Eucharistica, 3. De Oratione Gratulatoria, 4. De Oratore Funebri*. Paragraph II includes

Although generally influenced by Grigely in method and composition (not so much in conception), Mrazović's book has some important unique features. His manual should not be qualified as a kind of "loose translation," an abbreviated version or a simple paraphrase of Grigely. In contrast to Grigely, Mrazović's book generally reflects his wish to produce a textbook for the people (for "Slavic language enthusiasts" – the goal is stressed in the title already), rather than merely a manual for school use. It has a similar structure to Grigely's, but their respective parts and chapters do not match in many instances. He improves on Grigely's book by adding a compendium of exemplary speeches. In the main text, he frequently uses illustrations from Serbian literature.⁵⁴ He often tries to coin new Serbian words for foreign terms in an effort to develop and enrich scholarly terminology in the field of rhetoric. Obviously, with his book Mrazović wanted to contribute to the raising of the general cultural level of Serbian society, to encourage proper and effective use of the national language and, more generally, to contribute to national science, culture, and the nation-building process. Grigely did not have those ambitions.

Finally, Mrazović uses the specific Slavic word *krasnorečije* to denote the content of his book, avoiding the word *rhetoric* used by Grigely. What was the motive behind this decision?

5 *Krasnorečije*: Rhetoric, Oratory, or Eloquence?

At this point, it is necessary to draw attention to a sensitive issue of terminology. The Old Slaveno-Serbian word *krasnorečije* (and the Ukrainian term *krasnomowstwo* and Polish *krasomowstwo* that have similar meanings), probably

De Rationibus in genere deliberativo, and paragraph III encompasses *De Oratiunculis nonnullis, quarum hodie frequentior usus es, ut: 1. De Salutationibus Principum aut aliorum honoratiorum virorum, 2. De Orationibus Comitiorum Officiorumque clientelarium, 3. De Orationibus Inauguralibus*. The division of speeches suggested by Mrazovic follows the types of speeches from Grigely's paragraph I, but after that it varies significantly. Furthermore, Grigely does not present examples of different types of speeches as a kind of addendum to his manual.

54 Mrazović (1821) predominantly used examples from ancient Latin and Greek literature and history, frequently following Grigely. But, at the same time, he introduced Serbian examples for different rhetorical notions and manners: his own elegy of 1801 to the Russian princess Alexandra Pavlovna (an example for *dissimilitudo*) (30); the extensive military speech by Serbian Tsar Lazar before the battle of Kosovo (an example for *adiuncta*) (36–37); "An Epitaph to Jovan Rajić," [I have punctuated the Epitaph as if it is a title. Is it?] the archimandrite of the Kovilj monastery (an example on how to discuss the significance of eternal life after death) (125–126).

come from the Russian *krasnorečije* that was coined from the Greek term *kallilogia* – “nice speaking” in the mid-17th century.⁵⁵ Vojislav Jelić stresses that the word *kallilogia* is mentioned only once in the *Greek-English Lexicon* (in *De compositione verborum* by Dionysius of Halicarnassus) and he compares translations of ancient Greek *kallilogia* in other languages: *elegance of language*, *Schönrednerei*, *Schönsprechen*, *schön Ausdruck*, and *Beredsamkeit*.⁵⁶ Etymologically and literally, *krasnorečije* means “nice speaking,” the skill of speaking nicely. The influence of the classical Greek terminology is more than evident.

Some controversy considering Serbian 19th-century terminology was resolved by Jovan Sterija Popović. In his *Rhetoric* of 1841, he makes a clear distinction between *krasnorečije*, with the meaning “capability to make a nice speech in prose” (somewhat similar to *ars bene dicendi*), and *retorika*, which denotes “a science introducing the rules of *krasnorečije*.”⁵⁷ In line with the mainstream categorisation in the literature of that time, Sterija considers *rhetoric* as the theory of prose expression in general. Mrazović also defined both *rhetoric* and *krasnorečije* in his 1821 textbook. According to him, “*rhetoric* is a science (*nauka*) that enables us to understand and learn *krasnorečije*.” And, he continues, “*krasnorečije* is the skill (*iskustvo*) of speaking well, reasonably, and nicely about any topic.”⁵⁸ Significantly, Mrazović defines *krasnorečije* similarly as Grigely defines eloquence.⁵⁹ But, in contrast to Grigely, Mrazović does not imply in *krasnorečije* the skill of writing or prose in general, and defines it merely as a skill of speaking.⁶⁰ In his first text of 1744, Lomonosov treated *rhetoric* as a general theory of prose, but in the book of 1748 he gives the following definition: “*krasnorečije* is the skill (*iskustvo*) of speaking nicely on any topic and attracting others to your own opinion.”⁶¹

55 Jelić (1988b) 261 n. 1 and n. 4.

56 See Jelić (1988b) 262 n. 5.

57 Popović (1995) 227.

58 Mrazović (1821) 19.

59 Grigely (1823) 3: *Quid eloquentia? Est facultas de re qualibet perspicue, suaviter, graviterque dicendi seu scribendi.*

60 Different explanations are offered. Jelić (1988a) 432 argues that it was caused by his negligence; Stefanović (2002) 120 believes that Mrazović implied that *krasnorečije* encompasses prose in general, pointing out that in many places Mrazović uses examples from literature.

61 *Kratkoe rukovodstvo k ritorike* (1744), paragraph 1: “Ritorika jest nauka o vsjakoj predloženoj materii krasno govorit i pisat, to jest onuju izabranimi rečji predstavljajat i pristojnimi slovami izobražat na takoi konec, čtobi slušatelei i čitatelei o spravodlivosti ee udostoverit.” See also Lomonosov (1952) 23. *Kratkoe rukovodstvo k krasnorečiju* (1748), paragraph 1: “Krasnorečije jest iskustvo (skill) o vsakoj dannoi materii krasno govoriti i tem preklonjat

At the time Mrazović was preparing his book, rhetorical terminology had not yet been well developed in the Slaveno-Serbian language and he was also introducing classical Latin terminology in parentheses.⁶² He was supposed to create new terms for many classical rhetorical notions, including the most basic ones. Mrazović had to find or coin Slaveno-Serbian equivalents for rhetorical terms nearly at every step, but it is evident that classical Latin (Quintilian's?) terminology was not so alien to the readers, at least to some of them. Still, many Slaveno-Serbian words that Mrazović introduced should be the subject of a separate small piece of research.⁶³ Some disputes still exist even over the meaning of the crucial words like *krasnorečije*. How should it be translated into English: rhetoric, oratory, or eloquence?

Mrazović did not use the word *rhetoric* in the title of his book, although it existed in the Slaveno-Serbian vocabulary of that time (*ritorika*).⁶⁴ Nonetheless, he uses the notion of *rhetoric* in other places, although quite reluctantly. The question of whether *rhetoric* and *krasnorečije* were synonyms was solved by Mrazović, who gave two clear definitions, showing that the two terms differ in their substance: *krasnorečije* is a skill, *rhetoric* is a science. Although Lomonosov and Sterija follow similar differentiation of the two notions, *krasnorečije* still remained a rather ambiguous term, interwoven in some respects with *rhetoric*, particularly referring to its content and scope. At the same time, it is evident that Mrazović tended to avoid the word *rhetoric* in many instances.

A small parallel examination of Grigely and Mrazović could be useful at this point. Although Mrazović generally followed the system and composition of Grigely's book, his use of the words *krasnorečije* and *rhetoric* often distinguished him from Grigely. It is visible already in the titles of specific chapters of the two books. Grigely defines the first chapter (*caput*) of Grigely's *prolegomena* as "De stilo et eloquentia in genere" (2), and Mrazović translates it "Opredelenije krasnorečija" (Defining of *krasnorečije*) (1). The first part of chapter two in Grigely is titled "Precipua eloquentiae fundamenta, in primis brevis logica rhetoricae" (4), which Mrazović translates as "Osnovanija krasnorečija"

drugih k svoemu mneniju." See also Lomonosov (1952) 91. Curiously, Kostin and Lemeshev (2017) 310–346 translate Lomonosov's *Kratkoe rukovodstvo k krasnorečiju* as "Mikhail Lomonosov's 'Short Manual in Rhetoric': The History of the First Edition from 1748."

62 Mrazović was beset with many difficulties in translating technical rhetorical terminology into Serbian. Two decades later, Jovan Sterija Popović was faced with similar difficulties when he was writing his manual in rhetoric. More about that see Jelić (1988b) 243.

63 The first attempts in that direction were offered by Jelić (1986) 123–126.

64 It is worth mentioning that Lomonosov had changed his mind and used in the title of his first text of 1744 the word *rhetoric* (*Kratkoe rukovodstvo k ritorike*), while in the second text of 1748 he used *krasnorečije* (*Kratkoe rukovodstvo k krasnorečiju*).

(Fundamentals of *krasnorečije*) (1). In both instances, Mrazović accepts that *krasnorečije* is an equivalent for *eloquentia*. But he omits to translate the rest of the title which reads “in primis brevis logica rhetoricae” (4) and calls it simply “Opredelenije logiki. Časti logiki” (Defining of logic. Parts of logic) (2). He evidently wanted to avoid translating the word *rhetoricae* (or the entire phrase “the logic of rhetoric”).

The first paragraph of chapter two in Grigely reads: “De ideis earumque signis, seu vocabulis, et recto rhetorica vocabulorum usu” (8). Mrazović formulates it concisely: “O ponjatijah [*idea*] značeh [*signum*] i upotreblenija ih” (On the notion [*idea*] of signs [*signum*] and their use) (3). Again, the word *rhetoric* was excluded. Next, Mrazović completely ignores Grigely’s chapter three and its paragraphs II (“De materia rhetoricae”), III (“De partibus rhetoricae”), IV (“De dignitate et utilitate rhetoricae”), and V (“De subsidiis rhetoricae”). It is probably not a matter of pure chance.

Grigely’s part one (*pars* I) begins with the first chapter “De inventionis rhetoricae locis intrinsecis” (66), while Mrazović in his section three, part I uses a simple title with a Latin equivalent “O izobreteniji [*inventio*]” (20). The notion *rhetoric* was omitted once again. Speaking about *de inventione*, Grigely uses the title “De argumentis et locis oratoriis in genere” (59) and Mrazović translates it as “O mjestjeh ritoričeskih [*De locis rhetoricis*]” (20). Mrazović again uses the Latin equivalent as an explanation in parentheses, but instead of accepting the phrase “locis oratoriis,” he replaces it with “locis rhetoricis.” This is a significant example, showing that not only he did not fully endorse Grigely, but that he had his own perception of the notion of *rhetoric* that he generally tried to avoid. In the same way he avoided taking over the full title of chapter IV of part one, which reads “De secunda inventionis Rhetoricae parte seu de affectibus excitandis in genere” (120), and simply translated it as “O strastjeh [*Affectus*]” at the beginning of section IV (53).

Let us end this brief overview with part II, chapter I by Grigely, which reads “De progymnasmatis rhetoricis” (150). Translated by Mrazović, it merely reads “O predupražnenijah [*Progymnasmata*]” (65). Apart from his evident reluctance to use the word *rhetoric*, it is also clear that he often used Latin expressions (usually in parentheses) as an explanation or equivalent parallel to his Slaveno-Serbian words that he was introducing in his book. Not surprisingly, even Jelić had to admit that Mrazović amended, altered, and expanded some parts of Grigely’s manual, particularly with his illustrations of different definitions.⁶⁵

65 Jelić (1988a) 433.

The definition of *rhetoric* by Mrazović clearly reveals that he recognises it as a *science* that enables us to understand and learn *krasnorečije* – the *skill* of speaking nicely.⁶⁶ In the first sentences of his book, he states that *krasnorečije* comprises three elements: to speak *dobro* (well, accurately) according to grammar rules, to speak *s osnovanijem i dovodi* (with reason and proof) based on logic, and to speak *krasno* [nicely] by following the rules of rhetoric. Mrazović concludes that “Sledovatelno nauka krasnorečija tri osnovania imat: Gramatiku, Logiku, i Ritoriku” (Consequently, the science of *krasnorečije* has three foundations: grammar, logic, and rhetoric).⁶⁷

It may seem odd that this is another definition where Mrazović uses the word “nauka” for *krasnorečije* rather than reserving it exclusively for rhetoric, making it thus appear that he views those two notions as synonymous. Nevertheless, one should have in mind the meaning of rhetoric at that time.⁶⁸ Mrazović, however, never uses the word *iskustvo* (skill) for rhetoric. Be that as it may, it seems that Mrazović did not feel comfortable with the word *rhetoric* in Slaveno-Serbian, and that he preferred not to use it except when it is necessary and completely clear that it refers to science, a theory that gives knowledge to a practical discipline – *krasnorečije*. This is why the more suitable translation of *krasnorečije* in English should be “eloquence” rather than “rhetoric.” Consequently, the book *Rukovodstvo k slavenskomu krasnorečiju* by Mrazović should be translated as *A Manual in Slavic Eloquence* rather than *A Manual in Slavic Rhetoric*, although it has substantial elements from the rhetoric manuals of that time. A few decades later, the authors in Serbia did not have the same dilemma as Mrazović did in 1821: both Jovan Sterija Popović in 1844 and Đorđe Maletić in 1855 wrote their respective books under the title *Rhetoric* (*Ritorika*).

6 Conclusion

The influence of ancient rhetoric upon Mrazović is indisputable, although the conception of his manual does not follow the general pattern of Aristotle, Cicero, or Quintilian. Even though at first glance one may get the impression that Cicero was his favourite due to the numerous quotations of his rhetorical works and speeches, Mrazović’s book was fundamentally following Quintilian’s

66 Mrazović (1821) 9.

67 Mrazović (1821) 1.

68 In a small but interesting contribution, Moskovljević (1935) 146 points that, already in the 19th century, the word “nauka” designated merely the science, while “nauk” mostly meant advice, instruction.

theory of rhetoric. The only question which remains unclear is whether he was directly influenced by some, probably shortened, version of Quintilian (several compendia of the *Institutio oratoria* were circulating all over Europe by the end of 18th century) or whether the influence came via an intermediary, through Grigely.

Overall, the structure, terminology, and definitions in Mrazović's manual look back to Quintilian. On several occasions, however, Mrazović employs explanations, examples, and other features that have no ancient precedent. This is why it is not easy to say that his manual was a systematic reception of Quintilian. Mrazović was following Grigely on several occasions, but he often differs from him in important nuances (like in his hesitation to use the Slaveno-Serbian equivalent for the word *rhetoric*/ *ritorika*). A particular flavour of Mrazović's work is that it includes several practical rhetorical examples and speeches, many of them come from antiquity. At least this selection of peculiar examples of ancient forensic orations is unique.

Looking to make his own contribution, Mrazović was also trying to find or to coin new national words for different classical rhetorical notions, but he remained strongly attached to the ancient, mostly Latin, terminology. He often uses doublets (Slaveno-Serbian and Latin notions correspondingly) in an evident endeavour to educate not only pupils but also a wider circle of readers in classical Latin rhetorical vocabulary. For some reason Mrazović uses the specific Slavic word *krasnorečije* to denote the content of his book, avoiding the word *rhetoric* that is used by Grigely. One may have a feeling that he was searching for the most similar Slaveno-Serbian term to Latin *eloquentia* or even more to ancient Greek *kallilogia*. His *krasnorečije* was borrowed from Russian Lomonosov, as a kind of translation of the classical Greek *kallilogia*. His quotations of ancient authors do not often represent precise translations of the sources, but it is open for discussion whether it was due to carelessness or his wish to slightly adapt classical texts to the national language and contemporary readers.

Although he basically wrote his book as a manual for the pupils, Mrazović evidently wanted to affect the general cultural level of Serbian society, to encourage use of a proper and effective national language based upon ancient rhetoric and, more generally, to contribute to national science, culture, and the nation-building process by exploiting classical foundations.

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PART 2

Thematic Chapters



SECTION 1

The Genres, Techniques, and Features of Rhetoric



The Persuasive Potential of Epideictic Rhetoric: Ancient Past and Contemporary Reception

Takis Poulakos

1 Introduction

When Aristotle classified the art of rhetoric into three genres, the epideictic genre emerged as the weakest in terms of persuasion, since the hearers addressed in epideictic speeches are said to be spectators rather than judges or critics, and the end to be attained – the honourable or the disgraceful – does not seek to prompt audiences to judgment or action. Yet, Aristotle pointed indirectly to the persuasive potential of epideictic oratory when he noted that “praise and counsel have a common aspect; for what you might suggest in counselling becomes encomium by a change in the phrase” (*Rhetoric* 1.9.36). In other words, he identified an implicitly persuasive feature in epideictic oratory that could be discerned once praise is viewed from the angle of exhortation: “if you desire to praise, look what you would suggest; if you desire to suggest, look what you would praise” (1.9.38). Yet, rather than generating an inquiry into the persuasive potential of epideictic, Aristotle’s readers focused instead on underscoring the inferiority of epideictic to its political and forensic counterparts. For example, the renowned Aristotelian commentator E.M. Cope understood the function of epideictic rhetoric as pure self-display: *epideixeis* are “speeches composed merely to display skill in composition” (I: 51). Elsewhere, Cope describes epideictic as the “demonstrative, showy, ostentatious, declamatory kind: so called because speeches of this sort are composed for ‘show’ or ‘exhibition,’ *epideixis*, and their object is to display the orator’s powers, and to amuse an audience.”¹

Cope’s devaluation of epideictic – which proved influential to the genre’s reception for many decades – is understandable, given the disdain that ancients prior to Aristotle had expressed toward epideictic speeches by the Sophists. It is this disdain that Isocrates enhanced and perpetuated when he exposed the Sophists as fraudulent teachers composing speeches “worse than those which some laymen improvise” (*Against the Sophists* 9), and accused

1 Cope (1867) 121.

them of demonstrating their presumed knowledge of rhetoric by choosing “to praise bumblebees and salt and kindred topics” (*Helen* 12). These pejorative comments have been taken as evidence that most epideictic speeches are synonymous with inconsequential performances devoid of any significant purpose other than the speaker’s self-display and the auditors’ amusement. Nevertheless, the point is often missed that Isocrates’ scornful remarks above were not directed against the version that epideictic had taken under the older Sophists, but the version of triviality it had degenerated into, one generation later in the hands of self-proclaimed teachers – “the sophists who have lately sprung up and have very recently embraced these pretensions” (*Against the Sophists* 19). Indeed, Isocrates followed the example of the older Sophists and tapped into the persuasive potential of epideictic, albeit in his own distinct manner. As argued in the present chapter, Isocrates banked heavily on the hold that epideictic can have on auditors – hence, his reconceptualisation and reappropriation of rhetoric as the art of promoting the welfare of the *polis* by eliciting collective identification.

Unlike Cope and like-minded scholars, this chapter examines the persuasive dimension of epideictic rhetoric by exploring the distinct treatment it received in the hands of two older Sophists as well as Isocrates, and by considering how each use of epideictic in the classical era appropriated the genre’s previously established ends within new cultural formations and toward new purposes. By examining three uses of epideictic, this chapter seeks to lend credence to the argument that ancient rhetoric is not a monolithic entity, and that studies about its contemporary reception cannot always presume a stable point of origin in the past. Indeed, part of the purpose behind tracing the changing configurations that epideictic rhetoric assumed under Protagoras, Gorgias, and Isocrates is to dramatise the fact that ancient rhetoric is a fluid and living art form, drawing its energy from constantly changing contexts that continue to reshape its formal elements and redefine its persuasive ends. The chapter concludes by taking a brief look at two famous instances of epideictic oratory in the modern era, Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech and Ted Kennedy’s eulogy to his brother Robert Kennedy, and by making the case that the modern uses of ancient epideictic rhetoric attests to a genre which continues to evolve while maintaining remarkable continuities with the distant past.

2 Epideictic Rhetoric and the Sophists

The tradition of epideictic rhetoric begins with the older Sophists, who advertised their new craft to potential students through novel renderings of

mythical stories familiar to their audiences.² Delivered as lectures before audiences gathered to witness the new art of rhetoric, these pieces displayed the Sophists' ability to teach prospective students how to use language eloquently and persuasively as well as their skill in adapting myths to the new context of democratic self-governance. The two most famous examples of epideictic rhetoric, Protagoras' *Great Speech* and Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen*, exhibit the orators' ability to recount stories borne out of the epic era, laden with heroic ideals, and adjust them to the new realities of the democratic *polis*. Carrying on the Homeric tradition of using myths to instruct and delight, Protagoras and Gorgias recount these mythical stories in ways that not only display their linguistic talents to entertain their hearers, but also urge them to entertain new possibilities of being and acting in the world.

As reported in Plato's dialogue *Protagoras*, Protagoras' *Great Speech* recounts the origin and development of civilised life. According to the speech, the first crucial step in the process of civilisation was made possible by Prometheus, who stole the fire from the gods and bestowed fire upon humankind along with the basic arts of survival. Using Prometheus' gifts, humans discovered the power to protect themselves from wild animals, build shelters, and construct cities. They also used these same arts to make weapons and engage in warfare – which gradually put them on the path to destroying one another. Seeing humans headed toward extinction, Zeus felt sorry for them and intervened by giving them the civic arts – including the art of political deliberation – thereby enabling them to live together not as an aggregate of individuals but as a socially coherent whole.

In his rendering of this well-known myth, Protagoras divides the process of civilised life into two stages and assigns Prometheus' fire a central role only during the first. The second and more advanced stage – in which aggregates of individuals transform themselves into unified entities – is characterised by deliberating practices that enable them to form societies and to determine for themselves the direction of their life. By inserting political deliberation into the story of Prometheus, Protagoras projects an old myth onto the present, a time when the Athenians were not merely men but citizens actively engaged in their own collective welfare, and when Athens was not merely a geographical space housing a random population but a *polis*, a self-governing entity relying on "a smith's or a cobbler's counsel in public affairs" (*Protagoras* 324c). In effect, Protagoras reshapes a familiar myth in a way that made existing deliberative practices in the Assembly seem to be guided by an ideal – an ideal

2 Poulakos (1994).

soliciting citizens to internalise it and to pursue the excellence manifested in its efficacy through the strategic deployment of language.

While Protagoras claims to be teaching an art that the Athenians were already practising, Socrates was quick to pick up on the apparent inconsistency of this claim: how is it possible, he asks, to assert oneself as a teacher of a *technē* that the Athenians learn to develop through their upbringing rather than through their knowledge of the *technē*? Furthermore, if the art of public deliberation could be taught, why are there so many examples of well-to-do youth who, though surrounded by the best teachers, could never master it? Protagoras' answer – the city of flute-players – addresses Socrates' question through the distinction between competence and excellence. In a city whose very existence depends on its citizens' skill to perform a given art, it is natural that citizens acquire competence through their interaction with fellow citizens. Yet, neither social interaction nor teaching can guarantee excellence – which requires talent. It is this difference between competence and excellence that supports Protagoras' claim to be a teacher of an art that cannot be duplicated by mere knowledge of the rules of the art. It is also this difference that illuminates Protagoras' view of public deliberation as the highest ideal in a democratic city.

In Protagoras' rendering, existing deliberating practices in the Assembly are cast as an ongoing ensemble of exchanges in which the excellent few interact with the competent many, in a setting that allows as much for the expression of untutored opinions as for sound judgments, common-sense advice, and insightful proposals alike. Within this setting, deliberation is assessed not by means of a priori standards of a *technē* but in terms of the art's beneficial impact on the entire community – which means that excellence in deliberation can only be situation dependent, contingent to the limits and possibilities faced by the city at any given moment.

The example of the flute-playing city clarifies Protagoras' process of articulating ideals through language: his manner of retelling an old myth constitutes the members of the democratic city as a political collectivity bound by nothing other than the imperative to ensure the free exchange of everyone's desires and interests as well as by the vision to have a city whose only laws issue from the wishes of its citizens. Indeed, as the example of the flute-playing city suggests, when the only goal for a city is to secure the open circulation of citizens' desires and interests, the resulting self-governance becomes the best expression of citizens' collective wishes. Far more than a piece of self-display, Protagoras' speech shows what he professes to teach: the method of using language to make ideals tangible by giving them a presence that resonates with the audience's experiences of reality. The *Great Speech* performs a process of

rhetorical making – the act of taking an imperfect aspect of everyday life, submitting it to the workings of language and re-presenting it in its ideal version. As we also see with Gorgias, it is this rhetorical making that bears the hallmark of Sophistic epideictic.

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Gorgias similarly recounted ancient myths and adjusted them to contemporary audiences. At a time when the process of democratisation fostered public arguments and circulated new ideas, Gorgias showed through his *Encomium of Helen* how nearly all prior beliefs can be challenged.³ Under the sway of his words, Helen – whose reputation had been fixed by tradition as the person who betrayed her husband, her king, and her city-state – is defended as an innocent woman abducted to Troy against her will by being subjected either to the will of the gods, the force of human *bia* (rape), the charms of seductive *erōs* (love), or the power of *logos* (speech, argument). By aligning *logos* with the archaic forces of necessity – divine will, human violence, and erotic love – Gorgias assigns to speech an equal force, a force that can easily subdue human beliefs by means of its ability to enter hearers, bewitch their soul, and change their opinion. At the same time, Gorgias performs the power of *logos* by fashioning his own speech along the lines of typical courtroom practices – advancing an irrefutable argument in defence of the accused.

In addition to functioning as a self-display that exhibits the speaker's mastery of language, the *Encomium of Helen* acts as a showpiece of the capacity of language to transcend reality and forge a world beyond the known and unlike anything we have experienced. Following the tradition of poets like Pindar and Simonides, who used the praise (*epainos*) of athlete-victors as a springboard to a metaphysical realm where the essence of victory could be revealed in its glory,⁴ Gorgias uses the story of Helen as an impetus to the task of capturing the ineffability of *logos*. Tantamount to incantation and witchcraft, speech is said to be as tricky and violent as magic, inflicting pain and creating joy at will, producing suffering and pity, dismantling beliefs, and altering opinions. In Gorgias' formulation, the effect of spoken words on the human *psychē* is identical to the effect of drugs on the human body: they can heal or poison, remedy or destroy. Depicted as a powerful lord with an invisible body, *logos* is shown to be capable of entering the human *psychē*, banishing grief, and

3 Sprague (1972).

4 Lattimore (1985); de Romilly (1985).

alleviating suffering, creating longing and nurturing pity, as well as merging with the unstable opinion of the soul and deceiving it with false arguments.

Unlike Protagoras, who used epideictic to foreground political deliberation as an ideal that remained tacit behind everyday practices in the Assembly, illuminate it, and make viewers witness its grandeur, Gorgias mobilises epideictic to capture something ineffable and give it life within the imagined and the possible – a *polis* where *logos* exhibits its power by altering views no matter how entrenched they may be. Both epideictic gestures draw their energy from the cultural resources at the time, a period when the rapid process of democratisation, along with the shift of power from blood relations to effective public speaking, afforded hopes for a better world as well as dreams for a possible world.⁵ At its very beginnings then, epideictic rhetoric was channelled into two different tracks, each with its own persuasive potential. Protagoras understood humans as deficient and saw language as the only means of compensating for their inadequacies. His recount of the process of civilised life casts this lack as an inherent trait of their nature, which can only be overcome through deliberation, and which can help them create a more complete version of themselves and their world. Taken in conjunction with his example of the flute-playing city, the *Great Speech* reveals the extent to which citizens of a democratic city-state can improve their lot when they assert their agency over the project of remaking their world by mobilising the art of political deliberation.⁶ On the other hand, Gorgias understood humans as capable of excess and saw language as a resource to transcend the world and transform it. Tapping on the non-referential properties of language, Gorgias forged a fantastic world that sustained itself by its detachment from reality and its suspension of the familiar. Taken in conjunction with *On the Non-existent*, his *Encomium of Helen* displays the workings of language in the process of crafting a world from the depths of human imagination. Together, Protagoras and Gorgias took a generic form away from the didactic hold of the poets and stamped their own indelible imprint upon it by subjecting it to two distinct gestures of rhetorical making: the making of the ideal and the making of the possible. Both gestures sought to elicit the audience's identification as human agents that could either improve or transform their world.

5 Poulakos (1983).

6 Poulakos (2017).

3 Epideictic Rhetoric and Isocrates

In Isocrates' hands, epideictic rhetoric assumed the generic form as we commonly know it today, the praise of a person, place, or idea. In the preamble to an early work, the *Helen*, he critiques Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen*, claiming that his predecessor's exoneration of Helen from ill repute does not amount to praise – and goes on to give his own version of an encomium to Helen, which culminates in a hymn to beauty. Setting himself apart from his contemporaries, who displayed their eloquence by choosing “to praise bumblebees and salt and kindred topics” (*Helen* 12), Isocrates presents himself as continuing the poetic tradition of praising honourable subjects through hymns and *epainoi*, and declares that we should only “praise those who excel in some good quality” (*Helen* 15) and aspire to emulate the example of the poets by lauding virtuous persons in prose (*Evagoras* 8). Even though a much older Isocrates noted in the *Panathenaicus* that his *Helen* amounted to little more than a youthful composition, his strategy to praise Helen's beauty as the single force that unified the scattered Hellenes in an expedition against Troy gives us a reliable indication of the prominent place he assigned to epideictic within his unique conception of rhetoric – which departed significantly from the sophistic notion of rhetoric.

To be sure, Isocrates considered the development of the art of rhetoric under the Sophists to be virtually complete – something illustrated by his repeated reference to the field throughout his writings as “the things about speech” (*ta tou logou*). What remained incomplete – and what he regarded as his contribution – was the application of the art toward the advancement of the welfare of the *polis*.⁷ As he says in the *Antidosis*, knowledge of the art is fairly easy for dedicated students to master; but its application takes years of practice, and oftentimes requires collaboration between teacher and student: “both have a part in the exercises of practical application.”⁸ What he means by “practical application” is, first, the ability to discern which course of action might be the best available option for the city at any given moment and, second, the talent to employ one's ability with language so as to illuminate the course of action proposed and cast it as the most desirable to and beneficial for the *polis*. This two-pronged meaning of practical application signals the core transformation that the art of rhetoric underwent under Isocrates and accounts for his insistence on describing rhetoric as entailing both *legein* and *phronein*, eloquence and reflection. It explains why Isocrates understood his program in rhetorical

⁷ Poulakos (1997).

⁸ Poulakos (1997) 187–188.

education as *philosophia*, and why he presented it as a challenge to Plato's abstract understanding of philosophy: oriented toward practical wisdom, philosophical training in Isocrates' school involved the study of the wherefrom and the whereto of Athens, and sought to decipher the best option available to the *polis*.⁹ It also explains why he speaks about *legein* as both eloquence and persuasion, displaying the orator's ability to delight and benefit hearers. As he remarks in the *Panegyricus*, "I have singled out as the highest kind of oratory that which deals with the greatest affairs and, while best displaying (*epideiknyousi*) the ability of those who speak, brings most profit to those who hear" (4–5). Clearly, Isocrates wove the persuasive potential of epideictic into his conception of rhetoric.

In the *Helen*, we witness the earliest and most definite signs of the new direction epideictic was to assume under Isocrates' guidance. His hymn to beauty – as an excellence integral both to the character of Helen and to the culture of the Greeks from ancient to contemporary times – attests to his effort to situate encomiastic praise within a space where the subject of praise may be invested with and attached to an ideal already revered by the audience. The influence of Gorgias – who is purported to be his teacher – is evident here. Like Gorgias' *logos*, Isocrates' beauty is depicted as a powerful ruler that governs men's conduct: "we submit more willingly to be the slaves of [those who possess beauty] than to rule all others ... we revile those who fall under the power of anything other than beauty ... but those who are subservient to beauty we regard as lovers of beauty and lovers of service" (57). Unlike Gorgias, Isocrates uses the ideal of beauty not as lever to transcend the world but as a signifier of the common values that bind his auditors together. In addition, once shared values function as bonds for auditors, Isocrates points to a concrete path they can pursue to realise these values in action: just as Helen's beauty unified the Hellenes against Troy, so should our shared reverence to beauty remind us of our commonalities as Hellenes and compel us to unite in an expedition against the Persians at present.

The *Helen* illustrates Isocrates' view of philosophy as practical wisdom: "I hold that man to be wise who is able by his powers of conjecture to arrive generally at the best course and ... who occupies himself with the studies from which he will most quickly gain that kind of insight (*phronēsis*)" (*Antidosis* 271). The conclusion of his own study of Athens' predicament – at a time when the Athenian Empire had lost its power and Athens had become equipotent with three other Greek cities – was that only a unified, pre-emptive attack against the Persians would save Greece from annihilation should the Persians gather

9 Poulakos (2004).

strength to invade Greece once again.¹⁰ His conjecture that this indeed is the best course of action for Greece is supported by his vast knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the Persians, which he lays out elaborately in the *Panegyricus*, a work said to have taken him ten years to compose. *Legein* enacts *phronein* – as the praise of Helen, playful and youthful as it might be, serves the function of an eloquent discourse that delights but may also inspire auditors to see themselves differently and to put the orator's practical wisdom to action. The influence of Protagoras is unmistakable. Like Protagoras who used epideictic to constitute his auditors as a collectivity formed around an ideal, Isocrates also regarded the genre of epideictic as being conducive to an act of praise that exalted ideals and consolidated auditors into a unified “we.” But there is also a stark difference here. For unlike Protagoras, who sought to forge a collectivity in the *polis*, Isocrates crafted a collectivity for the benefit of the *polis*, i.e., a collectivity that – once elicited based on shared values and strengthened by the opposition between the Hellenic “us” and the Persian “them” – could be rallied toward action and directed to pursue the “common good” of the *polis*.

In effect, Isocrates followed Protagoras' conception of epideictic but gave it a decidedly practical orientation, seeking to use praise for the purpose of eliciting a collectivity that could then be subjected to persuasion. This is most evident in the *Panegyricus* where the glorification of Athens as a leader over the rest of Hellas – a glorification erected on a lengthy mythical and historical account of Athenian practices and customs – functions much like a sound warrant to the claim that Athens deserves to assume leadership over the Greeks in the recommended Panhellenic expedition against the Persian empire. Unlike his youthful approach in the *Helen*, the *Panegyricus* perfects the Isocratean version of epideictic, a lengthy form of praise that does not merely display the orator's eloquence, but also his capacity to elaborate the praiseworthiness of his topic through amplification. This version of epideictic coincides with Aristotle's remarks that “in epideictic speeches, amplification is employed, as a rule, to prove that things are honourable or useful” (*Rhetoric* 3.17.3, 1417b3), and that “amplification is most suitable for epideictic speakers, whose subject is actions that are not disputed so that all that remains to be done is to attribute beauty and importance to them” (*Rhetoric* 1.9.40, 1368a40). In addition to perfecting the form of his own version of epideictic, Isocrates makes explicit its persuasive potential: establishing Athens' greatness through amplified praise leads seamlessly to a course of action that seems most fitting to the city's noble heritage. In contemporary parlance, persuasion presumes identification: once

auditors identify as citizens of a renowned *polis*, they may be persuaded to act in a manner that perpetuates the renown of their city.

In *Evagoras*, Isocrates gives the form of epideictic yet another turn which seems to be a perfect instantiation of Aristotle's subsequent formulation of the genre as entailing praise founded on deeds (*praxeōn epainos*) and of encomiastic praise as grounded on achievements (*enkōmion ergōn*) (*Rhetoric* 1.9.32 ff., 1367b32 ff.).¹¹ It was on this basis that Aristotle critiqued Isocrates for exalting Helen through other people's praises of her, not through her own deeds – though he remains silent over Isocrates' praise of Evagoras, even as he confirms the king's goodness (*Rhetoric* 2.23.12). In the introduction to the *Evagoras*, Isocrates claims that his encomiastic praise of the late king follows the example of the poets and, like them, lauds the virtue of an honourable person so that others might emulate his virtuous conduct.¹² But he gives specificity to the didactic thrust of the poetic encomium by casting his laudatory account as an exhortation to Nicocles – Evagoras' son and successor to the throne of Cyprus – to pattern his reign along his father's virtuous conduct. Typical of his other works, Isocrates uses the preamble to boast about his own excellence in composing this oration, as well as about the novelty of his undertaking. What is uncharacteristic about this work is the fact that he encases his account with an introduction and a conclusion, both of which function as an exhortation to Nicocles. By assigning praise in the *Evagoras* with the task of persuading future conduct, Isocrates completes his project of infusing the genre with persuasion based on the past (*Helen*) and on the present (*Panegyricus*), as well as placing his own stamp on the form he inherited from Protagoras and Gorgias.

4 Epideictic Rhetoric in Contemporary America

Two famous speeches during the decade of the sixties, Martin Luther King Jr.'s "I Have a Dream" and Ted Kennedy's eulogy of his brother, Robert Kennedy, demonstrate that the genre of epideictic rhetoric, as it was employed by the older sophists and Isocrates, continued to be a cultural resource available to speakers in modern times. To be sure, the combination of formal elements and purposes advanced by ancient epideictic was inextricably connected to the context within which it flourished: the limited democracy of the *polis*. The re-emergence of ancient epideictic under the radically different context of the 1960's attests to its remarkable durability and impressive pliability across time

¹¹ Poulakos (1987).

¹² Poulakos (2016).

and place. In the revolutionary era of the sixties, when the project at hand was not to sustain but to expand democracy, the repetition of ancient uses of epideictic – albeit adjusted to this new context and to the new set of valuations animating it – is astounding. Naturally, it would be naive to assume that such a repetition could be taken as an indication of familiarity audiences in the sixties had with classical Greek rhetoric. In this chapter, the issue with contemporary reception is theoretical, not historical. Indeed, the constitutive function of language, i.e., the ability of discourse to function more than the referential, is available to all speakers. And what epideictic speakers constitute through language – and what accounts for the continuity of the genre – is the making of collectivities: the act of uniting individuals under, and eliciting their identification with, a larger “we.” What changes with each historical moment is whom they unite, what type of political and social collectivities they draw together, and what identities they call into being. The speeches by Martin Luther King and Ted Kennedy give us an opportunity to witness epideictic at work, during a time of great upheaval when individuals embracing change had yet to be unified into larger socio-political collectivities. They also enable us to appreciate the changes and continuities in the generic configurations that the genre exhibits in ancient and modern times.

In typical epideictic fashion, the two speakers craft their speeches in terms of praise and blame – praise of the principles of the Declaration of Independence and blame of a society that has yet to actualise these principles in all aspects of everyday life. Fashioning the eulogy of his brother around a man “who saw wrong and tried to right it,” Ted Kennedy lauds the “thirty-two-year-old Thomas Jefferson who proclaimed that all men are created equal,” and points to “the imperfection of human justice and the inadequacy of human compassion,” while Martin Luther King Jr. exalts the “unalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” bestowed upon Americans, and goes on to recast these rights as guarantees that have yet to be honoured by a society that still holds Blacks “on a lonely island of poverty in the midst of a vast ocean of prosperity.”

Reflecting the spirit of their times, both speakers take on the project of perfecting the Union by tapping on rhetorical formations we have seen emerge in ancient epideictic: the making of an ideal and the making of the possible. Protagoras’ construction of a collectivity around an ideal is present in the two speeches. So is Gorgias’ fashioning of a possible, imagined world that transcends the realm of the here-and-now. Similarly, Isocrates’ commitment to give ideals a practical turn and to make collectivities subject to persuasion is also present here. Though palpable and detectable throughout Kennedy’s and King’s speeches, the presence of ancient configurations of epideictic signals

no mere repetition of the past. Far from it, Kennedy's and King's use of the epideictic genre exhibit new combinations of formal elements and purposes that put us on the track of identifying the modern iteration of ancient epideictic. Indeed, both speakers follow a remarkably similar manner of mobilising the generic resources of an era long bygone: both integrate the three distinct instances of epideictic that we identified in the works of Protagoras, Gorgias, and Isocrates – i.e., the rhetorical formations that constructed the ideal, the possible, and the practical – into an indissolubly single entity with the purpose to change America into a more inclusive and more equitable democracy.

Like Protagoras, Ted Kennedy takes an ideal and fashions a “we” around it. Shown to be embraced by Robert Kennedy's beliefs and practices, the ideal put forth is having a social conscience and being propelled by the imperative to fight against injustice to correct the wrongs of this world as well as the human suffering they generate. Ted Kennedy consolidates a “we” by making it seem as the outcome of a “bond of common faith” and the inevitable result of an awareness “that those who live with us are our brothers, that they share with us the same short moment of life; and that they seek – as we do – nothing but the chance to live out their lives in purpose and happiness, winning what satisfaction and fulfillment they can.” As he is shedding light on an ideal, Kennedy ensures – as Isocrates does with Protagoras – that the majesty of the ideal can be seen as reachable within this world, and that its splendour can be understood as attainable in the here-and-now. Like Isocrates, in other words, Kennedy takes an ideal and displays it as an eventuality, something feasible and impending, bound to occur. He does this by attributing the ideal of having a social conscience to the youth of his generation, whom he describes as brave men and women with “the courage to enter the moral conflict,” and with the will “to brave the disapproval of their fellows, the censure of their colleagues, the wrath of their society.” Framing this ideal within the context of the turbulent sixties, Kennedy presents it as something already occurring, something spreading by those with “the moral courage ... to change a world that yields most painfully to change” and “find themselves with companions in every corner of the globe” as they confront those “who cling to a present that is already dying.” The ideal seems even more attainable as he augments the category of “youth” to include people with a youthful spirit, “not a time of life but a state of mind, a temper of the will, a quality of imagination, a predominance of courage over timidity.”

In the same spirit, Martin Luther King Jr. integrates the two epideictic configurations we discerned in Protagoras and Isocrates. He forges a collective “we” around the ideal of justice and, like Protagoras, gives it concreteness by means of a narrative, a long journey for blacks that began in slavery and carried

on through the Emancipation Proclamation – that “great beacon light of hope” that this decree shone upon “millions of Negro slaves who had been seared in the flames of withering injustice.” The journey is shown to continue for another one-hundred years under “the manacles of segregation and the chains of discrimination,” and finally to arrive to the present, the day when thousands of demonstrators “stand on the warm threshold which leads to the palace of justice.” Then he goes on to augment that collectivity by means of the shared commitment for justice that binds Whites and Blacks together: “for many of our white brothers, as evidenced by their presence here today, have come to realise that their destiny is tied up with our destiny.” In addition, he strengthens the collective “we” by the principles that mark the struggle for and the journey toward justice: “we must forever conduct our struggle on the high plane of dignity and discipline, we must rise to the majestic heights of meeting physical force with soul force.” Like Isocrates, who gave ideals a practical orientation by bringing them to the argumentative terrain of politics, he combines the journey to the ideal of justice with the political demand for justice in the here-and-now: “Now is the time to lift our nation from the quick sands of racial injustice to the solid rock of brotherhood.” In effect, he combines the Protagorean strategy of making a political collectivity with the Isocratean strategy of persuading this collective to act: “And there will be neither rest nor tranquility in America until the Negro is granted his citizenship rights. The whirlwinds of revolt will continue to shake the foundations of our nation until the bright day of justice emerges.” Martin Luther King’s rhetorical mastery lies in the way he forges a near certainty out of the uncertainty of political change. Rather than relying on the strength of his message about the “fierce urgency of now,” he goes on to make change appear as inevitable by pointing to the future, a time when the dream will be realised as his “four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the colour of their skin but by the content of their character.” By placing the dream of attaining justice not on the present but on the horizon of the next generation, Martin Luther King renders the dream feasible, probable, even inevitable – and does so by means of a simple image: “little black boys and black girls will be able to join hands with little white boys and white girls as sisters and brothers.”

In addition to blending Protagoras’ and Isocrates’ distinct uses of the epideictic, Martin Luther King Jr. and Ted Kennedy add to their genre configurations the gesture associated with Gorgias’ use of epideictic to create an imaginary world beyond the realm of the real. But whereas Gorgias forges the possible by relying on the workings of imagination alone, King and Kennedy craft the possible in synchrony with the ideal and the actual. Indeed, King’s words make up a transcendental world where Christian faith reigns supreme

and has the power to make the ineffable tangible in the imagination of his auditors. Like *logos* in Gorgias' speech, faith in this speech exhibits transformative, magical qualities: it can alleviate suffering and remedy desperation, "able to hew out of the mountain of despair a stone of hope." Having the power to transport human beings to a place beyond reality and to refigure the known world, faith can shed light on the realm of the imagined and the possible where "the glory of the Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together." Unlike Gorgias' *logos*, King's faith works in conjunction with political advocacy. Under the sway of faith, life is said to be raised to new heights of justice where inequalities will be levelled out and "every valley shall be exalted, every hill and mountain shall be made low." And each individual voice will contribute equally to a collective song of real and spiritual redemption. Even as it lies beyond this world, then, the possible works in unison with political change: "With this faith we will be able to transform the jangling discords of our nation into a beautiful symphony of brotherhood."

A similar effort is made by Kennedy to craft an imagined possible world in a way that blends the ideal with the actual, so as to create a single inextricable epideictic form charged with the sole purpose of bringing about change. Kennedy achieves this by constructing an imagined version of history. No longer attached to the commonsensical view of "great men" history at the time, this new version subscribes to the imagined notion that each person possessing a social conscience may become the author of history. In Kennedy's words, "(e)ach time a man stands up for an ideal, or acts to improve the lot of others, or strikes out against injustice, he sends forth a tiny ripple of hope, and crossing each other from a million different sources of energy and daring, those ripples build a current that can sweep down the mightiest walls of oppression and resistance." As magical as Gorgias' *logos*, this new version of history – constructed out of the workings of the imagination – makes historical change issue from ordinary individuals and, by extension, turns every individual into an author of history and an agent of collective destiny. Unlike Gorgias' *logos*, this imagined version of history works not independently of worldly endeavours but in conjunction with them, joining in and helping to actualise the project of change: "It is ... neither fate nor nature nor the irresistible tides of history, but the work of our own hands ... that will determine our destiny."

Taken together, Martin Luther King Jr.'s speech and Ted Kennedy's eulogy demonstrate an epideictic form of rhetorical making that takes up Protagoras', Gorgias', and Isocrates' use of epideictic in relation to three distinct projects of improving our lot – by forging a political collectivity based on an ideal, by charging this collectivity with feasible expectations, or by forging an imagined world – and by redesigning these three disjointed gestures into one project

that binds the ideal, the real, and the possible and realigns them to serve a shared purpose. In this sense, the dream that Martin Luther King expresses is a single dream that exalts the making of a better world along the combined terms of ideal desires, real expectations, and imagined wishes. A similar exaltation characterises the eulogy of Ted Kennedy, whose effort to depict people with a social conscience as members of a generation leading the rest of us to improve the world by embracing ideals, engaging politics, and writing our own history, may be best captured by Robert Kennedy's own words that also mark the end of Ted Kennedy's speech: "Some men see things as they are and say why. I dream of things that never were and say why not."

5 Conclusion

Endorsing his teacher's preference for two forms of poetic praise, hymns to the gods and encomia of good men (*Republic* 607a4), Aristotle devotes most of his remarks about epideictic rhetoric to encomiastic praise, i.e., commending virtue and exalting achievements. His lengthy discussion about the components of virtue (*Rhetoric* 1.9.9), along with his comment that "achievements are signs of moral habit" (1.9.33), explain his preference for these two forms of praise. Aware of the constitutive power of epideictic, Aristotle understood that speakers praising good men could serve a moral function in the *polis* through displays of deeds that reveal and inspire virtuous conduct. Even as he acknowledged the persuasive impact that epideictic could have on audiences, Aristotle limited the range of that impact to values circulating in the *polis*. An understanding of epideictic as a carrier of mainstream valuations alone does not acknowledge the organic tendency associated with genre forms to evolve into new combinations of features and ends that may challenge or contest dominant valuations. Nor does it acknowledge the uses made of epideictic in orations before Aristotle's time.

Indeed, pre-Aristotelian epideictic rhetoric draws our attention to a broader persuasive thrust of the genre, including the use of praise for the purpose of contesting rather than upholding mainstream valuations. Protagoras, for example, praised political deliberation as an art that could lead to a radical democracy, provided that agents of deliberation could express persuasively the collective wishes of citizens – if the *polis*, in other words, resembled the flute-playing city where excellent flute playing was determined by the collective tastes and interests of all flute players. At a time when democracy in Athens was at an early stage, his suggestion for a radical democracy must have been regarded as much of a revolutionary idea as was his "man-measure" principle. Through

his praise of Helen, Gorgias glorified the individual potential of every citizen to speak against normative views and to dismantle mainstream opinions at a time when unification was highly valued by the city-state. And Isocrates gave epideictic a prominent role in the affairs of the *polis* as he used the praises of Helen and Athens to advocate a change in foreign policy consistent with the emerging but still minor cultural sentiment of Panhellenism. In short, pre-Aristotelian rhetoric tells the story of the epideictic genre as an effective carrier of alternative valuations.

The uses of the epideictic genre in America during the modern era continue on this same trajectory, though in new combinations of forms and ends that give performative language a new reach in the political landscape. Martin Luther King Jr.'s and Ted Kennedy's speeches show how a realignment of ancient configurations of the genre – associated with distinct efforts to improve the world along the lines of the ideal, the possible, and the actual – can work as an effective strategy to address contemporary issues of justice and equality, even as they assume new forms of identification and social identity. Their speeches are indexes of reception that unfolds by reconfiguring traditional forms in ways that guide the persuasive and transformative properties of the genre to the novel mission of serving social justice, particularly during times of upheaval. Indeed, epideictic rhetoric may have realised the heights of its potential as a force of persuasion in its deployment by civil rights advocates during the decade of the sixties for the purpose of transforming America into a more inclusive and more equitable democracy. It remains to be seen how it may be mobilised strategically at present to meet the globally unprecedented challenges of our times.

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The Reception of *Paradeigma* in Late Greek Rhetorical Theory

M. Carmen Encinas Reguero

1 Introduction

It is usually accepted that rhetoric as *technē*, understood as an ensemble of rules which are consciously applied to reach the desired target, emerged in the 5th century BCE¹ in Syracuse, and from there soon passed to Athens. The first handbook of rhetoric is attributed to Corax and Tisias² (Cic. *Brut.* 46–48),³ both of them linked to the birth of rhetoric in Syracuse. However, it seems that in the 5th century BCE some other treatises of rhetoric were in existence too (cf., for example, Pl. *Phdr.* 266d; Arist. *SE* 184a–b; Isoc. 13.19). According to some scholars, these nascent *technai rhētorikai*, which, of course, are not preserved, were no more than model speeches.⁴ Some other scholars, however, think that they already included theoretical teachings.⁵ And still others differentiate between, on the one hand, the works of the Sophists, which consisted essentially of model speeches or even of parts of speeches, and, on the other hand, the theory of rhetoric gradually developed by Tisias, Thrasyarchus, Theodorus, and others.⁶

1 Some authors, as Cole (1991b) or Schiappa (1999) place the beginning of rhetoric in the 4th century BCE.

2 The relation between Corax and Tisias is disputed. Although Corax is mostly considered the inventor of rhetoric and the teacher of Tisias, Cole (1991a) 65–84, for example, defends the idea that Corax and Tisias are one and the same person. All the preserved testimonies making reference to Corax and Tisias are collected in Radermacher (1951) 28–35.

3 Although Cicero attributes that information to Aristotle, the Stagirite in *Rh.* 2.24, 1402a18 mentions only Corax, and Plato in *Phaedrus* 273c only quotes the name of Tisias. But not only Corax and Tisias strive to be the creators of rhetoric. Other sources, such as Diogenes Laertius 8.57, Sextus Empiricus, *Against Dogmatists* 1.6 (these two authors defer as their authority to Aristotle in his work *Sophist*) or Quintilian 3.1.8, attribute the honour to Empedocles. Hinks (1940) 61 deals with the issue and defends the idea that the creators of rhetoric were Corax and Tisias, and not Empedocles.

4 Cf. Gercke (1897) 341–359; Cole (1991b) 71–94.

5 Cf. Wilcox (1942) 137–141; Reinhardt (2007).

6 Cf. Kennedy (1959).

In any case, the first preserved handbooks of rhetorical theory are the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, attributed to Anaximenes of Lampsacus,⁷ and Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, both works of the 4th century BCE.⁸ In both handbooks the example or *paradeigma* is one of the most important *pisteis* or proofs.⁹ In concrete terms, example is, in those works, the most relevant argumentative resource together with *eikos* or probability (in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*) or the enthymeme (in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*). However, in the Stagirite's work, which creates a correlation between the *technē rhētorikē* and dialectic (*Rh.* 1354a1), the example or *paradeigma* can be a resource comparable to induction (and, as such, with the same level of relevance as the enthymeme), as well as a source of the enthymeme (and, as such, subordinated to it). This fact results in that work offering a broader view of the functions of example or *paradeigma*.

This chapter analyses the way in which the classical, and mainly Aristotelian, view of example is received in the imperial period.¹⁰ In that period rhetoric experiences an era of splendour and becomes the basis of education in all of the Graeco-Roman world.¹¹ Generalist treatises were still written, such as the *Anonymus Sequerianus* (2nd century CE), Rufus' *Rhetoric* (2nd century CE), or Apsines of Gadara's *Rhetoric* (3rd century CE), all of them organised around the parts of speech (*prooimion*, narration, argument, and epilogue).¹² These

7 On the authorship of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, cf. Cope (1867) 406–414; Chiron (2002) xl–cvii.

8 Due mainly to the mention of certain historical facts and to the political atmosphere reflected in the work, it is believed that the *Rhetoric to Alexander* was written ca. 340 BCE; cf. Chiron (2011a) 240–241. For its part, it seems that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was written in phases (cf. Kennedy [1996]) over a period from 350 to 330 BCE; cf. Cope (1867) 36–49; Rapp (2002) 178–193; Chiron (2011a) 241–243. Most scholars consider that the *Rhetoric to Alexander* is earlier than the Aristotelian treatise. In contrast, Chiron (2004) 82 and (2011a) proposes an interspersed, instead of consecutive, composition of both works, so that the *Rhetoric to Alexander* would be later than a first writing of the Aristotelian *Rhetoric*, but earlier than the definitive writing of this treatise.

9 On *paradeigma*, cf. Ernesti (1795) s.v.; Alewell (1913); Jost (1936); Hauser (1974); Price (1975); Anderson (2000) s.v.

10 A summary of the history of the rhetorical handbooks is offered in Kennedy (1997) 20–37; Conte (2016).

11 In the imperial age numerous rhetorical treatises are written. Pernot (2005) 157 adduced two reasons for that: on the one hand, the necessity of handbooks within the education system and, on the other hand, the fact that rhetoric became an object of analysis in itself. On the reception of Greek rhetoric in the late antique East, see chapter 2 in this book.

12 Chiron (2007) 104–105 divides the *technai rhētorikai* into two groups, namely the generalist and the specialised treatises, and he distinguishes in each group four subgroups, so that he creates a classification with eight types of rhetorical handbooks. Patillon (2001b) 243–246 instead, differentiates between six possible schemes in the composition of rhetorical handbooks: parts of speech, oratorical genres, tasks of the orator, technical

generalist treatises follow to a large extent the Aristotelian work, since they differentiate between artistic and non-artistic proofs and in the former category they include the example or *paradeigma* and the enthymeme. But the way these treatises present the example leads one to think about certain questions, such as the relation between example and induction, the different ways to refute an example, or the delimitation of its contents.

This last question is especially interesting, because the Aristotelian view thereof is innovative and opposes that of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*. This work considers that example or *paradeigma* has to be historical, while the Stagirite holds that example can be historical as well as fictional, and under the fictional example he includes the parable (*παράβολή*) and the fable (*λόγος*) (*Rh.* 2.20, 1393a28–31). From then onwards the rhetorical handbooks of the imperial period make an effort to delimit the contents of the example, and most of them establish a distinction between the example or *paradeigma*, and the comparison or *parabolē*, moving away significantly from Aristotle.

But, in addition to the rhetorical generalist treatises, in the imperial period the exercises of rhetoric or *progymnasmata*¹³ (Theon called them *gymnasmata*) were set. *Progymnasmata* were understood as a series of preliminary exercises which prepared the student for the last phase of education, the elaboration of *μελέται* or *declamationes*, which included the *ὑποθέσεις δικανικαί* or *controversiae*, and the *ὑποθέσεις συμβουλευτικά* or *suasoriae*.¹⁴ Although many *progymnasmata*, without any doubt, were written,¹⁵ only those of four authors have been preserved, namely Theon (1st century CE),¹⁶ Pseudo-Hermogenes (probably 3rd century CE), Aphthonius (4th century CE),¹⁷ and Nicholas of Myra (5th century CE). In these treatises the scheme of proofs is not mentioned

and non-technical proofs, thesis and cause, and *status causae*. The problem is that each handbook can imply more than one form of composition. For example, in Rufus' *Rhetoric* Patillon (2001b) 255 finds, at least partially, six ways of composition. And the *Anonymus Segerianus* is structured according to the four parts of speech, but, in addition, these four parts constitute a theory of *inventio* and are followed by a final part devoted to *elocutio*; cf. Patillon (2005) v–vi.

13 On *progymnasmata*, cf. Webb (2001); Chiron (2017).

14 On declamation in Greece, cf. Russell (1983).

15 Heath (2002–2003) 129–141 collects a list of the attested, although not preserved, *progymnasmata*.

16 Theon's *Progymnasmata* are generally dated in the 1st century CE. However, the date is disputable and some scholars defend a later date. For example, Heath (2002–2003) 141–158 shows how Theon's work fits into the situation of the 4th and 5th centuries CE.

17 Aphthonius' treatise stood out above the rest (perhaps because he is the only one who accompanies the explanation of each exercise with an example, and exceptionally with two examples) and his *Progymnasmata* became the prototype of the genre. On the use of examples in Aphthonius' *Progymnasmata*, cf. Robert (2016).

at all, and the *paradeigma* hardly. But some of these rhetorical exercises can be related to the example, and oddly enough, in them the fictional example gains prominence at the same time as its argumentative function becomes of secondary importance.

In the following pages an analysis is made of the reception of example or *paradeigma* in the rhetorical treatises of the imperial period, paying attention mainly to the three points mentioned above, that is, the *paradeigma* as an argumentative resource, the contents of the *paradeigma*, and the *paradeigma* in the *progymnasmata*.¹⁸

2 The *Paradeigma* as an Argumentative Resource

In classical rhetorical theory, represented by the *Rhetoric to Alexander* and Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, the *paradeigma* is considered primarily an argumentative resource. Both handbooks divide the rhetorical proofs into technical/artistic proofs or *entechnoi pisteis*, and non-technical/non-artistic proofs or *atechnoi pisteis* (*Rh. Al.* 7.2, 1428a16–19; *Rh.* 1.2, 1355b35–39), although this terminology is only Aristotelian,¹⁹ and they include the *paradeigma*, understood as a fact (*illustrans*) different from the explained fact (*illustrandum*) but related to it generally because of its similarity, in the artistic proofs. Within this group both handbooks give priority to two proofs, although these, despite being similar, are not exactly the same in both cases.

The *Rhetoric to Alexander* includes seven proofs among the artistic proofs (*Rh. Al.* 7.2, 1428a20–23; cf. *Rh. Al.* 7.4–14.7, 1428a26–1431b8),²⁰ but the first two are more developed, these being the probability or *eikos* argument and the *paradeigma*. Both proofs are supplementary, in the sense that the *eikos* is “what is being said when the audience has examples in their thoughts” (Εἰκὸς μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, οὗ λεγόμενου παραδείγματα ἐν ταῖς διανοαῖς ἔχουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες, *Rh. Al.* 7.4, 1428a25–26),²¹ while the use of *paradeigma* is recommended when it is not possible to use probability (*Rh. Al.* 8.1–2, 1429a22–27; *Rh. Al.* 14.1, 1431a25–27).

Aristotle creates a more complex system, according to which the artistic proofs can be developed in the sphere of *ēthos*, *pathos* and *logos*, or *pragma* (*Rh.* 1.2, 1356a1–4), and through two means, which are the *paradeigma* and the

18 The reception of *paradeigma* in late antiquity has been previously studied by Demoen (1996) 35–56; (1997).

19 On this division and the *pisteis* that each group includes in both authors, cf. Kraus (2011).

20 On these proofs, cf. Chiron (1998); Calboli Montefusco (2007); Kraus (2011) 268–274.

21 I use the edition of Fuhrmann (1966) (see also Chiron [2002]) and Mirhady's translation in Mayhew and Mirhady (2011).

enthymeme (*Rh.* 1.2, 1356b6–8; cf. *Rh.* 2.20, 1393a24–25). Since the enthymeme is developed from the probable or *eikos* (also from the sign or *sēmeion*; *Rh.* 1.2, 1357a31–32), the pair of *paradeigma* and enthymeme is similar (although not identical) to the pair that the *Rhetoric to Alexander* establishes of *eikos* and *paradeigma*.²²

In explaining the *paradeigma* and the enthymeme, Aristotle equates them with induction and the syllogism respectively (*Rh.* 1.2, 1356b2–6), so that the *paradeigma* proves from particular cases and the enthymeme does so from general premises (*Rh.* 1.2, 1356b14–18). But in the second book of *Rhetoric* the example appears also as a source of enthymemes, together with probability and signs, conclusive or not (*Rh.* 2.25, 1402b13–14). From this it is concluded that the example in Aristotle can be two things, a proof similar to induction,²³ as well as a source of enthymemes, in the sense that it supplies the premise of an argument. In accordance with this distinction, the term *paradeigma* designates in Aristotle the resource as a whole, comparable to induction, as well as the *illustrantia* or elements which are related to the *illustrandum* through similarity. In both senses the *paradeigma* is, or plays a part in, a method of reasoning.²⁴ However, how is this view of the example received in the late rhetorical treatises?

In the generalising treatises from the 2nd and 3rd centuries CE, where the theory of Hermogenes is still not meaningful (Hermogenes starts having strong influence only from the 4th century CE on), the rhetoric is still largely Aristotelian.²⁵ In these treatises the *paradeigma* continues to be primarily an argumentative resource.

This happens in the *Art of Political Speech* (*Τέχνη τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου*), generally known as *Anonymus Sequerianus*,²⁶ which was probably a summary made by a student collecting the opinions of several authors.²⁷ The treatise has been

22 I follow for Aristotle's *Rhetoric* the edition of Dufour (1967).

23 On induction in Aristotle, cf. Fritz (1964).

24 On example in the handbooks of the classical period, see a more detailed discussion in Encinas Reguero (2017a) 44–54.

25 “Before the victory of Hermogenes, rhetoric as taught in Greek schools seems to have been a development of concepts originating with Aristotle but modified by the system of stasis theory developed by Hermagoras of Temnos in the second century before Christ, by the taxonomy of tropes and figures to which grammarians contributed, and by the increasing role of declamation in the schools”; cf. Kennedy in Dilts and Kennedy (1997) ix.

26 See the editions of Dilts and Kennedy (1997), Vottero (2004), and Patillon (2005).

27 Cf. Kennedy in Dilts and Kennedy (1997) xi–xiv and Kennedy (2003a) 300. Kennedy disagrees with the proposal made in 1891 by Graeven, who understood this work as an epitome of a lost work of Cornutus.

dated towards the end of the 2nd and the beginning of the 3rd century CE²⁸ and is structured around the four parts of speech: *prooimion*, narrative, proofs, and epilogue.

Following Aristotle's lead, the *Anonymus Seguerianus* differentiates between artistic and non-artistic proofs (§145). And within the artistic proofs, those derived from the art, it distinguishes two species: *paradeigma* and enthymeme (§146). But the *Anonymus Seguerianus* awards this division to Alexander and, hereafter, it offers the division of Neocles (§147), according to which the two species are those which derive from *pathos* and those which derive from the evidence or *pragma* (note that the *ethos* mentioned by Aristotle is left out). These last ones are developed through probability, signs, and the *paradeigma* (§149).²⁹ In these two classifications the two views of Aristotle are reproduced, that is, the *paradeigma* can be a type of artistic proof, on the same level as the enthymeme, and also a source of and consequently subordinated to the enthymeme. From this point on, the handbook explains each of these elements: probability (§149–150), *tekmērion* and *sêmeion* (§151–153), and *paradeigma* (§154–156). And after the *paradeigma*, the handbook explains the enthymeme (§157 ff.), so that the positioning of *paradeigma* is strategic because it can make a pair with the enthymeme, whose explanation follows, or be one of the methods of reasoning from the *pragma*, like probability and signs, whose explanation precedes.

Regarding the definition of the *paradeigma*, the *Anonymus Seguerianus* collects the definitions of three rhetors: Neocles, Alexander, and Zeno.³⁰ According to Neocles (§154), the *paradeigma* is “a likeness and similarity and probability to a fact under question, from which, as a starting point, one would think it right to regard likenesses in a like way and applicable to the question under discussion” (ἐμφερές καὶ ὅμοιον καὶ εἰκὸς τῷ ζητούμενῳ πράγματι, ἀφ’ οὗ ὁρμώμενος ἂν τις ἀξιῶσαι ὁμοίως τὰ ὅμοια φρονεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ζητουμένου).³¹ For Alexander (§155) “*paradeigma* is language drawing from the particular either to (another) particular or the universal, or from like to like” (παράδειγμά ἐστι

28 Cf. Dilts and Kennedy (1997) xiii, Vottero (2004) 93–95.

29 On this point there is an interesting difference between the edition of Dilts and Kennedy (1997) 42–43, which mentions only three forms: probability, sign (τεκμήριον), and example, and, on the other hand, the edition of Patillon (2005), which adds the σημείον.

30 As Kennedy (2003a) 300 stresses, this handbook is especially interesting, since it identifies the sources from which each idea comes, something not very usual in the handbooks of Greek rhetoric from the imperial period. On the sources of the *Anonymus Seguerianus*, cf. Patillon (2005) xxxii–lxxiv.

31 I use for the *Anonymus Seguerianus* the edition and translation by Dilts and Kennedy (1997).

λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἤτοι ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἐπάγων ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἐπὶ τὸ ὅμοιον). And, finally, according to Zeno (§156), “*paradeigma* is a reminder of something that has happened for comparison with what is now under discussion” (παράδειγμά ἐστι γενομένου πράγματος ἀπομνημόνευσις εἰς ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ νῦν ζητουμένου).

Common to the three definitions is the consideration that the *paradeigma* establishes a link between two questions (*illustrans* and *illustrandum*) based on a relation of similarity. The one who most emphasises and develops this idea is Neocles, who, besides, includes probability almost as a form of similarity, which is not strange since *paradeigma* is “ein Teil des *comparabile*, das selbst wieder ein Teil des *probabile* ist.”³² Alexander emphasises the fact that example implies not only a relation of the part to the part or of the similar to the similar, as Aristotle said, but also of the part to the whole, to the universal, which is the consubstantial to induction, but which is not clearly considered in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*.³³ Finally, Zeno’s definition stresses that the content of *paradeigma* is something that has happened, omitting the possibility that the *paradeigma* can have a fictional content, as Aristotle claims (*Rh.* 2.20, 1393a28–31). So, each of these three definitions places emphasis on one concrete aspect of the *paradeigma*.

In order to refute a *paradeigma* classical rhetoric considers two possibilities: using a counter-example or saying that the given examples are not appropriate or similar to the *illustrandum* (*Rh. Al.* 36.33, 1443b38–41; *Rh.* 2.25, 1403a5–10). In contrast, the *Anonymus Seguerianus* includes three possibilities (§187): saying that the example is false, claiming that the circumstances are different and do not imply similarity, or dissenting over the way in which the example is applied. From these three possibilities the first one in particular stands out; it implies, in line with the definition of Zeno, that the example should be historical and not fictional, which would create a big difference from Aristotle, in whose view examples could be fictional as well as real (*Rh.* 2.20, 1393a28–31).

In any case, the possibilities of refutation are increased in Apsines of Gadara’s *Rhetoric*, a treatise from the 3rd century CE which, it seems, Apsines could not bring to a conclusion and was thus finished by one of his students.³⁴

32 Cf. Martin (1974) 119.

33 Aristotle makes it clear that the *paradeigma* implies a relation of the part to the part (*Rh.* 1357b26–30), which implies an essential difference with regard to the induction, where it goes from the part to the whole (*Top.* 105a13–14). This difference between παράδειγμα and induction or ἐπαγωγή is made explicit in the *Prior Analytics* by the philosopher himself, who explains, in addition, that induction proves from all the concrete cases and the example only from some of them (*APr.* 69a17–19).

34 On Apsines’ *Rhetoric*, see the editions of Dilts and Kennedy (1997) and of Patillon (2001a).

In its chapter 7 this treatise catalogues at least five ways of refutation of the example, namely through contradiction (§7.1), through a difference (§7.2), through the consequence (§7.3), through the counter-argumentation of an authority (§7.4), and finally through the inversion of the argument (§7.5).

3 The Content of the *Paradeigma*

One of the essential topics regarding the *paradeigma* is the delimitation of its content. In fact, on this point there was already a disagreement in the classical period, since the *Rhetoric to Alexander* considers that example has to be historical (*Rh. Al.* 8.14, 1430a6–8) and preferably referring to recent events or, at least, to well-known events (*Rh. Al.* 32.3, 1439a1–4), whereas Aristotle distinguishes between examples departing from historical events and invented or fictional examples, including the parable (παράβολή) and the fable (λόγος) (*Rh.* 2.20, 1393a28–31).³⁵

The content of *paradeigma* or example and its differentiation with regard mainly to the *parabolē* or comparison is a question addressed in some treatises. In Apsines of Gadara's *Rhetoric* the *epicheirēma*, a word with which in the late period logical proof is designated,³⁶ is divided into *paradeigma* and enthymeme (8.1), following the path indicated by Aristotle. Chapter 6 of that treatise is dedicated to the *paradeigma* and it starts by differentiating it from the comparison:³⁷ “A *parabolē* (or comparison) differs from a *paradeigma* (or example) in this, that the *parabolē* is taken from something inanimate or from irrational living things. *Paradeigmata*, on the other hand, are taken from persons of the past” (παράβολή παραδείγματος τούτω διαφέρει, ὅτι ἡ μὲν παράβολή ἀπ’ ἀψύχων ἢ ἀλόγων λαμβάνεται ... τὰ δὲ παραδείγματα ἐκ γεγονότων ἤδη λαμβάνεται προσώπων, 6.1).³⁸

35 On the differences of reasoning implied by the example, the parable and the fable, cf. Coenen (1992) 329–335. According to Price (1975) 42, the parable is “an analogy whose *illustrantia* are drawn from the real everyday world” and it differs from historical example, firstly, in that it describes the activities of types and not of specific people and, secondly, in that it can be hypothetical. The fable, for its part, is totally fictional and is usually located in an unreal world.

36 The word *epicheirēma* is used by Aristotle to designate a dialectic inference based on probabilities (*Top.* 162a16), but in late antiquity it is used with regard to a rhetorical proof in general, that is, what Aristotle called *pistis*. On the concept of *epicheirēma*, cf. Meador (1964) 54–57.

37 It has been supposed that there is a gap before chapter 6, where a definition of the example was probably included.

38 I use for Apsines' *Rhetoric* the edition and translation of Dils and Kennedy (1997).

On the one hand, Apsines considers the *paradeigma* a resource similar to comparison, which implies, although its definition is not preserved, that he saw it as a resource based on a relationship of similarity between *illustrans* and *illustrandum*.³⁹ On the other hand, Apsines considers that the specific quality of the *paradeigma* is its historical content. The real events on which the example is based can be, according to Apsines, domestic or foreign. The domestic ones are preferred, although foreign events are not to be totally rejected (6.2). If the *Rhetoric to Alexander* gives priority to examples close in time, Apsines' *Rhetoric* prioritises examples close from an affective or emotional point of view.

Furthermore, coinciding with classical sources, Apsines also advises that examples be well known and clear, not too remote nor mythical, closely related to the issue under discussion, and not very long (6.6). Regarding their inclusion in the speech, this treatise explains that it is not common to use the *paradeigma* in the *prooimion*, unlike in the remaining parts of the speech, and that the conclusions derived from the *paradeigma* can appear before or after (6.7).⁴⁰

In his *Rhetoric* Rufus organises the matter of arguments, distinguishing also between non-artistic and artistic proofs. But in the last group he distinguishes arguments based on people, on facts, and on examples (§27). Arguments based on example include the example itself (*paradeigma*), the comparison (*parabolē*), and the hypothesis (§30). The difference is that the *paradeigma* is the mention of a past event because of its similarity with the subject matter (§31); the *parabolē* is the mention of a real and present event because of its similarity with the subject matter (§32); and the argument based on hypothesis is neither past nor present, but arises from a hypothesis made by the orator (§33).⁴¹

In the treatise of Minucianus entitled *On Epicheiremes* (*Περὶ ἐπιχειρημάτων*) or *De argumentis* (3rd century CE), the author starts again from the Aristotelian division between artistic and non-artistic proofs, and classifies the first ones into ethical, pathetic, and logical or pragmatic. The proofs are manifested in *epicheirēmata*, which can be paradigmatic or enthymematic. And the paradigmatic *epicheirēmata* derive “from history and from a comparison of events which have already occurred” (παραδειγματικά μὲν ὅσα ἐξ ἱστορίας καὶ ὁμοιώσεως

39 Cf. Patillon (2001a) lix.

40 Aristotle recommends using the *paradeigma* as demonstration in the absence of an enthymeme (*Rh.* 2.20, 1394a9–10), but he recommends using it as a testimony when there are enthymemes, and to do it as their epilogue (*Rh.* 2.20, 1394a13–16).

41 On Rufus' *Rhetoric*, see the edition of Patillon (2001b).

τῶν ἤδη πεπραγμένων λαμβάνομεν, *Rh. Gr. I*, 418.2–3 Spengel).⁴² Furthermore, in order to function, examples have to be familiar to the listeners and appropriate to the subject matter (*Rh. Gr. I*, 418.11–12 Spengel). At a later stage Minucianus also includes in the paradigmatic *epicheirēmata* comparisons (*parabolai*) and similes (*eikones*) (τοῦ παραδειγματικοῦ εἴδους εἰσι καὶ αἱ καλούμεναι παραβολαὶ καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες, *Rh. Gr. I* 418.28–29 Spengel). The difference between the *paradeigma* and the *parabolē* is that *paradeigma* is taken from history and *parabolē* arises from events that may have happened in an undetermined moment, but without a reference to history (*Rh. Gr. I*, 418.29–32 Spengel), a difference that coincides with the one established by Aristotle. For its part, the simile (εἰκὼν) is similar to the *parabolē*, but it makes the speech more vivid, so that the listener thinks he sees it (*Rh. Gr. I*, 419.2–4 Spengel). This implies an interpretation of εἰκὼν as a stylistic similarity, something close to that which can be found in Aristotle, where εἰκὼν designates the comparison as an aesthetic resource and is a type of metaphor, while the παραβολή makes reference to an argumentative resource and is a type of παράδειγμα.⁴³ Nevertheless, according to Minucianus, the *paradeigma* itself is included in the paradigmatic arguments, along with the *parabolē* and the *eikon*. But Minucianus ends the section dedicated to the example by adding that “those stories which belong to fables are also in the class of examples” (παραδειγματικὰ δὲ καὶ ὅσα εἰς μύθους ἀνήκει, *Rh. Gr. I*, 419.10–11 Spengel), by which he seems to indicate that fictional stories too can be an example. So, Minucianus differentiates in the *paradeigma*: the historical example or *paradeigma*, the *parabolē* or comparison (the simile or *eikon* is linked to this *parabolē*), and the *mythos* or fictional story, that Aristotle calls *logos*. In that way Minucianus’ classification seems to integrate all the elements that are significant in the Aristotelian system concerning this matter.⁴⁴

42 I use for Minucianus the edition of Spengel (1853) and the translation of Meador (1964).

43 In order to designate the comparison in Greek there are essentially four words, namely εἰκὼν, παραβολή, εἰκασία, and ὁμοίωσις; cf. McCall (1969) ix. Among these words εἰκὼν is the main one and the earliest attested. In Plato παραβολή and ὁμοίωσις start being used; and in Aristotle the words used to designate the comparison are εἰκὼν and παραβολή, cf. McCall (1969) 1–24. On the relation between the *paradeigma* and the idea of similarity in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, cf. Encinas Reguero (2017b).

44 Similarly to Minucianus, but in a treatise of a different type (Περὶ τρόπων or *On Figures*), Trypho includes in the concept of similarity or ὁμοίωσις three figures: εἰκὼν, παράδειγμα, and παραβολή (*Rh. Gr. III*, 200.4–6 Spengel). In his definition of these elements Trypho makes it clear that the *paradeigma* refers to real and past events (*Rh. Gr. III*, 200.21–23 Spengel), and it differs from the *parabolē* in that this last refers to undetermined and possible events (*Rh. Gr. III*, 200.31–201.2 Spengel).

These rhetors (the *Anonymus Segerianus*, Apsines, Rufus, and Minucianus), therefore, divide the proofs in the Aristotelian way between *atechnoi* and *entechnoi pisteis*, designate logical proof as *epicheirēma*, and further divide it into *paradeigma* and enthymeme. For his part, Pseudo-Hermogenes in his treatise *On Invention* (*Περὶ εὐρέσεως* or *De inventione*) tries to relate the argumentation to *stasis* theory.⁴⁵ This treatise, composed of four books, focuses on *inventio*, but organises itself around the three parts of the speech (*prooimion* or preamble, *diēgēsis* or narrative, and *kataskēuē* or confirmation of proofs) and dedicates the fourth book to issues of style. The beginning of the third book explains that the refutation of a point or κεφάλαιον requires a λύσις, supported by ἐπιχείρημα, elaborated by ἐργασία, and it concludes with ἐνθύμημα. The *ergasia* is, therefore, necessary for the confirmation of the *epicheirēma* and it derives from the comparison, the example, the lesser, the greater, the like, and the contrary (ἀπὸ παραβολῆς, ἀπὸ παραδείγματος, ἀπὸ μικροτέρου, ἀπὸ μείζονος, ἀπὸ ἴσου, ἀπὸ ἐναντίου, Rabe in Rabe and Kennedy, p. 98.6–8). That is, the *ergasia* is comparable to the *paradeigma*.

However, the differentiation established in this treatise implies a re-elaboration of classical theory. Aristotle affirms simply that the *paradeigma* implies a relation of the similar to the similar (*Rh.* 1.2, 1357b28–30). Anaximenes, instead, mentions two types of relation when he differentiates between examples in line with the reasonable (κατὰ λόγον) and those contrary to the reasonable (παρὰ λόγον) (*Rh. Al.* 8.2, 1429a27–29). In the late antique period, however, Apsines says that the *paradeigma* is “the strongest thing in speaking” (ἰσχυρότατον ἐν λόγῳ) and that it can derive “from like, from contrary, from greater, from lesser” (ἀπὸ ὁμοίου, ἀπ’ ἐναντίου, ἀπὸ μείζονος, ἀπ’ ἐλάττονος, §6.8). Being “the strongest thing” is odd, because in Aristotle it seems that the probationary strength of the enthymeme is considered superior.⁴⁶ On the other hand, the

45 In the Hellenistic period *inventio* is expanded to include *stasis* theory, that is, the technique of determining the central question of a speech and designing the strategy to follow in the argumentation. Concretely, *stasis* theory was formulated by Hermagoras of Temnos in the 2nd century BCE, but his treatise was lost and we know it through the version of Hermogenes of Tarsus (2nd century CE). On the process of formation of *stasis* theory from Hermagoras to Hermogenes, cf. Nadeau (1959). On *stasis* theory, cf. Kennedy (1983) 73–86; Calboli Montefusco (1986). The work of Hermogenes of Tarsus did not initially have great success (it seems that, at the time, the handbook of Minucianus had greater success), but it became the essential handbook of rhetoric from the 5th to the 15th century CE; cf. Kennedy (1983) 73–74.

46 Although in the beginning *paradeigma* and enthymeme are put on the same level of relevance (*Rh.* 1.2, 1356b18–25), later Aristotle claims that “induction is not suitable to rhetorical discourses except in a few cases” (τοῖς δὲ ῥητορικοῖς οὐκ οἰκείον ἐπαγωγὴ πλὴν ἐν ὀλίγοις, *Rh.* 2.20, 1394a12–13). The supremacy of the enthymeme over the example can

classification of Apsines, as well as that offered by Pseudo-Hermogenes, takes into account a higher type of relation between *illustrans* and *illustrandum*.

Nevertheless, although the system created in the treatise of Pseudo-Hermogenes is different, the *epicheirēma* depends on the *ergasia* and the enthymeme, and the *ergasia* in turn is based on a relation of similarity and includes as main forms the *paradeigma* and the *parabolē*, so that the Aristotelian scheme is still maintained to a large extent.

4 The *Paradeigma* in the *Progymnasmata*

As has been seen, many treatises include the *paradeigma* in the treatment of argumentation. It is a different situation, however, with the *progymnasmata*, where the scheme of proofs is not mentioned and the *paradeigma* is hardly mentioned.

As has been explained, only the *progymnasmata* of four authors have been preserved, namely Theon, Pseudo-Hermogenes, Aphthonius, and Nicholas of Myra. Among all of them, the *Progymnasmata* of Aphthonius, which include fourteen exercises (*mythos*, *diēgēma*, *chreia*, *gnōmē*, *anaskeuē*, *kataskeuē*, *koinos topos*, *enkōmion*, *psogos*, *synkrisis*, *ēthopoia*, *ekphrasis*,⁴⁷ *thesis*, and *nomou eisphora*), became the prototype of the genre. Some of these exercises can be related to the *paradeigma*, although they are not designated as such. Narration, *chreia*, and comparison have been mentioned in that sense.⁴⁸ But, in my opinion, it would be more accurate to relate the *paradeigma* to fable, narration, and comparison.

The *mythos* or fable is the first of the progymnasmatic exercises and it is defined as “a fictive statement, imaging truth” (λόγος ψευδῆς εἰκονίζων ἀλήθειαν; Aphthonius 1.1 Patillon).⁴⁹ On his part, Theon (§73) claims that fable can receive different names: *mythos*, *ainos*, and *logos*. This last designation is the one used by Aristotle, who in his *Rhetoric* considers that the fable or *logos* is a type of fictional example (*Rh.* 2.20, 1393a28–31). Therefore, the *progymnasmata*

also be appreciated in other passages of the *Rhetoric*. See, for example, *Rh.* 1.1, 1354a15, where enthymeme is described as “the ‘body’ of persuasion” (σῶμα τῆς πίστεως) or *Rh.* 1.1, 1355a6–8: “rhetorical *apodeixis* is enthymeme (and this is, generally speaking, the strongest of the *pisteis*)” (ἔστι δ’ ἀπόδειξις ῥητορικὴ ἐνθύμημα, καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀπλῶς κυριώτατον τῶν πίστεων). On this, cf. Cope (1867) 107–108.

47 On *ekphrasis*, cf. Webb (2009).

48 Cf. Demoen (1996) 47.

49 I use for Aphthonius the edition of Patillon (2008) and the translation of Kennedy (2003b).

as well as Aristotle emphasise the fact that the fable is a fictive narrative, but Aristotle integrates it in his rhetorical construct through the example, while in the *progymnasmata* the attention is focused primarily on its composition.⁵⁰

Yet the fable functions as an illustration of a moral lesson that can be placed in the beginning as well as at the end of the fable (Aphthonius 1.3), and the fable itself is paradigmatically related to an account, which it can precede or follow (Theon 74–75). In essence, the fable is either a concrete and fictional account from which a general truth is extracted, as in inductive and nuanced reasoning, as in the Aristotelian example,⁵¹ or an account related to another through similarity.

The second progymnasmatic exercise is the narrative or *diēgēma*, defined as “an exposition of an action that has happened or as though it had happened” (ἔκθεσις πράγματος γεγονότος ἢ ὡς γεγονότος, Aphthonius 2.1 Patillon). This definition establishes a connection between the narrative and the historical example (which has happened),⁵² but perhaps also between the narrative and the fictional example designated as *parabolē*.⁵³ So, in these first two exercises (fable and narrative), the three types of examples pointed out by Aristotle (at least, the two essential types: the fictional and historical example) are apparently brought together.

However, although Aristotle includes in the *paradeigma* the historical as well as the fictional example, he seems to give priority to the historical example, since it is the one he uses to explain what the *paradeigma* is (*Rh.* 1.2, 1357b30–36). But in the late period the fictive narrative becomes very important, perhaps, among other things, because of the function of the *progymnasmata* in the scholar's education.⁵⁴ As a result, the concept of *enargeia* (Lat.

50 In the *Anonymus Seguerianus* (§99) *mythos* is dealt with in the section devoted to the narrative. Concretely, “l'Anonyme appelle μῦθος une narration dans la narration, plus précisément une narration fictive dans une narration réaliste”; cf. Chiron (201b) 38.

51 Aristotle says that the example goes from the part to the part (*Rh.* 1357b26–30); this statement disagrees with the definition of induction, which goes from the particular to the general (*Top.* 105a13–14). This is one of the differences between *paradeigma* and induction (cf. n. 34). But, the reality is that, when Aristotle exemplifies the *paradeigma*, he finishes with a general sentence (*Rh.* 1357b35–36), which shows that in Aristotle the *παράδειγμα* goes, effectively, from the particular to the particular, but passing through the universal; cf. Encinas Reguero (2017b) 243–245.

52 The sayings and events of the past can be an important argument. That is why Aristotle recognises the relevance for the orator of knowing his history (*Rh.* 1.4, 1360a33–37).

53 On the parable, cf. n. 35.

54 According to Webb (2001) 301, “While historical themes were common in declamation, at this earlier stage (*progymnasmata*) students made more use of the mythological figures and narratives which were synonymous with poetry.”

evidentia) is developed, which indicates that the described element can be vividly imagined by the listener or, as Nicholas of Myra says, seeks to turn the listeners into spectators (Nicholas of Myra 68–70).⁵⁵

The fact is that the *progymnasmata* provide elemental forms of speech and models from which the students can compose their productions, either in the sphere of political speech or in the sphere of literary expression. Thus, the argumentation in these treatises is deemed of secondary importance.

The pair formed by the *paradeigma* and the *parabolē*, so prominent in other rhetorical handbooks, is mentioned in the *progymnasmata* as well, but here the two are elements from which the *chreia* or anecdote (Aphthonius 3.3 Patillon) and even the *gnōmē* (Aphthonius 4.3 Patillon) can be composed, and the difference between them is not explained. Furthermore, among the *progymnasmatic* exercises *synkrisis* or comparison is also included; it is defined as “a comparison, made by setting things side by side, bringing the greater together with what is compared to it” (λόγος ἀντεξεταστικός ἐκ παραθέσεως συνάγων τῷ παραβαλλομένῳ τὸ μείζον, Aphthonius 10.1 Patillon). In this definition it seems clear that there is an *illustrans* and an *illustrandum*, as in the *paradeigma* and in the *parabolē*, but the relationship between them is of opposition instead of similarity, and as a consequence of that relationship between *illustrans* and *illustrandum*, the *illustrans* has the effect of emphasising the value of the *illustrandum*. The inductive value that exists in the Aristotelian *parabolē* is minimised, therefore, in the *progymnasmatic synkrisis*.

But there is another important consideration, and it concerns the fact that Aphthonius assumes that there can be comparison involving “both persons and things, occasions and places, dumb animals, and, in addition, plants” (πρόσωπα τε καὶ πράγματα, καιρούς τε καὶ τόπους, ἄλογα ζῷα καὶ πρὸς τούτοις φυτά, Aphthonius 10.2 Patillon). So, while *paradeigma* and *parabolē* are differentiated to a large extent according to their content, *synkrisis* seems to imply a different type of reasoning. That is, *synkrisis* separates itself from *paradeigma* and is presented as a specific resource at the service of the encomium or the

55 As Webb (1997) 344–345 explains, a form of *mimēsis* shared by poetry and rhetoric is the representation of a person, action or place through the narrative or description. So, the idea of *enargeia* acquires an important role in Hellenistic and Roman rhetorical theory. But Longinus is the only one who suggests a difference between the use of *phantasia* in poetry and in rhetoric. In poetry the result is one of astonishment, that is, the impact on the audience, while the rhetor looks for clarity, which, combined with argumentation, produces persuasion (Pseudo-Longinus, *On the Sublime* 15.2 and 15.9). On the relation between poetry and rhetoric, cf. Webb (1997). On Longinus' treatise see chapter 10 in this book.

vituperation,⁵⁶ since it establishes an opposition between two elements which deserve a different valuation, aiming not to support an argumentation, but to give, by opposition, more brilliance to a character.

5 Conclusion

Classical rhetoric, especially Aristotle, lays the essential foundations for the definition of *paradeigma*, explaining its argumentative function and its possible contents. The main characteristics of the *paradeigma* remain in the late antique period, although the view of that figure is gradually enriched. To begin with, in consonance with the double meaning of the *paradeigma* in Aristotle, in the late period too there are paradigmatic examples opposed to the enthymematic ones, and the *paradeigma* and the *parabolē* are included among them (in late antiquity the fable or *logos* is omitted in most cases); the *paradeigma* and the *parabolē* remain unfailingly linked, but they differ depending on diverse criteria: Aristotle differentiates *paradeigma* and *parabolē* because of their different grade of veracity; Apsines differentiates depending on whether they focus on rational or irrational creatures; Rufus differentiates depending on whether they refer to a past or a present event etc.

Moreover, in the imperial period, and later on during late antiquity, the methods of refutation are enriched and the types of relationship between *illustrans* and *illustrandum* increase, two aspects of the argumentation process that in classical rhetoric are not very developed. But perhaps the most important change refers to the function of the example. The *paradeigma* has, in general terms, three functions: “as an example, it makes generalisation possible; as an illustration, it provides support for an already established regularity; as a model, it encourages imitation.”⁵⁷ Classical rhetoric and most of late rhetoric focus on the first two functions, but with time the third function becomes increasingly prominent, which explains the medieval success of the collections of *exempla*.⁵⁸

56 On encomium and vituperation, see chapters 5 and 8 in this book.

57 Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, repr. 1971) 350.

58 On the medieval *exemplum*, see the summary of Demoen (1996) 54–55.

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Reading Pliny's *Panegyricus* within the Context of Late Antiquity and the Early Modern Period

William J. Dominik

The only extant Roman panegyric known to have survived until late antiquity is the younger Pliny's so-called *Panegyricus* to Trajan, who at the time of Pliny's delivery of the speech in September 100 CE had only been emperor for a few years (since January 98 CE). In addition to a brief introduction (*Pan.* 1–4), the *Panegyricus* consists of a description of Trajan's early career (5–10), an extended account of his career as emperor (11–80), an outline of his virtues (81–89), and Pliny's expressions of gratitude to Trajan and the senate (90–95). The *Panegyricus* is one of the twelve prose panegyrics that comprise what is known as the *XII Panegyrici Latini* (hereafter *Panegyrici Latini*).¹ The recognition of the precursory, generic role of Pliny's *Panegyricus* in the tradition of panegyric, including its *modus operandi*, is apparent through its positioning at the beginning of this collection of *exempla*.² Although there are numerous reminiscences of the *Panegyricus*' phrasing and *loci* in the panegyrics of late antiquity (3rd–7th centuries CE),³ the panegyrists did not slavishly imitate it

- 1 All references to the *XII Panegyrici Latini* are from Mynors (1964). Consonantal “u” (uppercase “V”) and “i” are used in all Latin quotations. All translations in this chapter are my own.
- 2 The dates of the manuscripts of the remaining eleven panegyrics of the *Panegyrici Latini* (presented generally in reverse chronological order), which were designed to serve as *exempla* of the genre, fall within a space of a century from 289 to 389 CE and were addressed to the emperors Constantius (*Pan. Lat.* 8 [297 CE?]), Maximian (*Pan. Lat.* 7 [307 CE], 10 [289 CE], 11 [291 CE]), Constantine (*Pan. Lat.* 4 [321 CE], 5 [311 CE], 6 [310 CE], 7 [307 CE], 12 [313 CE]), Julian (*Pan. Lat.* 3 [362 CE]), and Theodosius (*Pan. Lat.* 2 [389 CE]).
- 3 In addition to the numerous *loci* of late antique panegyrics and other works that recall those in Pliny's *Panegyricus* (many of which are discussed in this chapter), there are numerous textual echoes of the latter in the former, for example, in *Panegyrici Latini* 6 and 7 (*Pan. Lat.* 6.3.3, 7.7.1, 7.7.3; cf. Pliny, *Pan.* 10.4), 9 (*Pan. Lat.* 9.251.1; cf. *Pan.* 11.2, 8.9.2), and 10 (e.g., *Pan. Lat.* 10.2.7, cf. *Pan.* 28.6; *Pan. Lat.* 10.3.1, cf. *Pan.* 6.3; *Pan. Lat.* 10.4.2, cf. *Pan.* 6.2), as there are of the *Panegyricus* in other late antique writers such as the 4th-century Symmachus (e.g., *Or.* 1.6 [ed. Pabst (1989)], cf. Pliny, *Pan.* 4.5; *Or.* 1.19, cf. *Pan.* 15.5; *Or.* 1.2, cf. *Pan.* 9.3) and Ausonius (e.g., *Grat. Act.* 21.1.3 [ed. Green (1991)]; cf. *Pan.* 94.2) and the late-sixth, early 7th-century Isidore (e.g., *Inst. Disc.* 11–12 [ed. Pascal (1957) 426–7; cf. Beeson (1913) 96], cf. *Pan.* 79.6; *Inst. Disc.* 17–20, cf. *Pan.* 82.6; *Inst. Disc.* 21–22, cf. *Pan.* 82.6; *Inst. Disc.* 25–31, cf. *Pan.* 81.1). For discussions of the influence of Pliny upon late antique writers, see Beeson (1913); Maguinness

but rather adapted it to suit the particular stylistic and encomiastic requirements demanded by the ceremonial occasion and political realities of the day.⁴ The early modern period (c.1500–c.1800) most obviously reveals the influence of the classical tradition of panegyric. The panegyrics of such figures as Juan Luis Vives, Desiderius Erasmus, Walter Haddon, Thomas Moore, John Gordon, John Evelyn, John Dryden, and Alexander Pope show that it was standard for writers to adapt the strategies of rhetorical treatises on epideictic as well as previous models of panegyric, including Pliny's *Panegyricus*. Intertextual references, including topical allusions and lexical references, bear witness to this literary phenomenon.

1 Panegyric and the *Panegyricus*

The basic theories of panegyric, including the praise of a king or ruler, can be attributed to Greek rhetoric of the second and third centuries CE, namely the *Peri Epideiktikōn* of Menander Rhetor and the *Technē peri tōn Panegyrikōn* traditionally attributed to Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Epideictic oratory, especially the praise of a ruler (*logos basilikos* or *laus regis*), was commonplace in the Greek world. The Roman world developed its own traditions of the *laudatio funebris*, the eulogy delivered at a funeral, and the *laudatio iudicialis*, the speech of praise in a courtroom. In the *Institutio oratoria* (3.7.10–18), Quintilian discusses the *laus hominum* ("praise of men") and its constituent elements (e.g., praise of country, parents, ancestors, character, physique, external circumstances, natural gifts, words and deeds), many of which appear in panegyric. During the empire panegyrics were composed not just for emperors but also for private individuals, though extant examples are rare (e.g., *Panegyricus Messallae*).⁵

Pliny's *Panegyricus* seems to consist almost entirely of flattery and to be consistent with the tradition of *laus imperatoris* or imperial praise. Only a small

(1932); Maguinness (1933); Garrison (1975); MacCormack (1975); Ronning (2007) 139–144; Rees (2011a); Burgersdijk (2013); García Ruiz (2013); B. Gibson (2013); R. Gibson (2013); Kelly (2013); Rees (2013); and Ware (2013).

4 The extent to which Pliny's *Panegyricus* served as a model for late antique panegyric is contested, with a number of scholars asserting its important role, e.g., Maguinness (1932) 43; Maguinness (1933) 119; Cameron (1965) 295 n. 4; MacCormack (1975) 35; Winterbottom (1983) 289; Dewar (2000) 539; Manolaraki (2008) 374; Ljubomirović (2015) 1420. Some other studies downplay the influence of Pliny's work: Vereecke (1975) 152–154; Rees (2011a); Gibson and Rees (2013) 153; Rees (2018) 261; cf. Formisano (2015) 84.

5 For an overview of the tradition of praise (and blame) in Roman oratory, including Pliny's *Panegyricus*, see Dominik and Smith (2011).

number of Latin prose and poetic panegyrics survive from the classical age and late antiquity in complete or fragmentary form, out of what must have been hundreds of such panegyrics. The *Panegyricus* seems not only to accord generally with the practice of imperial panegyric but also to show the relevance of the panegyric practice to Roman conditions during the empire. The necessity of flattering emperors such as Tiberius, Gaius, Claudius, and Nero for fear of the consequences is well attested, for example, in Tacitus, whose comments on the use of praise during the empire are especially instructive for reading the *Panegyricus* (e.g., *Ann.* 1.1, 1.10, 1.52, 14.15; *Hist.* 1.15; *Agr.* 2.1, 43.4). The reception of Pliny's *Panegyricus* in late antiquity and the early modern period reflects its formative role in the development of panegyric. Although the function of the *Panegyricus* is self-evidently laudatory on the surface, later iterations of panegyric suggest other potential functions of its narrative. Situations in the *Panegyricus* are not always as uncomplicated as they first appear.⁶

In our modern era panegyric, including the *Panegyricus* of Pliny, has been derided by numerous critics. Syme expresses his view that Pliny's *Panegyricus* "has done no good to the reputation of the author or the taste of his age"; Kennedy asserts that "[j]udged as a piece of oratory the *Panegyricus* is tiresome in the extreme"; Goodyear maintains that "it has fallen, not undeservedly, into almost universal contempt"; Champlin describes Pliny as "unleashing a host of repetitive platitudes"; and Seager describes the *Panegyricus* as "monotonous, repetitive and unimaginative effusion" and suggests it "might deter from further degustation by all but the most chalcenic."⁷ More generally, Allan describes all the extant Latin imperial panegyrics as "being nauseous to our taste," while Fitzgerald observes that "[i]t is often said, in a rather self-congratulatory way, that imperial panegyric is the aspect of Roman literary culture that is most difficult for us to appreciate, most alien to our tastes and experience."⁸

Perhaps this modern aversion to the flattery of emperors has something to do with the rise of dictatorship in the 20th century. In any case, while imperial panegyric may well be alien to the sensibilities of a modern audience, during the Renaissance and early modern period attitudes toward Pliny's *Panegyricus* were often different, as can be seen by the laudatory comments of humanists such as Giovanni Aurispa,⁹ Pier Candido Decembrio,¹⁰ and Gerardus Vossius.¹¹

6 Dominik and Smith (2011) 10.

7 Syme (1958) 114; Kennedy (1972) 546; Goodyear (1982) 660; Champlin (1982) 1037; Seager (1983) 129.

8 Allan (2014) 97; Fitzgerald (2007) 115; cf. Champlin (1982) 1037.

9 Cf. Sabbadini (1931) 83.

10 Cf. Rundle (1998) 151.

11 Vossius (1630) 409–410.

During these eras the *Panegyricus* is the chief *exemplum* of panegyric used by orators and cited by scholars. Critics were sensitive to the exaggerative tendency of panegyric, including Pliny's *Panegyric*, and sometimes attempted to explain it away, as when, for example, Thomas Holyoke defined "panegyric" as "a lascivious kind of speaking, wherein men do join in praising one, many lyes with flattery, but this was the abuse of it, the word itself signifies no such infamous kind of speaking. See Plinies Panegyrick to Trajan."¹² Given that excessive flattery is an essential ingredient of the genre of panegyric, there is a limit to the extent that the listener or reader needs to feel caught up in the encomiastic expatiation of the subject's virtues and deeds. Alongside the obligatory praise it is possible to detect a number of other functions of panegyric that assume an important critical role. The modern criticism levelled against the *Panegyricus* is largely attributable to its effusive flattery of the emperor, but the focus on this feature of the work has partly blinded readers to its more nuanced aspects.

The strategies available for reading Pliny's *Panegyricus* are based upon the various functions of epideictic not only in the social, political, and literary contexts of the Greek and Roman worlds,¹³ but also in those of late antiquity and the early modern period. An understanding of the use of panegyric during these ages can feed back into our understanding and appreciation of Pliny's *Panegyric* as a literary tour-de-force whose functions transcend those of merely flattering an autocrat.¹⁴ An examination of Pliny's narrative techniques in the *Panegyricus* and its reception (and that of Graeco-Roman panegyric generally) during late antiquity and the early modern period suggests that it had at least five functions. First, the *Panegyricus* can be read most obviously as praise, even if such a reading includes the potential for the instability or slippage of flattery; secondly, as ceremony and celebration; thirdly, as authorial self-positioning, self-fashioning and self-representation; fourthly, as exhortation, admonition, and advice, that is, as protreptic (or paraenetic) and didactic; and fifthly, as potential admonishment and criticism.

¹² Holyoke (1677) s.v. "panegyricum".

¹³ Dominik and Smith (2011) 10.

¹⁴ Recent interpretations or "readings" of Pliny's *Panegyricus* include (most recently) those of Morford (1992); Bartsch (1994) 148–187; Braund (1998) 90–100; Connolly (2009); and Noreña (2011).

2 The *Panegyricus* as Praise and Flattery

As the earliest extant imperial panegyric, the *Panegyricus* has often been read as a straightforward panegyric in honour of the emperor Trajan. This reading of the *Panegyricus* is consistent with interpretations of other panegyrics in late antiquity and the early modern period as constituting the sincere expressions of the sentiments of their authors about their rulers or patrons. A recent reading is that of Rees, who stresses the honesty and sincerity of Pliny's speech.¹⁵ Pliny expounds upon Trajan's virtues and deeds at considerable length in the course of discussing his early years, including his military exploits and his later successes under Domitian (*Pan.* 14.1–15.3), with suggestions of his nearly divine status sprinkled throughout the text (e.g., 1.3, 2.7, 7.5, 31.1–2, 40.3, 61.9, 63.1, 80.3–4, 88.8; cf. 2.3, 52.3). Through the citation and illustration of his imperial qualities and actions, Pliny constructs an image of Trajan as an ideal ruler. Such blandishment, like *any* writing, cannot be attested as being representative of the poet's true feelings, but singing the emperor's praises was a standard and necessary part of the panegyric tradition. It matters little whether Trajan, the *laudandus*, actually possessed the virtues and performed the actions attributed to him: the important point is they are part of the model that describes the type of conduct suitable for an emperor.

Seventy-two virtues (some of them similar in meaning or nuance) in the *Panegyricus* can be identified that refer to or are associated with Trajan.¹⁶ Ware

15 Rees (2007) 142–144; cf. Dominik and Smith (2011) 9–10.

16 Cf. Roche (2011) 8 n. 24, who cites 51 virtues. The virtues in the *Panegyricus* not cited below in notes 20, 22 and 23 are *aequitas* ("fairness," 77.3), *candor* ("candour," 84.1), *castitas* ("chasteness," 20.2), *comitas* ("affability," 71.6), *familiaritas* ("friendliness," "friendship," 23.1, 85.5, etc.), *firmitas* ("strength," 4.7, 4.15), *frugalitas* ("frugality," 3.4., 41.1), *iucunditas* ("agreeableness," 49.7), *magnanimitas* ("magnanimity," 58.5), *moderatio* ("moderation," 78.2, 84.5), *munificentia* ("liberality," "generosity," 25.5), *pudor* ("modesty," 24.2, 73.5, etc.), *reverentia* ("reverence," 52.6, 77.3, etc.), *robor* ("vigour," "height," *Pan.* 8.4, 13.1), *suavitas* ("pleasantness," "charm," 49.7), and *veritas* ("truth," 54.5, 67.1, etc.).

Not all of the abstract qualities cited above in this note and in notes 20, 22, 23 (some of them similar in meaning or nuance, e.g., *benignitas* and *liberalitas*) may qualify in some critics' minds as virtues, particularly in circumstances when the abstraction (*providentia*, *restitutio*) appears in the form of one of its variants. Rees (1998) 83; Ware (2012) 24; Ware (2013) 317, 323; and especially Braund (1998) 61 stress Trajan's *civilitas* ("citizen-like behaviour," "courtesy"), though this term does not actually appear in the *Panegyricus*. Similarly Rees (2018) 262–263 calls attention to Pacatus' and Claudius Mamertinus' characterisations of Theodosius and Julian, respectively, as possessing *civilitas*, but the term is not used in the late-antique panegyrics of the *Panegyrici Latini*. Furthermore, Rees (2018) 277–286, esp. 277, argues that the quality of speed attributed to Trajan in the *Panegyricus* (*velocitas*, 14.3; cf. *velocissimi*, 80.3) when moving his legions becomes a fully developed

cites about ninety qualities that function as imperial virtues in the *Panegyrici Latini*, of which Wickert lists fifty virtues in his *Realencyclopädie* article on the *princeps*.¹⁷ Constantine is of special interest in this collection since he is the subject of five panegyrics: *Pan. Lat.* 4 (321 CE), 5 (311 CE), 6 (310 CE), 7 (307 CE) and 12 (313). The panegyrics in honour of Constantine have about the same number of words in total as Pliny's *Panegyricus* to Trajan,¹⁸ a fact which makes it a good test case for comparing the qualities ascribed to each emperor. Menander Rhetor (*Peri Epideiktikōn* 373)¹⁹ identifies the four most important virtues of a ruler as ἀνδρεία ("courage," "bravery"), δικαιοσύνη ("justice"), σωφροσύνη ("temperance"), and φρόνησις ("wisdom," "foresight"), of which the Latin equivalents appear in both Pliny's *Panegyricus* and the panegyrics addressed to Constantine in the *Panegyrici Latini*.²⁰ Ware identifies the four canonical imperial virtues of the Roman encomiastic tradition as being *virtus* ("bravery"), *clementia* ("clemency"), *iustitia* ("justice"), and *pietas* ("pietas"),²¹ all of which appear in the *Panegyricus* and the *Panegyrici Latini*.²² In regard to Constantine, there is considerable emphasis upon his *continentia* ("restraint," "self-control," e.g., *Pan. Lat.* 6.16.3; cf. *Pan.* 3.4) and *clementia*, for example, when he pardons the Roman soldiers who supported the usurper Maximian (*Pan. Lat.* 6.20.1–2; cf. *Pan.* 3.4, 80.1), including those underserving of being spared (*Pan. Lat.* 6.20.3). Of the virtues in the *Panegyricus* that refer to Trajan, almost four-fifths are used in reference to Constantine in *Panegyrici Latini* 4,

imperial virtue in the panegyrics of late antiquity (e.g., *Pan. Lat.* 2.10.2, 3.7.3, 4.36.5, 8.6.1, 11.4.2), though the specific term *celeritas* is employed in only a few instances in relation to the emperors (*Pan. Lat.* 11.4.4, 11.8.5, 12.15.3; cf. 4.36.5); cf. Lolli (1989). Finally, Braund (1998) 60 mentions *innocentia* ("innocence," "freedom from guilt," *Pan.* 49.3; cf. 28.3: *innocens*) as one of the "standard items from the pool" in the *Panegyricus*, but this abstraction is not attributed specifically to Trajan.

17 Ware (2014) 89; Wickert (1954).

18 The *Panegyricus* (ed. Mynors [1964]) has 19,205 words, while *Panegyrici Latini* 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 (ed. Mynors [1964]) have 19,669 words (18,539 words excluding the praise of Maximian in *Pan. Lat.* 7.7.1–7.12.8).

19 Russell and Wilson (1981).

20 *Fortitudo* ("bravery," "strength," *Pan. Lat.* 4.6.5, 7.3.4, etc.; *Pan.* 3.5, 16.2, 16.3) and *virtus* ("bravery," "excellence," *Pan. Lat.* 4.11.4, 7.13.5, 12.10.3, etc.; *Pan.* 89.3); *iustitia* ("justice," *Pan. Lat.* 6.6.1, 7.3.4, etc.; *Pan.* 33.2, 78.2, cf. *aequitatis*, "equity," *Pan.* 77.3); *continentia* ("temperance," "restraint," *Pan. Lat.* 6.16.3, 7.3.4; *Pan.* 3.4) and *temperantia* ("moderation," *Pan. Lat.* 4.34.3; *Pan.* 2.7, 82.9); and *sapientia* ("wisdom," *Pan. Lat.* 5.2.2, 12.15.6, cf. *prudencia*, "prudence," *Pan. Lat.* 4.10.2, 7.3.4, etc.; *Pan.* 55.8) and *providentia* ("foresight," *Pan. Lat.* 6.6.1, 7.2.2; *Pan.* 34.2: *provida*).

21 Ware (2014) 88; cf. Weinstock (1971) 228–259.

22 *Virtus* ("bravery," *Pan. Lat.* 4.11.4, 7.13.5, 12.10.3, etc.; *Pan.* 89.3), *clementia* ("clemency," *Pan. Lat.* 4.4.5, 6.20.1, etc.; *Pan.* 3.4, 35.1, 80.1), *iustitia* ("justice," *Pan. Lat.* 6.6.1, 7.3.4, etc.; *Pan.* 33.2, 78.2), and *pietas* ("duty," *Pan. Lat.* 6.20.3, 7.2.3, etc.; *Pan.* 2.6, 10.3, *et al.*).

5, 6, 7, and 12,²³ despite the over two hundred years that separate the former work from the latter panegyrics.²⁴ This suggests either that there is an inherent

23 The 56 virtues ascribed to or associated with Trajan that are mentioned in reference to Constantine (excluding those already cited in notes 20 and 22) are *abstinentia* ("abstinence," *Pan. Lat.* 4.34.1; cf. *Pan.* 2.6), *alacritas* ("eagerness," *Pan. Lat.* 7.4.4; *Pan.* 14.3), *amicitia* ("friendship," *Pan. Lat.* 4.38.3; *Pan.* 44.7, 85.6, 86.4), *auctoritas* ("authority," *Pan. Lat.* 6.7.4, 6.16.5, etc.; *Pan.* 8.6, 10.1, etc.), *beneficium* ("kindness," "benefaction," *Pan. Lat.* 4.35.1, 5.2.3, 6.20.3; cf. *Pan.* 31.6, 37.3, etc.), *benignitas* ("kindness," "generosity," *Pan. Lat.* 4.33.2, 12.20.2, etc.; *Pan.* 21.4, 25.3, etc.), *bonitas* ("goodness," *Pan. Lat.* 5.9.2, 6.20.2, etc.; *Pan.* 30.5, 52.6), *clementia* ("clemency," "mercy," *Pan. Lat.* 4.4.5, 6.20.1, etc.; *Pan.* 3.4, 35.1, 80.1), *concordia* ("harmony," "intimacy," *Pan. Lat.* 7.1.4; *Pan.* 90.4, 91.6), *conscientia* ("conscience," *Pan. Lat.* 6.20.4; *Pan.* 67.7), *consilium* ("counsel," *Pan. Lat.* 7.14.2, 12.4.1, etc.; *Pan.* 1.2, 29.2, etc.), *cura* ("care," *Pan. Lat.* 4.21.2, 6.18.3, etc.; *Pan.* 25.3, 31.5, etc.), *decus* ("honour," *Pan. Lat.* 4.34.3; *Pan.* 83.5), *dignitas* ("honour," *Pan. Lat.* 6.14.1, 12.19.6, etc.; *Pan.* 4.7, 17.4, etc.), *dignatio* ("dignity," *Pan. Lat.* 6.23.1; *Pan.* 47.1, 77.5, etc.), *divinitas* ("divinity," *Pan. Lat.* 7.3.2, 12.22.1; *Pan.* 2.7, 33.4, etc.), *facilitas* ("ease," "readiness," "accessibility," *Pan. Lat.* 4.27.6; *Pan.* 2.7, 47.3, etc.), *felicitas* ("felicity," *Pan. Lat.* 4.19.2, 6.8.2; *Pan.* 83.6), *fides* ("trust," *Pan. Lat.* 4.15.6, etc.; *Pan.* 29.2, 51.5, etc.), *fiducia* ("confidence," *Pan. Lat.* 12.15.4; *Pan.* 74.2, 92.2), *gravitas* ("dignity," "authority," *Pan. Lat.* 6.4.4, 7.1.3, etc.; *Pan.* 4.6, 46.5, etc.), *hilaritas* ("cheerfulness," *Pan. Lat.* 4.34.4, 7.6.5; *Pan.* 4.6), *humanitas* ("humanity," *Pan. Lat.* 12.12.1, 12.14.1; *Pan.* 2.7, 12.4, etc.), *indulgentia* ("indulgence," *Pan. Lat.* 5.1.3, 5.11.2, etc.; *Pan.* 61.8, 69.6, etc.), *iuventia* ("youth," *Pan. Lat.* 7.2.1, 7.3.3; *Pan.* 8.4), *labor* ("toil," *Pan. Lat.* 4.26.5, 6.21.3, etc.; *Pan.* 10.3, 24.2, etc.), *liberalitas* ("generosity," *Pan. Lat.* 4.33.3, 12.15.1, etc.; *Pan.* 25.3, 27.3, etc.), *magnitudo* ("greatness," *Pan. Lat.* 5.2.3, 12.8.4, etc.; *Pan.* 61.2, 71.5, etc.), *maiestas* ("majesty," "grandness," *Pan. Lat.* 5.14.4, 6.1.1, etc.; *Pan.* 4.7, 60.2, etc.), *mansuetudo* ("mildness," "pity," *Pan. Lat.* 4.22.2; *Pan.* 2.7, 38.5, etc.), *maturitas* ("maturity," *Pan. Lat.* 7.5.3; *Pan.* 4.7), *mitissimi sensus* ("gentleness," *Pan. Lat.* 6.20.2; *Pan.* 80.1: *mitis*), *modestia* ("modesty," *Pan. Lat.* 6.4.4, 6.8.6; *Pan.* 3.2, 21.1, etc.), *opes* ("wealth," *Pan. Lat.* 5.7.4, 6.15.1, etc.; *Pan.* 31.5, 74.1, etc.), *patientia* ("endurance," *Pan. Lat.* 4.9.1, 5.5.3; *Pan.* 76.1, 86.5), *pax* ("peace," *Pan. Lat.* 6.11.1, 12.2.6, etc.; *Pan.* 5.1, 16.1, 34.2, etc.), *pietas* ("duty," *Pan. Lat.* 6.20.37.2.3, etc.; *Pan.* 2.6, 10.3, et al.), *restitutio* ("restoration," *Pan. Lat.* 5.1.1: *restitutori*, 6.6.1: *restituit*, 12.1.1: *restituta*, etc.; *Pan.* 46.3: *restitui*, *restitutos*), *salus* ("safety," *Pan. Lat.* 7.2.5, 12.12.2, etc.; *Pan.* 67.6, 68.1, etc.), *sanctitas* ("sacredness," "reverence," "moral excellence," *Pan. Lat.* 4.15.1; *Pan.* 63.8, 82.8, etc.), *securitas* ("security," "freedom from fear," *Pan. Lat.* 6.8.1, 12.7.5; *Pan.* 24.1, 50.7, etc.), *severitas* ("severity," "strictness," "sternness," *Pan. Lat.* 6.10.3; *Pan.* 4.6, 34.2, etc.), *simplicitas* ("frankness," "openness," *Pan. Lat.* 6.16.6: *simplex*; *Pan.* 4.17, 54.5, 84.1), *tranquillitas* ("peacefulness," *Pan. Lat.* 6.4.4, 6.21.3; *Pan.* 16.3, 47.6, etc.), *venia* ("pardon," *Pan. Lat.* 4.4.5, 6.20.2, etc.; *Pan.* 59.2), *verecundia* ("modesty," *Pan. Lat.* 7.4.2, 7.6.5; *Pan.* 24.2, 55.4, etc.), *victoria* ("victory," *Pan. Lat.* 4.19.1, 12.22.2, etc.; *Pan.* 8.3), *vigilantia* ("watchfulness," *Pan. Lat.* 4.11.4: *vigilantior*; *Pan.* 10.3, 31.1, etc.), and *vis* ("force," "strength," "power," *Pan. Lat.* 4.26.2, 4.26.3, etc.; *Pan.* 5.8, 45.6, etc.).

24 In private correspondence, Fotini Hadjittofi (Lisbon) has pointed out to me how, in the emperor Julian's satirical Συμπόσιον ἢ Κρόνια or *Caesares* ("The Caesars"; ed. and trans. Wright [1913] 344–415), Trajan praises himself as "the mildest [emperor] toward his subjects" (τοῖς ὑπηκόοις πραδύτατος, 328D) and the gods declare that "he surpassed all the others in clemency" (τῇ πραδότητι πάντων κρατεῖν, 328D). By contrast, Constantine is severely criticised as an emperor in this satire (328D–329D, 335D).

generic pattern evident in the citation of these virtues in panegyric or that these virtues naturally emerged as the most important ones mentioned when talking about an emperor and do not necessarily reflect genre. In either case, the large overlap indicates that the *Panegyricus* may well have influenced latter panegyrists in their formulation.

In addition to being praised for this whole host of virtues that feature in descriptions of emperors in late antiquity, Trajan is lauded for having performed the actions of an ideal emperor in the *Panegyricus*. Many of the *loci* in the *Panegyrici Latini* are reminiscent of those used by Pliny, some of which include the following illustrative examples. In *Panegyrici Latini* 2 (389 CE), the orator Pacatus claims that he is speaking freely without fear or coercion (*Pan. Lat.* 2.2.2; cf. *Pan.* 2.2) and that the time of false flattery to tyrants has passed (*Pan. Lat.* 2.2.2–3; cf. *Pan.* 1.6–2.2), while he avers that Theodosius views himself as a private citizen (*Pan. Lat.* 2.12.5; cf. *Pan.* 2.3, 9.3). Claudius Mamertinus mentions in *Panegyrici Latini* 3 the frugal lifestyle of the emperor Julian (*Pan. Lat.* 3.10.3; cf. *Pan.* 41.1); his aversion to adulation (*Pan. Lat.* 3.21.3; cf. *Pan.* 3.2); his early award of the consulship (*Pan. Lat.* 3.22.4; cf. *Pan.* 91.1); the constancy of his character (*Pan. Lat.* 3.27.1–2; cf. *Pan.* 24.2); his respectful treatment of senators, including consuls, and his bearing as a citizen (*Pan. Lat.* 3.28.3–30.2; cf. *Pan.* 23.1–6, 77.1–8); and the joyous reaction of the crowd upon his gracious welcome of the consuls (*Pan. Lat.* 3.29.1–2; cf. *Pan.* 73.1–6).²⁵

Other illustrations of *loci* in late antique panegyric adapted from Pliny include those in a passage from the *Panegyricus* that contrasts life in the imperial palace during the reigns of Trajan and Domitian (48.1–49.8).²⁶ This passage forms part of Pliny's strategy in the *Panegyricus* (e.g., 2.3, 11.1, 11.4, 18.3, 20.3–4, 24.5, 41.2, 48.2–3, 49.6, 52.3–4) and in the *Epistles* (6.2.4, 10.2.3) of flattering Trajan by comparing him with Domitian (and other previous emperors). In his *Panegyricus de Quarto Consulatu Honorii Augusti* (398 CE), Claudian attributes various qualities and actions to the emperor Honorius (111–121) that are reminiscent of the type that Pliny ascribes to Trajan in the *Panegyricus*.²⁷ In the course of advising the emperor in the form of a flashback (214–418), Claudian's mention of *inmanis belua* ("monstrous beast," *IV Cons.* 250), an intertextual reference to Pliny's *immanissima belua* ("most monstrous beast," *Pan.* 48.3),

25 Cf. Garcia Ruiz (2013) 205–208.

26 Ware (2013) 319.C.

27 Ware (2013).

that is, Domitian, is particularly striking.²⁸ Similarly eye-catching is Pacatus' reference in *Panegyrici Latini* 2 (389 CE) to the seclusion of previous emperors in their palaces (2.21.3) in contrast to the receptiveness of Theodosius (2.21.1–2, esp. 2), which recalls Pliny's references to the self-isolation of Domitian in his palace (*Pan.* 48.3–5, esp. 5) and Trajan's receptiveness to the approach of his subjects (24.2–3).

3 The *Panegyricus* as Ceremony and Celebration

The context of imperial panegyric, in which the orator would deliver a speech marking the significance of a state or civic occasion, was ceremonial and celebratory.²⁹ The ceremonial occasion of imperial panegyric determined to a large extent its content and form. The *Panegyricus* is a *gratiarum actio* ("speech of thanks") delivered by Pliny when he assumed the consulship in September 100 CE. Pliny's standard expression of gratitude does not *per se* signify loyalty to the emperor and support for his policies. As the new consul Pliny was obligated to deliver a speech before the senate in which he expressed his gratitude for the honour and promised his senatorial colleagues that he would faithfully fulfil his duties. Presiding over the ceremonial occasion was the emperor, toward whom Pliny was expected to adopt a deferential tone in acknowledgement of the emperor's role in recommending the appointment of magistrates to the senate. Pliny's *Panegyricus* plausibly represents the general form of other speeches that were delivered in the imperial period on ceremonial occasions marking the beginning of one's term of office or the recent accession of an emperor, with the important difference that such speeches were usually comparatively short in length (cf. Pliny, *Ep.* 3.18.6). The responsibility of Pliny in undertaking the consulship included, as a result of the *senatus consultum* ("decree of the senate"), the delivery of a speech as part of the ceremony in which he celebrated not only his inauguration but also the ascension of Trajan to the imperial throne. In this respect, the *Panegyricus* provided a model for the late antique panegyrics that were connected to occasions in the senate or *adventus* ("arrival") of the emperor in Rome or in a provincial town.³⁰

28 Cf. Ware (2013) 318–320. Unlike for Pliny, there was no Domitian-like tyrant for Claudian to compare Honorius with; cf. Ware (2013) 320 and n. 25. Pliny's *inmanissima belua* refers specifically to Domitian, whereas Claudian's *inmanis belua* functions as a metaphor for the passions that dwell within that must be controlled.

29 Cf. MacCormack (1981).

30 On the *adventus* see MacCormack (1981) 16–61.

The *Panegyrici Latini*, which (except for the panegyric to Trajan) can be dated over a century between 289 and 389 CE, were delivered to mark a variety of occasions that naturally shaped their content. These included, but were not limited to, the expression of gratitude for a consulship, as in the case of Pliny in 100 CE; the commemoration of the arrival of the emperor in a provincial town; the celebration of imperial jubilees; the birthday of the emperor; the beginning of public games; an emperor's military victory; and the occasion of a civic anniversary. The delivery of a panegyric by a distinguished orator formed a necessary part of the ritual celebration of these events. In the case of the *Panegyricus*, Pliny stresses the ceremonial and celebratory functions of the speech that are consistent with the ritual aspects that afford legitimacy to Trajan's reign. Similarly, Claudian emphasises the importance of the ceremonial occasion in *Panegyricus de Sexto Consulatu Honorii Augusti*, which celebrates the *adventus* of the emperor to Rome (cf. 1–17) as well as the perceived revival of Roman greatness (e.g., 35–44). The panegyric also celebrates the fictitious Roman triumph over Alaric (cf. 180–192), who was actually bought off after besieging Rome. Honorius is identified with Trajan and Marcus Aurelius returning to Rome after their wars against the Dacian and Marcomanni tribes, respectively (*VI Cons. Hon.* 333–350).

In the *Panegyricus* Pliny stresses how Trajan's ascension represents a marked transition from the evils of the past, specifically Domitian's reign (cf. *Pan.* 2.1–2), through the frequent use of a *prius* (“then”) ... *nunc* (“now”) pattern (e.g., *Pan.* 48.1–49.8, 66.1–5, 70.4–8, 72.2–3, 81.4–82.3, 90.5–6). Late antique panegyrists similarly comment upon the contrast between the reign of the present emperor and his predecessors. In his panegyric to Theodosius (389 CE), Pacatus emphasises how the occasion represents the joyous restoration of peace and stability (e.g., *Pan. Lat.* 2.3.1–4), whereas the usurper Maximus exemplifies the baleful past (e.g., 2.23.1–30.2).

During the early modern period, the ceremonial emphasis of panegyric is stressed, for example, in Desiderius Erasmus' *Panegyricus ad Philippum Austriae Ducem*³¹ (1504) and in Walter Haddon's *In Auspicatissimum Serenissimae Reginae Elisabethae Regimen*³² (1567). In the same way that Pliny distinguishes the reign of Trajan from that of Domitian, Thomas More begins his *Carmen Gratulationum*³³ (1509) by stressing the jubilant atmosphere of Henry VIII's ascension to the throne, then employs the adverb *nunc* in his panegyric (21, 24, 26) to draw a contrast between his reign and that of his

31 Eds. Herding and Schalk (1974).

32 Ed. Lees (1967) 169–171.

33 Eds. and trans. Bradner and Lynch (1953) 16–17.

predecessor Henry VII. Similarly, Haddon commences his panegyric on the coronation of Queen Elizabeth I³⁴ by focusing on the momentous nature of the coronation ceremony of 1559, then follows the practice of Pliny by using *nunc*, which thereby distinguishes the present blessed state of England from its troubled past and is cause for such a happy occasion. In John Gordon's *England and Scotlands Happinesse*³⁵ (1604), a panegyric addressed to James I, the reigns of the newly ascended king and his predecessor Elizabeth I are portrayed as a period of restored harmony and order through the unity of the monarchies of England and Scotland, in contrast to the troubled past when the pope usurped the power of the kings. The Plinian formulation of the restoration of concord and order in contrast to the discord and disharmony of the past is apparent in John Evelyn's panegyric to Charles II.³⁶ A twist on this *prius nunc* pattern appears in Erasmus' verse panegyric to Archduke Philip of Burgundy,³⁷ whose return is celebrated as a time of national renewal, while his absence represents both an abnegation of his duties and a time of civic disarray.

4 The *Panegyricus* as Authorial Self-Positioning and Self-Fashioning

Another function of Pliny's *Panegyricus*, which emerges not only within the work itself but also in his *Epistulae*, is what can be described variously as authorial self-positioning, self-fashioning, self-representation, self-imaging, or even self-serving.³⁸ In other words, through the delivery and publication of the *Panegyricus*, Pliny shows no small measure of self-consciousness combined with self-aggrandisement when he endeavours opportunistically to instantiate a self-professed image of his position in Roman society by staking out frequently and at considerable length his own role as a senator and consul in relation to the emperor Trajan and his senatorial colleagues. Portraying himself as no mere imperial officeholder, Pliny seems intent upon establishing a level of political influence in the senate and thereby consolidating his position in its upper echelon (cf. *senatus ordinis flore*, "the elite of the senatorial class,"

34 Ed. Lees (1967) 169–171.

35 Gordon (1604) 3–5.

36 Evelyn (1661) 4.

37 Eds. Herding and Schalk (1974).

38 Cf. Leach (1990) on "self-presentation" in Pliny's *Epistles*; Noreña (2011) on "self-fashioning" in the *Panegyricus* (but generally with a different emphasis – especially upon Pliny's closeness to the centre of power and competence to make political judgements – from the discussion here).

Pan. 23.3),³⁹ a status confirmed by the occasion of the delivery of his *gratiarum actio* after being nominated for the consulship, the most prestigious political office that a senator could hold. This authorial stance is consistent with his other displays of self-promotion evident in the *Epistles* (e.g., 3.18.1–6, 4.16.1–3, 6.33.1–11) and through other activities, such as the publication of these letters and the recitation and circulation of his poetry.⁴⁰

Pliny's practice of advancing his own interests is never more apparent than when in the *Epistles* he justifies "publishing" (that is, circulating beyond his close friends) an expanded (*spatiosius et uberius*, "more extensive and fuller," *Ep.* 3.18.1) version of his speech. This step of augmenting and publishing an imperial panegyric, which seems to have been unusual for the time,⁴¹ draws particular attention to Pliny's programme of self-aggrandisement. In addition to presenting his own perspective on the relationship between himself, the emperors under whom he has lived, and his senatorial colleagues, Pliny endeavours to define what he believes the relationship *should be* between Trajan (or any *princeps*) and the senators, including himself. Ultimately the *Panegyricus* represents an attempt to forge a working relationship with Trajan by proposing a *modus operandi* for the new emperor that would meet his expectations, accommodate to some degree the wishes of the senate in its complementary governing role, and yet enable Pliny, within the constraints of the imperial system of government, to gain a measure of political authority and autonomy commensurate with the high status of the consulship (cf. *Pan.* 93.1). In the process of producing this manifesto, Pliny endeavours to enhance his own standing by fashioning an image of himself as a statesman fully immersed in the service of the empire alongside the figure of the *princeps*.⁴²

The intended audience of Pliny's self-portrait was not only Trajan but his senatorial colleagues, both of whom he endeavours to impress with, *inter alia*, an account of his financial expertise and experience (e.g., *Pan.* 37.1–41.3), which his prefecture of the *aerarium militare*, for example, enabled him to acquire; his intimate familiarity with the emperor (e.g., 45.3–4, 85.2–5) and the inner workings of the imperial palace (e.g., 48.1–3), including Trajan's eating habits (49.4–5, 7–8) and recreational activities (e.g., 81.1–4) and those of his predecessor (e.g., 49.6–8, 82.1–3), whether real or merely alleged; and his discussion of the circumstances surrounding the drought in Egypt (30.1–32.3). The statements of Pliny, which are intended to demonstrate his knowledge about the

39 Dominik and Smith (2011) 10.

40 Cf. Roller (1998) 289–300.

41 Cf. Durry (1938) 3–8; Noreña (2011) 40–41.

42 Cf. Riggsby (1995) 123, 129, 133 on Pliny as an "engaged public figure."

imperial court and geopolitical events, provide further impetus for the suggestion that he was trying to claim a space for himself among the elite of Rome's stratified senatorial class.

Thus Pliny's strategically placed reminders of his consulship to his audience at the beginning (cf. *Pan.* 1.2, 2.1) and the end of his speech (93.1–94.1, esp. 93.3, 94.1; 95.2) seem designed to buttress his social and political standing in Roman imperial society. In a remarkable twist, Pliny not only realigns Trajan to the status of an ordinary *civis* ("citizen," 2.3) and senator (62.4, 63.6), but also asserts that "he thinks he is one of us" (*unum ex nobis putat*, 2.4; cf. *par omnibus*, "equal to everyone," 21.4) and "he is mindful that he rules over men but is a man himself" (*nec minus hominem se quam hominibus praeesse meminit*, 2.4). Pliny even maintains that Trajan conducts himself "as if he were only a consul" (*ut si tantum consul foret*, 76.6; cf. 71.4, 77.3), which effectively places Pliny on the same level as the emperor – even though it is Trajan who has nominated him as consul (cf. 59.2, 63.2, 77.7–8). Later Claudian would employ this Plinian motif when remarking that Theodosius inspires the love of his people for him when he lowers himself to their level (*VI Cons.* 55–64, esp. 63–64).

Pliny appears to betray a self-consciousness, even a sense of guilt, for the prosperity he enjoyed during Domitian's reign when numerous senators were exiled or executed (cf. *Pan.* 35.2). Pliny maintains that he advanced in his career under Domitian only until the emperor "professed his hatred for good men" (*profiteretur odium bonorum*, *Pan.* 95.3; cf. *Ep.* 7.16.2), after which he slowed his own career progression through the *cursus honorum* ("course of honours," that is, sequence of public offices; *Pan.* 95.4). These offices include the quaestorship as Domitian's candidate in 89/90 CE (cf. *Pan.* 7.16.2; *Ep.* 7.16.2); plebeian tribune in 90/91 (cf. *Pan.* 1.23.2, 7.16.2); praetor in 93 (cf. *Ep.* 3.11.2, 7.33.4; Tac. *Agr.* 44–45; Cass. Dio 67.13–14); and prefect of the *aerarium militare* from 94–96⁴³ (cf. *Pan.* 95.4), though possibly the latter post was held under Nerva from 96–97.⁴⁴ Pliny refers to the danger he was in toward the end of Domitian's rule (e.g., *Ep.* 3.11, 7.27, 7.33) and that he lived "with grief and fear" (*inter maestos et paventes*, *Pan.* 95.4). But if indeed Pliny did hold the prefecture of the *aerarium militare* under Domitian, then this would seem to weigh against both of his claims that his advancement suffered under the emperor⁴⁵ – unless he was referring to the consulship that he eventually obtained under Trajan – and that he had been exposed to considerable danger under Domitian.

43 Sherwin-White (1966) 75.

44 Birley (2000) 15–16. On the offices held by Pliny, cf. *PIR*² P 490; Birley (2000) 5–17.

45 Cf. Syme (1958) 82.

In fact, the numerous and varied offices, especially the quaestorship, seem to attest to Pliny's steady advancement under the approving eye of Domitian, which Pliny attempts to play down in the process of fashioning his own composite career history in the *Panegyricus* and *Epistles*. In both works Pliny adopts the stance of a compliant but knowledgeable and assiduous senator under Trajan as he endeavours to transfer his successful career under Domitian to the reign of Trajan. In the process of doing so, Pliny's self-consciousness or guilt emerges through the lack of any reference to the prefecture of the *aerarium militare* under Domitian (if, in fact, he did serve as prefect under that emperor); his condemnation of the emperor (e.g., *Pan.* 20, 52, 95; *Ep.* 3.9, 4.11, 4.22); numerous authorial asides (e.g., *Pan.* 2.1, 3.4, 53.3–6, 68.6–7, 72.5–7); his apparent sympathy with the opposition to Domitian (e.g., *Ep.* 3.11, *Pan.* 90); his assertion that he was not brought to trial as he should have been under Domitian (*Ep.* 7.27); and his admission that he was among other senators taking part in crime and evil (*Ep.* 8.14.9–10).⁴⁶ Although Pliny's accounts of various events during Domitian's rule would leave us to believe that he was no less susceptible to its dangers than other senators, the self-conscious manner in which he attempts to describe, account for, and downplay his advancement under Domitian betrays his sensitivity to the complicitous role his colleagues may have perceived he played under the emperor. Considering the fact that Pliny's speech was delivered early in Trajan's reign, the references to the dangers he felt he was exposed to under Domitian suggest a hint of nervousness about how Trajan could turn out as an emperor.

Panegyrists in late antiquity, no less than Pliny, attempt in their panegyrics not only to convey their wishes, hopes, and concerns but to situate themselves in relation to their rulers as the political circumstances demanded. In the *Panegyricus*, Pliny speaks in his position as a senator and newly appointed consul, while the authors of the *Panegyrici Latini*, despite the fact that the majority of them are anonymous, were prominent orators and professors of rhetoric and at some point of their careers held imperial or political posts, including that of senator (*Pan. Lat.* 5.1.1–5). Just as Pliny speaks for his senatorial colleagues and Roman citizenry regarding their desires and aspirations for the future, the panegyrists of late antiquity represent the hopes and interests of their communities. In the *Panegyrici Latini*, there are various references to the inhabitants of towns pouring out into the streets to pay their respects to the emperor upon his *adventus* ("arrival," e.g., *Pan. Lat.* 2.37.1, 5.8.1–4, 8.19.1–4, 11.11.3–5, 12.7.5–7), a general scene reminiscent of Trajan's arrival in Rome in 99 CE in the *Panegyricus* (22.1–23.6). The delivery of a panegyric on the occasion of an

46 Cf. Dominik (2007) 329.

emperor's visit was an opportunity for the orator, as a spokesman for his community, to define his vision of its position and circumstances (and therefore of himself) vis-à-vis the emperor and the prevailing political order.

This panegyric function of authorial self-positioning and self-representation does not die with the panegyrists of late antiquity. Poets of the early modern period similarly strove to define their position in relation to their addressees. John Dryden, for example, purports to speak for his people (and therefore himself) as he declares the aspirations and beliefs of his country in a number of his early poems, including *Astraea Redux* (1660)⁴⁷ and *To His Sacred Majesty, A Panegyrick on His Coronation* (1661),⁴⁸ panegyrics to King Charles II.

5 The *Panegyricus* as Exhortation and Admonition

As far back as Isocrates' *Evagoras* it was apparent that encomium could function to espouse political points of view, including how a monarch should conduct himself toward his subjects. Aristotle similarly understood that eulogy can serve as an exhortation to right action: ἔχει δὲ κοινὸν εἶδος ὁ ἔπαινος καὶ αἱ συμβουλαί. ἃ γὰρ ἐν τῷ συμβουλευεῖν ὑπόθοιο ἄν, ταῦτα μετατεθέντα τῇ λέξει ἐγκώμια γίνονται ("Praise and advice have one point in common: for what may have been proffered as advice becomes encomium through a verbal change," *Rhet.* 1.9.35, 1967b35; cf. 1.9.32–38). Quintilian notes that panegyrics "are advisory in form" (*formam suadendi habent*, *Inst. Orat.* 3.4.14)⁴⁹ and that panegyric "is similar to deliberative oratory insofar as the same things are customarily advised in the latter as are praised in the former" (*Totum autem habet aliquid simile suasoriis, quia plerumque eadem illic suaderi, hic laudari solent*, 3.7.28).

The *Panegyricus* is the first extant speech whose purpose seems at least as much to persuade as it does superficially to praise. Until recently modern scholars generally have been slow to recognise the protreptic (or paraenetic) properties of panegyric,⁵⁰ but early modern scholars understood that the persuasive function lay at the core of the genre. Indeed, other than flattery, the most obvious function of the *Panegyricus* in terms of Pliny's professed objective is exhortative, admonitory, didactic, or advisory – a *speculum principis* or

47 Eds. Hooker and Swedenburg (1956) 22–31.

48 Eds. Hooker and Swedenburg (1956) 33–36.

49 Ed. Winterbottom (1970).

50 Born (1934) is an exception; for a recent exposition on the topic, see Braund (1998). See also Poulakos, chapter 5 in this volume, on the persuasive potential of epideictic rhetoric.

model for an emperor's conduct and actions.⁵¹ In *Epistles* 3.18 Pliny justifies publishing a more elaborate version of his speech as follows:

... primum ut imperatori nostro virtutes suae veris laudibus commendarentur, deinde ut futuri principes non quasi a magistro sed tamen sub exemplo praemonerentur, qua potissimum via possent ad eandem gloriam niti. Nam praecipere qualis esse debeat princeps, pulchrum quidem sed onerosum ac prope superbum est; laudare vero optimum principem ac per hoc posteris velut e specula lumen quod sequantur ostendere, idem utilitatis habet adrogantiae nihil.

PLINY, *Ep.* 3.18.2–3; cf. 10.14⁵²

In the first instance I had hoped to encourage our emperor with sincere praise of his virtues and then, by advising future emperors with his example rather than by teaching, to demonstrate to future emperors what path to take in order to gain the same glory. For to give advice to an emperor on his responsibilities might serve a valuable role, but it would constitute a challenging duty bordering on presumption, whereas to praise an *optimus princeps* [“excellent emperor”] and thereby shine a light on the path to be followed would be no less useful without seeming to be arrogant.

Here in the *Epistles* Pliny makes clear that the *Panegyricus* is designed to encourage Trajan in his virtues and deeds, a general intention that is elaborated upon by the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* when he observes that praise doubles the desire to do what is right (*Rhet. Her.* 3.7); this hortatory element can also be found in Cicero's *Pro Marcello* and even much earlier in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (1102b13–15).⁵³ In the case of an emperor such as Trajan, the “rhetoric of admonition and exhortation” – to borrow the phrase of Karl-J. Hölkesskamp⁵⁴ – could be construed as constituting the code of desirable, if not entirely expected, behaviour of an emperor.⁵⁵ The purpose here appears more protreptic than didactic, pedagogic, or even eulogistic.

While the *laudatio* was intended mainly to praise a man for his good qualities (cf. Cic. *De Or.* 2.341–49), Pliny recognised the potential for praise to have a hortatory element. Through panegyric a *princeps* such as Trajan could be

51 Cf. Born (1934); Braund (1998); Rees (2018) 259; Ware (2014) 98; Ware (2019) 293–294.

52 Ed. Mynors (1963).

53 Ed. and trans. H. Rackham (1926).

54 Hölkesskamp (2011) 29.

55 Dominik and Smith (2011) 11–12.

exhorted and even guided toward the right course of action or quality by praising him for already having pursued it or possessing it. The objective, as Pliny proclaims, was as follows: *ut ... boni principes quae facerent recognoscerent, mali quae facere deberent* ("so that ... good emperors should recollect their own deeds and bad emperors review what their actions ought to be," *Pan.* 4.1). Pliny's praise of Trajan's alleged actions can be construed as a programme that advises Trajan (or any emperor) on the duties of a good emperor.⁵⁶ Similarly, the character and deeds of a previous emperor could be criticised in the form of a *speculum tyranni*, as Pliny frequently does in the case of Domitian (e.g., *Pan.* 33.3–34.2; 42.4; 46.1; 47.1; 48.3–49.1, 8; 50.5–6; 52.3–5, 7; 76.3–5; 82.1–5; 90.5; 95.3), in order to advise the new emperor as to what qualities and actions were inappropriate.⁵⁷ In the *Panegyricus* Pliny performs the role of counselor to Trajan in an indirect manner, unlike the more direct role assumed by Seneca in his role of adviser to Nero (cf. *Clem.* 1.1). Here Pliny combines praise and encouragement to exhort Trajan to adopt a mode of conduct and pursue policies that not only would reflect favourably upon the emperor from his perspective but also would at least partly accede to the desires of the senators, including himself. It is impossible, however, to know to what extent Trajan may have heeded Pliny's advice. Ultimately the speech served as a way for Pliny to bring his ideas, hopes, and concerns about the new imperial regime directly to the attention of Trajan himself under the guise of praise.

During late antiquity the wishes expressed formed an essential part of the panegyric. The qualities and actions of the emperor were praised and suggestions were made that he might continue to conduct affairs in such a way as to ensure the welfare of the citizenry. Late antique panegyric functions not only to represent the values of the community, on whose behalf the orator speaks, but also to ascribe to the emperor the types of actions it would like to see him perform and the virtues it would like him to possess. In *Panegyrici Latini* 5 (311 CE), for example, the anonymous orator praises Constantine and expresses gratitude to him for the tax relief granted to the citizens of the Gallic town of Autun (*Pan. Lat.* 10.5–13.1; cf. *Pan.* 38.4–41.1 for the tax concessions granted by Trajan), with the inference that more is needed.⁵⁸ The descriptions of Constantine's *severitas* ("harshness") in *Panegyrici Latini* 6 (310 CE) by another anonymous orator are inherently protreptic and didactic in the emphasis upon the necessity of demonstrating this quality instead of *clementia*

56 For the construction of such a programme, see Roche (2011) 6–7.

57 For the negative example of Domitian (and other past emperors), see Roche (2011) 10–14.

58 Cf. Ware (2019) 294.

("mercy") when circumstances demand it (e.g., *Pan. Lat.* 6.10.1–6.13.5).⁵⁹ Just as Pliny cites the vices and deeds of Domitian as examples of qualities and conduct that are inappropriate for an emperor like Trajan (e.g., *Pan.* 33.3–34.2, 42.4, *et al.*), the usurper Maxentius is portrayed in *Panegyrici Latini* 12 (313 CE) as being the opposite of Constantine and therefore representative of the qualities and actions ill suited for an aspiring emperor (e.g., *Pan. Lat.* 12.4.3–5).⁶⁰

Examples of protreptic advice in late antiquity occur outside the *Panegyrici Latini* in the poetry of Claudian, who makes use of Pliny's *Panegyricus* in his panegyrics to Honorius.⁶¹ Claudian transforms the counsel that for the most part is adumbrated in the form of praise in the *Panegyricus* into indirect advice in his panegyrics of the emperor Honorius. In *Panegyricus de Quarto Consulatu Honorii Augusti* (398 CE), however, Claudian proffers advice to Honorius in a flashback in which the emperor Theodosius is imagined to be educating his son in the arts of government (214–418). Claudian's use of the flashback as a literary device, which has the effect of somewhat tempering the force of the counsel, raises the question of why the poet may have felt compelled to approach the subject of rulership in this indirect fashion. In the least, Claudian's guarded approach suggests that a poet in late antiquity, no less than a consul like Pliny at the turn of the 2nd century CE, had to be careful not to offer advice to an emperor too directly, which could cause offence and possibly put oneself in danger.

The actions and qualities required of a good emperor in the *Panegyricus de Quarto Consulatu Honorii Augusti* are similar to those mentioned in the *Panegyricus*. An emperor needs to rule with merit and his character is important (*IV Cons.* 219–268; cf. *Pan.* 10.3); the image of the beast is used as a *speculum tyranni*, that is, how an emperor should not act (*IV Cons.* 250–254; cf. *Pan.* 48.3, 49.1); an emperor cannot conceal his faults against ineluctable retribution (*IV Cons.* 269–275; cf. *Pan.* 49.1); the love of the people provides protection for the emperor (*IV Cons.* 276–293; cf. *Pan.* 49.2–3; *Pan. Lat.* 2.47.3–4); the desirable qualities necessary for an emperor in the *Panegyricus de Quarto Consulatu Honorii Augusti* include those ascribed to Trajan (e.g., *clementia*, "mercy," 277; cf. *Pan.* 3.4, 35.1, 80.1; *fides*, "loyalty," 283; cf. *Pan.* 51.5, 67.1); the emperor should be both a citizen and father to his people (*VI Cons.* 294; cf. *Pan.* 2.3–4); the emperor should be subject to the law (*IV Cons.* 296–299; cf. *Pan.* 65.1–2); the people follow the example of the emperor (*IV Cons.* 299–303; cf. *Pan.* 20.6,

59 Cf. Ware (2014).

60 Cf. the chapter of Quiroga in this volume on the rhetoric of invective in 4th-century CE imperial speeches.

61 Ware (2013).

44.2–8, esp. 44.8); and the emperor who is a model for his soldiers on the battlefield consequently earns their admiration (*IV Cons.* 320–352, esp. 350–352; cf. *Pan.* 13.1–5, esp. 13.1).

Mentioning the emperor as a model for future emperors and kings constitutes a particularly meaningful type of protreptic (or paraenetic) praise. Panegyrists in late antiquity transfer Pliny's *locus* of Trajan as a model ruler for future emperors (*Ep.* 3.18.2; cf. *Pan.* 4.1, 13.5) to their own emperors. In *Panegyricus de Quarto Consulatu Honorii Augusti*, Claudian traces the lineage of Theodosius to Trajan (18–20) before he depicts Theodosius as giving a lesson to Honorius on rulership (214–418). In the course of his didactic speech, Theodosius provides a number of exemplars of rulership, chief among which is Trajan, whose kindness he praises even more than his military successes:

victura feretur
gloria Traiani, non tam quod Tigride victo
nostra triumphati fuerint provincia Parthi,
alta quod invectus fractis Capitolia Dacis,
quam patriae quod mitis erat. Ne desine tales,
nate, sequi.

CLAUDIAN, *IV Cons.* 315–320⁶²

The glory of Trajan will endure,
not so much because, with his victory on the Tigris, vanquished
Parthia became our province and, with the Dacians broken,
he was conveyed to the lofty Capitol, but because he
was kind to his country. Do not desist, son, from following
men like him.

Theodosius' use of the example of Trajan to stress that Honorius should use the virtue of kindness (cf. *mitis*, "kind," "lenient," *IV Cons.* 319) toward his people instead of a military approach is adapted from the *Panegyricus*, where Trajan likewise is praised as being *mitis* to his people (*Pan.* 6.1, 80.1).

In his didactic speech to Honorius, Theodosius also cites heroes from the republican past as quintessential examples of leadership for Honorius to emulate (*IV Cons.* 401, 404–415) in much the same way that Pliny compares Trajan with heroes from this era (*Pan.* 13.4, 55.6–8). In *Panegyrici Latini* 2 (389 AD) of Pacatus, it is apparent that the emperor Theodosius transcends all past emperors (*Pan. Lat.* 2.1.2), including Trajan (cf. 2.4.5, 2.11.6). Whereas Trajan is

62 Ed. Platnauer (1922).

portrayed as a model emperor in Pliny's *Panegyricus* for those who succeed him (cf. *Pan.* 4.1, *Ep.* 3.18.2), he actually becomes an example in Pacatus' panegyric of an emperor to be surpassed, in this case by Theodosius.

One of the important protreptic themes in Pliny's *Panegyricus* is that of imperial limitation and self-restraint. Trajan submits himself to the law (*ipse te legibus subiecisti, legibus, Caesar, quas nemo principi scripsit*, "you submit yourself to the laws, Caesar; no one has written these laws for the emperor," *Pan.* 65.1) and chooses to be bound by the law no less than the consul (65.1–2) or common citizen (64.4). Thus Trajan, who is limited by the law just as he is limited by the qualities that are ascribed to him in the *Panegyricus*, must refrain from any action that would endanger the welfare of his subjects. Pliny's comparison of Trajan to Brutus (*Pan.* 55.6), who famously expelled Tarquinius Superbus from Rome in 510 CE (Livy 1.59–60, esp. 60), indirectly reminds the audience that a tyrant can be violently removed if he does not keep the best interests of his people in mind.

While it may seem less likely that a few centuries after Pliny a speaker or writer could proffer advice on the conduct and qualities that were appropriate for an emperor to assume,⁶³ there are some examples in the *Panegyrici Latini* and other late antique panegyrics, some of which make specific reference to Trajan in a manner reminiscent of Pliny (e.g., *Pan. Lat.* 2.4.5, 2.11.6). In his panegyric to Theodosius, Pacatus claims that Brutus, *regii nominis ... osor* ("despiser of the name of king," *Lat. Pan.* 2.20.5), would have changed his mind and accepted the monarchy under Trajan (2.20.5), thereby subtly reminding the reader of Pliny's theme regarding the supreme limitation of the exercise of power. Claudian picks up on this protreptic theme of self-restraint in *Panegyricus de Quarto Consulatu Honorii Augusti* (404 CE):

In commune iubes si quid censesque tenendum,
primus iussa subi: tunc observantior aequi
fit populus nec ferre negat, cum viderit ipsum
auctorem parere sibi.

CLAUDIAN, *IV Cons.* 296–299⁶⁴

If you make any law and custom for the common good,
submit to it first; then the people have more respect for
justice, nor refuse to submit to it when it has seen the author
of his own laws obey them.

63 Cf. Nixon and Saylor Rogers (1994) 26.

64 Ed. Platnauer (1922).

Similar to how Pliny observes that Trajan obeys the laws, Claudian advises Honorius to subject himself to the laws he has created.

During the early modern period the protreptic (or didactic) function of panegyric was recognised as one of its most important functions, and Pliny or Trajan was sometimes cited, the latter as a model emperor. For example, John Evelyn wrote his panegyric celebrating the accession of Charles II to the throne of England, Scotland, and Ireland in 1661 (*A Panegyric to Charles the Second Presented to His Majesty the xxxiii. [sic] of April, Being the Day of His Coronation, MDCLXI*) with specific reference to Pliny: "Thus what was once applied to Trajan, becomes due to your Majesty".⁶⁵

Early modern genres other than panegyric (epistolography, for example) pursue encomiastic themes found in Pliny's *Panegyricus* and late antique panegyric. Some of these themes are advisory or protreptic in intent. Upon the accession of Pope Adrian VI to the chair, Juan Luis Vives composed a congratulatory epistle to the Pope (1522)⁶⁶ that included praise (1–14, 32–34) and advice on the need to convene a general council (22–31). When the forces of Charles V, the Holy Roman emperor, captured Francis I, the king of France, Vives wrote an epistle to Henry VIII (1525),⁶⁷ Charles' ally, in which he praised Henry's supposed virtues and exhorted him and Charles to show clemency to the French nation (1–12).⁶⁸ The epistle alludes to the alleged benevolence and beneficence of Roman generals who had brought a nation or people under the control of Rome (7).

Other early modern epistles discuss the genre of panegyric. In an epistle to the orator of the University of Louvain (1504), which includes a reference to Pliny and his composition of the *Panegyricus*, Erasmus draws attention to its multifunctional nature:

Principio qui panegyricos nil aliud quam assentationes esse putant, prorsum ignorare videntur quo consilio, cui rei, genus hoc scripti sit a prudentissimis viris repertum; nempe in hoc ut obiecta virtutis imagine improbi principes emendarentur, probi proficerent, rudes instituerentur, admonerentur errantes, extimularentur oscitantes, denique ipsi apud sese pudescerent deplorati. An vero credendum est Calisthenem tantum philosophum, cum Alexandri laudes diceret, an Lysiam atque Isocratem,

65 Evelyn (1661) 7.

66 Eds. and trans. George and Tournoy (2019) 24–47.

67 Eds. and trans. George and Tournoy (2019) 49–57.

68 I owe these comments on Vives to Edward George (Texas Tech) made in private correspondence.

an Plinium et cum hiis innumerabiles, quum hoc in genere versarentur, alio spectasse quam ut sub laudandi pretextu cohortarentur ad honesta?

ERASMUS, *Epistle* 180⁶⁹

In the first place, those who think panegyrics are nothing other than flattery seem to be unaware of with what intention this kind of writing was invented by men of immense wisdom, whose aim it was for bad princes to be freed from faults by the image of virtue placed before them, the upright to gain advantage, the ignorant educated, the mistaken counselled, the wavering goaded on, and even those regarded as lost to feel shame. Or must we truly believe that such a philosopher as Callisthenes, when he spoke his praises of Alexander, or that Lysias and Isocrates, or Pliny and countless others, when they were occupied with this type of writing, strove for anything else other than to exhort to virtue under the pretext of praise?

Here Erasmus is concerned first to counteract the notion that panegyric, including that of Pliny, was solely intended as praise, then goes on to emphasise its various functions, including those that can be described as didactic, advisory, exhortative, and admonitory. In the last sentence of this passage, Erasmus expounds what he believes is the main objective of panegyric, which, though incidentally laudatory, was to encourage a ruler to right action under the semblance of flattery. In fact, from Pliny to the early modern period this function of guiding and correcting a ruler under the pretext of flattery can be detected, including to some extent in the panegyrics of late antiquity. While Pliny endeavours to inform his readers that the true purpose of the *Panegyric* was to advise emperors on how they should act and the qualities they should have, Erasmus suggests that the formula for instructing a ruler or other individual consisted of advice couched under the guise of praise.

Erasmus defends his own panegyric on Philip of Burgundy in another epistle of 1504 as follows:

Nec alia prorsus aequae efficax emendandi principes ratio quam si eis sub laudandi specie boni principis exemplar offeras, modo sic virtutes tribuas, sic vicia detrahas, ut ad illas adhortari, ab hiis detertere videare.

ERASMUS, *Epistle* 179⁷⁰

69 Ed. Allen (1906) 399.

70 Ed. Allen (1906) 397.

Certainly, no other way of correcting a prince is equally effective as offering, under the guise of praise, the model of a good ruler. Thus you impart virtues and extirpate faults in such a way that you appear to be exhorting the ruler to the former and to deter him from the latter.

The expression of this dual function of panegyric is remarkably Plinian in its configuration since Pliny stresses the positive qualities of Trajan while condemning the opposite qualities that his predecessor Domitian purportedly represents. In the *Panegyricus* Pliny adopts this formulation in the process of praising Trajan's qualities and actions and then exhorts him, for example, *Tene, Caesar, hunc cursum ...* ("Continue on this course, Caesar...", 43.4) and *Placeat tibi semper haec secta* ("May you ever follow this pathway...", 85.7; cf. 67.2, 72.3, 73.5).

In a speech to Queen Elizabeth (1572), the Warwick recorder views panegyric as predominantly protreptic in function:

The manner and custome to salute Princes with public Oracions hath bene of long tyme used, most excellent and gracious Souereigne Laide, begonne by the Greeks, confirmed by the Romaines, and by discourse of tyme continued even to this our daies: and because the same were made in publike places and open assemblies of senators and consaillors, they were called both in Greek and Latyn *panegyricae*. In this were sett fourth the commendacions of Kings and Emperors, with the sweet sound whereof, as the ears of evil Prynces were delighted by hearing there undeserved praises, so were good Princes by the pleasaunt remembrance of their knowen and true virtues made better, being put in mynde of their office and government.⁷¹

Again, the passage is reminiscent of Pliny's assertions that expressions of undeserved praise were made to Trajan's predecessors (cf. *Pan.* 2) and especially that the function of his speech was "so that ... good emperors should recollect their own deeds" (*ut ... boni principes quae facerent recognoscerent*, *Pan.* 4.1).

White Kennet, an English bishop and historian who published an English translation of Pliny's *Panegyric* (1686), similarly views panegyric as having largely a protreptic function. In his preface Kennet argues for a historical parallel between James II, who ascended the throne in 1685, and Trajan. In addition, he notes that his fellow writers have not commemorated James' ascension in a Pliny-like manner, which he ascribes to their concern about being labelled

⁷¹ Ed. Nichols (1823) 311.

as a flatterer. Kennet attributes a specifically paraenetic function to Pliny's *Panegyricus*:

The intent of [the *Panegyricus*] was first a deserv'd commendation of the good Trajan, and then the offer of a kind of winning Lecture to future Princes, (not by way of assertory instructions, which he was sensible would have look'd saucy and pedantick) by recommending the best of Precedents to insinuate upon their imitation, which had a more taking resemblance of modesty, and promis'd a stronger influence.⁷²

While Kennet argues that praise of Trajan was "deserv'd," he intends for his translation of the *Panegyricus* to serve as a model of conduct for James II. Just as Pliny purportedly rejects the obsequious flattery of the emperor (*Pan.* 2), early modern panegyrists themselves, as can be seen from the comments above, express their disapproval of servile praise of their king.

The protreptic theme of self-restraint was an important aspect of early modern panegyric. In John Dryden's *Astraea Redux* (1660) and *To His Sacred Majesty, A Panegyrick on His Coronation* (1661), Pliny's theme of limitation through Trajan's obedience to the law (cf. *Pan.* 65.1–2) is echoed through the poet's references to King Charles II's subjection to his own laws:

Your Pow'r to Justice doth submit your Cause,
Your Goodness only is above the Laws;
Whose rigid letter while pronounc'd by you
Is softer made.

DRYDEN, *Astraea Redux* 266–269⁷³

But you that are a Sovereign Prince, allay
Imperial pow'r with your paternal sway.

DRYDEN, *To His Sacred Majesty* 95–9⁷⁴

In *A Panegyric to Charles the Second Presented to His Majesty* (1661), John Evelyn similarly comments in Plinian-like fashion upon the king's willingness to submit himself to the same laws that govern his subjects:

⁷² Kennet (1686) vii.

⁷³ Eds. Hooker and Swedenburg (1956) 29.

⁷⁴ Eds. Hooker and Swedenburg (1956) 35.

Nor indeed do you desire any thing should be permitted your Majesty, but what is indulg'd your Vassals, subjecting even your self to those Lawes by which you oblige your Subjects; For as it is a great felicity to be able to do what one will, so is it much more glorious, to will only what is just and honourable.⁷⁵

The use of this Plinian theme of limitation in late antique and early modern panegyric shows that the quality of self-restraint is one of the genre's most important *loci* in terms of the approach to ruling that an emperor is advised to adopt.

6 The *Panegyricus* as Potential Admonishment and Criticism

On a general level in Roman culture, panegyric is represented as being basically foreign to Roman practice because of its fictitious and exaggerative aspects (e.g., *Brut.* 62);⁷⁶ this is especially the case of panegyric that is directed at the living in extant sources such as Cicero (cf. *De Orat.* 2.341–349, esp. 341), who engages in praise of prominent individuals in *Pro Lege Manilia* and *Pro Marcello*, and Juvenal (cf. *Sat.* 3.86–108). The 2nd-century rhetorician and satirist Lucian, who lived in the eastern Roman Empire, questioned the sincerity of the encomiast: ... εἴ γε τῷ μὲν ἐγκωμιάζοντι μόνου ἐνὸς μέλει, ὅπως οὖν ἐπαινεῖσαι καὶ εὐφρανᾶν τὸν ἐπαινούμενον, καὶ εἰ ψευσαμένῳ ὑπάρχει τυχεῖν τοῦ τέλους, ὀλίγον ἂν φροντίσειεν (“... if indeed the encomiast's only concern is to praise and please his subject by any means, and if he can achieve his goal by lying, he will scarcely care,” *Hist. Conscr.* 7).⁷⁷ Pliny himself observes that prior to Trajan imperial panegyric was the object of hatred on account of its insincerity (*Ep.* 3.18.7). Despite a recent critic such as Rees stressing the honesty and sincerity of Pliny's *Panegyricus*,⁷⁸ he still alludes to such rhetorical qualities as irony and earnest assertions of sincerity as well as the potentially, in fact, essentially suspect, fabricatory and inauthentic nature of the *laudatio* in the courtroom.⁷⁹ There is no reason to presume that a Roman audience was less sensitive to any possible nuance, ambiguity, or irony inherent in praise than a modern one. Imperial incidents recounted by Tacitus attest to this critical perceptiveness.

75 Evelyn (1661) 9.

76 Cf. Dominik and Smith (2011) 10–11.

77 Ed. Jacobitz (1913).

78 Rees (2007) 142–144.

79 Rees (2011b); cf. Dominik and Smith (2011) 12.

On one occasion when Tiberius praised Germanicus rather demonstratively, his audience immediately detected the insincerity of the emperor (*Ann.* 1.52). On yet another occasion, Burrus, a member of Nero's audience, reputedly grieved as he praised the emperor's artistic ability (*Ann.* 14.15). The fictitious and unreliable aspects of panegyric and the *laudatio* were evident generally in Roman culture, but the economical aspects of the genre insofar as the truth is concerned somewhat obscure its other potential functions. Although the ceremonial and political contexts of the *Panegyricus* are of course different from the judicial arena, the main point to be observed is that if there is a precedent in Roman legal practice not to interpret too literally the contents of a particular *laudatio*, then the argument for a nuanced, multivalent, and ambivalence-laden reading of imperial panegyric becomes similarly compelling.

Given that the *laudatio* in Roman culture provided a framework for reading praise as potential criticism of its subject, the reader should not be surprised to find that Pliny's *Panegyricus* is endowed with the capability to function partly as admonishment. Circumstances alluded to in the *Panegyricus* are rarely as straightforward as they may first appear. A passage praising Trajan early in the *Panegyricus* reads (*Pan.* 3.4):

non enim periculum est ne, cum loquar de humanitate, exprobrari sibi superbiam credat; cum de frugalitate, luxuriam; cum de clementia, crudelitatem; cum de liberalitate, avaritiam; cum de benignitate, livorem; cum de continentia, libidinem; cum de labore, inertiam; cum de fortitudine, timorem.

PLINY, *Pan.* 3.4

Indeed there is no danger that when I speak of [Trajan's] humanity he believes himself to be rebuked for arrogance; when I talk of his frugality he thinks I mean extravagance, that I mean cruelty instead of clemency, or greed rather than generosity; and that he presumes spite when I speak of his kindness, wantonness instead of self-control, idleness rather than industry, or fear instead of courage.

Here Pliny praises Trajan *inter alia* for various personal qualities such as humanity, frugality, clemency, generosity, kindness, self-control, industry, and courage. On the surface this passage seems to accord with the practice of imperial panegyric with its profusive flattery of the emperor. Elsewhere in the *Panegyricus* Pliny suggests that his speech is a sincere expression of his feelings

(cf. 3.1; 53.3–6).⁸⁰ But here in the *Panegyricus* Pliny combines a number of ideas that resonate far beyond the superficial level of praise. Pliny takes care to assure Trajan there is only one possible way of interpreting his *laudes* and that they should not be construed to mean exactly the opposite of their literal meaning; furthermore, Pliny stresses that bad emperors were praised for having qualities they did not possess and for deeds they did not perform (cf. *Pan.* 2.1–3.7).⁸¹ Pliny expresses a similar idea in the *Epistles* when he asserts that the highest praise he could offer Trajan was to say nothing that was expected of him and that, in contrast to the customary tributes paid to the worst of his predecessors, he was attempting a new kind of praise (*Ep.* 6.27.2–3) – presumably praise that could be believed (cf. *Ep.* 3.18.7). Pliny's statement that his praise of Trajan should be understood differently from that accorded to past emperors – that is, it was sincere and popular (cf. *Ep.* 3.18.7) – seems hard to accept given the tradition of Roman panegyric.

Although the expressions of admiration and support for Trajan in the *Panegyricus* are so adulatory as to suggest their insincerity to a modern observer, they should not of course be automatically rejected on that score alone. In the case of the aforementioned passage (*Pan.* 3.4), what is most revealing is Pliny's intimation that his audience was well versed in interpreting this type of praise as something other than what it professes to be. In the *Epistles* Pliny expresses his admiration for the critical sense of his audience at a reading of the *Panegyricus* (*Ep.* 3.18.4–10), which suggests they were particularly sensitive to nuance and ambiguity. In both the *Panegyricus* and *Epistles*, then, Pliny draws attention to the potential qualities in panegyric of hyperbole and inauthenticity as well as the ability of the audience to construe its real meaning.⁸²

Pliny's tributes to Trajan in the *Panegyricus* are not unlike those composed by poets such as Martial (*Epig.* 7.99) and Statius (e.g., *Silv.* 1.1.61f.; 4.3.135; 5.1.261; *Ach.* 1.14–19) to Domitian, *laudationes* that are fraught with interpretive possibilities that the majority of modern critics deny.⁸³ Martial's hollow flattery of Domitian was recanted by the poet after the emperor's death (*Epig.* 10.72). In the case of Pliny, we cannot be sure how he would have responded to the

80 Similarly Tacitus declares that during Trajan's reign one is allowed to feel what one wishes and to say what one feels (*Hist.* 1.1). But Tacitus undercuts this assertion by remarking that the kind of praise that involves the claim to be speaking freely was the only form of imperial panegyric still left (*Ann.* 1.8); cf. Dominik (2007) 329; Dominik and Smith (2011) 11.

81 Dominik (2007) 329; Dominik and Smith (2011) 10.

82 Dominik and Smith (2011) 10–11.

83 For exceptions see Ahl (1984) 91–101 on *Silv.* 1.1; Garthwaite (1984) on *Silv.* 3.4; Dominik (1994) 135–148 on the *Thebaid*; Holzberg (1988) 74–93 on the *Epigrams* (recanted by Holzberg [2002]); Garthwaite (1990) on *Ep.* 6; and Garthwaite (1993) on *Ep.* 9.

memory of Trajan's reign if he had outlived him. But in the aforementioned passage (*Pan.* 3.4), Pliny urges that his own praise of Trajan's qualities and deeds is to be understood differently from previous imperial panegyric, that is, literally rather than ironically. It is difficult to know precisely how to construe praise that denies its opposite meaning in the same breath. Whether or not Pliny himself expects his audience to interpret *this* to mean the opposite of what he says, at the very least he suggests the insincerity of the fulsome flattery directed toward Trajan,⁸⁴ the potential for reading it as criticism, and the possibility of the return of an oppressive emperor through the mention of the qualities that characterise him.

In addition to stressing the sincerity of his panegyric in a way that suggests the possibility of reading it ironically, Pliny exculpates himself from responsibility for both the delivery of the speech and its contents. Pliny remarks that he is obliged as a result of a decree of the Senate to deliver a *gratiarum actio* upon his assumption of the consulship (*sed parendum est senatus consulto quod ex utilitate publica placuit, ut consulis voce sub titulo gratiarum agendarum*, "But now I must obey the decree of the senate, which in the public interest has pronounced that under the title of a vote of thanks ...," *Pan.* 4.1; cf. *Pan.* 90.3, *Ep.* 3.18.1–2). But where Pliny seems to distinguish himself is reflected in the published version of his speech, whose length considerably exceeds that which might normally be expected for a panegyric, judging by the length of the other panegyrics in the *Panegyrici Latini*. Pliny's emphasis upon the amplificatory aspect in his published version seems almost defensive in nature, as if he feels that he must take care to cover all the expected topics to the maximum extent possible while still being tolerable to his readers. Accordingly, Pliny stresses at various intervals of his panegyric that it was incumbent upon him to speak at considerable length in order to cover the topics appropriate to the occasion (cf. *Pan.* 25.1, 56.1–2, 66.1, 75.1). Through the aforementioned statements strategically placed at the start of the *Panegyricus* and at various intervals throughout the text, Pliny effectively distances his own voice from its ostensibly obeisant and adulatory narrative. As Nauta astutely remarks, "panegyric is only possible on the basis of a contract between the poet and his audience which defines the context of utterance as, precisely, panegyric."⁸⁵ Since Trajan and his senatorial

84 Dominik (2007) 329; Dominik and Smith (2011) 11. Cf. Bartsch (1994) 148–187, esp. 156–157, 169–175, who argues *in extenso* that the need for Pliny to stress the sincerity of his panegyric is evidence of the possibility that it could be interpreted to mean the opposite of its literal meaning.

85 Nauta (2002) 426.

audience knew that Pliny was acceding to convention and that his praise of the emperor was demanded by the ceremonial context, nothing definitive could be adduced as to the sincerity of its expression.

Just as Pliny's *Panegyric* creates critical space for reading it as ironic or paradoxical praise, examples and discussions of panegyric from the early modern period confirm this interpretive possibility. While early modern panegyrics do not owe these interpretive origins specifically to Pliny or even to Graeco-Roman panegyric as a whole, the existence of panegyrics from this period that functioned as criticism suggests this potential interpretation of Pliny's *Panegyric*. A notable example is Erasmus' *Μωρίας ἐγκώμιον*, *Id Est, sive Stultitiae Laus* ("The Praise of Folly," 1511),⁸⁶ which is a satire on the Christian religion, church institutions, theologians, philosophy, rhetoric, and other areas of human life. (In the preface to *Μωρίας ἐγκώμιον*, Erasmus mentions two works that form part of the tradition of Greek paradoxical encomium:⁸⁷ Lucian's *Praise of the Fly*⁸⁸ and Synesius' *Praise of Baldness*).⁸⁹ During the early modern period, Anthony Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, views panegyric as a form of satire:

Our encomium or panegyrick is as fulsome and displeasing; by its prostitute and abandon'd manner of Praise. The worthy Persons who are the Subjects of it, may well be esteem'd Sufferers by the Manner. And the Publick, whether it will or no, is forc'd to make untoward Reflections, when led to it by such *Satirising Panegyrists*. For in reality the Nerve and Sinew of modern *Panegyrick* lies in a dull kind of *Satyr*; which the Author, it's true, intends shou'd turn to the Advantage of his Subject; but which, if I mistake not, will appear to have a very contrary Effect.⁹⁰

Here Cooper sees the potential for even deserving subjects of panegyric to be diminished by its praise. The passage is notable for its emphasis upon the potential of panegyric to be construed as satire and for it to have an ironic effect upon its audience. In *First Epistle of the Second Book of Horace, Imitated*,⁹¹ Alexander Pope's translation of Horace's praise of Augustus becomes an ironic

86 Ed. Listrius (1780); trans. Radice (1971) 9–134.

87 Ed. Listrius (1780); trans. Radice (1971) 3–8.

88 Ed. and trans. Harmon (1913) 82–95.

89 Ed. Migne (1864) cols. 1167–1206 (Greek text with Latin translation); trans. Fitzgerald (1930) 243–274. I owe this observation, made in private correspondence, to Fotini Hadjittofi (Lisbon).

90 Cooper (1714) 226.

91 Pope (1737).

panegyric when applied to George II since it actually highlights the disparity between the two figures.

7 Conclusion

One approach to the reading of Pliny's *Panegyricus* is to examine later iterations and discussions of panegyric in late antiquity and the early modern period for *loci* and passages that recall and discuss this earliest extant imperial panegyric. Although a surface reading of imperial panegyric, whether it is in the judicial or political context, is indisputably laudatory, the ambiguous undertones of a text like the *Panegyricus* will always be the subject of contestation among critics. Inevitably scholars who read imperial panegyric literally will not like an interpretation that opens up possibilities for a multivalent reading of Pliny's panegyric on Trajan.⁹² The *Panegyricus* can be read firstly and most obviously as praise and flattery, even if such a reading includes the potential for the instability or slippage of flattery. But the hybrid nature of the genre it represents suggests that the *Panegyricus* can also be read in at least four other ways: as ceremony and celebration; as authorial self-positioning, self-fashioning, and self-representation; as exhortation, admonition, and advice, that is, as protreptic and didactic; and as potential admonishment and criticism.

As later panegyric evidently was multi-dimensional and allowed for ambiguity and even criticism, it seems natural that the *Panegyricus*, which sometimes served as a model for the composition of subsequent panegyrics, would possess a similar capacity to function on a number of levels. The reception of Pliny's *Panegyricus* by writers of late antiquity and the early modern period not only provides evidence of its important role in the history of the genre of panegyric, but it also serves to illustrate the potential functions of the *Panegyricus*' own narrative. The modern criticism levelled against the *Panegyricus* is largely attributable to its effusive flattery of the emperor, but the focus on this feature of the work has partly blinded readers to its more nuanced aspects. An examination of Pliny's narrative techniques in the *Panegyricus* and its reception (and that of Graeco-Roman panegyric generally) during late antiquity and the early modern period demonstrates that the oration had a number of potential functions that transcend the mere purpose of praising the emperor.

92 Dominik and Smith (2011) 12.

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Psogos: The Rhetoric of Invective in 4th Century CE Imperial Speeches

Alberto J. Quiroga Puertas

Abusive language is one of the ways in which the classical past harmonises with our times. Sign in to your Twitter account and you will be greeted by offended users of a *leptodermic* (that is, thin-skinned) nature denigrating whomever dares to differ minimally from their opinions. Politics offers us a similar prospect. Regardless of their nationality and views, most politicians are more versed in the art of name calling than in doing their job. Yet it would be exaggerating to say that modern society is especially prone to slander if compared to the Graeco-Roman civilisation. The pervasive agonistic element of the Greek and Roman societies nurtured the creation of invectives as literary pieces that not only engaged with ongoing issues, but also became the kernel of public speaking occasions.¹ Numerous examples of these compositions from different periods have come down to us. Thersites' portrayal in the *Iliad*, Hipponax's iambs against Boupalos, Aristophanes' mockery of illustrious contemporary figures, or Demosthenes' and Aeschines' withering exchanges stand out in the canon of rhetorical invectives (*psogos*) from the archaic to the Hellenistic period.²

This type of literature remained in vogue in late antiquity, although it underwent a number of changes to adjust to the imperial political system of that time. It is true that emperors and high-ranking officials did not suffer public chastisement in the form of rhetorical speeches as often as in previous regimes, but rhetorical invectives against emperors did not vanish from the 4th and 5th century CE. A set of *psogoi* composed by Athanasius of Alexandria, Hilary of Poitiers, and Lucifer of Cagliari condemned the emperor Constantius II on political and religious grounds. More renowned is the case of the emperor Julian. Julian, the author of vitriolic speeches, was fiercely attacked by Gregory of Nazianzus after his death and by Cyril of Alexandria in the 5th century in rhetorical invectives that reformulated Classical *psogic* themes adapted to

1 Barker (2009) 2–19.

2 Relevant contributions to the field are Rinker (1979); Rosen (1988); Pernot (1993) 690–696; Barker (2009) 2–19; Smith and Covino (2011); and Serafim (2017).

Christian apologetics. Meanwhile, the bishop and Neoplatonic philosopher Synesius of Cyrene scorned the emperor Arcadius for lacking the royal stature expected of a ruler in his *On Kingship*. Additionally, the cultural, political, and religious debates emerging in this convulsive period opened up new ways of framing rhetorical invectives. Julian himself penned two *psogoi* against contemporary Cynics for their deviation from the *modus vivendi* of the original Cynics, as well as his famous *Misopōgōn*, a bitter oration that lambasted the citizens of Antioch for their insults and raillery against him. In the complex arena of Christology and theology, the bishop Epiphanius of Salamis' *Panarion* brims with all types of psogic themes dedicated to heretical groups. When it comes to public mores, the poet Claudian's *Against Eutropius* is considered a hallmark in the articulation of psogic topics dealing with the slander of eunuchs.³

All these instances invite further scrutiny into the constituents and dynamics of rhetorical invectives from the 4th and 5th centuries CE, as they are the result of the religious and political disputes of a period especially propitious for the composition of *psogoi*.⁴ In fact, the conceptual and formal laxitude of *psogos* in Graeco-Roman rhetorical theory (as will be shown in the first section of this chapter) dovetailed with these historical circumstances. Thus, *psogos* accommodated literary references and rhetorical devices from subgenres with a similar intent such as satire, iamb, and comedy. In this sense, my adoption of a methodological approach to the analysis of late antique rhetorical invectives is borrowed from Cribiore's broad understanding of rhetorical invectives as not only "independent epideictic discourses" but also as elements that partook of other genres.⁵

3 Although it falls out of the scope of the present contribution, it is important to question the extent to which the concept of *parrhēsia* ("frankness, freedom of speech") was operative in the invectives against emperors. Late antique cultural elites needed to find a balance between the outspokenness that their status and ethos entitled them to and the potential retaliations from the emperors or governing figures to whom the invectives were addressed. Their role as spokesmen of cities and communities enabled them to criticise the enforcement of religious and political policies yet restraint was advisable to avoid their intervention backfiring, which helps explain the different degrees of animosity in the invectives against ruling figures. On this topic, see Brown (1992) 61–70; Pernot (1993) 489–490; Pazdernik (2012); Flower (2013) 55; Rees (2018).

4 Agosti (2001); Miguélez-Cavero (2010); Flower (2013) 33–77; Trout (2015). See also Petkas' contribution to this volume (chapter 2).

5 See Cribiore (2013) 77, 110 and Flower (2013) 51–55. I will also take into account Thomas Conley's social and anthropological approach in his study (2010) of verbal abuse as a universal whose analysis can reveal important aspects of how slanderous language exchanges worked in a specific context.

Although the study of rhetoric in late antiquity seems an almost-exhausted field given the number of contributions produced in recent decades, its complexities and intricacies continuously attract new efforts to address the metatextual and intertextual interplay characteristic of late antique literature. In the case of *psogos*, it has been somewhat understudied despite its frequent usage and its ability to act as a catalyst of political and religious debates in the 4th and 5th centuries CE. This gap, however, has begun to be filled in recent decades. One of the most ambitious and comprehensive attempts to deal with abusive language through invective is Koster's book (1980), in which an overview of the ancient theorisation of invective and specific case studies from different periods are given. Agosti's work (2001) is a valuable starting point to understand the poetics of invective in late antiquity, although it does not mention important texts that would contribute to a better understanding of *psogos*. Flower's recent monograph (2013) and translation of several late antique invectives against the emperor Constantius II (2016) do justice to the important role that *psogos* played in the relationship between the church and the empire in the 4th century CE. Hawkins' monograph (2014) explores the reuse of the works and persona of the poet Archilochus of Paros by imperial authors as a means to create a discourse disruptive of contemporary social habits. Cribiore's translation (2015) of some invectives by the sophist Libanius of Antioch has helped to further our knowledge of the implications of rhetorical invectives in such a culturally and religiously changeable period.

Building on these works, this chapter surveys the dynamics of late antique rhetorical invectives as part of different cultural and religious debates of the time. In the first part of this chapter, I will survey the theoretical and conceptual roots of late antique rhetorical invectives as a propaedeutic outline of the language and motifs of verbal abuse used in the 4th and 5th centuries CE. Then two case studies are offered. In the first one, texts by the sophist Libanius of Antioch are explored. His *Oration* 2 is analysed with particular attention, as it showcases Libanius' main invective tropes. Then passages from three more invectives (*Ors.* 23, 3 and 58) are surveyed jointly, as they are thematically related to his activity as a teacher of rhetoric. As shown, Libanius scolded his students when their behaviour, outside or inside the classroom, failed to put into practice the fruits of the *paideia* that he taught them. In the second case study, examples of *psogic* themes from Socrates Scholasticus' *Ecclesiastical History* are studied. The church historian made frequent use of rhetorical invectives in his discussions of the different doctrines and creeds that threatened the unity of the church after the Council of Nicaea in 325. The focus in

this study is on Socrates' invective strategy to discredit the *auctoritas* of a heretic bishop by criticising his clothing, a well-known psogic topic in the classical tradition.

1 The Rhetorical Framework of *Psogos*

Psogos is one of those terms whose pliability makes it difficult to delineate its meaning strictly. Although the definitions provided by *LSJ* refer to a well-defined semantic field ("blemish," "flaw," "blame," and "censure"), it is a hard task to assign it to a single notion or category in the context of literary criticism, since *psogos* has been interpreted as a rhetorical trope, a literary form, or a genre in its own right.⁶ This vagueness when it comes to the creation of a solid theoretical framework is reflected by the semantic affinity of *psogos* with other thematically akin concepts (e.g., μέμψις, κακολογία, λοιδορία, ὄνειδος, ἀτιμία, βλασφημία, and δυσφημία) as well as with other literary forms characterised by their verbally abusive quality – iamb poetry, *spoudogeloion*, or even comedy. Yet it was in the field of rhetoric and oratory that *psogos* flourished.⁷ Theoretical specifications on the composition of rhetorical invectives are scarce if we bear in mind how productive it was throughout antiquity.⁸ These directions were presided over by Aristotle's definition of *psogos* (*Rh.* 1368a31–4): "Such are nearly all the materials of praise or blame, the things which those who praise or blame should keep in view, and the sources of encomia and invective; for when these are known their contraries are obvious, since blame is derived from the contrary things (ὁ γὰρ ψόγος ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν)."⁹ Although a thorough digression on the nature and use of *psogos* is missing from his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle recommended the use of tropes such as amplification (αὔξησις) and comparison (σύγκρισις) for both praise and blame when circumstances allowed it (*Rh.* 1368a10–37). In his *Poetics*, though, Aristotle considered the origins and development of *psogos* from Homer to his times (*Po.* 1448b24–34):

6 As Rinker (1979) 10–13, 18–19 rightly pointed out, ancient Greek and Latin sources lacked a comprehensive and detailed approach to *psogos*.

7 Adamik (1977–1978); Rosen (1988); Pernot (1993) 481; Saetta Cottone (2005).

8 Pernot (1993) 485.

9 Translation taken from Freese (1926).

Poetry branched into two, according to its creators' characters: the more serious produced *mimēsis* of noble actions and the actions of noble people, while the more vulgar depicted the actions of the base, in the first place by composing invectives we cannot name such an invective by any poet earlier than Homer, though probably many poets produced them; but we can do so from Homer onwards, namely the latter's *Margites* and the like. In these poems, it was aptness which brought the iambic metre too into use – precisely why it is called “iambic” now, because it was in this metre that they lampooned one another.¹⁰

The author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* complied with Aristotle's treatment of praise and blame as two sides of a coin by replicating the latter's definition of *psogos* and by recommending the use of figures like αὔξησις (*Rh. Al.* 1426a–1427a; 1428a3–5) to develop praising and psogic topics appropriately.

In the Roman world, Quintilian's approach to *vituperatio* was indebted to Aristotle's as the Roman rhetorician considered that its composition was the exact opposite of *laus* (*IO* 3.7.19: *Qui omnis etiam in vituperatione ordo constabit, tantum in diversum*). Quintilian, however, is more exhaustive when it comes to providing further instructions on the topics from which an invective could be composed (*IO* 3.7.19–22: lowness of birth, physical and moral blemishes, character) and on the skills that an orator required to adapt a speech to his audience (*IO* 3.7.23–25). In his discussion on epideictic rhetoric, Quintilian commented on the circumstances in which *laus* and *vituperatio* were practised. Other than in oratorical displays (“Are not encomium (*laus*) and vituperation (*vituperatio*) frequently introduced in our contests?” wondered Quintilian in his *Institutio oratoria* [2.1.11]),¹¹ these forms were also used in funeral speeches, in the senate and even in courts (3.7.1–4).¹²

But it is in the *progymnasmata* that we find a more solid grasp of the practice and dynamics of rhetorical invectives from their inception.¹³ In these collections of rhetorical exercises that trained young students in order to prepare them for the composition of different types of texts, we are offered detailed information about the techniques and topics which substantiated rhetorical

10 Translation taken from Halliwell (1995). Psogic strategies also played a relevant role in the oratorical arena as a way to arouse emotions. On this topic, see Serafim (2019) 137–152.

11 Translation taken from Russell (2001).

12 On invective in the Roman world, see Kish (2018). I thank Andreas Serafim for bringing this study to my attention.

13 See Aphth. *Prog.* 10.27.13–10.31.5; Hermog. *Prog.* 19.14.20–25; Lib. *Prog.* 9.1–9.8; Theon *Prog.* 112.10–113.25. On the relevance of *progymnasmata* in late antiquity, see Reguero's contribution to this volume (chapter 6).

invectives. The rhetoricians Aelius Theon and Hermogenes provide us in their *progymnasmata* with the topics and literary materials to compose an encomium, which, just by subverting the meaning of these topics, were the same materials that a student should use to compose an invective. Two reasons stopped both rhetoricians from addressing *psogos* from a theoretical point of view: first, their interest in differentiating rhetorical encomia from other types of praise or of *progymnasmata* (there seemed to be a concern about the overlapping between the exercises of encomia and commonplaces); second, the display of names from the mythological and historical legacy of classical antiquity with which students should write their encomia. Thus, Theon only dealt with it by reprising Aristotle's above-mentioned formulation of *psogos* (*Prog.* 112.15: ψέξομεν δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων), while Hermogenes just pointed out that it shared its topics with encomia (*Prog.* 7.14–15: ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς τόποις ἀμφοτέρω προάγεται). The treatises on epideictic rhetoric by Menander Rhetor also followed the traditional consideration of *psogos* as the counterpart of encomium, although he made it clear that, while encomia could be divided into different subtypes (just as in Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria* 3.7.8–18, 26–28), *psogos* was indivisible (331.15–331.18). A more insightful survey into the nature of rhetorical invectives is represented by Aphthonius' collection of *progymnasmata*, in which *psogos* is granted a section and a definition on its own (*Prog.* 10.27.15: a speech about vices that also contains an accusation), even though the topics and their arrangement in the speech are once again drawn from the encomia scheme. A further example of a rhetorical invective is offered by Aphthonius, in which Philip II of Macedon is denigrated by subverting some of the most common praise topics (birthplace, ancestors, deeds, and character).¹⁴

2 Slandering Students: Libanius of Antioch's Use of *Psogos*

The works by the sophist Libanius of Antioch (ca. 319–393) have become the touchstone in the study of almost every aspect of late antique rhetoric given the plethora and multilayered dimension of his writings. Rhetorical invectives are no different in this sense. Leaving aside the theoretical and fictional character of the invectives included in the collection of *progymnasmata* attributed to him,¹⁵ *psogos* was one of Libanius' weapons of choice during his long career.

14 On the most recurrent topics in rhetorical invectives, see Conley (2007) and (2010) 37–38. On other attempts to index and to catalogue the topics of rhetorical blame, see Criboire (2013) 112; Flower (2013) 20.

15 Flower (2013) 50–51; Gibson (2014) 135–136.

His usage of rhetorical strategies derived from the poetics of invective was activated when he had to defend himself from accusations regarding his personal and professional activities. It should also be noted that *psogos* not only operated in his rhetorical invectives but also in larger compositions of a different kind, some of which contained encomiastic overtones. The dualistic nature of epideictic rhetoric, like a coin with two faces (encomium and *psogos*), allowed the disruption of invective in praises as subtle messages whose understanding depended on the perspicacity of the audience in decoding literary allusions and linguistic cues.¹⁶ That is the case, for instance, of his *Autobiography*. A self-glorifying text, it combines self-praise (e.g., *Or.* 1.37) with a *psogic* narrative about Libanius dealing with his rivals in the oratorical arena (e.g., *Or.* 1.109–110).

We frequently find the *psogic* mode taking centre stage in Libanius' orations motivated by the ups and downs of his teaching activity and his relationship with his students.¹⁷ Such is the case of his orations 2, 3, 23, and 58, related compositions in that they follow the same pattern. After disclosing rumours that made him the target of abusive and humiliating language, the sophist elaborated at length on the nature and content of the invective in order to defuse it by means of self-praise and turn the *psogic* blaming against his accusers. Let us start the examination of Libanius' use of *psogos* with his *Oration* 2. Although it is not thematically connected with the set of invectives against his students (*Or.* 23, 3, and 58), it prefigures his articulation of *psogic* themes and techniques. Composed at the beginning of the 380s, *Oration* 2 ("To those who called him tiresome") was meant to respond to the comments that labelled him tiresome (βαρὺς) because of his inclination to expose publicly what he considered to be corrupted in the politics and morals of his time. Although some scholars have argued that a quixotic vein motivated Libanius' denunciations,¹⁸ a rhetorical approach to these works can provide us with a new insight into his intentions. Having become a *laudator temporis acti* after the death of his much-admired emperor Julian, the tone of Libanius' speeches tended to merge autobiographical notes with complaints about the new policies and habits that came with the new religious order. "I have said that in the past there were sacrifices in plenty," Libanius bitterly complained (*Or.* 2.30), "the temples used to be full of worshippers, there was good cheer, music, songs, garlands, and the treasure in every one was a means of assistance to those in need. What lie did I tell, then?

16 On rhetorical invectives as a code between author and audience in late antique times, see Cribiore (2013) 21, 77–78, 116–119.

17 On student life in late antiquity, see Watts (2006) and Cribiore (2007).

18 López Eire (1992); Criscuolo (1995); Malosse (2007); Cribiore (2013) 35, 78.

Can you find the temples like this nowadays? Indeed, can you find such dire poverty anywhere else?”¹⁹

It seems that the intensity of this melancholic and reproachful position led to him being called “tiresome” (βαρύς), a polysemantic adjective that Libanius knew how to adjust to the rhetorical arrangement of the arguments of the speech. Throughout this composition the sophist addressed issues from several spheres in which βαρύς was a key concept levelled against him. In the first lines, though, Libanius feigns surprise, as he believed that being βαρύς was the kind of flaw that went away with time. Since he was almost in his seventies when he composed this piece, he concluded that desperation had taken hold of his enemies due to his determination not to quit denouncing injustices and his adherence to this flaw (*Or.* 2.5): “After having had recourse to every other shift, and having been made to blush at every one, they still cannot keep quiet; without concerning themselves about the conviction of any of their assertions, they have been reduced to this [i.e., calling him βαρύς], so as to have some justification for avoiding association with me.” As the oration continues, the varied nuances of βαρύς unfold, thus allowing Libanius to rebut each of them by exemplifying how his behaviour proved the opposite in the spheres where the imputation of being βαρύς was levelled against him. The moral connotations of this term are responded to with patronising claims of being a man of the people; thus, in his relationship with *hoi polloi* he puts into the people’s mouth two nominalised adjectives that describe his attitude towards them (*Or.* 2.6: ὁ μέτριος – “decent” – and οὐχ ὁ κοινός – “polite”). Likewise, his relationship with the upper class under the charge of βαρύς showed him no less self-effacing – for he pretended that he did not care to elaborate on the honours and treatment to which his position entitled him (*Or.* 2.7–9) nor desire to digress on the merits of his family and his sacrifices for his students and Antioch (*Or.* 2.12–17). However, his reluctance to mention what kind of honours and merits he possessed must be understood as a rhetorical pose, as these omissions were actually filled by his use of figures of speech and rhetorical tropes. Libanius made use of *erōtēma* (rhetorical question) and *procatalēpsis* (prebutter) to relate what treatment he deserved and what sacrifices he had made for his city. In using these rhetorical tropes, Libanius avoided a narration in the first person that could have been read as a blunt counter-argument (even for someone as immodest as him) to the accusation of being βαρύς.

Equally interesting is the usage of *ēthopoia*²⁰ in *Or.* 2.19: “‘Ah! But we find your walk is offensive.’ Indeed? Unless of course you refer to the effects of my illness.

19 Libanius’ translations are taken from Norman (1977).

20 On the use of *ēthopoia* in rhetorical contexts, see Serafim (2017) 91–99.

'And your glance, your haughty airs, your tone!'" The imaginary of this passage referred to the different elements involved in an oratorical performance that could endanger its success if they were not properly performed.²¹ Libanius' emphasis on the criticism of the performative dimension of his oratory troubled him because of the competitive atmosphere of the late antique cultural landscape.²² Yet in these lines there seems to be also an intertextual nod. In a reference to the feud between Aeschines and Demosthenes in Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists*, Demosthenes is compared with his oratorical nemesis in several aspects. At some point we are told that (VS 508) "Demosthenes, on the other hand, had a gloomy expression and an austere brow (βαρὺς τὴν ὀφρύν)." ²³ Bearing in mind that Demosthenes became Libanius' rhetorical and moral yard-stick, it can be argued that the presence of αἱ ὀφρύες (translated above by Norman as "haughty hairs") in a speech motivated by the charge of being βαρὺς did not result from a coincidence but was a subtle allusion to the Philostratean anecdote. This intertextual nod would help Libanius make the point that even his admired Demosthenes, unanimously acknowledged as the peak of classical rhetoric, was accused of being βαρὺς when it came to his appearance.²⁴ The psogic charge of αἱ ὀφρύες from Libanius' critics would thus be reversed: rather than an insult, this intertextual allusion would turn it into a resemblance with Demosthenes.

In the last part of *Oration 2* a change of strategy is detected. In addition to the itemisation and response to the charges of being βαρὺς, Libanius thought that the best defence was a good offense. Having lost his patience and sense of restraint, Libanius openly chastised his critics (*Or.* 2.59): "I cannot help but speak the truth about it, and I have my supporters, just as you have each other at your fine parties, where there is plenty of iced water laid on and plenty of misconduct, and where there is competition in vice and winning is a disgrace, and where not the gods but those responsible for our present woes receive hymns of praise." The psogic vocabulary (πολλὴ δὲ ὕβρις, αἰσχραὶ δὲ ἄμιλλαι, πονηραὶ δὲ νῖκαι, ὕμνουνται δὲ ἀντὶ τῶν θεῶν οἱ τῶν κακῶν τῶν παρόντων αἴτιοι) is condensed in a short sentence but densely arranged in four periods in order to mark the relevance of his refutation even though his defence may gain him,

21 Numerous examples of oratorical fiascos can be found in Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists* (e.g., VS 571–572, 594, 623).

22 See Van Hoof (2013) for an analysis of the strong competitive dimension of *paideia* in late antiquity. On his oratorical performances, see Quiroga Puertas (2018) 89–150.

23 Philostratus' translation is taken from Wright (1921).

24 On Libanius' construction of his ethos as an orator following Demosthenes' style and habits, see Criboire (2013) 108–109 and Chrysikou's contribution to this volume (chapter 17).

as he admitted in the epilogue of the oration, a reprimand (*Or.* 2.60: μέμψιν ἐνεργεῖν δίκαιον).

The psogic strategies and vocabulary deployed in *Or.* 2 resurface in other invectives in which criticism of his students looms large. Part of this resentment can be credited to the frustration that Libanius must have felt when they did not meet his standards and his concern for the reputation of his school. However, his relationship with them has to be approached with caution. As Criboire has noted, the fatherly attention that he dispensed in his letters to his students must be reconciled with the vitriolic tone of his invectives against them in public orations.²⁵ Such is the case of his *Oration* 23, “Against the Refugees.” This oration closes the set of five speeches composed by the sophist *à propos* the Riot of the Statues that took place in Antioch in 387 CE.²⁶ *Or.* 23 inveighs against those who fled the city for fear of being unjustly imprisoned or condemned. “What need was there to fly into a panic of fear and trembling when there was no cause for alarm?” Libanius wondered (*Or.* 23.3–4), “Well, one cannot name any injury suffered by those who stayed here, so why did the refugees not join those who stayed?”²⁷

These rhetorical questions set the tone of the speech and, more to the point, represent how Libanius conceived the structure of his invectives by combining encomiastic passages with psogic lines. First, praise of the management of the crisis by the Emperor Theodosius (*Or.* 23.12–14) is put side by side with an invective against the different social groups of Antioch who threw themselves into starvation and into the hands of bandits that assaulted them on their flight across nearby rural regions (*Or.* 23.8–10). Second, the sophist’s attack on a group of his students who joined those who abandoned the city is framed by the deployment of a number of psogic concepts that, in turn, give way to lines praising Libanius’ exemplary attitude in the aftermath of the riot and describing rhetoric as panacea to moral blemishes. The laziness, deceitfulness, and idleness (*Or.* 23.20: ἀργία, ἑξαπατάω, and ῥαθυμία) of his students made them run away from Libanius’ school (*Or.* 23.20) “as though they were being chased, though there was no one chasing them nor yet eager to seize them.” The invective against this group of students is interrupted by a praise of rhetoric, a discipline that for Libanius (*Or.* 23.21) “helps to conceal lowly origin: it hides ugliness, protects wealth, relieves penury, and suffices cities for their protection, since in war it is more useful than any equipment and in battle is more potent than any superiority of numbers.” The psogic tone is

25 Criboire (2013) 26.

26 On the events and reactions to the riot, see French (1998).

27 Translations of Libanius’ *Or.* 23 are taken from Norman (1977).

immediately reprised by the addition of three more derogatory concepts relating to the students' behaviour (*Or.* 23.22–23: νωθεία, μάλαχία, and κακία) that turned them into (*Or.* 23.27) “enemies of the Muses” who gained themselves Libanius' severest judgment in the epilogue of the oration (*Or.* 23.28): “you, you will feel shame at the sight of the city, its gates, its place of learning, and of me also, unless you are even thus far lost to any sense of shame.”

The same dynamics of rapid alternations of encomium and *psogos* preside over *Oration* 3, “To his students about the speech.” The motivation of the composition of this *psogos* was to reply to defamatory remarks from some of his students against him because he had not delivered a declamation at school. This accusation should not be taken lightly, as for late antique *pepaideumenoi* silence and refusal to deliver an oration could lead to ostracism from the cultural and social spheres, as these were overcrowded by sophists, philosophers, and teachers eager to win over the admiration of students and a place of honour.²⁸ Old and resentful of his ailments at the moment of composition of this oration (ca. 387–388), Libanius found the strength to fight back and to dispel suspicions over his declamatory skills. At stake was his status as one of the most respected voices of Antioch, a position that was being contested as other socially relevant figures (mostly Christian bishops) and the institution of a Latin chair were challenging his standing in the Syrian city. His dismissal of the charge follows what Norman called a double paradox. First, the composition of *Oration* 3 would replace the speech demanded by his students; second (and more to the point of this chapter), Libanius turned them “from being complainants to being themselves the recipients of complaint.”²⁹

Thus, he dedicated the first argument of his refutation to replying that his voluntary refusal to give a talk was not to be ascribed to moral blemishes such as idleness or negligence (*Or.* 3.4: ἀργία καὶ ῥαθυμία), an ironic statement as ἀργία καὶ ῥαθυμία were frequent words in his attacks against his students (see above *Or.* 23.20). Libanius continued to exonerate himself by discoursing on the behavioural problems and ethical faults which his students committed. His claim that he was a self-sacrificing sophist impervious to pecuniary motivations (*Or.* 3.9) sharply contrasts with the characterisation of his students as shameless youngsters wasting their fathers' money (*Or.* 3.6):

It is indeed reason enough for anyone to lose his temper and to make him keep silent, that a lad should get money from his father to pay his

28 On the significance of silence in late antique rhetoric, see Quiroga Puertas (2013). Libanius himself criticised a fellow sophist on these grounds; see *Or.* 1.50.

29 Norman (2000) 183.

professor, and then divert it to drink, dicing or amorous adventures – adventures which at times are more brazen than is lawful; and then that he, enveloping his shamelessness (τὴν ἀναίδειαν) about himself, should burst into the classroom, with shouting, threats and assault, and treat everyone else like dirt, and expect the fact of his own arrival to be counted as the professor's reward.³⁰

The use of ἀναίδεια served Libanius as a fitting prologue to the *narratio* of the speech as this concept works as a hypernym under which his students' misdoings are judged. Not only had they been slow and sluggish when they were summoned to attend Libanius' previous public orations but they had also disrespected him with their careless attitude (*Or.* 3.11: βλακεύοντας) while he was performing (*Or.* 3.12–13):

When I am speaking and developing any theme, there is much nodding of heads to one another about drivers, actors, horses, dancers or some fight that has happened or is due to happen (...) some stand there with arms folded like graven images, or fidget with their noses with either hand, or sit stock still, though there is so much to excite them, or they force an excited listener to sit down, or count the number of the newcomers, or content themselves with looking at the leaves or chattering about anything that comes into their heads anything rather than attend to the speaker.

Mirroring the combination of bitter *psogos* and self-praise in the guise of an *apologia pro vita sua*, the feedback loop between rhetorical blame and praise is explicitly manifested when Libanius replies to charges about the decaying state of his oratory (*Or.* 3.20): “So you cannot seek refuge in comments like that, for their praise (ἔπαινος) is testimony to my superiority and debars you from casting aspersions upon my oratory (κατὰ τῶν λόγων μέμψεων).” This juxtaposition of terms for encomium and *psogos* here does not seem to be unintentional, as it appears in other works. For instance, in his *Or.* 37, another invective composed to chastise two individuals (Helpidius and Polycles) who accused the emperor Julian of masterminding the poisoning of his wife Helena, Libanius rebuked Polycles by contrasting the verbs ἐπαινέω and ψέγω (*Or.* 37.2): “although pretending to praise, you criticised him (ἐν σχήματι δὲ ἐπαινοῦντος ἔψεγες) for being so lavish in his gifts.”

Dating from his late years (ca. 390–391), *Oration* 58 (“To his students on the carpeting”) continues some of the leitmotifs of his last works: his lament over the decline of rhetoric in comparison with other disciplines and his students’ misbehaviour. Libanius’ outrage was sparked on this occasion by the offense of some of his students who carpeted a pedagogue close to him (*Or.* 58.18): “The manner of it is for a carpet to be stretched out on the ground, and for it to be held at each edge by people, many or few, as its size dictates. The prospective victim of this outrage is put in the middle of it, and they toss him up as high as they can. Sometimes he lands in the carpet when it is held high, and he is all right, but at times he misses it and lands on the ground.” Throughout this oration Libanius deployed his frequent arsenal of psogic terms against his students (e.g., *Or.* 58.3: ἐξαμαρτάνω; 4: ἐπιτίμησις; 19: ἀσέλγεια; 21: κακία; 26: μέφομαι; 27: ὕβρις) by framing it within three metaphors. First, Libanius expressed his desire that his students’ misconduct be medically treated (*Or.* 58.1), thus comparing his *psogos* to a health remedy. Second, he felt that they behave like panicking sailors in a wavy sea (*Or.* 58.4), a metaphor that would remind his students of their need for an authority figure (i.e., Libanius himself). Finally, the carpeting was compared to an impious action (*Or.* 58.5: τᾶσεβές) unworthy of those who sought (*Or.* 58.5) “the initiation into the rites of Hermes,” which shows the sacred and divine dimension that rhetoric had for Libanius.

Once again, in an invective composed by Libanius, there is an encomium within the *psogos*. On this occasion, the pedagogues are verbosely praised (*Or.* 58.7–14). While the students’ fathers spent most of their time untroubled by their children and the teachers dealt with them only until midday, pedagogues worked restlessly *in loco parentis* all day long. In return, Libanius complained, the students verbally and physically abused them (*Or.* 58.15). One is under the impression that selflessness alone moved Libanius to defend the pedagogues but self-interest should also be taken into account. The pedagogue defended by Libanius had been carpeted because he was considered to be (*Or.* 58.21) “guilty of malicious behaviour towards one of the teachers of Latin.” The chair of Latin appointed in Antioch around 388 worried Libanius as it meant undesirable competition for his school, which already resented the defection of students who left for the school of other sophists or Latin rhetors.³¹ In this way, when Libanius lamented that (*Or.* 58.22) “the Latin teacher wanted his subject to become superior to mine and he has often caused pupils to transfer from Greek literature to Latin,” he was making clear that oration 58 was not only about defending the carpeted pedagogue but also about maintaining his status in Antioch.

31 On this topic, see also Lib. *Ep.* F838, *Or.* 1.53, 65–70, 100.

Read separately or jointly, these orations on the student life in Antioch and on Libanius' own school are a vivid demonstration of the understanding of praise and blame as two sides of the same coin. Encomium prompts invective in the same way that invective gives rise to encomium. "Much of Libanius' oratory," Cribiore has pointed out, "unleashed against governors, the people in Antioch, rival disciplines, and his delinquent students, suggests a satirist's desire for moral reform."³² Such moral reform implied respect for the values attached to the teaching of rhetoric, the moral compass of the sophist. Invective language, "a powerful medium for self-construction,"³³ came to be the chassis of Libanius' reproofs that suited his professional and personal agenda.

3 Slandering Heretics: *Psogos* in Socrates Scholasticus' *Historia Ecclesiastica*

In late antique Christian literature, praise and blame strategies did not differ from the classical dicta on their composition or from contemporary non-Christian invectives. However, the classical psogic themes were reinterpreted in a Christian key.³⁴ Representative of this reformulated style are the invectives included in Socrates Scholasticus' *Historia Ecclesiastica* (henceforth *HE*). The 5th-century CE church historian composed a highly rhetorised work in which cultural, religious, and theological issues, spanning from the beginning of the 4th century until the mid-5th century CE, converge. Socrates was influenced by a well-established tradition of Christian texts of an epideictic nature. Encomia of bishops and other relevant Christian figures (e.g., John Chrysostom's homilies on Meletius and Eustathius; Gregory of Nazianzus' encomium on Basil of Caesarea; Eusebius of Caesarea's *Life of Constantine*, etc.) and texts sketching out the *virtutes* that church leaders should observe (e.g., Ambrose of Milan's *On the Duties of the Clergy*, or John Chrysostom's *On Priesthood*) shared the epideictic arena with rhetorical invectives and psogic texts both against Christian and non-Christian figures (see above pp. 170–171). In his work, Socrates frequently subverted the rhetorical topics of Menander Rhetor's dicta on the *basilikos logos* (368–377.30) and the *specula principum*, two literary subgenres widely used in late antique literature as their characteristics enabled authors to

32 Cribiore (2013) 111.

33 Flower (2013) 134.

34 On the originality of the Christian epideictic discourse, see Cribiore (2013) 120–124; Flower (2013) 18–19, 61–68.

praise not only emperors but also other influential figures in the socio-cultural and religious landscape of late antiquity.

As a consequence, Socrates' *HE* is composed of numerous *specula episcoporum*, as Giorgia Vocino has named those accounts of Christian bishops and priests meant to reshape "their memory into models of sanctity to be offered to their successors" by providing them with "portraits, *specula*, of authoritative bishops suited as models and sources of inspiration for present-day ambitious churchmen."³⁵ These *specula episcoporum*, however, were transformed into rhetorical invectives through which Socrates criticised bishops and Christian elites with the assistance of literary techniques from the *psogos* as part of his historiographical program. Thus, the main goal of Socrates' *HE* was to condemn heretical beliefs and doctrinal disagreements that were rooted in the problems that had to be tackled by the church and the empire in the 4th and 5th centuries. His work aimed to provide information about and condemnation of the tenets defended by the heresies that populated the late antique world and, more specifically, of the Christian figures that did not abide by the Nicene Creed. They were, consequently, cast under a negative light because of their failure to contribute to the unity of the church.³⁶ In fact, Socrates' intention to denounce theological friction and call for religious consensus is clearly stated by reproducing the letter sent by the emperor Constantine to the bishops Alexander and Arius, in which the emperor attempted to reconcile opposing theological positions (*HE* 1.7):

In order to remind you of your duty by an example of an inferior kind, I may say: you are well aware that even the philosophers themselves are united under one sect. Yet they often differ from each other on some parts of their theories: but although they may differ on the very highest branches of science, in order to maintain the unity of their body, they still agree to coalesce. Now, if this is done amongst them, how much more equitable will it be for you, who have been constituted ministers of the Most High God, to become unanimous with one another in such a religious profession.³⁷

One example of Socrates' application of *psogic* strategies to ecclesiastical divisions is provided by his account of the Council of Constantinople in 360. Summoned by the emperor Constantius II, this council meant to bridge the

35 Vocino (2016) 343, 348.

36 Van Nuffelen (2004) 315–319.

37 Socrates' translations are taken from Zenos (1886).

differences regarding the Arian controversy. Instead, depositions of bishops, banishments, and more fights about the similar or identical substance of Jesus and God ensued. Among those affected was Eustathius, the bishop of Sebastia, who suffered several depositions in his lifetime due to his continuous shifts in the theological milieu and to his peculiar behaviour.³⁸ In this regard, another church historian, Sozomen, tells us that Eustathius forbade marriage, recommended the neglect of fasting, behaved in a most eccentric way, among many other “extravagances which were altogether contrary to the laws of the Church” (*HE* III.14).³⁹

Socrates lambasts Eustathius at length by condemning some of his unorthodox doctrines in the form of *ēthopoia*, a useful form when it came to the composition of invectives as shown in the previous section of this chapter. As part of Socrates’ *psogos* against Eustathius’ doctrines, mentions of the clothing of the bishop of Sebastia can be found. Socrates tells us that Eustathius’ father had deposed him “for dressing in a style unbecoming of the sacerdotal office (ἀνάρμοστον τῇ ἱερωσύνῃ στολήν),” and that Eustathius “himself wore the habit of a philosopher (φιλοσόφου σχῆμα) and induced his followers to adopt a new and extraordinary garb.”⁴⁰ Socrates’ comments on Eustathius’ clothes should not be dismissed as a petty issue deployed simply to complement his theological criticism. Rather, clothing plays an important role in the ethical portrayal of the characters in his *Ecclesiastical History*. As with the wife of Caesar, religious orthodoxy had to be above suspicion – and this included outward appearance, as proven by the fact that unorthodox or heretical tenets reflected by clothing became a frequent *psogic* theme in late antique Christian historiography.⁴¹ For instance, in Eusebius of Caesarea’s *Ecclesiastical History*, which was the work that Socrates wanted to continue, religious criticism against the heretic Paul of Samosata was also complemented by an invective on his erratic behaviour and clothing (*HE* 7.30). What is more, as Michael Roberts argued in his influential *The Jeweled Style*, late antique literature reflected a strong awareness of the relationship between ethics, clothing, and literary composition.⁴²

38 Sterk (2009) 40–42.

39 Sozomen’ translations are taken from Zenos (1886). Sozomen *HE* 3.14.33 abounds in the same accusations yet he acknowledges that “many persons, however, justify him from this accusation, and throw the blame upon some of his disciples.”

40 However, Sozomen explains why Eustathius did this (*HE* 3.14.36): “Eustathius exchanged his clothing for the stole, and made his journeys habited like other priests, thus proving that he had not introduced and practised these novelties out of self-will, but for the sake of a godly asceticism.”

41 Conley (2010) 10 lists “eccentricity of dress” as one of the most recurrent *psogic* topics in Graeco-Roman literature.

42 Roberts (1989) 115–121.

Thus, the seemingly trivial comment on the clothing style of Eustathius has more layers of interpretation if we scratch under its surface. Two words stand out in the derogatory description of Eustathius' external appearance. First, *στολή*, whose general meaning was "dressing, clothing," had important connotations in Christian texts.⁴³ In *Exodus* *στολή* is the word used to describe the priests' garment as commanded by God (Ex. 28:2; 39:18; 40:13). But *στολή* can also be a deceptive accessory, as Jesus meant to show when he warned about the scribes and the teachers of the law walking in robes (Mk. 12:38: ἐν στολαῖς). This helps explain Socrates' clarification that dress must be appropriate to the dignity of the office (ἀνάρμοστον τῇ ἱερωσύνῃ).⁴⁴ The second word is *σχῆμα*, another concept with important religious implications in early Christianity that referred to the ethos as well as to the physical appearance of Christian bishops or priests.⁴⁵ But *σχῆμα* was also a word used to refer to the theatrical gestures and body language of actors, a figure that was poles apart from Christian leaders.⁴⁶ In Eustathius' portrayal, Socrates exploits this second meaning of *σχῆμα* by criticising the heretic's personality for wearing the clothes of a philosopher, used here with the sense of a figure alien (and, sometimes, antagonistic) to the Christian imaginary. The implications of Socrates' invective on Eustathius' clothing become more vivid if we compare it to the historian's portrait of Sisinnius, a Novatian bishop close to the church historian's theological beliefs.⁴⁷ When Sisinnius was asked why he wore white garments (*HE* 6.22: ἱμάτια λευκά), he answered by resorting to the authority of the Scriptures. After quoting a line from Ecclesiastes (Eccl. 9.8: "Let your garments be white"), Sisinnius used neotestamentarian references (Mt. 17:2; Mk. 9:3; Lk. 9:29) by replying that "our Saviour in the Gospels appears clothed in white raiment: moreover, he showed Moses and Elias to the apostles, clad in white garments." Unlike Eustathius' clothing, Socrates intended to prove, Sisinnius' choice of clothes had a scriptural support that legitimated his use of white garments.⁴⁸

Clothing used as a means to signal religious dissidence through rhetorical invective reaches its peak in book three of Socrates' work, which deals with the emperor Julian, the epitome of evil for a church historian. In his report on the last pagan emperor, Socrates relates the beginning and the end of

43 See Lampe (1961) 1261–1262.

44 On the breadth of Socrates' education, see Maraval (2001) and Van Nuffelen (2004) 3–8.

45 See section 8 of Lampe's (1961) entry of the noun *σχῆμα*.

46 Serafim (2017) 133. See also Dio Chrysostom's *Or.* 62 (*On Personal Appearance*).

47 On Socrates' sympathy for Novatianism, see Vogt (1968) 159–161 and Wallraff (1997) 250.

48 An outdated yet interesting remark on the importance of clothing as a matter of debate in Christian councils can be found in Bingham (1834) 584–586.

Julian's reign by paying particular attention to the symbolism of the clothing of Julian's acolytes. In the narration of Julian's first measures as emperor Socrates tells us that Julian's entourage was composed of philosophers and that (*HE* 3.1) an "abundance of pretenders to learning of this sort resorted to the palace from all quarters, wearing their palliums (τρίβωνας), being more conspicuous for their costume (ἐκ τοῦ σχήματος) than their erudition." These dilettantes, together with real philosophers, were precisely the first to feel the consequences of Julian's death only a year and a half later, when the emperor died during his campaign in Persia. Socrates reports that when Jovian was proclaimed emperor after Julian's death (*HE* 3.24) "the philosophers also laid aside their palliums (τοὺς τρίβωνας), and clothed themselves in ordinary attire (εἰς τὸ κοινὸν σχῆμα)." These passages reveal that in Socrates' *HE* one of the main features that gives deceptive characters and philosophers away is their clothes. Yet it is noteworthy that also Julian used this psogic strategy. In his rhetorical invective against the Cynics of his time the emperor scolded them for being pseudo-philosophers more concerned by what a philosopher should look like than with what they should know (225b–c): "They adopt the staff, the cloak, the long hair, the ignorance that goes with these, the impudence, the insolence, and in a word everything of the sort."⁴⁹

4 Conclusions

In conclusion, the polyhedral and malleable nature of rhetorical invectives and psogic strategies fitted particularly well with a convulsive period that played host to an important number of ongoing debates. Either as part of the personal agenda of an ageing *pepaideumenos* (Libanius of Antioch) or as part of a historiographical work such as that of Socrates, the slanderous component of their texts was activated by the rhetorical mechanisms involved in these *psogoi*. Such processes entailed the synchronicity of several components at different levels. On a conceptual level, the double meaning implied by the rhetorical ties that bound encomium and *psogos* together should always be taken into consideration. Much of the *psogic* weight of a rhetorical invective derived from its intricate relationship to the encomium, which allowed Socrates Scholasticus, for instance, to praise and to criticise through recourse to the same topic – clothing. On a second level, rhetorical and literary forms such as *ēthopoia*, *procatalēpsis*, or *erōtēma* were needed as they provided authors with an excuse to defend themselves whilst attacking their critics. The usage of these forms

closely resembled the dynamics of the genre of *periautologia* (speaking about oneself) in that their deployment was a way to work out “a problem of *decorum* created by a conflict between the social pressure to assert oneself in public and the social criticism of excessive assertiveness.”⁵⁰ Thus the presence of an (imaginary) respondent in the form of *ēthopoia* allowed Libanius to elaborate his invective as if he were in dialogue. Without the use of such a rhetorical trope, the sophist’s invectives against his students would be contemplated as a mere outburst. Finally, on a third level the replacement of praise topics for psogic themes had to do with the context in which the invective was composed. The “ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων element” pointed out by Aristotle in his definition of *psogos* facilitated authors in their search for psogic topics. If these three levels were harmonised, the resulting invective would contribute to undermining the ethos of the author’s rival and to asserting his own authority.

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Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in Italy (1250–1400): The Latin and the Vernacular Traditions

Fiammetta Papi

This chapter deals with the early reception of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in Italy and focuses on the period between the mid-13th century and the end of the 14th century, that is, on the period before High Renaissance Aristotelianism and before the Humanistic revival of ancient rhetoric – both of which have been long-established research subjects from a number of different perspectives.¹ Here, I argue for the presence of an Aristotelian tradition that ran parallel to the Ciceronian tradition that developed during the Duecento in northern Italy. While the Italian reception of Cicero's works, both in Latin and in the vernacular, has long been at the centre of research,² less attention has been devoted to the first circulation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in Italy from the years immediately after William of Moerbeke's translation (1269). The examination of this period offers an opportunity to highlight the continuity of Aristotle's fortunes, which extended to the “rhetorical renaissance” of the 15th and the 16th centuries.

The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part surveys the early European dissemination of the *Rhetoric*, beginning with its Latin translations in the 13th century (section 1).³ The second focuses on the Italian context and illustrates how Aristotle's text was accessed by scholars and readers both in Latin and in the vernacular. In particular, I investigate the following aspects:

- 1 See Green (1994a), (1994b), (1998), (2018); Lardet (1989); Mack (2011); Meerhoff (1998). On Italian Humanism, see Vasoli (1968) and Tanturli (2017). See also Berti (2017) 209–210.
- 2 See Fredborg (1987), (2006), (2018); Camargo (1991); Ward (1995), (1996), (2006); Cox (1999), (2003), (2006); Artifoni (2002), (2011), (2014); Alessio (2015) 13–76, 163–179, 421–444. For the Italian *volgarizzamenti*, see Maggini and Segre (1968); Scolari (1984); Speroni (1994); Guadagnini (2015); Guadagnini and Vaccaro (2011), (2012); Berti (2010); Lorenzi (2018). For the history of rhetoric in Italy from the Middle Ages to the 20th century, see Marazzini (2001). See also Mortara Garavelli (2015, originally published 1988) 17–53.
- 3 In the Middle Ages and Renaissance another rhetorical treatise circulated under the name of Aristotle, the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*: see Chiron (2007). I will not deal with its reception here, since it was translated into Italian only in the 16th century, by Giovan Francesco Zeffi (see E. Refini, “Retorica ad Alessandro,” in Vernacular Aristotelianism in Renaissance Italy Database [VARIDB], last access: January 2021, <https://vari.warwick.ac.uk/items/show/4993>).

the manuscript tradition and the circulation in Italy of Moerbeke's version (section 2); three 14th-century translations of the *Rhetoric*, one of which has only been discovered recently (section 3); examples of the literary reception of Aristotle's treatise, as further proof of the *Rhetoric*'s early success in the history of Italian literature (section 4).

1 The Medieval Circulation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*: Latin Translations and Commentaries

The *Rhetoric* was among the last works by Aristotle to penetrate Western medieval culture. It was translated three times in the 13th century, but, as I will detail below, it was only the third version by William of Moerbeke (1269) that marked a turning point in the Latin reception of the treatise. Before that, Aristotle's text was unfamiliar to Western medieval readers, the discipline of rhetoric being mainly represented by the long-established Ciceronian (and Boethian) traditions.⁴

On the other hand, "there were a number of important stages preparatory to the definitive entry of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in the late 13th century,"⁵ among which the mediation of Arab scholars in the 11th and the 12th centuries was crucial. The *Rhetoric* had already been translated into Arabic in the 8th century (MS Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France Ar. 2346),⁶ and the commentary tradition on the text was rich and significant, including, among the most relevant works, al-Fārābī's *Great Commentary* (now lost) with its prologue known as *Didascalía in Rethoricam Aristotelis ex Glosa Alfarabii* (attested by MS Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France Lat. 16097),⁷ Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Ḥiṭāba*, the rhetoric section of his *Kitāb al-Šifā'*,⁸ and Averroes' *Middle Commentary*, which has survived today in the original Arabic version.⁹

4 Copeland and Sluiter (2009) 697. For the complex placement of rhetoric within the medieval classifications of the sciences, see Marmo (1990); Dahan (1998); Copeland (2014b).

5 Copeland and Sluiter (2009) 695.

6 For the edition of the text, see Lyons (1982). See also Aouad (1989), (2003); Woerther (2017) 180.

7 See the edition by Grignaschi in Grignaschi and Langhade (1971). A new edition with French translation and commentary is in preparation by Woerther and Aouad: see Woerther (2018) 42, n. 1.

8 See Celli (2017), (2018).

9 See Aouad (2002).

Before 1256, the *Didascalía* was translated into Latin by Hermannus Alemannus, who had recourse to this text as well as to the other Arabic commentaries when translating Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (see below). In turn, Herman's translations were used by Giles of Rome in his later commentary on the *Rhetoric* (1272/1273), which soon became the "standard *accessus*" for reading the text (see below). Therefore, through these intermediaries, the views of Arab commentators on the *Rhetoric* "found their way, sometimes in partial or indirect form, into the Latin scholarly world."¹⁰ In effect, some topics had already become common knowledge as a result of the previous mediation by 12th-century Latin scholars (Gundisalvi, Gerard of Cremona). Among these topics, crucially, was the classification of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* as logical sciences belonging to an "expanded" *Organon*¹¹ – a model which then made its way into the Latin universities thanks to the works of Albert the Great, Roger Bacon, and Thomas Aquinas (especially his commentaries on *De interpretatione* and on *Posterior analytics*, which had a vast influence on the Parisian and Bolognese masters of arts).¹²

As for the Latin translations of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, the oldest one (= *vetus*), made from the Greek perhaps even before 1200, is incomplete and anonymous (in the past, Bartholomew of Messina has been proposed as a possible author).¹³ The text, now attested by four manuscripts,¹⁴ was occasionally used by Giles of Rome in his commentary on the *Rhetoric* (see below) and was translated at least once into Italian in the 14th century (see below §3). The second version is the aforementioned Arabic-Latin translation (= *arabica*), realised before 1256 by Hermannus Alemannus, who also incorporated into his translation passages from al-Farabi's, Averroes', and Avicenna's commentaries on the *Rhetoric*.¹⁵ The *arabica* is attested by two 13th-century manuscripts (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France Lat. 16673 and Toledo, Biblioteca Capitulare 47.15), while two folia of 15th-century MS Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana Plut. 90 sup. 64 (fol. 105r–106v) contain the passages from Averroes used by Herman.

¹⁰ Copeland and Sluiter (2009) 737.

¹¹ See Black (1990).

¹² See Marmo (1990), (1997).

¹³ For the critical edition, see Schneider (1978). The *terminus ante quem* of the translation is MS Toledo, Biblioteca Capitulare 47.15, dated around 1250. However, Schneider maintains that some characteristics of the text prove that it belongs to an earlier period ("ante saeculum tertium decimum"). The name of Bartholomew of Messina was suggested by Spengel (1867) 177. His authorship was questioned by Schneider (1978) xiii.

¹⁴ Chicago, Newberry Library 23.1, 14th cent., fol. 104v–113r (lib. I); Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France Lat. 16673 (olim Sorbonne 1779), 13th cent., fol. 1r–61r; Toledo, Biblioteca Capitulare 47.15, 13th cent., fol. 25r–35v; Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana Lat. VI.164, 14th–15th cent., fol. 40r–42r (extracts).

¹⁵ See Boggess (1971); Dahan (1998); and, for a full examination, Woerther (2010–2011), (2012), (2017), (2018). For Avicenna's quotations, see Celli (2017).

As anticipated above, Herman's version was also known to Giles of Rome, who had recourse to the *arabica* to interpret better Aristotle's text, contributing at the same time to the dissemination of the Arabic rhetorical tradition among later thinkers (beginning with John of Jandun and John Buridan).

The most successful Latin version of Aristotle's text, however, is the one made from the Greek by William of Moerbeke, completed before 1269.¹⁶ This had a very large circulation, becoming the standard text for readers and commentators. More than a hundred manuscripts (as well as three early modern printings) are known: Schneider considered 99 manuscripts in his critical edition.¹⁷ Two manuscripts were found by Charles F. Briggs: Oxford, Bodleian Library Lat. Class. 174 and Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria E.III.20.¹⁸ Finally, the following manuscripts can be added:¹⁹ Oxford, Bodleian Library Canon. Misc. 385, fol. 95–136v²⁰ and Bergamo, Biblioteca Civica "Angelo Mai" MA 504 (Phi I sopra 5.6), fol. 44r–48v (extracts).²¹

The textual tradition of Moerbeke's *Rhetorica* is far from linear. According to Schneider's hypothesis, two versions of the text can be identified; the earlier one (*g*) being attested by MS Wolfenbüttel, Herzog August Bibliothek Cod. Guelf. 488 Helmst., fol. 182r–219v (= *Wl*), the second (*versio vulgata* = *G*) being represented by the largest number of copies.²² The most important witness of *G* is MS Eton College Library 129 (ca. 1300) (= *Oz*), which Schneider claims to be close to the translator's autograph.²³ All the other manuscripts derive from a hyparchetype (= *b*): specifically, MS Toledo, Biblioteca Capitular 47.10 (ca. 1280) (= *Tz*) is its direct descendent,²⁴ while the remaining copies depend on another intermediate copy (= *c*), from which other two important

16 For the critical edition, see Schneider (1978). The name of the translator appears in three manuscripts: Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France Lat. 7695; Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana D 49 inf.; Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional de España Escorial V.III.10 (see Schneider [1978] xxvi).

17 See Schneider (1978) xxxiii–xxxvii.

18 See Briggs (2007) 254 n. 38.

19 But the number of manuscripts is likely to increase further as new catalogues' descriptions appear.

20 See Thomson (2011) vol. 1: 92–93 (number 62).

21 See the description of the manuscript by Luca C. Rossi in *Censimento e edizione dei Commenti danteschi*, last access: January 2021, <https://www.centropiorajna.it/censimento/elencocodici.htm>.

22 See Schneider (1978) xxxix–xl. Schneider maintains that Moerbeke revised his earlier version using a different Greek manuscript: "versionem *g* primam recensionem Translationis Guillelmi esse, quam interpres ipse postea ad alterum exemplar graecum revisit atque correxuit. Cuius revisionis vestigia adhuc in codicibus versionis vulgatae *G* vel omnibus vel quibusdam inveniuntur."

23 See Schneider (1978) xliii.

24 *Oz* and *Tz* also contain Moerbeke's translation of Aristotle's *Poetics*: see Minio-Paluello (1968) xiv–xvii.

manuscripts – Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France Lat. 16583, 13th cent. (= *Pä*) and Paris, Bibliothèque de la Sorbonne 120, 13th cent. (= *Pf*) – directly descend. As for the rest of the tradition, Schneider shows that the witnesses are grouped together in different families of the *stemma* according to different portions of the text. This can be explained by the fact that these copies derive from a *pecia*-exemplar, probably identifiable with that recorded in 1304 in the Parisian stationers' taxation list.²⁵

The presence of a *pecia*-exemplar proves that Aristotle's text was read at the university, or at least in Paris, at the beginning of the 14th century.²⁶ Nevertheless, as James J. Murphy has demonstrated, the impact of the *Rhetoric* is to be found not at the level of medieval theories of discourse, but rather in connection with the practical sciences.²⁷ As far as Moerbeke's translation is concerned, the majority of the manuscripts are copies that contain both the *Rhetoric* and other Aristotelian works, mostly the *Politics* or the *Nicomachean Ethics* (and, to a lesser extent, the *Magna Moralia*, the *De bona fortuna* or the pseudo-Aristotelian *Economica*).²⁸ Recent contributions by Charles F. Briggs,²⁹ Rita Copeland,³⁰ and Renato De Filippis³¹ have further illustrated how

25 See Schneider (1978) xlviii. See also Lewry (1983) 46.

26 According to Fredborg (1987), three different periods can be identified in the development of the rhetorical teachings in Paris: "Ciceronian" (12th century), "Boethian" (13th century), and "Aristotelian" (14th century). See also Ward (1996); Marmo (1997).

27 See Murphy (1969), (1974). See also Marmo (2016) 218–219.

28 See Murphy (1974) 100–101. For exceptions, however, see Ward (1995) 202 n. 480.

29 Investigating the reception of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in England, Briggs (2007) 262 has shown that the text "was studied primarily in connection with moral philosophy, just as Murphy originally postulated. Nonetheless it should certainly now be apparent that one would be wrong to dismiss its importance as a rhetorical treatise in the milieu of later medieval scholars. True, these 'men of learning' seem largely to have ignored the *Rhetoric*'s practical advice on composing speeches, but they enthusiastically applied its lessons to the broader fields of ethical formation and political discourse and action."

30 Copeland (2014a) has demonstrated how the *Rhetoric* was especially appreciated for Aristotle's analytic examination of the human passions in book II. For example, manuscript evidence shows that preachers had a special interest in the *Rhetoric* at least within the study of moral philosophy, as in Aristotle's treatise they "would find an analytical typology of the emotions that came closest to what they already knew experientially from preaching: a *pragmatic psychology* of the emotions" (116). This also provided a connection with the persuasive and affective power of poetry, as revealed by the presence of a 15th-century annotation on MS Cambridge, Peterhouse 57 in form of a rhymed couplet apostrophe to *Piers Plowman*, which refers to the section on friendship in *Rhetoric*, book II.

31 See De Filippis (2015) for a summary of the main reasons that can explain the "absence" of Aristotle's text in medieval rhetorical theories. De Filippis' conclusions are that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* "non può influenzare la *teoria retorica*, dentro o fuori l'Università, ma potrebbe invece condizionare, in modi e forme ancora tutti da sondare, l'universo *pratico*,

Aristotle's *Rhetoric* could be influential primarily as a result of its connection with moral philosophy.³² However, the problem of assessing the place of rhetoric as a subject in the *curricula* of medieval faculties of arts (especially Paris and Oxford) remains a matter of discussion, complicated by the “diverging scope modern scholars have chosen to assign to rhetoric in the period.”³³

I do not go into detail about this problem here, since this chapter's primary focus is on the Italian context. Nonetheless, it is impossible to deal with the fortunes of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* without considering its undisputable dissemination in the university milieu, as attested not only by the *pecia* manuscripts, but also by the number of commentaries that anonymous as well as renowned masters devoted to the treatise. The first and most successful is the aforementioned commentary by Giles of Rome (1272/1273). There followed the *Sententia libri Rhetoricorum Aristotelis* (or *Summa super Rhetoricam*) by the Dominican Guido Vernani da Rimini (1324/1334),³⁴ and the two commentaries in the form of *quaestiones* by John of Jandun (short version ca. 1310; augmented version 1317/1326) and John Buridan.³⁵

Giles' commentary, also recorded in the Parisian taxation lists of 1304,³⁶ “quickly became the standard *accessus* to Aristotle's text, and remained so throughout the Middle Ages” thanks to its “precociousness,” “fullness,” and “high quality.”³⁷ As Costantino Marmo has observed,³⁸ Giles of Rome was still very young when he composed his commentary and could not rely on

e principalmente l'ambito etico-politico”; therefore, he maintains that “l'assenza è stato finora un cercare nel posto sbagliato” (80–81).

32 In the first half of the 13th century, Robert Grosseteste and, most of all, Roger Bacon, had anticipated the connection of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* with ethics. The first one had declared “that the office of rhetoric is to use the topical methods of dialectic and produce arguments so that it may best fulfil its aim, which is to move the emotions” (Copeland and Sluiter [2009] 696; see *De artibus liberalibus*, 2.1–5 and 4.29–33). As for Bacon, while presenting rhetoric in the service of moral teaching, he also admitted that “Ciceronian theory is not sufficient to teach this ethical dimension of rhetoric, because it is too involved in forensic oratory”; Copeland and Sluiter (2009) 696. See *Moralis philosophia*, in *Opus Maius* 7. For Roger Bacon, see Rosier-Catach (1998).

33 See Fredborg (2006) 165–167 (165 for the citation). See also Copeland and Sluiter (2009) 698, De Filippis (2015) 68–69.

34 See Antonelli (2020) 795.

35 Buridan's commentary has long been investigated by Margareta Fredborg; among her most recent studies, see Fredborg (2018). See also Biard (1998). For John of Jandun, see Marmo (1992), (1994); Beltran (1998); Costa (2018). Other three anonymous commentaries on the *Rhetoric* are in MSS Hereford, Cathedral Library P.III.6; Tortosa, Biblioteca de la Catedral 249; Oxford, Bodleian Library Digby 55; see Fredborg (1987) 97 n. 28.

36 See Lewry (1983) 46.

37 Briggs (2007) 247.

38 See Marmo (2016) 217.

any previous works on the *Rhetoric*, since this was a new source for medieval scholars – and a difficult one, given its inner complexities and contradictions. Moreover, Giles does not seem to have been acquainted with either Albert the Great's nor Boethius of Dacia's previous commentaries on Aristotle's text (now both lost), or even with Cicero's rhetorical works.³⁹

Giles commented on the *Rhetoric* on the basis of Moerbeke's version, completed a few years before, but also had recourse to both the *vetus* and the *arabica* (see above).⁴⁰ His "philological" approach and accurate treatment of the sources were among the reasons for the success of his commentary. Other key characteristics of Giles' work include the placement of rhetoric within a complex theoretical framework, where the discipline is maintained to be both linked to logic (or dialectic) and to moral philosophy, without being subordinate to any of them; the distinction of six differences between rhetoric and dialectic, through which Giles could also explain the *incipit* of Aristotle's text; and, finally, a fine analysis of the means of persuasion and, most of all, the theory of emotions in *Rhetoric*, book II. Here Giles, partly drawing on Aquinas' *Summa theologiae* and partly revising his master's theory, introduced and discussed a sophisticated classification later imposed as the "standard canon" of Aristotle's emotions – as also emerges in all subsequent commentaries on the *Rhetoric*, which drew consistently upon Giles of Rome (named "The Expositor" *par excellence* by John of Jandun).⁴¹

Moreover, the influence of Giles' theory of the emotions was not limited to the commentary tradition, but also affected literary works, since it was mainly as a result of Giles' re-elaboration of the *Rhetoric* in his later *De regimine principum* that the catalogue of the passions penetrated later literature. I will return to this in section 4.

2 The Manuscript Tradition

To appreciate the dissemination of the *Rhetoric* in Italy, at least three interrelated aspects must be taken into account: its manuscript circulation, its translations into Italian, and its influence on literary works produced or circulating in Italy.

39 Which Giles starts considering in his later *De differentia rhetoricae, ethicae et politicae*: see Bruni (1932), Murphy (1969), Copeland and Sluiter (2009) 793–794, Marmo (2016) 217 n. 21.

40 See Marmo (1998) 132: "la *vetus* può essere utilizzata in senso immediatamente emendatorio, l'*arabica* ha soprattutto un valore di corroborazione (per quel che concerne le divergenze sul piano sintattico) e di arricchimento semantico dell'interpretazione."

41 See Marmo (2016) 233.

As far as the manuscript tradition is concerned, the first thing to note is the great number of manuscripts either copied by Italian hands or bearing traces of Italian ownership. According to the *Aristoteles Latinus* catalogues (= AL), there are at least 18 including both complete and incomplete or fragmentary witnesses:⁴²

Baltimore, Walters Art Museum W.160 (AL4, without signature number), fol. 6v, 14th cent. (copied in Bologna?), from the Library of the Convent of San Lorenzo in Bibbiena, Arezzo (see fol. 2v);⁴³ Barnard (Missouri), Charles D. Humbert Library? (AL6), 15th cent.; Bordeaux, Bibliothèque Municipale 418 (AL452), 14th cent.; Cambrai, Médiathèque (olim Bibliothèque) Municipale 314 (AL457), end of 13th cent. (*Ca* in Schneider's edition); Cambridge (US), Harvard University, Houghton Library Lat. 39 (AL9), 14th cent. (copied in France), from the Library of the Convent of Santa Maria Novella in Florence (see fol. Iv, which also contains a note by Francesco Vettori, nephew of the Florentine scholar Piero Vettori);⁴⁴ Chicago, Newberry Library 23.1 (AL11, without signature number), 14th cent. (copied in Bologna?), fol. 113r–129v (see also above, n. 14); Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Pal. lat. 1011 (AL1781), 14th cent., bought in 1379 by Simintendi di Arrigo, son of ser Arrigo Simintendi da Prato (see fol. 201v), then owned by Giannozzo Manetti (see fol. Iv); Pal. lat. 1012 (AL1782), 13th–14th cent., owned by Giannozzo Manetti and Tommaso di Piero dei Tornaquinci (see fol. Iv, 178v, 179v); Vat. lat. 2097 (AL1851), 14th cent.; Vat. lat. 2104 (AL1852), 13th–14th cent.; Windsor, Eton College Library 129 (AL282), ca. 1300 (*Oz* in Schneider's edition, see above §1); Firenze, Biblioteca Riccardiana 113 (AL1419), first half of 14th cent.;⁴⁵ Jena, Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek El. phil. q. 5 (AL953), first half of 14th cent.;⁴⁶ Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana D 49 inf. (AL1437), 14th cent., owned by Gian Vincenzo Pinelli; F 141 sup.

42 See Lacombe (1939, 1955); Minio-Paluello (1961). In the following lists, I cite the manuscripts according to the AL, and I update information from new manuscript descriptions when available.

43 A partial description is available online at Mirabile: Archivio digitale della cultura medievale – Digital Archives for Medieval Culture, last access: January 2021, <http://sip.mirabileweb.it/manuscript/baltimore-md-walters-art-museum-w-160-manuscript/169723>.

44 It has been suggested that the Greek and Latin annotations on the manuscript could be by Piero Vettori: see Light (1997) 62–66.

45 See Francesca Mazzanti's manuscript description available online in Manus: Censimento dei manoscritti delle biblioteche italiane, last access: January 2021, https://manus.iccu.sbn.it/opac_SchedaScheda.php?ID=87187.

46 See Tönnies (2002) 299–300.

(AL1444), 14th cent., annotated in the 15th cent. by Ugolino Pisani in Bologna; Paris, Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal 699 (AL505), 14th cent., owned by Sozomeno da Pistoia;⁴⁷ Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France Lat. 7695 (AL608), 14th cent.; Wolfenbüttel, Herzog August Bibliothek Cod. Guelf. 488 Helmst. (AL941), 13th cent. (*Wl* in Schneider's edition).⁴⁸

The number may increase by the addition of another 14 manuscripts that are recorded in AL as of either non-Italian or unidentified origin, but that are now preserved in Italian libraries (including the Vatican Library), where many of them were likely to have been in the Middle Ages (as in the cases of Bologna or Florence cited below):

Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria Lat. 1150 (2295) (AL1284), first half of 14th cent.; Cassino, Biblioteca Statale del Monumento Nazionale di Montecassino (AL1312), fragments, 14th cent.; Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Ott. lat. 1236 (AL1757), 14th cent.; Pal. lat. 1016 (AL1783), 14th cent.; Ross. 551 (AL1805), 14th cent.; Vat. lat. 2091 (AL1848), 13th–14th cent.; Vat. lat. 2995 (AL1882), 14th cent. (*Rl* in Schneider's edition);⁴⁹ Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana Conv. Soppr. (Badia Fiorentina) 95 (AL1334), 14th cent.; Plut. 13 sin.6 (AL1367), end of the 13th cent. (*Fz* in Schneider's edition), from 1319 in the Library of the Convent of Santa Croce in Florence (see fol. IIIr); Parma, Biblioteca Palatina Fondo Parmense 6 (AL1500), 15th cent.; Padova, Biblioteca Capitolare nella Curia Vescovile C 54 (AL1514), 14th cent.;⁵⁰ San Gimignano, Biblioteca Comunale A III 17 (AL1558), 15th cent.; Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana Lat. VI.39 (AL1600), 14th cent.; Lat. VI.43 (AL1603), 14th cent.⁵¹

47 See Ceccherini (2016) 214–217.

48 The manuscript is made of four parts (1r–159v, 160r–169v, 170r–177v, 178r–220r), the last of which was probably copied in Bologna around 1320/30. Fol. 115r–159v contain Moerbeke's *versio vulgata*; fol. 182r–219v contain Moerbeke's earlier version, according to Schneider's hypothesis (see above §1). See the manuscript description available online in the Herzog August Bibliothek Wolfenbüttel Manuscript database, last access: January 2021, <http://diglib.hab.de/?db=mss>.

49 MS Vat. lat. 2995 also contains the so-called *Translatio Vaticana* of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (see above, n. 3).

50 See Marchesi (1904) 44–46.

51 See Marchesi (1904) 41–42.

Finally, among the additions to AL, there are two other copies now preserved in Italy,⁵² expanding the total to at least 34. This means that around one third of the manuscripts of Moerbeke's *Rhetorica* seem to be connected to Italy – and that number could further increase when we consider the manuscript tradition of the *Rhetoric's* commentaries dealt with above, many copies of which are located in Italy.⁵³

The Italian “popularity” of the *Rhetoric* comes as no surprise if one considers that Moerbeke's version could be composed in Italy during the Dominican's stay at the papal court in Viterbo, where his presence is attested for the first time in 1267.⁵⁴ It is also significant that MS *Oz* – the most important witness of *G*, close to Moerbeke's autograph manuscript (see above §1) – seems to have been copied in Italy.

A survey of the *Rhetoric's* Italian manuscript tradition also provides other information of interest. Firstly, the presence of copies in such cities as Bologna confirms the text's reception at the university. Quotations of the *Rhetoric* in commentaries on philosophical or literary works produced (or at least circulated) in Bologna in the 13th and 14th centuries point in the same direction. For example, the Florentine physician and philosopher Dino del Garbo, who studied in Bologna with Taddeo Alderotti and later taught in the city,⁵⁵ cites the *Rhetoric* in his commentary on Guido Cavalcanti's *Donna me prega* when

52 Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria E.III.20; Bergamo, Biblioteca Civica “Angelo Mai” MA 504 (Phi I sopra 5.6): see above §1.

53 For example, Giles' commentary is in MSS Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria 197 (299), 14th cent.; Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Borgh. lat. 314, Vat. lat. 776 and 833, 14th cent.; Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana Plut. 16 sin. 8, 14th cent.; Milano, Biblioteca Trivulziana 837, 15th cent.; Padova, Biblioteca Universitaria 678, 14th cent.; Ravenna, Biblioteca Comunale Classense 409, 14th cent.; Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana Lat. XI.1, 15th cent.: see Briggs (2007) 264–268. For the textual tradition of Giles' commentary, see Marmo (1998), (2016) 218 n. 22. As for the other commentaries, see MSS Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria Lat. 1625, 14th cent. and Padova, Biblioteca Universitaria 1472, 15th cent. (John of Jandun); Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana Ashb. 249, 14th cent. and Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana Lat. XI.24, 14th cent. (Guido da Rimini). For the latter, see Ward (1995) 193.

54 For Moerbeke's presence at the papal court, see Paravicini Bagliani (1989). For the relationship with Thomas Aquinas, to whom a secular tradition attributed the very initiative of translating the Aristotelian *corpus*, see Steel (1989).

55 See De Ferrari (1988) 578.

explaining verse 70 “che solo di costui nasce mercede”;⁵⁶ here reference is given to Aristotle’s examination of *misericordia* in the second book of the treatise.⁵⁷

Further evidence is the reuse of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* in the commentary tradition on the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* that developed in Bologna from the end of the 13th century, due to the *lecturae* first by Jacques de Dinant, then Giovanni di Bonandrea and Bartolino di Benincasa, which resulted in a new approach to classical texts alongside the traditional teaching of the *dictamen*.⁵⁸ It was especially Bartolino di Benincasa, teaching in the years 1321–1338, who drew upon Aristotle’s text in his commentary⁵⁹ while, almost contemporaneously, two other *magistri*, Guizzardo da Bologna and Pace da Ferrara, had recourse to the *Rhetoric* in the *accessus* of their commentaries on Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s *Poetria Nova* of the first decades of the 14th century.⁶⁰

This brief overview of the university contexts where the *Rhetoric* was most likely to be assimilated would require expansion with regard to other important centres such as Florence (with Pisa), Rome, and Naples.⁶¹ Yet for our purposes it is worth mentioning another city where a *studium* (school or community of scholars and masters) was founded in 1240 and subsequently promoted to the status of *Studium Generale* in 1357: Siena.⁶² Here, Dino del Garbo and Guizzardo da Bologna taught for periods after 1306, as a consequence of the temporary suppression of the Bolognese *studium* by Napoleone Orsini, which led to a massive migration of teachers and students to the Tuscan city. Even more significant is that Siena already had a consolidated tradition of teaching grammar and rhetoric.⁶³ From archival documents we know that as early as 1278 a magister in logic was called in to teach the Siennese:⁶⁴ “Nicholaus de Anglia.” The same name appears in the subscription of one of the *Rhetoric*’s

56 See Fenzi (1999) 84, Rea and Inglese (2011) 160–161.

57 “Secundum enim quod apparet per Aristotilem, II *Recthorice*, misericordia est tristari et compati de malo alterius, quoniam illud malum habet ille indigne”: Dino del Garbo in Fenzi (1999) 132. See *Rhet.* II, 9, 1385b13–1386b15.

58 See Alessio (2015) 427–430.

59 In later years Bartolino’s commentary was praised by some and criticised by others (such as George of Trebizond): see Alessio (2015) 430.

60 See Domenico Losappio’s chapter in this volume (chapter 11). Guizzardo da Bologna’s commentary is edited by Losappio (2013).

61 For Aristotle’s reception in the Italian universities, with special attention to the *Ethics*, see Lines (2002). For the rhetorical teachings in Paris see above, n. 26.

62 See Nardi (1991).

63 See Fioravanti (1991).

64 See Cecchini and Prunai (1942) 22–24. See also Parks (1954) 639, Nardi (1991) 12, Fioravanti (1991) 271.

ancient Italian translations, probably copied in Siena, to which I will return in the next section.

Thus, as one would expect, the universities were the leading cultural context for the circulation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. However, the analysis of the manuscript tradition also reveals other patterns of ownership, including not only private owners and renowned intellectuals (such as Sozomeno da Pistoia and Giannozzo Manetti), but also the mendicant orders, which were doubtless key institutions and fertile contexts for the reception of the text. There is evidence (although outside Italy) that the Dominicans included Aristotle's *Rhetoric* among the secondary readings of their learning programmes,⁶⁵ therefore it is hardly surprising to find manuscript copies of the text held in the libraries of the order – such as the convent of Santa Maria Novella in Florence, to which MS Harvard University, Houghton Library Lat. 39 once belonged (see above). The Franciscans also possessed copies of the *Rhetoric*, as attested by the manuscript of the convent of Santa Croce in Florence, now Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana Plut.13 sin. 6.⁶⁶

Finally, we must not neglect the importance of the later Order of the Hermits of St. Augustine for the text's dissemination. After all, it was the Augustinian friar Giles of Rome, the first of his order to be regent master of theology, who provided, as we have seen, the standard commentary on Aristotle's treatise. Giles, who became prior general of the order in 1292, had special connections to the city of Siena;⁶⁷ he was acquainted with the famous Tolomei family, and resided in the city during the General Chapter of 1295. As attested by the library inventories of 1360, the Augustinians of Siena owned copies of the *Rhetoric* along with commentaries and other works by Giles.⁶⁸ The earliest Italian *volgarizzamento* of his *De regimine principum* was probably composed in Siena before 1288 (see below §4), and Siena is also involved in the history of the earliest Italian translations of the *Rhetoric* that we are now going to examine.

3 Vernacular Translations of the *Rhetoric* in Italy (14th Century)

The vernacular reception of classical rhetoric in medieval and early modern Italy has long been investigated, especially with regard to the impact of

65 See Maierù (2002) 20–21.

66 See Pegoretti (2017) 48.

67 See Papi (2016–2018) 1: 24–25.

68 See Gutiérrez (1954) 304.

Cicero's theories from the second half of the 13th century onwards.⁶⁹ As is well known, Italy saw an upsurge of rhetorical works in the vernacular beginning in the mid-13th century with Brunetto Latini's translations and treatises. His *Rettorica*, an incomplete translation with commentary of the *De inventione* (i.e., *Rhetorica vetus* in the Middle Ages), was conceived as a "dialogue" between *Tullio* and *Brunetto* "the expositor," who paraphrased, clarified, and expanded on the text.⁷⁰ Moreover, the third book of Brunetto's *Tresor* is specifically devoted to the instruction of the *rettore* or *podestà* in rhetorical as well as political matters.⁷¹

The 13th-century reception of Cicero's rhetoric in the *volgare* was not limited to Brunetto Latini, but included other successful compilations such as the *Fiore di rettorica*, a translation of the *Ad Herennium* (i.e., *Rhetorica nova*) that circulated widely in Italy in the 14th–15th centuries in at least four different versions: α (anonymous, ca. 1260), β (by Bono Giamboni, ca. 1260), γ (anonymous, ca. 1260), δ' – δ'' (by, respectively, Guidotto da Bologna and a later compiler).⁷² Anonymous treatises based on Cicero's works were also popular in the 14th–15th century, such as the *Trattatello di colori rettorici*, composed in Florence in the years 1329–1345 and largely, though not exclusively, indebted to the *Ad Herennium*.⁷³ In short, a well-consolidated tradition of Ciceronian rhetorical treatises existed in the *volgare*,⁷⁴ which ran parallel to another more "practical" tradition represented by the teaching manuals of *formulae* and exemplary speeches (examples range from Guido Faba's *Parlamenta et epistole*, dated to the early 1240s to Filippo Ceffi's *Dicerie*, from the first half of the 14th century).⁷⁵

The Ciceronian tradition continued in the Quattrocento, also contributing to the development of Florentine civic humanism. At the beginning of the 15th century, the revival of classical eloquence – the ethical implications and association to civic commitment of which were interpreted as an essential, defining aspect of the political life of the Roman Republic – was crucial in shaping the new cultural and political ideal of Florentine *libertas* and

69 See above, n. 2.

70 See Maggini and Segre (1968); Beltrami (2007) xii; Guadagnini and Vaccaro (2011), (2012); Guadagnini (2015).

71 See Beltrami (2007) xix–xxii; Artifoni (2014) 222.

72 See Speroni (1994).

73 See Scolari (1984).

74 See Cox (1999), (2006).

75 See Guadagnini and Vaccaro (2011) 5–7, Ward (1995) 199–200. For Filippo Ceffi's *Dicerie*, see Pregnolato (2018). Another important group of texts for the history of vernacular rhetoric is the *volgarizzamenti* of Albertano da Brescia's treatises: see Tanzini (2012).

republicanism in opposition to the growing power of the *signorie* in northern Italy. The reappropriation of ancient models of *eloquentia* combined with *sapientia* resulted in, and was fuelled by, the proliferation of miscellaneous manuscripts containing vernacular *pistole* and *dicerie*, which served as sources of inspiration for frequently pronounced political speeches. It has been demonstrated that this revival was not born abruptly in the 15th century but, on the contrary, came from the long tradition which – a *unicum* in contemporary Europe – dates back to the mid-13th century with Brunetto Latini's new acquaintance with Cicero's works.⁷⁶

As far as Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is concerned, however, the attention given to the vernacular tradition has been much more limited. It is only recently that vernacular Aristotelianism has been placed at the centre of research reconsideration, due to the international projects "Vernacular Aristotelianism in Renaissance Italy (c.1400–c.1650)" and "Aristotle in the Italian Vernacular: Rethinking Renaissance and Early-Modern Intellectual History (c.1400–c.1650)."⁷⁷ Yet even in this case the focus of research has been primarily on the period from the 15th century onwards, which means, concerning the *Rhetoric*, the Renaissance translations by Felice Figliucci (1548), Bernardo Segni (published in 1549), Annibal Caro (completed in 1551, but printed in 1570), and Alessandro Piccolomini (1572) – to mention only the best-known examples.⁷⁸

However, due especially to the first project, "Vernacular Aristotelianism in Renaissance Italy (c.1400–c.1650)," significant advances have also been made on the *Rhetoric* concerning the earlier period. Eugenio Refini has drawn attention to two ancient translations of Aristotle's text,⁷⁹ one of which was partially edited in the 19th century; the other remains unedited, despite the interest it had already generated in the Renaissance when it was intensively studied by Jacopo Corbinelli (see below). In addition to these two versions, I have recently found another old vernacular compendium of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.⁸⁰ The three texts are remarkable because they are among the first full translations of a work

76 See Tanturli (2017) (originally published in 1998) and Russo (2019).

77 For details, see <https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/ren/researchcurrent/vernaculararistotelianism> (last access: January 2021); and <https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/335949> (last access: January 2021). See also Lines and Refini (2014), Bianchi, Gilson, and Kraye (2016), Refini (2020).

78 For full bibliographical information on these translations, see the database <https://vari.warwick.ac.uk> (all records are by Eugenio Refini [2013]), where other 16th-century versions of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* are also described.

79 See Refini (2013) 314 n. 12.

80 See Papi (2020).

by Aristotle dating back to the 14th century, whereas the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics* were only translated into Italian in the 15th and 16th centuries.⁸¹

In the following summary, I present the most important features of the three translations of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. In the next section, I show how the contents of the *Rhetoric* could also be accessed in the vernacular through the intermediation of different texts, *in primis* the translations of Giles of Rome's treatise *De regimine principum*, largely based on the *Rhetoric*. In reverse, Giles' translations could inspire interest in the original source, resulting in a virtuous circle for the dissemination of the most relevant Aristotelian doctrines.

3.1 *Anonymous Italian Translation (First Half of the 14th Century)*

This translation is attested by the single MS Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Chig. M.VI.126, of the second quarter of the 14th century.⁸² The Latin source text seems to be the old *translatio vetus* rather than Moerbeke's version of the *Rhetoric*.⁸³ The Vatican MS was later owned and glossed by Jacopo Corbinelli, who was preparing an edition of the third book (which has the heaviest annotation in the manuscript).⁸⁴ Calderini and Calderini De Marchi (1915) have also noted that this version is similar to the translation published in 1548 by the Sienese scholar Felice Figliucci.⁸⁵

3.2 *Italian Translation Attributed to "maestro Nicholo [-ao] Anglico" (First Half of the 14th Century)*

This is attested by two manuscripts: 1) Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Chig. M.VIII.162 (ca. 1350) and 2) Padova, Biblioteca Universitaria 1402 (15th century). The text was partially edited in 1868 by Giusto Grion (who, however, did not know the Vatican MS and relied only on the Paduan MS, which is anonymous and incomplete).⁸⁶ In MS Chig. M.VIII.162 the *Rhetoric* (fol. 20r–83v) is preceded by a vernacular compendium of the *Ethics* (fol. 1r–19r): both works are here attributed to a certain "maestro Nicholo [-ao] Anglico." The *Ethics* is also attested by three other manuscripts: 1) Napoli, Biblioteca dei

81 See Refini (2020) 95. In the 13th and 14th centuries, the *Nicomachean Ethics* circulated in the vernacular in the form of *compendia*, such as Taddeo Alderotti's Italian version of the *Summa Alexandrinorum*: see Gentili (2014).

82 See Papi (2020) 293–294.

83 See the appendix in Papi (2020) 307–308.

84 See Gazzotti (1991) 165–167; Bianchi M.G. (2009) 181.

85 See Calderini and Calderini De Marchi (1915) 17–22. For Figliucci, see Bianchi L. (2009) 369.

86 See Grion (1868), Refini (2013) 314 n. 12.

Girolamini CF I 8 (where the text is also attributed to Anglico), 2) Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana It. II.2 (Lat. XIV.43), both from the 15th century, and 3) Venezia, Biblioteca del Museo Correr Cicogna 1474, from the 14th century.⁸⁷ On the assumption that the two mentions of “Anglico” as translator of the *Ethics* and the *Rhetoric* refer to the same person, the question remains whether Anglico can be identified with the teacher of logic in the Siennese *studium* mentioned in the previous section.⁸⁸ In order to understand better the origin and circulation of Anglico’s translation of the *Rhetoric*, it will be crucial to re-examine in detail MS Chig. M.VIII.162, which seems characterised, in what I have seen so far, by distinctive and recurrent Siennese linguistic features, e.g., Siennese diphthongs in *uopera* “opera (work),” *puoi* “poi (then)”; the absence of anaphoresis (e.g., *conseglio*, *consegliante*), though with exceptions; infinitive terminations in *-are* instead of *-ere* (e.g., *eleggiare*, *imprendare*); futures and conditionals with *-ar-* (e.g., *amarà*); occurrences of typical forms such as *giovano* “giovane (young)” etc.⁸⁹ If the Siennese origin were confirmed, this would prove a strong connection to the translation of Giles of Rome’s *De regimine principum* dated 1288 (see below §4).

3.3 *Anonymous Italian Compendium (Second Half of the 14th Century)*

This is a vernacular compendium of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* attested by MS Siena, Biblioteca Comunale degli Intronati I.VI.22, of the second half of the 14th century.⁹⁰ The surviving text occupies fol. 1r–32v and consists of some chapters from book II (*Rhet.* 1380b35–1391b7) and book III (*Rhet.* 1403b6–1414a30). The following fascicle (fol. 33r–37v) contains a list of *Sententiae* attributed to Cicero, Seneca, and other philosophers. The interest of this abridged version of the *Rhetoric* lies not only in its provenance – which, once again, points to Siena⁹¹ – but also in the additions occasionally included by the compiler in the text, consisting of short glosses or comparisons between Aristotle and Cicero.⁹²

87 See Scarpino (2015). See also Refini (2020) 83–84.

88 See Fioravanti (1991) 271, Papi (2020).

89 See Papi (2020) 303–304 n. 42. For the Siennese dialect, see Papi (2016–2018) vol. 2.

90 For a detailed description of the manuscript, see Papi (2020) 296–300.

91 See Papi (2020) 300.

92 I am currently preparing an edition of the compendium: for anticipations, see Papi (2020).

4 The Literary Reception of the *Rhetoric* (Giles of Rome, Dante, Bartolomeo da San Concordio)

A survey of the *Rhetoric's* influence on later literature begins with Giles of Rome's reuse of Aristotle's text (and his own commentary on it) in his *De regimine principum* (= *Drp*), ca. 1280, one of the most successful "mirrors for princes" circulating in the late Middle Ages. The treatise, dedicated to the young heir to the French throne, the future King Philip IV "the Fair," is devoted to the moral and political instruction of kings and princes. However, as Giles clearly states at the beginning, *Drp* is also addressed to a larger audience, which implies, according to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* itself, a "rough and sketchy way" (*modum grossum et figuralem*) of presenting the subject matter.⁹³ In *Drp* Giles also envisaged the possibility of instructing future kings in the vernacular, and indeed his treatise was soon translated into French by Henri de Gauchy (1282), and from French into Italian, most probably in Siena (1288).⁹⁴ Translations into almost all European vernacular languages began to appear over the following decades (Castilian, Catalan, Portuguese, English, Flemish, German, Swedish, and Hebrew); sometimes more versions in a language have survived (for example, there were at least five different Italian translations in addition to the Siennese *Governo*).⁹⁵

Drp is divided into three books, dedicated respectively to ethics, economics, and politics, according to the traditional threefold division of Aristotle's practical philosophy that had become common in the Middle Ages. The influence of the *Rhetoric* is mostly evident in the first book of *Drp*; the second book of Aristotle's treatise is continuously referred to in *Drp* book I, parts III and IV, while other single chapters of the *Rhetoric* are also cited in *Drp*, books II and III.⁹⁶ A closer look at Giles' treatment of the catalogue of emotions from *Rhetoric*, book II, both in his commentary and in *Drp*, is revealing of the ways in which the Augustinian scholar contributed to the afterlife of one of the *Rhetoric's* main themes.

93 See Papi (2016–2018) 1: 33–34 (with further bibliography). Since there is no critical edition of the Latin *Drp*, I quote from Aegidii Columnae Romani, *De Regimine Principum Lib. III*, ed. F. Hieronymum Samaritanium (Rome 1607).

94 For the critical edition of the Italian *volgarizzamento*, see Papi (2016–2018). The oldest manuscript (Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale II.IV.129), of Siennese origin, is dated in the colophon "16 June 1288."

95 See Papi (2016–2018) 1: 17–18, 41–42.

96 See Lambertini (1990) 284–285.

In the commentary on the *Rhetoric*, the passions are the subject of four *declarationes* at the beginning of book II.⁹⁷ Here the *passio animae* is defined as a *motus sensitivi appetitus*; the sensitive appetite is further distinguished into *appetitus irascibilis* and *appetitus concupiscibilis*, upon which two parallel series of emotions depend. Love (*amor*), desire (*desiderium*), pleasure or joy (*delectatio*), pain or sorrow (*tristitia*), hatred (*odium*) and aversion or abomination (*abominatio*) belong to the concupiscible appetite; hope (*spes*), despair (*desperatio*), confidence (*audacia*), fear (*timor*), anger (*ira*), and satisfaction or calmness (*mansuetudo*) belong to the irascible appetite. As Costantino Marmo has demonstrated, Giles' account of Aristotle's passions is largely influenced by Thomas Aquinas, though the Augustinian friar also autonomously developed some of his master's theses and arguments, for example by adding the passion of *mansuetudo* as the sixth passion belonging to the irascible appetite.⁹⁸

Such is also the position of Giles in *Drp*. When, at the beginning of book I, part III, Giles summarises his classification of the twelve passions, he states that, because he had already devoted his commentary to the exhaustive analysis of each passion, he does not examine them in detail, but only *superficialiter* (*Drp* I. iii. i). The following chapters are devoted to the analysis of each emotion together with its opposite, according to this order (I also give the Italian equivalent in the vernacular translation of 1288): *amor* (*amore*) vs. *odium* (*odio*), ch. I. iii. iii; *desiderium* (*desiderio*) vs. *abominatio* (*abbominazione*), ch. I. iii. iv; *spes* (*esperança*) vs. *desperatio* (*disperança*), ch. I. iii. v; *timor* (*paura*) vs. *audacia* (*ardimento*), ch. I. iii. vi; *ira* (*ira*) vs. *mansuetudo* (*debonarietà*), ch. I. iii. vii; *delectatio* (*dilecto*) vs. *tristitia* (*tristitia*), ch. I. iii. viii.

The catalogue of the passions is completed in the two final chapters of *Drp* book I, part III, where another series of six passions is added with reference to the *Rhetoric*, book II: *zelus* (*gelosia*); *gratia* (*gratia*); *nemesis* or *indignatio de prosperitatibus malorum* (*dissdengno e corucio del bene e dell'alegreçça dei malvagi*); *miser cordia* (*miser cordia*); *invidia* (*envidia*); *erubescencia sive verecundia* (*vergongna*). As in the previous case of the twelve emotions, Giles had examined this last set of six emotions in his commentary, but, in his later treatise, he partly revised the Aristotelian quotation trying to simplify the exposition. For example, while in the commentary Giles had explained better the relationships between the two different series of 12 + 6 feelings, describing some of the emotions as "effects" (*effectus*) of others (following Aristotle's *Rhetoric*), in *Drp* the list from *zelus* to *verecundia* is presented as a mere addition to the first set of twelve emotions. Thus, what was in the commentary described as a

97 Aegidii Romani, *Expositio super libros Rhetoricorum Aristotelis* (Venice 1515), fol. 49rb–51rb.

98 See Marmo (1991). For vernacular adaptations in Giles' translations, see Papi (2016).

cause-effect relationship was then summarised in *Drp* as one passion simply “depending on” or “being connected to” another (*reducuntur ad alias*).⁹⁹

The last point serves as further confirmation of Giles’ intention to present his philosophical subjects in a “rough and sketchy way,” which also became one of the reasons for *Drp*’s later success. By the early years of the 14th century, Dante Alighieri had read the treatise, his acquaintance with the book being attested to by the direct quotation of the *Reggimento de’ principi* in *Convivio* IV, 24, 9. Many passages, not only of the *Convivio*, but also of *De vulgari eloquentia*, prove that Dante had been influenced by Giles’ treatise,¹⁰⁰ including the set of emotions in *Convivio*, III, 8, 10: “con ciò sia cosa che sei passioni siano proprie dell’anima umana, delle quali fa menzione lo Filosofo nella sua Rettorica, cioè grazia, zelo, misericordia, invidia, [amore] e vergogna.”¹⁰¹

As I have shown elsewhere (following Gianfranco Fioravanti’s observations in his edition of the *Convivio*), despite the direct citation of the *Rhetoric*, the source of Dante’s passage is likely to be the unmentioned *Drp*.¹⁰² It should also be said that, from a textual point of view, one of the six emotions is missing in the manuscript tradition of *Convivio* III, 8, 10. This could be *amore*, as Franca Brambilla Ageno conjecturally added in her critical edition.¹⁰³ However, if we think of *Drp* as the possible source for the passage, then it becomes highly plausible that the missing emotion is *nemesis*. The hypothesis can be further confirmed by examining Brambilla Ageno’s apparatus for the *Convivio*: in correspondence of III, 8, 10, some manuscripts have *essere l’anima* between the two words *invidia* and *vergogna* (in other manuscripts there is a blank space). Now, *essere l’anima* does not make any sense here, but seems closer to *nemesis* (or *nemesare*) than to *amore*, especially if we think how *essere l’anima* – or even better, *anima essere* (with an inversion) – and *nemesis/nemesare* could be abbreviated in Latin palaeography.

Apart from the textual problems – which are to be expected in the transmission of remote concepts and difficult argumentations (as happened with *nemesis*) – the case of the *Convivio* suggests that Giles had shaped a standard canon of Aristotelian emotions that could be easily memorised and cited. This is confirmed also by what emerges from quotations of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* in other texts. I have already mentioned Dino del Garbo’s gloss on *Donna me prega* (see above §2), where the *Rhetoric* was cited in relation to the emotion

99 See Papi (2016), where I also examined other differences between the commentary and *Drp*, for example in Giles’ treatment of *zelus*.

100 See Papi (2018).

101 See Fioravanti (2014) 434.

102 See Papi (2016).

103 See Brambilla Ageno (1995) 2: 198.

of *misericordia*. Further evidence comes from early commentators on Dante's *Commedia* (for example, Iacomo della Lana, 1324–1338), who refer to the *Rhetoric* to better explain passions such as *vergogna* or *timore*, or the different species of *tristitia*.¹⁰⁴

Of the entire *Rhetoric*, the impression is that it was especially book II on the passions that was actually read. The preference for this book can be explained by the fact that, because of Giles' clarification and synthesis in *Drp*, it was the one that could be better understood. After all, as we have seen, *Drp* had been translated in the vernacular early on. The French and Siennese versions in particular (completed in 1282 and 1288) provided simplified access to the contents of Aristotle's treatise, contributing at the same time to raising interest in the full text – hence the early appearance of vernacular translations of the *Rhetoric* in Italy (see above §3).

Not only was *Drp* translated into Italian early, but it was also readapted in other vernacular treatises such as Paolino Minorita's *De regimine rectoris*, composed in the Venetian dialect between 1313 and 1315.¹⁰⁵ Chapters xxx–xlv deal with the passions, summarised in ch. xxxi as: *amor, desiderio, delectacione overo allegrezza, odio, abominacione, tristicia overo dolor* (belonging to the concupiscible appetite, *vertude concupiscibile*); *speranza, desperanca, ira, mansuetudene, ardimento, paura* (belonging to the irascible appetite, *vertude irascibile*); then, *çelosia e gracia (le qual se reduce ad amor), vergogna (la qual se reduce a paura), envidia, misericordia, and grameça sovra quelli che à ben e no è degni (le qual se reduce a tristicia)*.

Another example of the literary influence of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* via the *Drp* is a case discussed by Charles F. Briggs (2005). In the first half of the 14th century, the Tuscan Dominican Friar Bartolomeo da San Concordio (1262–1347)¹⁰⁶ composed a *Compendium moralis philosophiae* (now attested, in different *recensiones*, by eleven manuscripts), abridging and summarising Giles' *Drp* (or, in some cases, amplifying it by adding glosses). It is interesting that “while other abridgments of the *Drp*, as well as of Aristotle's moral philosophical works,

104 See Iacomo's commentary (ed. Volpi [2009]) to *Inf.* vii (*Nota*), *Inf.* xxiii, 19–20 and 128–132, *Inf.* xxxii, 34, *Purg.* xiii (*nota*) and *Par.* iv, 10. In early Italian literature, other quotations of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* are in the anonymous translation of Marsilius of Padua's *Defensor Pacis*, translated from French into Italian in 1363 with the title *Libro del difenditore della pace* (see Tromboni [2018]). *Defensor Pacis* is full of references to Aristotle, so it would be interesting to examine the reuse of the *Rhetoric* not only in the original treatise – given that Marsilius was acquainted with John of Jandun, commentator on the *Rhetoric* (see above) – but also in the vernacular translation.

105 See Mussafia (1868).

106 See Segre (1964); Lorenzi Biondi (2017); Conte (2020).

tend to devote the most space to the *Ethics*,” in Bartolomeo’s *Compendium*, rather it is “those parts of the *Drp* that rely more heavily on the *Politics* and *Rhetoric*, as well as on Vegetius, that are accorded the most attention.”¹⁰⁷ As for the glosses, they especially occur in the sections of the *Compendium* dealing with the passions – where an important annotation about Giles’ and Aquinas’ different classification of *mansuetudo* can also be read.¹⁰⁸

Bartolomeo drew upon Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* not only in his *Compendium*, but also in other works. For example, the *Rhetoric* is frequently cited in the *Documenta antiquorum*, which was later translated into Italian by Bartolomeo under the title *Ammaestramenti degli antichi*.¹⁰⁹ Here the majority of citations, again, come from *Rhetoric*, book II, followed by *Rhetoric*, book I and book III. In fact, some of these could have been taken from compilations such as the *Auctoritates Aristotelis* rather than directly from Aristotle’s text.¹¹⁰ The very structure of the *Ammaestramenti* is partly similar to that of the *Auctoritates*, both being florilegia of different sources that could be used as reference manuals for philosophical works or other kinds of moral authorities, including religious and patristic as well as classical texts.¹¹¹

However, and to conclude, the presence of *compendia* such as Bartolomeo’s, and *a fortiori* the circulation of more complex and comprehensive works such as Giles’, does not diminish the importance of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* but, on the contrary, should be considered further proof of the success of a philosophical source that attained a new, rediscovered authority between the end of the 13th and the beginning of the 14th century.¹¹²

5 Conclusion

Around 1230, in his satirical poem *La bataille des sept arts*, Henri d’Andeli offered a clear illustration of what, in his view, Italian Rhetoric was. In the

¹⁰⁷ Briggs (2005) 190.

¹⁰⁸ Briggs (2005) 191. For Giles’ treatment of *mansuetudo*, see above at the beginning of this section.

¹⁰⁹ See Conte (2020).

¹¹⁰ See Hamesse (1974). See, for example, *Ammaestramenti*, dist. 9, cap. 8 “*Aristotile nel secondo della Rettorica*. Per lo non curare dimenticanza viene” (*Auct.* 33 “*Oblivio est signum parvipensionis*”); dist. 36, cap. 7 “*Aristotile, nel secondo della Rettorica*. Lodare il presente segno è di adulazione” (*Auct.* 43 “*Laudare praesentem adulari est*”). Bartolomeo’s text is cited from *Corpus OVI dell’italiano antico*, last access: January 2021, <http://gattoweb.ovi.cnr.it/>.

¹¹¹ See Segre (1964) 769; Conte (2020) 161–164.

¹¹² See Castelnuevo (2014) 150–154.

disputes between the armies of Grammar (that is, the study of the *belles lettres* in Orléans) and of Logic (that is, the predominant study of Aristotelian logic in Paris), a group of Lombard knights (*chevaliers lombards*), presented as lying and deceiving lawyers, intervenes as the army of a personified Rhetoric (v. 68–74): “a reference to the notaries from northern Italy who came to Paris during the 13th century”¹¹³ and, at the same time, a biting criticism of the “specialised professional study of notarial rhetoric” in which the *ars dictaminis* had transformed into a “narrow but lucrative professional competence.”¹¹⁴

Indeed, when dealing generally with rhetoric in late medieval Italy, the two peculiarities that come to mind are the teaching of the *ars dictaminis*, on the one hand, and the impact of Ciceronian theories, which had no proven equivalent in Europe, on the other.¹¹⁵ While “the extent of Ciceronian rhetorical teaching in the northern universities, and how, if at all, it was taught throughout the 13th century, remains a matter of debate,” it is beyond doubt that Italy testifies to an early revival of the Ciceronian tradition, as “the late 13th century saw a significant upsurge of new glosses and commentaries on the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (probably conditioned by dictaminal teaching), which continued through the 14th and 15th centuries.”¹¹⁶

However, this chapter has also reconsidered the contemporary Aristotelian tradition, arguing that its influence in Latin as well as in vernacular works should not be underestimated. Taking into account both the Latin and the vernacular reception of the *Rhetoric* – the latter almost completely neglected to this day – I have tried to demonstrate that Aristotle's text continually circulated and generated interest in Italy during the late 13th century and the 14th century, as attested by the manuscript circulation of the *Rhetoric* (in Moerbeke's translation) with its derivative texts, by the presence of early *volgarizzamenti*, and by the reuses of Aristotle's treatise in philosophical as well as literary works.

Moreover, given the technicalities of Aristotle's text and its intrinsic difficulty, it is reasonable to think – and textual evidence confirms the hypothesis – that the contents of the treatise were accessed also through complementary texts such as Giles of Rome's commentary (1272/1273) or his successful *De regimine principum* (ca. 1280), one of the first Western *specula principis* to be based on Aristotle's works, and one of the clearest examples of the inclusion of the *Rhetoric* within the framework of practical philosophy.¹¹⁷

113 Copeland and Sluiter (2009) 711.

114 Copeland and Sluiter (2009) 708.

115 See Ward (1995) 170–210.

116 Copeland and Sluiter (2009) 692–693.

117 See Papi (forthcoming).

Explicitly addressed to a larger audience, *Drp* encountered an enduring success in the 13th, 14th, and even 15th centuries, being translated into most European vernacular languages. It is probable that the importance accorded to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in *Drp*, and especially to the analysis of emotions and characters, substantially contributed to further interest in those sections of the original. At the same time, Giles' text could become itself a reference text for medieval authors dealing with these topics (the most famous example is Dante's *Convivio*) because it provided a clear summary of book II of the *Rhetoric*, cataloguing the emotions in a persuasive and easy-to-memorise way.

Thus, the presence of explicit references to the *Rhetoric* in vernacular works, together with the circulation of vernacular treatises based on Aristotle (*De regimine's* translations *in primis*) could have increased interest in reading the original work, not only in Latin but also in the vernacular. That would explain the presence of three different ancient Italian translations of the *Rhetoric*, which constitute a *unicum* with no equivalent in Europe.

On the other hand, the demand for translations of Aristotle's treatise could also be elicited by the broad circulation of other rhetorical works in the *volgare* (as those by Brunetto Latini or Bono Giamboni) belonging to the Ciceronian tradition, which provided a fertile background for the reception of the "new" Aristotelian treatise. After all, in Brunetto's *Rettorica* itself – and the same could be said of his *Tresor* with the Italian *volgarizzamento* – there are citations of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, either deriving from the original source *De inventione*¹¹⁸ or taken indirectly from earlier commentaries, such as the *Ars rethorice* by an anonymous (but Italian) author attested in MS Oxford, Bodleian Library Canon. Class. lat. 201.¹¹⁹

Therefore, future research will be needed to further examine how the Ciceronian and Aristotelian traditions interacted in Italy in the different contexts taken into account here (universities, mendicant orders, prominent cities such as Bologna, and also less-known centres such as Siena), better to illuminate the development of the "Italian rhetoric" from the second half of the 13th century to the period of Humanism and the Renaissance – the latter of which may in turn prove to have been more indebted to past traditions than we have understood until recently.

118 For Aristotle's presence in the *De inventione*, see Kennedy (1996) 422–423.

119 See Alessio (2015) 14–62.

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Dionysius Longinus, *On Sublimity*

Malcolm Heath

1 Before the *editio princeps*

Greek rhetorical theory made the leap from manuscript to print in 1508, when Aldus Manutius published *Rhetores Graeci*, edited by Demetrius Ducas. This substantial corpus (734 pages and around 410,000 words) contained the core texts of the late ancient rhetorical texts (Aphthonius' *Progymnasmata* and four works attributed to Hermogenes),¹ followed by a multitude of other texts ranging from the 4th century BCE (Aristotle) to the 4th century CE (Sopater); a second volume appeared in the following year, containing late ancient and Byzantine scholia on Aphthonius and Hermogenes.² These two volumes together comprised 1151 pages of text and more than 600,000 words – a large collection, with evident aspirations to comprehensiveness. It did not include *On Sublimity*.

The treatise did not lie outside the scope of the Aldine corpus. The author's stated aim is to be useful to "political men" (*Subl.* 1.2), and early modern readers recognised it as a treatise on rhetoric; Longinus³ was advertised as *rhetor praestantissimus* in later editions and commentaries. The most obvious explanation of its omission from the Aldine corpus is therefore that the treatise was not widely known at the beginning of the 16th century. That is not to say that it was entirely unknown: manuscripts existed. But they were not plentiful. The manuscript tradition depends on a single 10th-century codex, P (Parisinus graecus 2036).⁴ Two copies of P were made in the late 15th century (Marcianus graecus 522 and Parisinus graecus 2974).⁵ Mazzucchi identifies six additional

1 It is incorrect to speak of a "Hermogenean" corpus comprising five works in this period (e.g., Till [2006] 75–76; Mack [2011] 24–26, 40). The Greek text of the *progymnasmata* attributed to Hermogenes was transmitted separately from the other works, and remained unpublished until 1790.

2 The contents of the two volumes are documented in Sicherl (1992).

3 Known to readers in the 16th and 17th centuries as Dionysius Longinus. To avoid anachronism (e.g., n. 19) I adopt (without endorsing) this and other attributions accepted by 16th- and 17th-century scholars. Scholars who wrote in Latin will be referred to by their Latin names.

4 Mazzucchi (1989) 205–210; summary in Mazzucchi (2010) xxxix–xlii.

5 Mazzucchi (1989) 210–213.

indirect copies, one inferred copy, and four others that have not survived or are untraced.⁶

When the treatise was eventually published in the middle of the 16th century, Marc. gr. 522 was the textual basis for both of the first two printed editions (1554 and 1555: see §2).⁷ This was a codex of varied contents; *On Sublimity* was the last text to be added, early in 1468.⁸ It was compiled for Cardinal Bessarion (1403–1472), and was one of 746 codices which Bessarion donated to the Bibliotheca Marciana. Though the donation was recorded on 14 May 1468, the physical transfer of the codices to Venice did not begin until the following spring. Only 466 codices were transferred in Bessarion's lifetime, but Marc. gr. 522 is one of the codices that can be assumed to have been in the first consignment “with a high degree of certainty.”⁹ However, the existence of a manuscript does not guarantee its accessibility. The codices which Bessarion deposited in the Bibliotheca Marciana remained largely inaccessible for decades.¹⁰

Since *On Sublimity* was just one of many texts included in Marc. gr. 522, and since Bessarion did not retain the codex for his own use, we cannot assume that *On Sublimity* had any special significance for him. The fact that he marked the *lacunae* in his own hand¹¹ shows that he read the treatise at least once; but he makes no explicit reference to it, and a severe methodological challenge confronts any attempt to identify implicit influence. A case for the implicit influence of one text on another must be based on features that are distinctive to the supposed source, rather than widely disseminated commonplaces. Though “sublimity” and cognate terms were widely and variously used in a long-standing classical and post-classical tradition,¹² the use of these

6 Mazzucchi (1989) 213–218. Some of these copies post-dated the Aldine *Rhetores Graeci*.

7 Mazzucchi (1989) 224; (2010) xli.

8 Mazzucchi (1989) 211. The contents are listed in the 1468 inventory as follows: “Item Lysias orator, Agathii historia, Theognus poeta, Aurei versus Pythagorei, Moscus Siculus, Musaeus Hero et Leander, et Dionysius Longinus de magnitudine orationis, et de aciebus bellicis, in pergamen” (Labowsky [1979] 169). For a detailed modern description see Hosoi and Yoshikawa (2016) 181.

9 Labowsky (1979) 27–28, 46.

10 On the difficulties of accessing the resources of the Bibliotheca Marciana at this period see Lowry (1979) 230–234; Sicherl (1992) 134 (“Hier bestätigt sich ein weiteres Mai, daß Aldus Manutius keinen Zugang zu den Codices Bessarions im Dogenpalast von Venedig hatte”). Other copies existed: for example, Janus Lascaris (1434–1501) borrowed, annotated, and failed to return a manuscript (Par. gr. 2974) from the private library of the Medici (Mazzucchi [1989] 212–213).

11 Mazzucchi (1989) 211.

12 Documented in Porter (2016): the documentation is somewhat unreliable, and Porter's judgements are often inconsistent (Heath [2017]). Ley (2013) makes bold claims for an

terms is not sufficient to establish a connection to *On Sublimity's* distinctive conception of sublimity as the highest pinnacle of discourse (1.3).¹³ To my knowledge, Bessarion's only use of *sublimis* in relation to a quality of discourse is in book 1 chapter 4 of his *In calumniatorem Platonis* (first drafted in Greek in 1459 and published in Latin translation in 1469).¹⁴ Bessarion paraphrases Hermogenes' praise of Plato (386.16–389.6 Rabe), formulated in terms of the Hermogenean system of *ideai* ("forms," or types of style),¹⁵ and then presents a version of the doctrine of three *genera dicendi* ("kinds of speech"). In the Greek version he names the *genera* using terminology current in late rhetorical and philosophical sources (*iskhnos*, *mesos*, *hadros*).¹⁶ The equivalent terms in the Latin version (*tenuis*, *moderatus*, *sublimis*) derive directly or indirectly from a 4th- or 5th-century Latin rhetorician (Fortunatianus 126.1–3 Halm): *sublimis* translates *hadros*, not *hupsēlos* or any other Greek term characteristic of *On Sublimity*. Curiously, in the Latin version (but not the Greek) Bessarion attributes the three *genera dicendi* to Hermogenes, who does not use that doctrine and does not use the Greek terminology which Bessarion associates with it.¹⁷

Two claims have been made for explicit familiarity with *On Sublimity* prior to the *editio princeps*: both involve a straightforward philological and (in one case) logical error. Petrus Victorius (1499–1585), in his *Commentarii in Tres*

early knowledge of the text, without evidential support (e.g., 29: "Eine Kenntnis des Textes war offenbar bereits im Mittelalter ... wieder im Westen verbreitet"; cf. 31); his speculation that the text was treated as an exclusive "Arcanum" (32) merely confirms the lack of evidence.

- 13 Since, for Longinus, sublimity is conceived as the pinnacle of discursive excellence, though it is possible to fail to be sublime, it is impossible to be sublime badly. By contrast, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who prefers the mixed or middle to the slender (*iskhnos*) and sublime (*hupsēlos*) styles (e.g., *Dem.* 2–3, 15, 33, 41; cf. *Comp.* 21), is willing to apply *hupsēlos* to unsuccessful instances of his "sublime" stylistic register (*Dem.* 5, 9; *Comp.* 18). Hermogenes' rare uses of *hupsēlos* also associate the term with excess (221.24–26, 401.16, 410.7 Rabe).
- 14 55.15–16 Mohler ([1508] 8^r). There are several non-literary uses of the term. I have used the Greek and 1469 Latin texts in Mohler (1927), alongside the 1503 Aldine edition (incorporating Bessarion's corrections and additions). On the stages of the work's development, see Monfasani (2013).
- 15 When Bessarion uses *ideai* in the Greek at 52.18 Mohler, the Latin translation refers vaguely to *praecepta* (53.20). However, *ideai* does appear in the Latin at 53.35, when the *ideai* used by Plato are listed. For literature on Hermogenean stylistics, see n. 26.
- 16 E.g., in the *Chrestomathia* attributed to Proclus (Photius *Bibl. cod.* 239, 318b26–36). See also [Plut.] *De Homero* 2.72; Procl. *In Tim.* 1.62.7–10 Diehl; *In Parm.* 645.22–6.1 Cousin; Hermias *In Phdr.* 260.10–11 Lucarini-Moreschini (247.29–30 Couvreur); anon. *Proleg. Phil. Plat.* 17.2 Westerink.
- 17 Hermogenes uses *iskhnos* once, in the compound form *huperiskhnos* (407.2 Rabe), but never *hadros* or (in any relevant sense) *mesos*.

Libros Aristotelis De Arte Dicendi (1548), quotes Longinus as describing rhythm as the “breath of metre” (*metri spiritus*).¹⁸ Several scholars have assumed that this is a reference to *On Sublimity*.¹⁹ In fact, Victorius is quoting a fragment of Cassius Longinus’ commentary on Hephaestion’s metrical handbook (Longinus F42.8 Patillon-Brisson). Scholars in the 16th century were aware of Cassius Longinus, a distinguished literary critic, rhetorician, and philosopher of the 3rd century CE, from a variety of sources: the Byzantine encyclopaedia then attributed to Suidas, Porphyry’s *Life of Plotinus*, Eunapius’ *Lives of the Sophists*, and scattered fragments. In this case, a distinctive textual error proves that Victorius encountered the fragment in a Byzantine commentary on Hermogenes (RG 7.935 n. 16 ~ 5.473.20–21 Walz): the correct reading, preserved in the scholia to Hephaestion (81.10 Consbruch) and the *Suda* (ρ288), describes rhythm, not as metre’s breath (*pneuma*), but as its father (*patēr*).

Equally flawed is the inference that Adrianus Turnebus (1512–1565) was familiar with *On Sublimity* before its publication, based on a marginal annotation in his edition of Hephaestion (1553): “Ex. Longino. Vide Cod. Reg. 3254. f. 69 r.”²⁰ Since we do not know when this marginal annotation was written, or who wrote it, it cannot tell us anything about what Turnebus knew, or when he knew it. Nor does it tell us anything about the anonymous annotator’s knowledge of *On Sublimity*: for in this case, too, we are dealing with a fragment of Cassius Longinus’ commentary on Hephaestion. Turnebus prints, in adapted form, a version of the scholia^B in which the fragment’s author is not identified (1553: 81.1–3 = 297.15–19 Consbruch); the marginal annotator points to a manuscript that contains a fuller version of the scholia, in which Longinus is named as the source (Georgius Choeroboscus, 212.21–25 Consbruch).

18 Victorius (1548) 513. Vossius (1650) 80 has the same false reading.

19 Ley (1994) 241 (cf. [2013] 173), followed by Till (2006) 21 and Gründler (2012) 91 n. 23, who anachronistically turns “Longinus” in Ley’s quotation of Victorius into “Pseudo-Longinus.” When Refini (2012) 37 says that “there are no Longinian traces” in Victorius (1548), he presumably means that there are no traces of *On Sublimity*: there is a definite trace of Longinus.

20 Steppich (2006) 40 n. 14, following Coleman (1985) 407. Though Coleman does not claim that the marginal note was written before the publication of *On Sublimity*, she implicitly assumes that Turnebus wrote it. Her claim that Turnebus’ familiarity with *On Sublimity* “is evident in several of his commentaries of Classical Greek and Latin texts” is unevicenced and, so far as I have been able to discover, false. Steppich (2006) 45–57 suggests that knowledge of *On Sublimity* is implicit in the chapter on imitation in Joachim Vadianus’ *De Poetica*. But the failure of Vadianus (1484–1551), who is otherwise so lavish in naming his authorities, to mention *On Sublimity* strongly indicates that he was not familiar with the treatise; and the sources that he cites explicitly, such as Homer’s metempsychosis into Ennius (1518: s^r, cf. h iiii^r), provide sufficient grounding for his argument.

The *Bibliotheca Universalis* of Conrad Gesner (1516–1565) shows genuine evidence of an awareness of *On Sublimity*, but not of familiarity. Gesner's knowledge of the treatise, derived indirectly from library catalogues, is confused. His entry for Dionysius Longinus (1545: 212^v) includes two *opuscula* under Latin titles (*De magnitudine orationis* and *De aciebus bellicis*) and an incomplete book on sublimity with a Greek title (περὶ ὕψους λόγου ῥητορικοῦ *liber imperfectus*). Gesner is evidently unaware that he has recorded the same text twice. The duplication results from combining two sources: the summary of the contents of Marc. gr. 522 in the 1468 inventory of Bessarion's donation, and a catalogue of the manuscripts owned by Diego Hurtado de Mendoza.²¹ In the summary of contents of Marc. gr. 522 the text on military tactics is listed after *De magnitudine orationis*, without the name of the author (Aelian). Gesner's assumption that *De magnitudine orationis* and the *liber imperfectus* on sublimity were different works by the same author was, therefore, reasonable, but mistaken.

More substantial evidence of intensifying awareness of and interest in *On Sublimity* immediately before the publication of the *editio princeps* is provided by Marcus Antonius Muretus (1526–1585). Muretus reports in his commentary on Catullus that Paulus Manutius, who commissioned the commentary,²² had also encouraged him to prepare a Latin translation of *On Sublimity* to be printed alongside an edition of the (still unpublished) Greek text (1554: 57^v–58^r). Manutius had borrowed Marc. gr. 522 from the Bibliotheca Marciana in September 1553,²³ presumably in connection with the projected edition of *On Sublimity*. That project and the Catullus commentary were related, since a poem by Sappho uniquely preserved in *On Sublimity* (10.1–2) had been recognised as the model for Catullus 51. Predictably, Sappho's poem attracted scholarly attention after the publication of the *editio princeps*. Henricus Stephanus (1528–1598) printed it in his edition of Anacreon and other lyric poets (1556: 69); Guilielmus Canterus (1542–1575) mentioned it in the second edition of his *Novae Lectiones* (1566: 279–281); and Fulvius Ursinus (1529–1600) included it in his *Carmina Novem Illustrium Feminarum* (1568: 9–10, 283–285). Ursinus owned a manuscript of the treatise (Vat. gr. 1417) and made a Latin translation, probably before the appearance of the *editio princeps*, though it remained

21 Diego Hurtado de Mendoza y La Cerda (1500–1578), ambassador in Venice, 1539–1547. The manuscript was destroyed in a fire in the Escorial in 1671: details in Monfasani (1984) 492–493; Mazzucchi (1989) 223.

22 Gaisser (1993) 151–168 on Muretus' collaboration with Manutius; 163–165 on Catullus 51.

23 Access to the library's contents had improved after 1530 (Wilson [1992] 133). The codex was also borrowed by Georgius Corinthius in 1547 and Daniel Dolphin in 1551–3 (Mazzucchi [1989] 211–212; Castellani [1897] 25–26, 34, 53). The diversity of the codex's contents precludes any automatic assumption that *On Sublimity* was the focus of their interest.

unpublished.²⁴ As for Muretus, he explains that his role in the projected edition came to nothing, since Franciscus Portus (1511–1581) had already begun work on the edition that Manutius planned to publish. There is no evidence that Muretus' translation of *On Sublimity* was ever made.

2 *Editiones Principes*

Portus and Manutius were pre-empted. The *editio princeps* was published in Basel in 1554, under the title *De Grandi sive Sublimi Orationis Genere*: the editor was Franciscus Robortellus (1516–1567). The title page draws attention to its being the first edition (*nunc primum ... in lucem editus*), and the dedication underlines the point: a work previously unknown (*antea ignotum*) has been resurrected (*redivivum*), brought from darkness into life (*e tenebris in lucem eductum*). These claims, though not literally true, reinforce the point made earlier: the treatise had not previously been widely known. The further claim that the treatise has been “polished” (*expolitum*) is perhaps overstated: the text has been lightly edited. On the other hand, the marginal annotations which are also advertised on the title page do provide a useful initial aid to understanding this unfamiliar and difficult text.

It is instructive to compare Robortellus' Latin title, *De Grandi sive Sublimi Orationis Genere*, with the title of Ursinus' unpublished translation, *De Altitudine et Granditate Orationis*. Both capture the literal sense of height (*hupsos*) in the Greek title, though in different ways, and both gloss it with a word connoting greatness or grandeur. But there is a subtle difference. For Robortellus, the treatise is about a certain *category* of discourse: the title implicitly assimilates Longinus' sublimity to the grandest of the three *genera dicendi*, and the marginal annotations reinforce that interpretation. In Ursinus' title, by contrast, the treatise is about sublimity or greatness as *qualities* of discourse. That would be consistent with an assimilation of the treatise to the Hermogenean stylistic forms (*ideai*). *Granditas* and *magnitudo* were freely used as synonyms, and in Bonfini's Latin translation of Hermogenes (1538) *de magnitudine orationis* renders *περὶ μεγέθους λόγου* (241.12 Rabe). That phrase had already been applied to *On Sublimity* (unaccompanied by any expression of the title's literal sense) in the contents summary of Marc. gr. 522 (n. 8).

The use of a term for greatness as a gloss on or substitute for the Greek title is not in principle an error. *Megethos* is frequently used in *On Sublimity* as a

24 Vat. Lat. 3441. Transcription by S. Linscheid-Burdich in Ley (2013) 429–460. Weinberg (1950) 156; Costa (1985) 224–227; Refini (2012) 35–36.

non-exclusively coreferential variant for *hupsos*: that is to say, although the two terms are not semantically identical in Longinus' usage, *megethos* is often used in the treatise with the same reference as *hupsos* – often, but not always: Longinus, writing for sophisticated readers, deliberately avoids the regimented terminology appropriate to a technical treatise for beginners. However, glossing sublimity with a term for greatness does become an error if it assimilates Longinian sublimity to the Hermogenean forms (*ideai*) of discourse or to the three *genera dicendi*. We have already observed the combination of Hermogenean stylistics with the theory of three *genera* in Bessarion (§1). That combination had been a fundamental feature of Renaissance rhetorical theory since Georgius Trapezuntius (1395–1472) in his *Rhetoricorum Libri V* attempted to combine the Greek rhetorical tradition, dominated by Hermogenes, and the Latin tradition, in which the three *genera* were dominant.²⁵ This well-established syncretism determined the horizon of expectation within which *On Sublimity* was interpreted. Consequently, though its Renaissance readers recognised a distinctive voice, they struggled to recognise the distinctiveness of its teaching.

In Hermogenean stylistics²⁶ there are six variable components of discourse; adjusting these variables produces the different stylistic “forms” (*ideai*). These forms are organised in a three-tier hierarchy. Forms in the two subordinate tiers may be used separately or in combination; the superordinate form is *deinotēs* (“force,” “eloquence”), which is able to draw on all the subordinate forms to achieve optimal effect. In Hermogenes *megethos* (“greatness,” “grandeur”) is a second-tier form. Although Longinus uses *megethos* and cognate words in free variation for *hupsos*, many of his examples of *hupsos* do not match the Hermogenean form *megethos*. For example, Hermogenes associates Xenophon with “simplicity” (*apheleia*, 404.22–6.18), and Sappho with “sweetness” (*glukutēs*, 331.19–21, 334.8–10); both are subordinate to *ēthos* (“character”), a second-tier form separate from *megethos*. Yet Longinus includes them both in a treatise on *hupsos*. The same contradiction arises when Longinian *hupsos* is equated with the grand *genus*: it fails to recognise the diversity of Longinus' examples of excellence. Early commentators, wedded to an assimilation of sublimity with the grand *genus* or Hermogenean *megethos*, have significantly little to say about Longinus' ranking of Xenophon as a “hero” alongside Plato

25 For Georgius Trapezuntius (George of Trebizond), see Monfasani (1984); Calboli Montefusco (2008). On the date of his death, see Monfasani (1976) 233–234. Mack (2011) provides a good overview of Renaissance rhetoricians.

26 Introduction and English translation in Wooten (1987); in more depth, Patillon (2012) vii–cxxxiii.

(*Subl.* 4.4), or about his quotation of Sappho's poem. Longinus characterises sublimity as a pinnacle of excellence (1.3). If any Hermogenean stylistic form could be equated with Longinian sublimity, therefore, it would have to be the superordinate *deinotēs* ("forcefulness," "eloquence"), which shares with Longinian *hupsos* the potential to draw on diverse stylistic registers, not the subordinate *megethos*.

The edition published by Manutius in 1555 had the title *De Sublimi Genere Dicendi*: sublimity is assimilated to the *genera dicendi*, though without the additional gloss supplied in Robortellus' title. In his prefatory letter, Manutius claims that "before our time it lay concealed in Bessarion's library," reinforcing the impression that the treatise had not previously enjoyed a high profile. This edition is promoted on the title page for its improved presentation (Robortellus had printed poetic quotations as if they were prose) and for its greatly improved text. The credit for these improvements must go to Portus, who had made his own copy of Marc. gr. 522 (Cantab. Kk.VI.34) around 1530–1535, and who noted corrections and conjectures in the margins.²⁷ Not all of his suggestions have stood the test of time,²⁸ but the greatly superior quality of Portus' text gave the Aldine edition a decisive advantage over its predecessor. Consequently, even though he had been pre-empted by Robortellus, Portus was the root of the subsequent editorial tradition.

Portus' contribution to purging the mutilated and error-ridden text and restoring it, so far as possible, to "some kind of form" (*aliquem formam*),²⁹ was also emphasised in a commentary that remained in manuscript until 1733, when it was printed as a supplement to the third edition of Pearce's commentary.³⁰ This commentary has the status of a work in progress, since Portus' thoughts were evolving as an ongoing draft. In the preliminaries, for example, he accepts the political explanation of the decline of sublimity proposed by "one of the philosophers" (44.1) at face value (283); but in the commentary on chapter 44 he recognises that the philosopher's political explanation is ultimately rejected by Longinus in favour of a moral one (357). Publishers in the 18th century

27 Costil (1935) 282 n. 5 (with 280–284 on Portus' input into the 1555 edition); Mazzucchi (1989) 215–218. The marginalia cannot be dated, and may be associated with the preparation of the edition rather than copying of the manuscript.

28 For example, in 9.9 ἐγνώρισε for the transmitted ἐχώρησε (the conjecture appears in a lemma in his commentary, without comment). Portus' almost universally accepted conjecture ὁ Λυσίας (for ἀπουσίας, 35.1) eliminates an obvious error at the cost of introducing a subtle error that makes nonsense of Longinus' argument: Heath (2000), to be revisited in Heath (in preparation).

29 Pearce (1733) 279.

30 Pearce (1733) 279–360. The manuscript containing the Longinus commentary also has Portus' commentary on Hermogenes' *On Ideas*: Weinberg (1971) 196–198.

assumed that Portus' notes had been compiled in connection with the edition of the text which he produced in 1569;³¹ but now that his role in the 1555 edition is known, and in view of the fact that the commentary's author lays claim to emendations printed in that edition,³² the earlier date can be taken as established.

Portus' commentary begins by remarking that he has elsewhere described Sophocles as *gravis et sublimis*: he now proposes to explain how to achieve sublimity. The next paragraph of the commentary affirms that Dionysius Longinus and Hermogenes both wrote with the greatest precision about "greatness (*megethos*) and sublimity (*hupsos*)" in discourse, or (in the Latin gloss) about discourse that is "magnificent and sublime."³³ The two rhetoricians do not differ in subject matter or doctrine, Portus suggests, but in the way their teaching is presented: Hermogenes gives precepts; Longinus' teaching ravishes and inspires.³⁴ Longinus' aim is to show how it may be possible to attain a *genus dicendi* that has "magnificence and amplitude" (*magnificum et amplum*, 238). Portus interpreted Longinian sublimity in terms both of the three *genera* (283, 295, 319) and of Hermogenean *idea*-theory (279, 283–284, 298). With regard to Sappho, Portus' notes reproduce Catullus 51, but have nothing to say about either its magnificence or its sublimity.

3 Growing Awareness

In the year that saw the publication of Portus' edition of *On Sublimity*, Joannes Sturmius (1507–1588) produced the first instalment of a corpus of Greek rhetorical theory more compendious than the Aldine *Rhetores Graeci*, and of more practical use to students. The core of the collection was Hermogenes. Style had priority: *On Ideas* came first. In his brief preface, Sturmius proceeds to Hermogenean *idea*-theory by way of the three *genera dicendi* in Cicero's *De oratore* (though he confuses Crassus with Antonius). The second instalment (1556) contained *On the Method of Deinotēs* and two other works on style: Demetrius of Phalerum, whose four stylistic "characters" (plain, grand, elegant, and forceful [*deinos*]) could be viewed as a forerunner of Hermogenean *ideai*, and Aristides' less complex (but therefore also more accessible) version of *idea*-theory. The third instalment (1558), contained *On Issues* and *On Invention*.

31 Pearce (1733) xxviii–xxx.

32 E.g., τέρματα for μέτρα (9.13); ἐμβεβάσαι for ἐπακμάσαιμι (13.4).

33 Pearce (1733) 279: "περί μεγέθους καὶ ὕψους λόγου. *De Magnifica & Sublimi Oratione*."

34 Pearce (1733) 283–284.

When the sequence was complete, the three parts were published in a single volume.

In 1569, eleven years after the completion of Sturmius' project, Portus produced an alternative corpus, supplementing the core texts of the late ancient rhetorical corpus (Aphthonius' *Progymnasmata* and the four works of Hermogenes) with *On Sublimity*. This improves on Sturmius in two ways. First, the corpus opens with Aphthonius, a preparatory text for beginners, before progressing to the more advanced works of Hermogenes. Second, Sturmius' two supplementary stylistic texts, Demetrius and Aristides, are discarded: in their place Portus offers *On Sublimity*, which has greater potential to make a distinctive contribution to the corpus. Hermogenes' treatment of *deinotēs* in *On Ideas* is incomplete, and *On the Method of Deinotēs* does not provide an adequate completion. Though Hermogenes provides instruction for students who have progressed beyond the elementary exercises of Aphthonius, at the final stage he offers only an unsatisfactory stopgap. Longinian *hypsos* is equivalent to Hermogenean *deinotēs* in the sense that each ranks as the highest level of stylistic achievement in its own theoretical system. Therefore, if Hermogenes and Longinus do not differ in subject matter or doctrine, as Portus maintains (§2), Longinus' treatise can be recruited to supply a superior completion to the incomplete Hermogenean corpus. Longinus has one further advantage: as we have seen, Portus observes in his commentary that Hermogenes teaches by precept, while Longinus' teaching inspires. The manner, as well as the content, of Longinus' most advanced teaching is appropriate to the most advanced students.

On the separate title page of *On Sublimity*, adapted from the 1555 edition, the title now conforms to the tendency to gloss "sublimity" with a word for greatness (*De Grande sive Sublime Orationis Genere*). Portus draws attention to the index, which serves as an aid to understanding the book's structure and doctrine: the index, which extends to eleven pages, is recommended as a substitute for Robortellus' annotations.³⁵ The publisher's preface, noting that few manuscripts were available, emphasises Portus' contribution to the improvement of the text by emendation.

Shortly afterwards, Sturmius published an edition of Hermogenes with a facing Latin translation and commentaries (1570–1571). He makes no mention

35 Portus also introduced section divisions: these are not numbered, but if the lacunae at 3, 19, 31, and 38 are taken as divisions, the sections correspond to the 44 sections in modern editions (though the division at 33 is delayed by one sentence). Portus' 44 sections reappear, numbered, in Hudson (1710). In the intervening period Petra (1612) has 39 numbered sections (followed by Langbainius [1636]; Manolesius [1644]; and Hall [1652]); Pinelli (1639) has 37; Faber (1663) has 40; and Tollius (1694) has 43.

of Longinus in the commentaries, or (five years later) in *De Universa Ratione Elocutionis Rhetoricae Libri iiii* (1576). By contrast, the separately paginated commentary that follows Caspar Laurentius' (1556–1636) text and translation of Hermogenes (1614) makes six references to Longinus, three of which say that he should be or is “annexed” to the treatises of Hermogenes. Laurentius therefore shares Portus' view of Longinus as a significant adjunct to Hermogenes; and he, too, assumes that Longinus is concerned with Hermogenean *megethos*, and combines Hermogenean *idea*-theory with the three *genera* (1614: 130).³⁶

We have seen that Victorius showed no awareness of Longinus (that is, Dionysius Longinus, the author of *On Sublimity*) in his 1548 commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. There is a decisive change after the publication of *On Sublimity*. Longinus is mentioned twice in Victorius' commentary on Aristotle's *Poetics* (1560: 149, 295). His commentary on Demetrius mentions Longinus in the preface to the reader and in five other places (1562: iv^r, 77, 87, 236, 246, 268). Longinus appears three times in *Variarum Lectionum XIII Novi Libri* (1569: 32, 72, 140). The first of these is concerned with a false reading in *Subl.* 27.2: the printed editions (dependent on Marc. gr. 522) had *kērux* (“herald”); Victorius found the correct reading (the name Ceyx) in two manuscripts which he had consulted in Ridolfi's library in April and May 1559 (Par. gr. 2036, 2974).³⁷ This discovery went unnoticed until Tollius' edition (1694). Finally, the expanded commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* adds six references to *On Sublimity* (1579: 572, 575, 579, 614, 649, 733) to the first edition's reference to a fragment of Longinus' commentary on Hephaestion.³⁸

In the preface to the commentary on Demetrius, Victorius states that “Dionysius of Halicarnassus preceded ‘the other Dionysius’ by a long time” (*alter vero Dionysius qui Halicarnasso oriundus fuit ac tempore illum multo antecessit*, 1562: a iv^r). The only plausible candidate for the role of “the other Dionysius” is Dionysius Longinus, the author of *On Sublimity*; and the chronological distance from Dionysius of Halicarnassus implies an identification of Dionysius Longinus with Cassius Longinus. This is the earliest identification

36 Vossius (1630) 472 regards Hermogenes' forms as “affections” (modifications, inflections) of the three *genera* (“Sanè tres tantum sunt characteres: at Hermogenicæ formæ nihil aliud sunt, quàm trium dicendi generum affectiones”).

37 Mazzucchi (1989) 226, n. 62.

38 In the first edition Victorius described Longinus as a pupil (*auditor*) of Plotinus (1548: 313). The source of this strange error is Stephanus' edition of Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica* (1544: 272), based on a manuscript with a false variant that turns a feast in honour of Plato (*Platōneia*) into one in honour of Plotinus (*Plotineia*) (10.3.1). The error remains in the revised edition of Victorius' commentary, though he now also identifies Longinus as Porphyry's teacher (1579: 611). Viger's edition (1628) has the correct reading.

of Dionysius Longinus with Cassius Longinus that I have found. It was not self-evident. Gesner's *Bibliotheca Universalis* had separate entries for Dionysius Longinus, the author of *On Sublimity*, and for Cassius Longinus (1545: 212^v, 483^r); and Dionysius Longinus was the only form of the name which scholars in the 16th century found in the manuscripts of *On Sublimity* that they consulted.³⁹ But the identification quickly became established. For example, Portus, who had not hinted at this identification in his 1555 edition or the unpublished commentary, in his second edition applies Eunapius' "living library" epigram to Dionysius Longinus in the prefatory letter to Beza (1569: *iii^r), and places two testimonia relating to Cassius Longinus from Suidas and Eunapius before the text.⁴⁰

Once the identification had become established, the names could be combined. Longinus appears as Dionysius Longinus Cassius in the biographical section of Petra's edition (1612: 30) and in the paragraph on Longinus in Gerardus Vossius' (1577–1649) *De Historicis Graecis Libri Quatuor* (1624: 195–196). Lucas Holstenius (1596–1661) uses the same triple name when he formally introduces Longinus in his dissertation on Porphyry's life and writings (1630). Dionysius Longinus Cassius appears on the title page of Manolesius' edition (1644), which presents a Greek text alongside the translations of Petra, Pizzimenti, and Paganus. The commentary of Tanaquil Faber (1615–1672) generally refers to him as Dionysius Longinus; but he is Dionysius Cassius Longinus in the heading to the notes (1663: 235).

The triple form of the name was not anomalous in principle: it was recognised that a Greek with Roman citizenship might combine a Roman with a Greek personal name.⁴¹ But there was an unnoticed anomaly in the distribution of the two forms of the name. The 3rd-century polymath is always referred to as Cassius Longinus or (more frequently) Longinus; Dionysius Longinus only appears in manuscripts of *On Sublimity*. At the end of the 17th century Frederik Rostgaard observed a disjunctive attribution ("Dionysius or Longinus") in Par. gr. 2036, but merely made a note in his copy of Tollius' edition. Then, in 1808,

39 The author's anonymity in Laur. 28.30 is not evidence of scholarly doubt about the attribution (as sometimes suggested: e.g., Russell (1964) xxiv n. 3): the copyist's note for the rubricator was accidentally cut off when the pages were trimmed for binding; Mazzucchi (1989) 213.

40 At the end of the 17th century, a historian of Palmyra was prompted by Gesner's puzzling reference to a treatise on military tactics to speculate that it was written by Longinus "for the use of that warlike Empress" (i.e., Zenobia); Seller (1696) 269. The widespread obsession with Zenobia, which concentrates attention on the last years of Longinus' life and obscures his long academic career in Athens, is a regrettable side effect of the attribution to Cassius Longinus.

41 E.g., Ruhnken (1776), reprinted in Weiske (1809) lxx–lxxi.

a Vatican librarian observed the disjunct in Vat. gr. 285, and “almost died of joy.”⁴² He reported this reading to Benjamin Weiske, who was in the last stages of completing an edition of the treatise with introduction and commentary. Though the disjunctive attribution is, in fact, consistent with Cassius Longinus’ authorship, and resolves the anomaly in the distribution of the two forms of the name, Weiske’s precipitate rejection of the attribution to Cassius Longinus rapidly became, and remains, the scholarly consensus.⁴³ The important point for present purposes, however, is that Dionysius Longinus and Cassius Longinus became the same person less than a decade after the *editio princeps* of *On Sublimity*.

4 Dissemination

On Sublimity is difficult to read in Greek. Longinus’ style makes demands on the reader, as do his many allusions; the lacunae obscure the overall structure of his argument, and textual corruptions obscure its details. Translations and commentaries were needed to make the treatise more accessible. Twelve translations of the 16th and 17th centuries are attested. Five (marked with an asterisk in Table 10.1) were not published; some of these were perhaps informal by-products of a scholar’s individual quest for understanding. The table shows a trend from Latin to vernacular languages. The titles, both of translations and of Greek texts and Latin commentaries (Table 10.2), reveal a decreasing inclination to gloss “sublime” as “grand” or to define Longinian sublimity as a *genus dicendi*.

Gabriel de Petra’s Latin translation, printed in parallel columns with the Greek text, included annotations. This edition is introduced by an elaborate set of paratexts, many of which were taken over by successors. These include a biographical account of Dionysius Longinus Cassius (20–24), a “synoptic preface” (24–31), a diagrammatic outline of the treatise’s doctrine, and (most importantly) an attempt to solve a “philosophical *aporia*” concerning the relationship between Hermogenes and Longinus (31–33). The solution’s premise is that *megethos* in Hermogenes and *hupsos* in Longinus refer to the same thing. But this shared subject matter is treated in different ways: Hermogenes divides *megethos* into the six subordinate *ideai* that contribute to it; Longinus

42 Weiske (1809) 213: “Haec sane inscriptio quantivis est pretii; meque, quum primum viderem, pene gaudio exanimavit.”

43 I am not convinced that the consensus is correct (Heath 1999), and argue elsewhere for the identification of Cassius Longinus as the author of *On Sublimity*.

TABLE 10.1 Translations

Date	Language	Author	Title
pre-1554?	* Latin	Ursinus ^a	<i>De Altitudine et Granditate Orationis</i>
pre-1560	* Latin	Dudithius ^b	
1566	Latin	Pizzimentius ^c	<i>De Grandi Orationis Genere</i>
1572	Latin	Paganus ^d	<i>De Sublimi Dicendi Genere</i>
1575	* Italian	da Falgano ^e	<i>Della altezza del dire</i>
1612	Latin	Petra ^f	<i>De Grandi sive Sublimi Genere Orationis</i>
1631	* Latin	Allatius ^g	
1639	Italian	Pinelli ^h	<i>Dell' altezza del dire</i>
1644	Latin	Manolesius	<i>De Sublimi Genere Dicendi</i>
1652	English	Hall	<i>Of the Height of Eloquence</i>
c.1645	* French	anon. ⁱ	<i>De la sublimité du discours</i>
1674	French	Boileau	<i>Du sublime ou du merveilleux dans le discours</i>
1680	English	Pulteney ^j	<i>Of the Loftiness or Elegance of Speech</i>

a See n. 24.

b Andreas Dudithius (1533–1589). The translation is mentioned in Dudithius (1560) B2v–B3r; Costil (1935) 283–284; Weinberg (1971) 194; cf. (1950) 154–156.

c Dominicus Pizzimentius (1550–1592). Reprinted in Manolesius (1644).

d Petrus Paganus (1532–1576). Reprinted in Manolesius (1644).

e Magl. VI, 33, Biblioteca Nazionale, Firenze. Transcription by B. DasGupta in Ley (2013) 461–501.

f Reprinted in Aromatari (1643) and Manolesius (1644).

g Leo Allatius (c.1586–1669). Ms. Allacci XXIX, Bibl. Vallicelliana, Rome. The manuscript also contains notes and two versions of a commentary. Costa (1985) 232–233.

h Though Pinelli claims to be the first to put Longinus into Italian, he has in fact copied da Falgano's unpublished version with only minor changes (Ley [2013] 273, who strangely denies that this was direct plagiarism).

i BNF fonds italien 2028; edited in Gilby (2007).

j Translated from Boileau (1966).

TABLE 10.2 Commentaries

Date	Text/Commentary	Author	Title
1554	text	Robortellus	<i>De Grandi sive Sublimi Orationis Genere</i>
1555	text	Portus	<i>De Sublimi Genere Dicendi</i>
1569	text	Portus	<i>De Grandi sive Sublimi Genere Dicendi</i>
1612	comm	Petra	<i>De Grandi sive Sublimi Genere Orationis</i>
1636	comm	Langbaine	<i>De Grandi Loquentia sive Sublimi Dicendi Genere</i>
1663	comm	Faber	(not translated)
1694	comm	Toll	<i>De Sublimitate</i>

identifies the five sources of *hupsos*. This difference derives from their different projects: Hermogenes' aim is to instil the art of speech most completely; Longinus instead fixes his attention on *deinotēs*, and aims at the "highest pinnacle" (*summum apicem*).⁴⁴ A corollary is that Longinus is not writing for beginners (compare Portus 1569, above). But Petra's solution to the philosophical *aporia* fails: in Hermogenes' system *megethos* is subordinate to *deinotēs*, and therefore cannot refer to the same thing as Longinus' *hupsos*, which is the pinnacle of discursive excellence (*Subl.* 1.3). In view of Petra's equation of Longinian *hupsos* with Hermogenean *megethos* it is no surprise that the annotation on the Sappho passage goes no further than mentioning Catullus 51, and comparing Sappho's emotional confusions to those of Theocritus' Simaetha.

Gerardus Langbaine (1609–1658) in his edition (1638) reproduces Petra's text, translation, and annotations, together with almost all his paratexts. His original contribution is to be found in the separately paginated *notarum auctarium*. Like Victorius, he is misled by a false reading in Eusebius into believing that Longinus took part in a celebration of Plotinus (2); unlike Petra, he realises that *Philarchaeus* (Porph. *Plot.* 14.19) is the title of a treatise written by Longinus, not (as Ficino supposed) the name of a co-author (21). Isaac Casaubon's description of Longinus as *semichristianus* (prompted by his favourable comments on the *Genesis* citation in *Subl.* 9.9: §5) is refuted (52–3). But Sappho is evaded: Langbaine's only comment is on the meaning of the phrase ὅτ' αὐτό (57).

Faber (1663) also reproduces Petra's text and translation, but not the paratexts. He, too, addresses the question of whether Hermogenes and Longinus dealt with the same subject matter (ē i^r–ī iii^r). He assumes the equivalence of Hermogenean *megethos* with *to hadron* in the system of three *genera*, but denies that Hermogenean *megethos* and Longinian *hupsos* are equivalent. Greatness is a "step" (*gradus*) towards sublimity; but it is, by comparison, mediocrity. Greatness is, as it were, the body, and sublimity the soul; and though there may be greatness without sublimity, there cannot be sublimity without greatness. Faber thus escapes from the error of equating *hupsos* with Hermogenean *megethos*. Nevertheless, he restricts sublimity to the great or grand *genus*. That restriction, as we have already seen, poses a problem for commentators. Faber's comments on Sappho express strong moral distaste

44 Petra's transfer of *deinotēs* as the stylistic pinnacle from Hermogenes to Longinus is a striking example of the prevailing syncretism.

(quoting from his 1660 edition of Sappho and Anacreon), and admiration of her expressive use of the particle *δέ* (294–295).

Jacobus Tollius (1633–1696) announced an edition as imminent in 1667, but the project was delayed: he did not find a publisher until 1694.⁴⁵ The long gestation may account for the confusing structure of the final product. The core is a Greek text with facing Latin translation and a commentary at the foot of the page. The commentary incorporates the notes of all previous commentators back to Robortellus, as well as Tollius' own observations. A revised version of his *Animadversionum Criticarum ad Longinum Gustus* (1677) is also included, followed by a further set of *animadversiones* and a collection of readings from Vatican manuscripts. The majority of Petra's paratexts are reproduced, along with some material from Langbaine and Faber. Further expansion resulted from the publication of Boileau's translation (1674): Tollius admired it and, with Boileau's permission, included it in his edition, along with the *remarques* of Boileau and Dacier, placed (in accordance with the layout of his commentary) beneath the texts, together with his own comments. He, like Boileau, rejected the dominant interpretation of Longinian sublimity as equivalent to Hermogenean *megethos* or the grand *genus dicendi*.

5 “Let There Be Light”

The first two editors of *On Sublimity* had different views of Longinus' citation of *Genesis* (9.9). Robortellus (1554), in his brief marginalia, remarks that Longinus praises Moses and speaks honorifically of God. Portus, in his unpublished commentary, is suspicious: since Longinus was not a Christian he was probably unfamiliar with Scripture and would not use Christian examples. Though Portus does not deny that Moses wrote *magnifice & graviter* about God, he suspects that this passage was a marginal note mistakenly inserted into the text (1733: 301). Isaac Casaubon, by contrast, thought it possible that Longinus was *semichristianus* (1603: 512). Langbaine dismisses that suggestion, pointing out that Longinus' view of death (*Subl.* 9.7) was as inconsistent with Christian belief as that of Catullus (5.5–6), and that many pagans had expressed admiration for Moses (1636: *notarum auctarium* 52). Faber also rejects the “semichristian” view (1663: 281–282).

Casaubon had, in fact, already changed his mind. In *De Rebus Sacris et Ecclesiasticis Exercitationes* (1614) he recruited the pagan Longinus' admiration for the divine Word as a way of shaming Cardinal Bellarmine for his assertion

45 Brody (1958) 10–11.

that the authority of scripture was void without the church's endorsement (1614: 110).⁴⁶ Longinus was frequently labelled as a pagan, from Hieronymus Vielmus (1519–1582) in his exposition of the six days of creation (1575: 134) onwards;⁴⁷ it was not infrequently added that he had taught “impious Porphyry.”⁴⁸ Advertising respect for Moses on the part of a pagan, especially one associated with an opponent of Christianity, had a rhetorical function: the high esteem in which Moses' words were held even by potentially hostile pagans is striking testimony to the compelling power of his speech about God. And, as Casaubon saw, pagan respect for Moses' words can be turned into a polemical weapon when one is arguing against a theological opponent who does not hold scripture in sufficiently high esteem.

That, however, says nothing specific about the intrinsic qualities of Moses' rhetoric. In book 6 of the *Commentaria Rhetorica* (1630) Vossius divides the thoughts (*sententiae*) appropriate to the magnificent *character* (that is, the grandest of the three *genera*)⁴⁹ into three categories: the divine, great, and rare natural phenomena, and ethical and political themes. The chapters that precede and follow are concerned with the style and vocabulary appropriate to discourse on these themes. The magnificent *character* is therefore a single package, in which thought and expression are correlated. So when Moses is adduced as an example of the first of the categories of thought in this *character* (446), it is implied that both his style and his thought are grand. In Bartholomaeus Keckermann's (1572–1609) *Systema Rhetoricae* the treatment of the grand *character* proceeds from the same three categories of subject matter, with Moses as an example (1608: 578): a correlation of style and content is, again, assumed.

Daniel Heinsius (1580–1655), who was not offering instruction in rhetoric but investigating biblical style, had a different perspective. His *Aristarchus Sacer* (1627) was concerned with Nonnus' paraphrase of John's Gospel; his *Sacrae Exercitationes ad Novum Testamentum* (1639) appended a revised version of *Aristarchus Sacer* to a massive exercise in New Testament philology.⁵⁰

46 For Casaubon's admiration for *On Sublimity*, see Hardy (2017) 40 n. 76 quoting the comment which Casaubon wrote on the title page of his copy of the *editio princeps*. This includes a specific reference to the Moses citation: “et quod de Mose tam bene pronunciat, id factum est, quia erat τῆς ἀληθινῆς κριτικῆς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔμπειρος.”

47 Vossius (1630) 446; Casaubonus (1614) 110; Heinsius (1627) 230 ~ (1639) 807; Caussin (1626) 196. I have not had access to Vossius' first (1606) or revised second (1609) editions, published under the title *Oratoriarum Institutionum Libri Sex*.

48 Vossius (1630) 446; Keckermann (1608) 578 (inexplicably reporting that in Eunapius Longinus was Porphyry's pupil); Heinsius (1627) 6^a1r–v ~ (1639) 675.

49 The terminological diversity is summarised in Vossius (1630) 432–433.

50 van Miert (2018) 103–132.

In *Aristarchus Sacer*, Heinsius observes that Longinus admired the *character* of Moses' discourse even though he read it in Greek translation (1627: 230 ~ 1639: 807):⁵¹ the style is simple, the thought sublime. Heinsius' reading of Moses' words breaks the correlation of style and thought.

In 1674 Boileau (1636–1711) published his translation of *On Sublimity* under the title *Traité du sublime ou du merveilleux dans le discours*. Unlike the earlier tendency to gloss (or replace) sublimity with a word connoting "great" or "grand," Boileau's supplement captures an essential aspect of Longinus' conception – the power of sublimity to cause amazement or wonder (*Subl.* 1.4, 7.4, 9.2–3, 10.3, 35.4, 36.2–3, 39.4). But Boileau insists that what commonly passes for sublime style among orators is not genuine sublimity. He illustrates his point by setting a parodic periphrasis ("Le souverain Arbitre de la nature d'une seule parole formera la lumière") alongside Moses' words ("Dieu dit: Que la lumière se fasse; et la lumière se fit"). Petrus Daniel Huetius (1630–1721) briefly presented an opposing view in the first edition of his *Demonstratio Evangelica* (1679: 54).⁵² He argues that Longinus mistakenly presents Moses' words as if they were sublime, and approves their grand (*hadros*) style: but the style of the Hebrew text is, in fact, extremely simple. What Moses narrates is as great as anything could be, but the style is "simple" (*litos*). If Longinus had had access to primary sources (that is, the books of Moses in Hebrew), he would have found the "slender" *charaktēr* throughout: the dignity of the content made ornamentation inappropriate.

Boileau replied, obliquely and without argument, in a paragraph added to his preface in the 1683 edition.⁵³ In response, Huetius' rebuttal underwent a fivefold expansion in the third, revised edition of the *Demonstratio Evangelica* (1690: 65–66). Longinus, he argues, has been misled by an intermediary source that has altered Moses' wording, and by his unfamiliarity with Hebrew idiom, in which parallelism is routine and not (as in Greek and Latin) an artistic device. The appearance of sublime style is therefore an illusory artefact of translation. Huetius goes on to explain that *granditas* can be found at four different levels: in the choice of words, in word order, in thought, and in the things that are spoken about. The first three are under the speaker's control; the last is not. In this case, the words are simple and not used figuratively; the word order is commonplace in Hebrew; and the thought of God creating everything by a

51 Petra's comment that Longinus focuses on the thought, not the words ([1612] 59: "τὴν ἔννοιαν κοινῇ spectavit Dionys. non verba") may also reflect an awareness that the Greek is a translation.

52 On the history of the ensuing dispute, in which personal animosities were involved, see Shelford (2007) 158–163, 231–232.

53 Boileau (1966) 338–339 ("J'ai rapporté ... lumieres de la raison").

word can be found throughout scripture and elsewhere. Only the thing that Moses is speaking about is sublime: and God's creative agency is as sublime as anything could be.

In Longinus, there are five sources of sublimity (8.1): thought, emotion, figures, diction, and composition. Thought, which for Longinus is the most important source of sublimity, is also part of Huetius' scheme. But Huetius omits Longinus' second source, emotion. Word choice and word order in Huetius may be taken to map roughly onto figures, diction, and composition in Longinus. But when Huetius reaches his fourth level, the object of thought or discourse, there is a radical divergence: Longinus has no use for this category. As Huetius has said, sublimity in the objects of thought or discourse is beyond the speaker's control. From that it follows that the objects of thought or discourse lie beyond the scope of the art of rhetoric. There are, of course, things that are in themselves great and amazing (*Subl.* 35.3–5). However, sublimity in Longinus' sense does not reside in those things themselves, but in thought or discourse about them. Longinian sublimity does not, therefore, reside in God's creative act, but in Moses' success in conceiving divine power and giving expression to it according to its worth (9.9). If Huetius agrees with Longinus that God's creative act is a great object of thought and discourse, and that Moses achieved a worthy conception of God's creative act, the only point left for dispute is style – word choice and word order in Huetius' scheme; figures, diction, and composition in Longinus. Huetius assumes that Longinus, as a rhetorician, would be bound by the correlation of style and thought: and he therefore also assumes that, for Longinus, sublimity of thought requires a style that is sublime, in the sense of the grand *genus dicendi*. But Huetius' assumption is misconceived. Longinus' sublimity is not limited to the grand style: the five sources of Longinian sublimity are independent variables, and simplicity of expression is therefore consistent with sublimity of thought.⁵⁴ Indeed, as Boileau's ally Toliuss observed (1694: 62), Longinus has shown by the example of Ajax (*Subl.* 9.2) that sublimity in thought is sometimes best expressed by complete silence.⁵⁵

54 Porter (2016) 45: "Boileau wanted nothing more than to insert himself into these richly evocative traditions. In fact, he was scooped. Vossius (1606) had quoted the same passage of Genesis on Longinus' authority in order to prove that grand thoughts are conducive to sublime expression." But no one denied that grand thoughts are conducive to sublime expression: the question is whether grand thoughts can be expressed in a style that is not "grand" or "sublime." If anyone "scooped" Boileau, it was Heinsius.

55 "Potest autem etiam in tenui genere saepe occurrere sententia sublimis & elata, quam non tam studium, quam ipsa rei magnitudo exprimat ... In hoc igitur Moysis locorecogni & res maxima est, & ex merito a Moyse expressa. Non consistit hic in elocutionis, seu

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potius verborum, amplitudine τὸ ὕψος, (verba enim εὐτελείστατα sunt) sed in ipso sensu: & hoc est, quod Longinus volebat, Moysem dignum ipsa rei magnitudine sensum protulisse: cuiusmodi sensum etiam nudum sine verbis nonnumquam, ut in Ajacis silentio, sublimem esse dixerat."

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Ancient Rhetoric and the Early “Italian” Commentaries on the *Poetria nova*

Domenico Losappio

As already pointed out by some of the ancient commentators, Geoffrey of Vinsauf's *Poetria nova* (“The New Art of Poetry”) is strictly connected with the classics, which is clear even considering the title of the work.¹ According to Bartholomew of San Concordio (1262–1347) “it is called *nova* because of the *poetriae* previously written, such as those by Aristotle, Horace and others.”² Pace of Ferrara, a contemporary of Bartholomew, explains why Geoffrey's *Poetria* is “novella,” and he does it in a way similar to that of Bartholomew: “It is called *novella* in comparison with the *Poetria* of Horace and Aristotle and with others if any have existed before.”³ Alongside Aristotle's and Horace's *poetriae*, another classic work, the pseudo-Ciceronian *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, possibly influenced the title of Geoffrey's work: “The *nova* of *Poetria nova* ... was interpreted as an echo of the medieval name for the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*,”⁴

1 On this topic see Woods (2010) 12–14; at p. 14 Woods states that the adjective “nova” or “novella” “may have been created by the commentators” and, at footnote 62, cites some interesting passages of an unpublished paper by Martin Camargo concerning the different titles of Geoffrey's work featured in the manuscript tradition. “Nova” is used to refer to Geoffrey's work in the 13th century not only by commentators but also, for instance, by an author of another medieval *ars poetriae*, Eberhard the German, whose *Laborintus* (vv. 665–666) “certainly refers to the *Poetria nova* when it speaks of the *Ars nova scribendi* as a work that shines with a special merit” (Gallo [1978] 69).

2 “Nova’ autem dicitur propter poetrias prius compositas, ut ab Aristotile, Horatio et aliis,” Losappio (2018) 144; see this paper also for up-to-date information and bibliography on life and works of Bartholomew (in particular p. 130) alongside Conte (2020), in particular 158–160.

3 “Dicitur autem ‘novella’ in comparatione ad *Poetriam* Oratii et Aristotilis et ad alias si que fuerunt prius,” ms. London, British Library, Add. 10095, f. 108 vd. Stadter (1973) is still fundamental on the life and works of Pace, but, for a larger and up-to-date bibliography, see also Woods (2010), in particular 138–147; and Losappio (2013) 40–41. This important scholar is sometimes mixed up with Pace del Friuli (for example see Bortolami [2006]) and more studies are needed in order to identify him precisely, as is highlighted by Zabbia (2018) 582.

4 Woods (2010) 14.

which was *Rhetorica nova*, in opposition to the *Rhetorica vetus*, that is the *De inventione*, both attributed to Cicero in the Middle Ages.⁵

The ancient commentators talk about the numerous *virtutes* of Geoffrey's work, one of which is the right balance between two of the Latin classic milestones in the field of rhetoric and poetry that I have mentioned above: Horace's *Ars poetica* – which, in the Middle Ages, was frequently called just *Poetria* – and the *Ad Herennium*. Pace, in the *accessus* of his *lectura*, explains that the *Poetria nova* aims to clarify what Horace in his *Ars poetica* has said in a too short and unsystematic way: "The reason for undertaking the project ... was so that he might reveal perfectly the art of poetry, which Horace had taught in a way too condensed and confused."⁶ About a century later, in the glosses written probably by Franciscellus Mancinus in the ms. Vind. lat. 53 of the Biblioteca Nazionale Vittorio Emanuele III of Naples, the *Poetria nova* is compared to the *Ad Herennium* and is considered better than the pseudo-Ciceronian treatise.⁷ One of these glosses is particularly important from this point of view: "When he saw that Tully's *Rhetoric* was somewhat prolix because of the overabundance of examples, succinctly gathering together what seemed most useful for pupils, he composed this abbreviated little work."⁸

Here I consider some commentaries on the *Poetria nova*, with the aim of showing how a classical rhetorical treatise, the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, was used in these texts, and if there is any affinity between these exegetical texts in the use of this source, through a comparison of specific passages of the commentaries. The oldest known Italian composers of complete commentaries on the *Poetria nova* are four, all of them living between the end of the 13th and the beginning of the 14th century. They are Benedict of Cividale,⁹ Guizzardo of Bologna,¹⁰ and the already mentioned Bartholomew of San Concordio and Pace of Ferrara. The sources of these commentaries are various, but one of the

5 On this topic see also Copeland and Sluiter (2009) 595.

6 *Causa suscepti operis fuit ut artem poeticam posset declarare perfecte, quam Oratius nimis confuse et compendiose docuerat*, ms. London, British Library, Add. 10095, f. 108 vd. See Woods (2010) 12.

7 On Franciscellus and the glosses of Naples manuscript, see Woods (2010) 152–157.

8 *Quia cum vidisset Rethoricam Tullii prolixam <ali> quantum propter copiam exemplorum confusam, <colligens> compendiose que utiliora sibi ad utilitatem scholarium visa sint, hoc opusculum sub brevitate composuit*, ms. Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale Vittorio Emanuele III, Vind. lat. 53, f. 1 r: I quote (text and translation) from Woods (2010) 12.

9 We know very little about Benedict: some considerations about him (with bibliographical references) are available in Woods (2010) 148–151 (where he is called Benedict of Aquileia); and Losappio (2013) 28–31.

10 On life and works of Guizzardo, see Losappio (2013), in particular 31–39 (with bibliography). On a new fragmentary witness of Guizzardo's commentary, see Losappio (2020); for information on lost manuscripts of this commentary, see Black (2018) 56.

most important is definitely the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. The influence of this rhetorical treatise – as we are going to see – is clear in specific sections of some of these exegetical texts: in this chapter I consider the explanation of the *colores*, where the commentators take advantage of the *Ad Herennium* in different ways. Sometimes there are explicit quotations of the definitions (and/or of the related examples) of the *colores* offered in the pseudo-Ciceronian treatise, sometimes there are citations of them through the filter of medieval treatises that have the *Ad Herennium* as a source.

I have already discussed elsewhere the influence of rhetorical classics on the commentary composed by Guizzardo of Bologna¹¹ (who was a teacher of grammar, logic, and philosophy in Bologna, Siena, and Florence), so here I summarise only some essential points. In his *accessus* Guizzardo has the main goal of distinguishing rhetoric from dialectic, *poesis*, and *sermo ornatus*, and the digression is heavily based on the syllogism. According to the *magister*, rhetoric and poetry are two different things, which is proved by the fact that Aristotle (one of the main sources in this *accessus*, in particular his *Rhetorica*, which is explicitly mentioned) had to write two different works, the *Rhetorica* and the *Poetria*, to explain both subjects:

Of those things that differ according to specific forms, one is not subordinated to the other. But poetry and ornate speech are of this kind, so they are not subordinated to rhetoric. The major is known per se, the minor is shown according to Aristotle, who treated each of them separately; it is clear because the form of poetry or poetic syllogism proceeds from certain fictional things or taken metaphorically, in order to create suspicion. So “poio, pois” is the same of “fingo,” as it is clear in the fables of the poets: Ovid, Horace, Juvenal, and other similar distinguished persons. The form of rhetoric or rhetorical syllogism is to proceed and persuade on the basis of certain attributes, conjectures or signs of the things, that make some aspects adhere to some of the parts of the objection. The Philosopher explains in a complete way this rhetoric in *Rhetorica* and so it is said, in the first book of the *Rhetorica*, that *enthimema* is a rhetorical syllogism and rhetorical induction is an example of it, as when it is said: “The woman has milk, so she brought forth” et “He had a bleeding sword in his hands, so he had killed the man.”¹²

¹¹ Losappio (2013) 41–45, 63–65.

¹² *Illorum que differunt per formas specificas, unum non reponitur sub altero. Sed poesis et sermo ornatus sunt huiusmodi, ergo non reponuntur sub rethorica. Maior est nota de se, minor declaratur autoritate Philosophi qui separatim de singulis determinavit per se; hoc*

It is also interesting to underline what Guizzardo, in the *accessus*, says about what he calls *sermo dictatorius* or *passionalis*. According to him, the author of the *Ad Herennium* and Aristotle show a different approach to this topic (§7–8):

Dictaminal speech is something composed of sounds, that has dignity and consonance, in order to get receptiveness, good will and attention – according to Cicero – that is a speech adapted for the use of the speaker and must have three things: elegance, composition and dignity, because a very eloquent speech seems to distinguish the wise from the unlearned and deserves a lot of grace among people.

It is possible to call this speech also *passionalis*, because it can fit all the things that must be told; but since we use it in order to reach the rhetorical objective of persuasion, it is called by the name of *rhetoric* and it seems to better fit rhetoric. In the *Rhetorica* of Cicero this speech is defined mixedly with rhetoric, but the Philosopher explains just rhetoric.¹³

In the rest of the commentary, other ancient texts in the field of rhetoric and of the connected fields of poetry and grammar are used as sources, such as Cicero's *De inventione*, Donatus' *Ars maior*, Horace's *Ars poetica*, and Priscian's *Institutiones grammaticae*. As I said before, the *Ad Herennium* has a relevant

idem apparet, quia forma poesis vel sillogismus poeticus procedit ex quibusdam transumptive sumptis vel fictis, ut aggeneret suspensionem. Unde 'poio, pois', idem est quod 'fingo', ut apparet in fabulis poetarum: Ovidii, Oracii, Iuvenalis et aliorum illustrium personarum similium. Forma autem rethorice vel sillogismi rethorici est procedere vel persuadere ex quibusdam rerum attributis, coniecturis vel signis facientibus aliqua adherere alicui partium contradictionis. De hac autem rethorica Philosophus plene determinat in Rethoricis et ideo dicebatur, primo Rethorice, quod enthimema est sylogismus rethoricus et exemplum est inductio rethorica, ut cum dicitur: 'Mulier habet lac, ergo peperit' et 'Iste habebat gladium sanguinolentum in manibus, ergo hominem interfecit', ed. Losappio (2013) §5–6 (in the present chapter I refer to the numbering of the paragraphs in this edition; in the Latin text of Guizzardo some letters of some words are in italics because of the original use in the critical edition).

- 13 *Sermo autem dictatorius est quiddam compositum vocum, quod dignitatem et consonantiam in se tenet, ad docilitatem, benivolentiam et attentionem captandam – Tullio protestante –, que ad usum oratoris est oratio accomodata et tres res debet habere: elegantiam, compositionem et dignitatem, quia multum ornatus modus loquendi doctos ab indoctis separare videtur et multam in populis gratiam promeretur. Hic autem sermo passionalis dici potest, quia omnibus enarrandis merito adaptatur; sed quia ipso potius utimur ad finem rethorice persuasivum, ideo 'rethorice' nomine nuncupatur et melius videtur posse rethorice adaptari. De hoc autem sermone determinatur in Rethorica Tullii mixtim cum ipsa rethorica, sed Philosophus de rethorica determinat.*

role in Guizzardo's exegetical work: in particular, it is significant that, in a direct or indirect way, he uses the pseudo-Ciceronian text as a source when he comments on the *colores* or *flores rhetorici*, one of the most extended parts of the commentary. Indeed, as is usual in the explanation of this kind of text, Guizzardo, when he analyses the *colores*, for each of them he gives its definition and then one or more examples, in order to show the practical application of that *color*. The sources used by Guizzardo in this section are basically three: the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*,¹⁴ Bene of Florence's *Candelabrum*, and Bono of Lucca's *Cedrus Libani* (but also Donatus' *Ars maior* is sometimes quoted).¹⁵ The explanation of the *colores* in both the medieval sources is largely based on the pseudo-Ciceronian treatise, so we can say that "in a direct or indirect way" Guizzardo uses the *Ad Herennium* as a source. He does so in various ways: he sometimes takes the definition of a *color* and the related *exemplum* or *exempla* from just one source. Other times he takes the definition from one source and one or more *exempla* from another. In general, we can say that Guizzardo prefers the *brevitas* of the *Cedrus* than any larger number of examples usually available in the other two texts. Another feature is that Guizzardo, as in the *Candelabrum* and in the *Cedrus*, usually gives the corresponding Greek name of the *colores verborum* and for two of the *colores sententiarum* (*paradeigma* and *prosōpopoia*).¹⁶

Pace of Ferrara is the author of one of the most important commentaries on the *Poetria nova*,¹⁷ though we do not know much about him. Between the end of the 13th century and the beginning of the 14th he taught logic (from before 1294 until after 1319, according to Nancy Siraisi)¹⁸ and grammar at the University of Padua. In particular, in ca. 1300 he was "minister arcium in studio Paduano."¹⁹ Like Albertino Mussato, Pace took advantage of the protection of Pagano Della Torre, bishop of Padua from 1302 to 1319 and patriarch of Aquileia from 1319 to 1332.²⁰ In addition to his long commentary on the *Poetria nova*, Pace was the author of the brief *Evidentia Ecerinidis*,²¹ a commentary on the

14 In this chapter I refer to the edition of Caplan (1954) for the text and translation of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*.

15 The critical editions of Bene's and Bono's texts are respectively Alessio (1983) and Vecchi (1963).

16 On Guizzardo's explanation of the *colores* and on the sources used by this teacher, see the detailed report in Losappio (2013) 65–77 and 251–267.

17 The most complete study on this commentary is in Woods (2010), in particular 107–131.

18 Siraisi (1973) 51, where Pace is mentioned as "Pace del Friuli."

19 Stadter (1973) 142 and 144.

20 Hyde (1985) 255.

21 Transmitted by the ms. Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria, 2073, and published in Megas (1967) 203–205.

tragedy composed by Mussato: alongside Guizzardo, he is the only one who commented on both the *Poetria nova* and the *Ecerinis*, and this is not the only affinity between these *magistri*. Some aspects connected with biography and sources used, and a comparison between specific passages of their commentaries on Geoffrey's work, seem to suggest that both of them were part of, or near to, the so-called Paduan pre-humanistic group.²²

If we look at Pace's *accessus*, we see that, as in Guizzardo's own, the main aim of the commentator is to make clear the difference between rhetoric and poetry. In order to reach this goal, Pace uses the same argument used by Guizzardo: since poetry and rhetoric are different subjects, Aristotle (who is one of the favourite sources of Pace)²³ has written two different books, one about poetry and the other one about rhetoric.²⁴ It is also interesting that both Guizzardo and Pace, in other parts of their *lecturae*, sometimes use the same source in order to explain the same passage of the *Poetria nova*. Here I give a couple of examples related to Horace's *Ars*, a classical text which belongs to rhetoric's sister *ars* of poetry. Guizzardo and Pace comment on some passages of the *Poetria nova* adding, in the same order, two quotations from the *Ars*: Guizzardo, §189, and Pace, ms. London, British Library Add. 10095, f. 123 v^d (*Poetria nova*, vv. 527–531): *Ars*, vv. 16 and 14; Guizzardo, §577, and Pace, ms. London, British Library Add. 10095, f. 150 v^c (*Poetria nova*, vv. 1842–1850): *Ars*, vv. 156 and 114.²⁵

To find some other similarities or differences between Pace and Guizzardo, it should be interesting to compare the way they treat the *colores*. I have already said what Guizzardo's method is; now I aim to show Pace's method in analysing the first *colores verborum*:

Then he explains the first colour, which is called *epanaphora*, and treats together the topics of the fault of the first parent and of the coming of Christ on the earth, his passion and resurrection and all the other colours

22 I have tried to analyse these similarities in Losappio (2013) 40–46 and 50–52; see also Ciccone (2016) 48–50.

23 About the use (through translations and commentaries) of Aristotle's *Poetria* by Paduan pre-humanists, particularly, Mussato, Pace, and Guizzardo, see Kelly (1979) 186–200. About the few quotations of Aristotle in Bartholomew of San Concordio's commentary, see *infra*, p. 325 and n. 53.

24 On the presence of the *Philosophus* in the *accessus* of both Guizzardo and Pace, see Woods (2010) in particular 138–140, Losappio (2013) in particular 41–45, and Ciccone (2016) 48–51.

25 For a list of this kind of case, see Losappio (2013) 52 and 249–250. In this paper I always refer to Faral (1924) 194–262 for the text of the *Poetria nova* and to Gallo (1971) for the English translation.

in the same topic. These colours, indeed, are 35 and, since it seems that the apple eaten by Adam was the reason of our punishment, in order to demonstrate it, he starts talking against the apple: "O" – add apple – "thing of evil!" about Eve; "Thing worse than any other!" about Adam; "Thing worst of all!" about us, that were born from Adam.²⁶ It is defined by Cicero in this way: "*Epanaphora* occurs when one and the same word forms successive beginnings for phrases expressing like and different ideas."²⁷ Here Cicero put six²⁸ examples, but, in order to be brief, just one is sufficient for us, and it is this: "To you must go the credit for this, to you are thanks due, to you will this act of yours bring glory."²⁹ And to it corresponds the kind of figure that is called *anaphora*, and it is defined by Donatus as follows: "*Anaphora* is the repetition of the same word at the beginning of several verses."³⁰

Secondly, he explains another colour as he says, "O apple! O wretched apple! O miserable apple!"³¹ In fact, *antistrophe*, according to Cicero, is "not when, as in the previous colour, we repeat the first word in successive phrases, but the last." It is called *antistrophe* because in *antistrophe* the word is repeated in the opposite way than in the previous colour, since in the previous colour the word is repeated at the beginning of the phrase, in this colour at the end. And the example of Cicero is as follows: "It was by the justice of the Roman people that the Carthaginians were conquered, by its force of arms that they were conquered, by its generosity that they were conquered."³²

Thirdly he explains another colour that is called interlacement when he says "Why were you touched by the taste of Adam? Why must all weep over the sin of one, Adam?"³³ Interlacement, in fact, is the union of both figures which we have explained above, so that we repeat both the first word and the last in a succession of phrases. Interlacement is called in this way because it combines *epanaphora*, at the beginning, and *antistrophe*, at the end, as it is clear in the following example of Cicero:

26 Here Pace explains v. 1098 of the *Poetria nova*.

27 *Ad Her.* 4.13.19. As far as I know, "principia" is in two manuscripts containing Pace's commentary: Oxford, Bodleian Library, Lat. Misc. e. 52, f. 83 v (Black [2018] 62) and Sevilla, Biblioteca Capitulare y Colombina, Cap. 5-4-30, f. 64 ra.

28 "Sex" also in ms. Sevilla, Biblioteca Capitulare y Colombina, Cap. 5-4-30, f. 64 ra, but in the *Ad Herennium* the examples of *repetitio* are only three.

29 *Ad Her.* 4.13.19.

30 Don. *Ars gramm.* (Keil [1864] 398, ll. 5-6).

31 See *Poetria nova*, v. 1099.

32 *Ad Her.* 4.13.19.

33 *Poetria nova*, vv. 1100-1101.

"Who are they who have often broken treaties? The Carthaginians. Who are they who have waged a cruel war in Italy? The Carthaginians. Who are they who now ask for pardon? The Carthaginians."³⁴ And note that *epanaphora* could be considered in two ways, namely in a large way.³⁵

In the passage above, Pace says explicitly that, for each of these *colores verborum*, he takes just one example (not all the examples "causa brevitatis," as he says) from *Tullius*, that is the *Ad Herennium*, from which also come the definitions of these *colores*: it is coherent with what seems to be a shared opinion, as we have seen in the already mentioned gloss by Franciscellus Mancinus, according to which in the *Rhetorica nova* there is overabundance of examples.³⁶ So, in

34 *Ad Her.* 4.14.20, even if with some differences: *Qui sunt qui foedera saepe ruperunt? Kartaginienses. Qui sunt qui crudelissime bellum gesserunt? Kartaginienses. Qui sunt qui Italiam deformaverunt? Kartaginienses. Qui sunt qui sibi postulant ignosci? Kartaginienses.* ("Who are they who have often broken treaties? The Carthaginians. Who are they who have waged war with severest cruelty? The Carthaginians. Who are they who have marred the face of Italy? The Carthaginians. Who are they who now ask for pardon? The Carthaginians.")

35 *Notificat ergo primum colorem qui dicitur repetitio, pertractando unum thema de transgressionem primi parentis et adventu Christi in mundum, passione et resurrectione eius et omnes alios colores in eodem themate. Sunt enim isti colores* 35 [ms.: 25] *et, ut videatur quod pomum gustatus ab Adam fuerit causa nostre penalitatis, ideo ad ipsius detestationem exclamando contra pomum incipit: "O," supple pomum, "res mala!" quantum ad Evam, "Res peior aliis!" quantum ad Adam, "Res pessima rerum!" quantum ad nos qui sumus nati ex Adam. Diffinitur autem a Tullio sic: "Repetitio est cum continenter [ms.: convenienter] ab uno atque eodem verbo in rebus similibus et diversis principia [ms.: principalia] summuntur." Hic autem Tullius ponit sex exempla, sed unum nobis, causa brevitatis, sufficiat et est tale: "Vobis istud attribuendum est, vobis gratia est habenda, vobis ista res est honori." Et huic correspondit species scematis que dicitur anaphora et sic diffinitur a Donato: "Anaphora est relatio eiusdem verbi per principia versuum plurimorum." 2° notificat alium colorem qui dicitur conversio dicens "O malum! O miserum malum! O miserabile malum!" Est enim conversio secundum Tullium "non, ut ante, primum repetimus <verbum>, sed ad postremum continenter revertimur [ms.: convertimur]." Dicitur autem conversio quia in ipso repetitur dictio e contrario quam prius, quia in ipso repetitur dictio in principio, hic autem in fine. Exemplum autem Tullii est tale: "Penos populus Romanus iusticia vicit, armis vicit, libertate vicit." 3° notificat alium colorem qui dicitur complexio cum dicit "Cur tetigit te gustus Ade? Cur omnes flemus culpam unius Ade?" Est enim complexioque utramque complectitur exornationem et hanc et quam exposuimus ut repetatur idem verbum sepius et crebro ad idem postremo revertatur. Dicitur autem complexio, quia in se continet repetitionem que fit in principio et conversionem que fit in fine, ut patet per exemplum Tullii quod tale est: "Qui sunt qui federa sepe ruperunt? Cartaginenses. Qui sunt qui in Ytalia crudele bellum gesserunt? Cartaginenses. Qui sunt qui sibi postulant ignosci? Cartaginenses." Et nota quod repetitio duobus modis potest considerari, scilicet large..., ms. London, British Library Add.10095, ff. 136 ra–136 rb.*

36 *Copia exemplorum confusa*: see *supra*, pp. 248.

the section considered, Pace takes definitions directly from the *Ad Herennium*, Guizzardo (§379–382) sometimes directly from the pseudo-Ciceronian treatise, sometimes through texts that depend on it – as we said above – and the example for both the *magistri* is exactly the same one, chosen among others given in the *Ad Herennium*. In the case of *repetitio* (*epanaphora*) Pace adds the definition given by Donatus in his *Ars grammaticae* to the one he cites from Pseudo-Cicero's work. What is interesting from this comparison is that Pace and Guizzardo's ways of exposition, again, have some similarities and, on the other hand, are different from that of Bartholomew of San Concordio. Bartholomew indeed, when explaining the *colores verborum*, is very brief: the definition he usually gives is not a quotation from the *Ad Herennium*, while the example is the one Bartholomew finds in the *Poetria nova*. Bartholomew's approach is rather similar in the treatment of the *colores sententiarum* (in the *Poetria nova* they are explained at vv. 1230–1279 and the corresponding *exempla* are at vv. 1280–1527): he gives a simplified version of the definitions available in the *Poetria nova*, then a paraphrase of the examples or just the same examples he finds in Geoffrey's work. A quite different method from those of Guizzardo and Pace.³⁷

For a fuller picture, it is useful to see how Pace comments on the first *colores sententiarum*:

And when he says "distribuit"³⁸ he means the name of the first colour, that is called distribution, and when he says "distincta"³⁹ he means its definition. It is defined by Cicero as follows: "Distribution occurs when roles are assigned among a number of persons."⁴⁰ And it is "The statement can distribute different functions to different things or among different people."⁴¹

Secondly, he explains another colour to which he refers when he says "et licite," because it is called *licencia* [frankness of speech], "It fittingly and properly blames masters and friends: its words offend nobody",⁴²

37 For an analysis of the treatment of the *colores* in Bartholomew's commentary see Losappio (2018) 136–138.

38 *Poetria nova*, v. 1233.

39 *Poetria nova*, v. 1233.

40 *Ad Her.* 4.35.47: *Distributio est cum in plures res aut personas negotia quaedam certa disperitiuntur* ("Distribution occurs when certain specified roles are assigned among a number of things or persons").

41 Cf. *Poetria nova*, vv. 1233–1234.

42 Cf. *Poetria nova*, vv. 1234–1236.

and the verse starts with “aut.”⁴³ He adds the definition when he says “cum culpat”⁴⁴ and this is the definition given by Cicero: “It is frankness of speech when, talking before those to whom we owe fear or reverence, we yet say something else instead of what we would have said, because we seem to reprehend them, or persons dear to them, for some fault.”⁴⁵

Thirdly, when he says “Cum plus”⁴⁶ he explains another colour that is called *diminutio* [understatement], to which he refers when he says “diminuit.”⁴⁷ And that is “it sees more than he says and its expression understates the matter, but” add “understates it in a restrained way,” namely just a bit. Cicero defines this colour as follows: “Understatement occurs when we say that by nature, fortune, or diligence, we or our clients possess some exceptional advantage, and, in order to avoid the impression of arrogant display, we moderate and soften the statement of it.”⁴⁸

While Pace here, for each *color sententiarum*, alongside the correct construction of the phrase, gives just the definition, taking it explicitly from the *Ad Herennium*, in the corresponding passages of Guizzardo’s commentary (§428–431) we also find an example taken from one of the usual sources: for the three *colores* mentioned above, in particular, the source is Bono’s *Cedrus*.⁴⁹ If we have a look at another manuscript containing Pace’s commentary on the *Poetria nova*, ms. Sevilla, Biblioteca Capitulare y Colombina, Cap. 5-4-30, f. 75 vc,

43 *Poetria nova*, v. 1234.

44 *Poetria nova*, v. 1234.

45 *Ad Her.* 4.36.48.

46 *Poetria nova*, v. 1236.

47 *Poetria nova*, v. 1237.

48 *Et in hoc quod dicit “Distribuit” tangit nomen primi coloris qui dicitur distributio, et per hoc quod dicit “distincta” tangit diffinitionem eius. Diffinitur autem sic a Tullio: “Distributio est cum in plures personas negocia distribuuntur.” Et hoc est “distribuit distincta negocia variis rebus aut in varias personas.” 2 notificat alium colorem cuius nomen innuit per hoc quod dicit “et licite,” quia vocatur licencia, “cum culpat honeste et licite dominos et amicos nemine offenso [ms.: nomine offensio] verbis; et incipit versus “Aut.” Diffinitionem vero innuit per hoc quod dicit “Cum culpat” et sic diffinitur a Tullio: “Licentia est cum apud eos quos metuere [ms.: metui] aut vereri debemus tamen aliquid pro vero nostro dicimus quod [ms.: quos] hos aut quos hii diligunt in aliquo errato reprehendere videamur.” 3º cum dicit “Cum plus” notificat alium colorem qui dicitur diminutio, cuius nomen innuit per hoc quod dicit “diminuit.” Et hoc est “cum notat plus in re quam sit in ore et diminuit rem sed,” supple “diminuit eam modeste,” id est temperato more. Tullius vero hunc colorem sic diffinit: “Diminutio est cum aliquid inesse nobis aut in his quos defendimus aut natura aut fortuna aut industria dicemus egregium, quod, ne qua [ms.: neque] significetur arrogans ostentatio, diminuitur et attenuatur oratione” [*Ad Her.* 4.38.50], ms. London, British Library Add. 10095, f. 139 ra.*

49 See Losappio (2013) 262–263.

we can see that Pace is aware of his choice, which he justifies in this way at the end of the explanation of distribution: "We will find examples of this colour later in the text."⁵⁰ So, for Pace, it is not necessary to add at this point of the commentary other *exempla* since he will comment on the examples offered by Geoffrey at vv. 1280–1527.⁵¹

Let us see now how the last of these four early Italian authors of a full commentary on the *Poetria nova*, Benedict of Cividale (who wrote his commentary "At the urging of the notary students of Ravenna"),⁵² comments on the same *loci* of Geoffrey's work we have seen above. If we compare Benedict's *accessus* with those of Guizzardo and Pace, the thing that probably is most evident is the absence of references to Aristotle: an aspect that is in common with Bartholomew's commentary.⁵³ It is interesting what Benedict says in the prologue of his *lectura*, just before the real *accessus*:

Since many authors have written various books about eloquence, from which has spread sometimes a sea, sometimes a rivulet, with a mix of waste, with an excessive fusion, they weakened the way of teaching eloquence. But, since the perspicacity of youth, educated on the teaching of the giants, applauds new ways of teaching, Geoffrey, distinguished in the field of eloquence, by cutting the superfluous aspects of the explanation and avoiding those that were too brief, wrote on eloquence with the right balance of clarity.⁵⁴

50 *Exemplum autem huius coloris et aliorum habemus infra*. This passage is absent from ms. London, British Library Add. 10095, f. 139 ra.

51 Pace's commentary on the examples offered by Geoffrey for distribution, frankness of speech, and understatement is in ms. London, British Library Add. 10095, ff 139vd–140ra.

52 *Ad instantiam scoliarum tabelionum Ravennatum*, ms. Napoli, Bibl. Nazionale Vittorio Emanuele III, V D 6, f. 46 v (translation: Woods [2010] 48).

53 The list of explicit sources of Bartholomew's *accessus* is the following: Cicero's *De officiis*, *De oratore*, and *De inventione*, Cassiodorus' *Variae*, Seneca the Elder's *Controversiae*, and the *liber Ecclesiasticus*. On the sources used by Bartholomew and on the small number of quotations from Aristotle in his commentary see Woods (2010) 101; Losappio (2013) 45, 273; and Losappio (2018) 133–136.

54 *Quoniam circa elloquentiam quamplures dispersa volumina condiderunt, quorum alii mare, alii rivulos emittentes hinc, dispendii confusione, conflacione nimia, ipsius methodum sincoparunt. Verum, quia perspicacitas iuvenilis novis formis applaudit super gigantum dogmatibus errudita, Gaufridus, elloquentie titulo privilegiatus, superfluitates resicans et evitans nodos contexionis succintos, circa elloquentiam lucis temperiem compilavit*, ms. Napoli, Bibl. Nazionale Vittorio Emanuele III, V D 6, f. 1 r.

Here Benedict seems to share the opinion that, as we have seen,⁵⁵ is expressed by other commentators of the *Poetria nova* like Pace and Franciscellus Mancinus: differently from other works on eloquence, the one written by Geoffrey explains its subject with balance. But while Pace and Franciscellus say explicitly that the *Ad Herennium* and Horace's *Ars poetica* are, respectively, too long and too short, Benedict does not specify which treatises on *eloquentia* he is thinking about.

Now I consider the section dedicated to the *colores rhetorici*, in order to understand which the sources employed by Benedict are.

"Repetitio" etc.:⁵⁶ "*Epanaphora* occurs when one and the same word forms successive beginnings for phrases expressing like and different ideas," as Cicero says.⁵⁷ Or so: epanaphora occurs when two or more phrases begin with one and the same word expressing the same meaning, as follows: "Scipio destroyed Carthage, Scipio brought peace, Scipio saved the state."⁵⁸ Again: "You venture to boast about your fault, you venture to be elevated more than you deserve, you venture not to bewail your crime."⁵⁹ The exemplum of the author is as follows: "O thing of evil! Thing worse than any other! Thing worst of all!"⁶⁰ In each of these examples it is clear how more than one phrase begins with one and the same word expressing one and the same meaning because if the same word expressing different meanings is used, it is not epanaphora, as follows: "The dog is the guardian of the houses, the dog that reigns over a little group of individuals lower to it is an *impressor*." For this reason, in the definition

55 See *supra*, pp. 248 and 254.

56 This lemma is not present in the *Poetria nova*.

57 *Ad Her.* 4.13.19.

58 *Ad Her.* 4.13.19: *Scipio Numantiam sustulit, Scipio Kartaginem deleuit, Scipio pacem peperit, Scipio civitatem servavit* ("Scipio razed Numantia, Scipio destroyed Carthage, Scipio brought peace, Scipio saved the state").

59 Cf. *Ad Her.* 4.13.19: *Tu in forum prodire, tu lucem conspiciere, tu in horum conspectum venire conaris? Audes verbum facere? audes quicquam ab istis petere? audes supplicium deprecari? Quid est quod possis defendere? quid est quod audeas postulare? quid est quod tibi concedi putes oportere? Non ius iurandum reliquisti? non amicos prodidisti? non parenti manus adtulisti? non denique in omni dedecore volutatus es?* ("You venture to enter the Forum? You venture to face the light? You venture to come into the sight of these men? Dare you say a word? Dare you make a request of them? Dare you beg off punishment? What can you say in your defence? What do you dare to demand? What do you think should be granted to you? Have you not violated your oath? Have you not betrayed your friends? Have you not raised your hand against your father? Have you not, I ask, wallowed in every shame?")

60 *Poetria nova*, v. 1098.

is specified "one and the same meaning." We have to consider that this author, when he gave examples of colours, used the topic of the first human being, namely "O Adam,"⁶¹ and he goes on using it, in fact he says "O thing of evil,"⁶² namely it was a thing of evil when the first man was tempted, it was a thing worse than any other when he and Eve ate the apple, but it was the thing worst of all when he refused to bewail his sin, since, as a consequence, all the human race has suffered because of him.

"O malum" etc..⁶³ the author gives an example about another colour called *antistrophe* and Cicero defines it as follows: "In *antistrophe* we repeat, not the first word in successive phrases, as in the previous colour, but the last."⁶⁴ Or so: *antistrophe* is when several clauses or phrases end simply with one and the same word. It was well said by Cicero that with *anastrophe* we repeated the first word – namely put at the beginning of the phrase – as is clear that happened in the previous colour, namely in *epanaphora*, but we repeated it at the end, that is the last word of the phrase. For example: "The Roman people with the justice won, with the force of arms won, with the generosity won,"⁶⁵ and this is Cicero's example. Again: "Knowledge liberates man from constraints, it liberates him from rational fear of danger for the body, liberates man from unpredictable facts." The example of the author is this: "O apple! O wretched apple! O miserable apple!"⁶⁶ ...

Thirdly, the author explains another colour that is called interlacement that is defined by Cicero as follows: "Interlacement is the union of both figures which we explained above, when both the first word and the last in a succession of phrases are repeated."⁶⁷ As if he says that interlacement occurs when *epanaphora* and *antistrophe* are used together, so that the figure that we have just explained, namely *antistrophe*, and the one we have explained before, namely *epanaphora*, are tied together by repeating

61 *Poetria nova*, vv. 1100 and 1101.

62 *Poetria nova*, v. 1098.

63 *Poetria nova*, v. 1099.

64 *Ad Her.* 4.13.19.

65 *Ad Her.* 4.13.1: *Poenus populus Romanus iustitia vicit, armis vicit, liberalitate vicit* ("It was by the justice of the Roman people that the Carthaginians were conquered, by its force of arms that they were conquered, by its generosity that they were conquered").

66 *Poetria nova*, v. 1099.

67 *Ad Her.* 4.14.20: *Complexio est quae utramque conplectitur exornationem, ut et conversione et repetitione utamur, quam ante exposuimus, et ut repetatur idem verbum saepius et crebro ad idem postremum revertamur* ("Interlacement is the union of both figures, the combined use of *antistrophe* and *epanaphora*, which are explained above; we repeat both the first word and the last in a succession of phrases").

both the first word and the last one in a succession of phrases, so that in the same phrase the first word is different from the last. Or so: interlacement occurs when some successive phrases or clauses begin with one and the same word and end with one and the same word that is different from that at the beginning. About this colour Cicero gives this example: "Who are they who have often broken treaties? The Carthaginians. Who are they who have waged a cruel war in Italy? The Carthaginians. Who are they who now ask for pardon? The Carthaginians."⁶⁸ Or so: "Who is he that owns everything? The wise. Who is he that has control over all the leaders? The wise. Who is he through whose suggestions all the right measures can be managed? The wise." About this colour the author gives this example: "Why were you touched by the taste of Adam? Why must all weep over the sin of Adam?"⁶⁹ In all these examples the phrases begin with one and the same word – including also *antistrophe* – and end with one and the same word. Note that this colour includes the first two but it is neither of them. In fact it includes both the colours and this is clear in the text: it, indeed, includes *epanaphora* because the phrases begin with one and the same word, it includes *antistrophe* because the phrases end with one and the same word, and so it includes both these colours but it is neither of them, and it is clear in the text the difference and how they have to be used.⁷⁰

68 *Ad Her.* 4.14.20: *Qui sunt qui foedera saepe ruperunt? Kartaginienses. Qui sunt qui crudelissime bellum gesserunt? Kartaginienses. Qui sunt qui Italiam deformaverunt? Kartaginienses. Qui sunt qui sibi postulant ignosci? Kartaginienses* ("Who are they who have often broken treaties? The Carthaginians. Who are they who have waged war with severest cruelty? The Carthaginians. Who are they who have marred the face of Italy? The Carthaginians. Who are they who now ask for pardon? The Carthaginians").

69 *Poetria nova*, vv. 1100–1101: *Cur tetigit te gustus Adae? Cur unius omnes / Culpam flemus Adae?* ("Why were you touched by the taste of Adam? Why must all weep over the sin of one, Adam?")

70 "*Repetitio*" et cetera: *repetitio est cum continenter ab uno atque eodem verbo in rebus similibus et diversis principia assumuntur, ut dicit Tullius. Vel sic: repetitio est cum due vel plures distinctiones ab uno et eodem verbo secundum eandem significationem incipiunt, ut hic: "Sipio Cartaginem deleuit, Sipio pacem peperit, Sipio civitatem servavit." Item: "Audes in malitia gloriari, audes ultra debitum extolli, audes delictum non flere." Exemplum vero auctoris est hoc: "Res mala! Res peior aliis! Res pessima rerum!" Patet enim in omnibus hiis exemplis quomodo plures distinctiones ab una et eadem incipiunt dictione et secundum unam et eandem significationem, quia si secundum diversas significationes poneretur eadem dictio non esset repetitio, ut hic: "Canis custos domorum est, canis in circulis regnans inferiorum impressor est." Et propter hoc in diffinitione est "secundum unam et eandem significationem." Considerandum est quod auctor iste, exemplificans de coloribus, assumpsit sibi materiam primi plasmatis, scilicet "Adde," et secundum illam materiam in quantum potest prosequitur, unde dicit auctor "Res mala," id est quando temptatus est res mala fuit, quando*

In these first *colores verborum* there is a clear and explicit dependence on the *Ad Herennium*, even if Benedict does not always cite *ad litteram* from the pseudo-Ciceronian treatise. The scheme seems to be the same in each of these *colores*. Let us focus, for example, on the first one, *epanaphora*: Benedict gives two definitions of it; the first one is taken from the *Ad Herennium*, as the commentator says explicitly, while the other one seems to come from other texts. Then follow two *exempla* that clarify what is stated by the definitions: the first one, that refers to Scipio, is a shortened version of the second example of the three that can be read in the *Ad Herennium* (not here, but in the other *colores* here considered Benedict states that the first example is taken *a Tullio*), while the second one is simply inspired by another example used by pseudo-Cicero with the aim of exp *epanaphora*. Then, Benedict goes on, adding some

gustavit Eva et ipse de pomo fuit res peior aliis, sed res pessima rerum fuit quando noluit flere reatum quia ex hoc totum humanum genus in posterum passum est propter eum. "O malum" et cetera: Exemplificat auc<tor> de alio colore qui dicitur conversio et diffinitur sic a Tullio: "Conversio est per quam non, ut ante, primum repetimus verbum, sed ad postremum continenter revertimus." Vel sic: conversio est per quamplures clausule vel distinctiones in unam et eandem simpliciter terminantur dictionem. Bene dicebatur a Tullio quod conversio erat per quam reppetebamus primum verbum – id est in principio clausule positum – ut ante adest ut fiebat in priori colore, scilicet in repetitione, sed revertebatur ad postremum, id est ad verbum ultimo positum in distinctione. Et sic hoc modo pones: "Populus Romanus iustitia vicit, armis [ms.: arnis] vicit, liberalitate vicit," et hoc est exemplum Tullii. Item: "Scientia ab angustiis hominem [ms.: hominum] liberat, eadem a corporis periculis rationale <timore> liberat, a casibus inopinatis ipsum liberat." Exemplum auctoris hoc est: "O malum! miserum malum! miserabile malum!" ... Tertio determinat auctor de alio colore qui dicitur complexio, qui diffinitur sic a Tullio: "complexio est que utranque completitur exornationem, et hanc et quam ante posuimus, ut reppetitur idem verbum sepius et creb<r>o [ms.: sepius et crebo sepius] ad idem postremum convertitur," quasi dicat quod complexio fit secundum repetitionem et conversionem simul ita quod complectitur exornationem proxime dictam, scilicet conversionem et quam ante exposuimus, scilicet repetitionem, repetendo idem verbum sepius in principio et revertendo crebro, id est in unaquaque distinctione ad aliud quod postremo ponitur. Vel sic: complexio est in qua plures distinctiones vel clausule in una dictione incipiunt et in aliam eandem, tamen a precedenti diversam terminantur. De quo modo ponit exemplum tale Tullius: "Qui sunt qui federa sepe ruperunt? Cartaginienses. Qui sunt qui in Ytalia crudele bellum gesserunt? Cartaginienses. Qui sunt qui sibi postulant ignosci? Cartaginienses." Vel sic: "Quis est qui cuncta possideat? Sapiens. Quis est in cuius potestate sunt potentes? Sapiens. Quis est per cuius consilium cuncta recta disposita regantur? Sapiens." De isto modo ponit auctor tale exemplum: "Cur tetigit te gustus Ade? Cur omnes culpam flemus Ade?" Ecce in predictis omnibus exemplis distinctiones incipiunt ab una dictione – complectitur conversionem – et finiunt in unam et eandem dictionem. Nota quod iste color cum duobus primis convenit et neuter illorum est. Completitur enim ambos colores, quod ex se patet: complectitur enim repetitionem in eo quod distinctiones incipiunt ab una dictione, completitur conversionem eo quod remanent clause in una dictione et sic ambas completendo neuter illorum est per se et patet differentia et convenientia, ms. Napoli, Bibl. Nazionale Vittorio Emanuele III, V D 6, ff. 27 r–27 v.

additional explanation about this *color* and another example (“the dog is the guardian ...”) that I am not able to say whether it has been taken from other texts or has been created by our commentator. The only source to which Benedict refers explicitly in the explanation of these colours is the *Ad Herennium*.

Benedict’s treatment of the *colores sententiarum* is not different from that of the *colores verborum*, as we can see from the transcription of the first three of them:

“Distribuit” etc.:⁷¹ here the *auctor* gives the definition of the colour and says that distribution is when you give different functions to different things or among different people.⁷² And note that when the author says “distribuit,” he refers to the name of the colour that is called distribution, which Cicero defines as follows: “Distribution occurs when certain specified roles are assigned among a number of things or persons.”⁷³ About this colour he gives the following example: “Whoever of you, men of the jury, loves the good name of the Senate, must hate this man, for his attacks upon that body have always been most insolent. Whoever of you wishes the equestrian order to be most resplendent in the state, must want this person to have paid the severest penalty, so that he may not be, through his personal shame, a stain and disgrace to a most honourable order. You who have parents, must prove by your punishment of this creature that undutiful men do not find favour with you. You who have children, must set forth an example to show how great are the punishments that have been provided in our state for men of that stamp.”⁷⁴ Or so: “It is doctors’ duty to teach what they know in a clear and profitable way, it is pupils’ duty to be submissive to their knowledge submissively and obligingly.” Search for the author’s example in the next passages of the text. The author firstly defines each of these figures of thought, then describes in advance each of them. He gives examples in a specific way and the example of this colour, which is called distribution, is the following: “It is the office of the Pope to dictate sacred laws, and of his subordinates to follow the form of the law which he prescribes.”⁷⁵ In fact, it is clear in all these examples how different roles are assigned among a number of persons, because the task of dictating sacred laws, namely decretals, is

71 *Poetria nova*, v. 1233.

72 Cf. *Poetria nova*, vv. 1233–1234.

73 *Ad Her.* 4:35–47.

74 *Ad Her.* 4:35–47.

75 *Poetria nova*, vv. 1280–1281.

assigned to the pope, the task of enforcing the above-mentioned rules is assigned to the princes; it is said in a similar way with other examples. And the meaning of the text and the explanation of the colour are clear.

"It fittingly and properly blames masters or friends: its words offend nobody":⁷⁶ here the *auctor* defines a certain colour that is called frankness of speech. He refers to the name of the colour when he says "properly" [*licite*] and when he provides a definition such as this: frankness of speech [*licentia*] is when master or friend is blamed fittingly, and he is not offended by words.⁷⁷ And Cicero gives the following definition of this colour: "It is frankness of speech when, talking before those to whom we owe reverence or fear, we yet exercise our right to speak out" – without offending – "and we seem justified in reprehending them, or persons dear to them, for some fault."⁷⁸ About this colour Cicero gives the following example: "You wonder, fellow citizens, that every one abandons your interests? That no one undertakes your cause? That no one declares himself your defender? Blame this upon yourselves; cease to wonder. Why indeed should not every one avoid and shun this situation of your making? Bethink yourselves of those whom you have had for defenders; set their devotion before your eyes, and next consider what has become of them all. Then remember that thanks to your – to speak aright – indifference, or cowardice rather, all these men have been murdered before your eyes, and thanks to your own votes their enemies have reached the highest estate."⁷⁹ Again: "O venerable father – without prejudice to my reverence towards you –, the Patriarchate of Aquileia has to help the orphans, has to protect the weak and, in a time of particular need of its subject, to bring the help that your paternity has denied." This is the author's example: "But many err, and their error confutes you, O Pope. You forgive and do not punish the seekers of great riches."⁸⁰ In these aforementioned examples it is clear how we accuse our superiors honourably, but not offending anyone with words, and about this colour you can find an example above, as here: "If it is permitted, I accuse God. God, best of all things, why do you here become worse?"⁸¹ And in a similar way you could say to a friend as follows: "I say boldly to you: you think to put everybody on the same level of friendship, but you are unpleasant,

76 *Poetria nova*, vv. 1234–1236.

77 Cf. *Poetria nova*, vv. 1234–1235.

78 *Ad Her.* 4.36.48.

79 *Ad Her.* 4.36.48.

80 *Poetria nova*, vv. 1281–1283.

81 *Poetria nova*, vv. 412–413.

you who with all your efforts insult men, put them in troubles, and do not honour them."

"It sees more than it says, and its expression understates the matter, but in a restrained fashion":⁸² the author explains understatement and refers to the name of the colour when he says "diminuit." The definition is: "It sees more than it says, but in a restrained fashion." He refers to the definition, namely when he says that understatement is like a greater intellect who prefers to leave things unsaid rather than say them in a restrained fashion. Cicero defines this colour as follows: "Understatement occurs when we say that by nature, fortune, or diligence, we or our clients possess some exceptional advantage, and, in order to avoid the impression of arrogant display, we moderate and soften the statement of it."⁸³ And he gives this example: "This, men of the jury, I have the right to say – that by labour and diligence I have contrived to be no laggard in the mastery of military science."⁸⁴ Or so: "I was not useful to many people because of my powerlessness." Again: "In order to get this little bit of knowledge that I have, I did not desist from sustaining nine years of summer sweats and winter cold." This is the author's example: "Powerful Pope, whose power is not short, be mindful of punishment. Mild father, at some time take out your sword."⁸⁵ It is clear in these examples how you can refer to something rather than say something explicitly. In fact, when in Cicero's first example it is said "to be no laggard in the mastery of military science," it seems more like a suggestion rather than something explicitly said, as he would say "I would not consider it the last of the things, but I do." But, to avoid arrogance, it is said, as we have seen. In a similar way in the second example, when it is said "a little bit of knowledge," it is rather a hint; also in the third example, the one of the author, when it is said "O Pope, whose power is not little, but big."⁸⁶

82 *Poetria nova*, vv. 1236–1237.

83 *Ad Her.* 4.38.50.

84 *Ad Her.* 4.38.50.

85 *Poetria nova*, vv. 1285–1287.

86 "*Distribuit variis*" et cetera: ponit auctor diffinitionem coloris dicens quod distributio est attributio distinctorum negotiorum in varias personas vel res. Et nota quod hoc quod auctor dicit, "*distribuit*," innuit nomen coloris qui dicitur distributio qui etiam sic diffinitur a Tullio: "*Distributio est cum in plures res aut personas negotia quedam certa dispertuntur.*" De quo ponit tale exemplum: "*Qui vestrum, iudices, nomen dilligit scenatus, oderit necesse est hunc [ms.: tunc]; poetulantissime enim semper iste oppugnavit scenatum. Qui equestrem locum splendidissimum cupit esse in civitate, hiis oportet ut istum [ms.: iustum] maximas penas dedisse velit, ne iste sua turpitudine ordini honestissimo macule atque dedecori*"

[ms.: decoris] sit. Qui parentes habetis, hostendite istius suplitio vobis homines impios non placere. Quibus liberi [ms.: libetis] sunt, constituite exemplum, quante pene sint in civitate hominibus istiusmodi comparate [ms.: istius mundi comperate].” Vel sic: “Ad doctores [ms.: dedecores] pertinet suam doctrinam lucide ac floride ministrare, ad discipulos vere humiliter et benigne discipline se supponere eorundem.” Exemplum vero auctoris queras aliquantulum inferius. Auctor enim primo diffinit unumquamque istorum colorum sententiarum et postea singulorum preordinat [ms.: perordinat]. Secundum modum diffinitum subicit exempla et est hoc exemplum coloris istius qui dicitur distributio: “Est pape sacras leges dictare, minorum / Prescriptam iuris formam servare.” Patet enim in hiis exemplis omnibus quomodo varia negotia distribuuntur in varias personas quia negotium dictandi sacras leges, scilicet decretales, attribuitur summo pontifici, negotium vero servandi predictas ordinationes attribuitur principibus; simili modo dictum est aliis exemplis. Et sic patet sententia textus et declaratio coloris. “Cum culpatur honeste / Et licite dominos vel amicos nemine verbis / Offenso”: diffinit hic auctor colorem quandam qui dicitur licentia. Nomen coloris innuit per hoc quod dicitur “licite” et talem diffinitionem: licentia est quando culpatur honeste dominus vel amicus verbis non offensus. Et ponit eiusdem coloris Tullius talem diffinitionem: “Licentia est cum apud eos quos aut vereri aut metuere debemus, tamen aliquid pro iure nostro dicimus,” quod minime offendat, “quo eos aut quos hii dilligunt aliquo in erato vere reprehendere videamur.” De quo idem Tullius hoc ponit exemplum: “Miramini, Quirites, quod ab omnibus vestre rationes deserantur? Quod causam vestram nemo suscipiat? Quod se nemo vestri defensorem profiteatur? Id attribuite vestre culpe, atque desinite mirari. Quid est enim, quare non omnes istam rem fugere aut vitare debeant? Recordamini, quos habueritis defensores; studia eorum vobis ante oculos proponite; deinde exitus omnium considerate. Tum [ms.: cum] vobis veniat in mente, ut vere dicam, negligentia vestra sive ignavia potius illos omnes ante oculos vestros trucidatos esse, inimicos eorum vestris suffragis in amplissimum locum pervenisse.” Item sic: “Reverende pater, vestra reverentia salva, patriarchatus Aquilegensis debet orfanis subvenire, imbeciles defensare et, subditis necessitatis articulo imminente, auxilium impartiri quod vestra paternitas denegavit.” Exemplum auctor est hoc: “Set errant / Quamplures, quorum te, papa, redarguit error. / Parcis, non punis, enormia lucra sequentes.” Ecce patet in hiis exemplis predictis quomodo culpamus dominos honeste, non tamen offendendo quemquam verbis et de hoc colore habes exemplum superius ut illic: “Si fas est accuso Deum. Deus, optima rerum, / Cur hic degeneras?” Et simili modo posses dicere ad amicum ut sic: “Confidenter tibi dico: credis, omnibus displicendo, secundum genus amicitie comparare, qui, totis tuis nisibus, hominibus infers contumelias, molestias, non honores.” “Cum plus notat in re [in the ms., alongside re, there is the lectio verbo] quam sit in ore / Et rem diminuit verbo sed more modesto”: determinat auctor de diminutione et innuit nomen coloris per hoc quod dicit “diminuit,” diffinitionem vero per hoc quod dicit “Cum plus notat in re quam sit in ore ... sed more modesto.” Diffinitionem innuit, hoc est dicere quod diminutio est maior intellectus relinquens in ore quam exprimitur ore modesto more. Qui color diffinitur etiam sic a Tullio: “Diminutio est cum aliquid inesse nobis aut in iis quos defendimus aut natura aut fortuna aut industria dicamus egregium quod, ne qua significetur arrogans ostentatio, diminuitur et attenuatur oratione.” Et ponit exemplum tale: “Nam hoc pro meo iure, iudices, dico, me labore et industria curasse, ut disciplinam militarem non in postremis tenerem.” Vel sic: “Non profui multis propter impotentie defectum [ms.: defactum].” Item: “Ut particulam quam habeo scientie adipiscere novem annis sudores est(̃)uales et yemalia frigora in studio non destiti substinere.” Exemplum auctor est hoc: “Papa potens, cuius non est breve posse, memento / Vindictae. Mansuete pater, quandoque mucronem / Exere.” Patet in istis exemplis quomodo plus innuitur quam exprimitur. Nam

In the passages considered above we can see that the criteria adopted by Benedict are similar to those he uses for the *colores verborum*. For each colour he gives two definitions: one explicitly taken from the *Ad Herennium*, and another one that I cannot say if Benedict has written on his own or if he has taken from another text. Then, for each *color*, there are some examples: one taken from the pseudo-Ciceronian treatise, one or more whose origin is not specified, and a commentary on the example that Benedict finds in the *Poetria nova*.

A first examination of the text allows us to say something more about explanation of the *colores* offered by the commentators considered here. While Guizzardo (like Bene in the *Candelabrum* and Bono in his *Cedrus Libani*) gives the Greek translations of the names of the *colores verborum* and of two of the *colores sententiarum* (*paradeigma* and *prosōpopoiia*), Pace usually gives the corresponding Greek name only for *repetitio* and *gradatio* among the *colores verborum*. On the other hand, Bartholomew does not offer any Greek translation⁸⁷ and the same appears to be the case with Benedict.

In conclusion, this brief survey – based on the analysis of specific *loci* of some commentaries composed in Italy – suggests that the *Ad Herennium* was a fundamental source not only for Geoffrey, but also for the above-mentioned commentators. Anyway, it appears clear that a wider investigation needs to be carried out; in particular, the critical edition of all these commentaries is definitely desirable, since it would be a tremendous help for the study of the *Poetria nova*.⁸⁸ As a result of my analysis, it seems that only Guizzardo uses the *Ad Herennium* not just directly, but also as it has been filtered through medieval treatises that take advantage of the classical Latin text (the *Candelabrum* and the *Cedrus Libani*); Pace and Benedict, on the other hand, make repeated and explicit references to (pseudo-)Cicero, who seems to be exclusive as a source in their commentaries on the *colores*.⁸⁹ Bartholomew stands a little apart, since he has his own way of commenting on the *colores*: he gives just the definition without offering any additional essential information or examples

per hoc quod in primo exemplo Tullii dicitur, "ut disciplinam militarem non in postremis tenerem," plus innuitur quam exprimitur, quasi dicat "non ut tenerem in postremis, imo ut tenerem." Sed ad causam evitandi arrogantiam sic dicitur. Similiter modo in secundo exemplo cum dicitur "particulam scientie": plus enim innuitur et sic etiam in tertio exemplo, auctoris, cum dicitur "Papa cuius posse non est breve, imo magnum," ms. Napoli, Bibl. Nazionale Vittorio Emanuele III, V D 6, ff. 32 v–33 r.

87 On this topic see Losappio (2018) 137.

88 As I have said before, the critical editions of commentaries on the *Poetria nova* available are Losappio (2013) and Losappio (2018), to which must be added Woods (1985). I am preparing a complete critical edition of Bartholomew's commentary.

89 An exception is the quotation of Donatus by Pace: see *supra*, pp. 253–255.

in comparison with what can be found in Geoffrey's text. What would be interesting to understand if the examples mentioned by Pace and Benedict that are not taken from the *Ad Herennium* come from other specific texts or from *florilegia*, or if their paternity has to be assigned to the two *magistri*: this should be one of the next topics to be studied in a specific way, in order to discover something more about the sources of these old commentaries on the *Poetria nova*.

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The Reception of Quintilian's Theory of Gesture: Rhetorical Elements in Pantomime Acting

Chrysanthi Demetriou

1 Introduction

Theoretical discussions on rhetorical delivery have a long tradition. Aristotle discusses the matter, but his account is not long (*Rhet.* 3.1.3–10), while relevant treatises from the Hellenistic period, including one by Theophrastus, who seems to have been the first to deal with the matter extensively, do not survive. The *Rhetorica ad Herennium* is the first to present a “developed rhetorical theory,”¹ but it is Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria* 11.3 that offers the most extensive discussion on orators' nonverbal behaviour.² It ranges from observations on ideal postures and delivery tones to instructions on the orator's appropriate use of specific hand gestures, in order to accompany certain expressions or indicate certain meanings.³ At the same time, Quintilian's account constitutes an invaluable testimony for the way rhetorical *hypocrisis* attempted to distinguish itself from other performances of the public realm. The link between theatrical and oratorical performance is of course well known: the term *hypocrisis* refers to both delivery and acting, while famous Greek rhetoricians have variously discussed the extent to which actors' delivery techniques can be useful for their profession.⁴

1 Quotation from Edwards (2013) 15; see pp. 15–16 for a good survey of the sources, including the ones mentioned above.

2 See Graf (1991) 38: “Quintilian's chapter is the only preserved Roman (or for that matter, ancient) text which gives detailed information about rhetorical body language in the Roman sense”; see pp. 37–48 for a good discussion of Quintilian in general. For the reception of Quintilian's ideas on rhetorical delivery in Shakespeare, see MacDonald in this volume, pp. 355–359. For the reception of Quintilian in the Renaissance, see Stacey in this volume, and for a modern reception of Quintilian's work, see Avramović in this volume.

3 A comprehensive analysis of Quintilian's treatise, co-examined with other relevant sources (primarily Cicero), is found in Aldrete (1999) 6–43.

4 See Edwards (2013) 16–17, with sources. For evidence of *hypocrisis* clues in Greek rhetorical texts, see Serafim (2017), esp. chapter 5. For rhetorical *hypocrisis*, see also the Introduction to this volume (p. 4).

Quintilian, like Cicero, is heavily concerned with the influence of theatrical performance on oratorical performance; in this context, he argues that a good orator must distinguish himself from an actor or a dancer (cf. *Inst.* 11.3.89, discussed below). More interestingly, Quintilian suggests that the use of gestures is governed by a sophisticated system of categorisation; his basic systematisation refers to the distinction between “natural” (or “symbolic”) and “imitative” gestures.⁵ According to Quintilian, the first types of gesture are considered to occur “automatically” and are based on some “natural” reactions that are understood universally,⁶ while the second are related to the process of “mimicking” what is being said. As we shall see more extensively below, the rhetorician considers mimetic gesture as a feature of theatre, while he insists on the rhetors’ dexterous use of “natural” gesture.

By elaborating on Quintilian’s basic distinction between the two types of gesture above, this chapter focuses on the relationship between Quintilian’s theory and a specific dramatic genre: pantomime.⁷ Seemingly, this was the most popular spectacle of the imperial period (from the end of the 1st century BCE onwards), whose popularity spanned and increased throughout late antiquity (until the 6th century CE).⁸ Pantomime performance was inevitably heavily dependent upon the *pantomimus*’ gesture: in its basic and commonest form, this spectacle presented a solo artist dancing along with a story sung by a chorus; the dancer was mute, depicting with his movement all the points and actions included in the relevant song, which was performed synchronously.⁹

5 See also Dutsch (2013) 410–411.

6 On the concept of “symbolism” in the interpretation of gestures and their use, see also Corbeill (2004) 5–7. For a critical approach to Quintilian’s categorisation, see Graf (1991) 38–39, with reference to modern scholars.

7 On pantomime’s acknowledgement of the power of nonverbal language, a fact stressed also in rhetorical practice, see also Aldrete (1999) 51–53.

8 On pantomime’s origins, its spread and popularity as well as its founders and main supporters, see the short but informative account by Zanobi (2014) 2–6. Beacham (1999) 141–146 provides a brief but equally comprehensive summary of pantomime’s development, (tragic) themes, and main principles and characteristics of the performance. Also, Rotolo (1957) provides a good overview of pantomime’s main characteristics, preferred themes and storylines, origins, its historical and social context, as well as its artistic depictions, all richly supplemented by the relevant testimonies. A very informative introductory study of pantomime is provided by Hall (2013). For a brief but comprehensive introduction to pantomime (history, development, and main characteristics), see also Manuwald (2011) 184–186.

9 On the main features of pantomime shows, see further Zanobi (2014) 6–9 (quoting relevant primary sources). On pantomime’s art in general, see the short but substantial introduction by Lada-Richards (2007) 13–14; see also pp. 19–25 for an informative overview of the history of this genre from the available evidence; for the arrangement of the spectacle and its components, see pp. 40–44.

Although Quintilian makes a sharp contrast between the system of gestures used in oratory and the one used in *saltatio*, nevertheless, it seems that the rhetorician's proposed system of oratorical gesture was not alien to the principles of pantomime performance.

In this framework, my line of investigation is concerned with the question of whether Quintilian's theoretical system on oratorical gesture is also to be found in treatises describing or discussing pantomime.¹⁰ More specifically, my main argument is that, although the rhetorician regards the use of "mimetic" gesticulation as the basic characteristic of pantomimic performance, it seems that pantomime is, at the same time, not unaware of the use of symbolic gesture. Along these lines, I aim to elaborate on a suggestion expressed by Lada-Richards, who proposed that, although pantomime was undoubtedly addressed to a mass audience, over centuries it developed certain conventions of gestures.¹¹ In light of Quintilian's discussion, I aim to show that this "stereotyped" system of gestural communication would make use not only of "imitative" but also of "symbolic" gestures. In other words, this chapter argues that the concept of "symbolic" gesture, which, according to Quintilian, is a feature that primarily belongs to rhetorical kinesiology, is – eventually – not excluded from the conventions of pantomime movement. In this context, the theoretical system that is found in Quintilian's treatise eventually becomes a part of these popular performances in late antiquity, confirming that, under the strong influence of rhetoric in various aspects of public life, the boundaries between rhetorical and popular performance were anything but sharp.

Before moving to the examination of the texts, a clarification regarding the concept of "reception" as used in this chapter is essential. While the "influence" of contemporary oratory upon pantomime would have been reasonable, hence naturally expected, this chapter argues for something more systematic.¹² In the following pages, Quintilian is treated as the primary source that epitomises an important element of rhetorical delivery;¹³ rhetorical *gestus*, as I aim to show, is later "absorbed" by pantomime acting. Thus, although I do not argue for a

10 Of course, as Lada-Richards (2007) 14–15 rightly points out, our literary sources for pantomime inevitably reflect each author's aims, cultural background, or even biases.

11 Lada-Richards (2007) 49–51.

12 Cf. Schlapbach (2008) 315, with reference to Lucian's treatise: "if the portrayal of pantomime draws heavily on discussions of rhetoric, this suggests a relationship of fundamental affinity, rather than a straightforward opposition or hierarchy."

13 On *Institutio oratoria* being the most important manual of rhetorical education that survives, see Aldrete (1999) 3; see also p. 5: "[w]hen one turns to Roman rhetoric and attempts to recreate the gestures used by Roman orators, by far the most useful resource is the rhetorical handbook of Quintilian." See also Corbeill (2004) 2–4, who notes that "Quintilian's remarks do not only show the types of details the student of oratory was expected to

direct connection between the “receiver” (i.e., pantomime, as described in the sources presented below) and the “received” (i.e., Quintilian) through a conventional reading process, nevertheless, I believe that we can trace a process of “reception” rather than a case of mere “influence,” due to an inner connection that can be discerned between the two forms of performance. In other words, what we actually witness is a certain level of “adoption” of Quintilian’s system in a way that would not call for a simple influence but rather for a productive “reuse” and “transformation.”

Thus, as shown below, the presence of Quintilian’s gestural system in pantomime sources calls for essential elements of “reception” as defined in classical scholarship: the “received” (i.e., Quintilian’s account) is regarded as an “authority,” there is a certain time-lapse between the “received” and the “receiver” and, most importantly, this act of reception is largely a process of reuse and “representation.”¹⁴ What is more, this process of “reception” inevitably draws attention not so much to the “received” as to the “receiver.”¹⁵ As expected, in my reading of Quintilian’s reception, the emphasis is not so much on the text but, more broadly, on the performative contexts described in this text; in other words, the process of reception, as examined in this chapter, is concerned with the survival of a certain set of performative rules that are expressed through specific texts.¹⁶ In my analysis, I focus on pantomime gesture as this is described in sources from the 2nd to the 4th centuries, in Apuleius, Lucian, and Libanius. Before moving to these texts, however, let us first have a quick look at Quintilian.

2 Quintilian on Gesture: General Principles and Notions about Pantomime

Quintilian’s extensive advice on the employment of appropriate gestures by orators is placed into a heavily theoretical framework from the outset. In 11.3.1,

internalise; in order for these gestures to possess any kind of persuasive power, we must also presuppose an audience trained at some level to interpret these gestures correctly.”

14 See the extremely informative summary of the uses and main senses of the term “reception” in Kennedy (2006); see also Martindale (2013) 171: “Classical texts (I use the word in the broadest sense) are remade and refashioned by later writers; as a result, new light is cast on them, they are made newly ‘readable.’” For various definitions of (classical) reception, see also the Introduction in this volume (pp. 6–7).

15 As Martindale (2006) 3 rightly points out, reception studies “involved a significant turn to the reader.”

16 See again Martindale (2006) 3 for the range of meanings in the use of “text.”

Quintilian refers to Cicero's notion of *actio* or *pronuntiatio* by clarifying that both terms are used to denote "delivery," which can function as a "language" (cf. *De oratore* 3.222) due to the fact that delivery constitutes the "body's eloquence" (cf. *Orator* 55). A few paragraphs below, Quintilian emphatically points to the ability of an orator's gesture and overall movement to convey certain meanings (11.3.9 *gestus motusque significet*, "gestures and movements have a meaning").¹⁷ Later on, he notes that a gesture's meaning can be conveyed even without the aid of words (11.3.65) and this is the reason why gesture is so significant in oratory. In 11.3.66, the rhetorician stresses that the body – even that of the animals – can express attitudes and emotions. More interestingly, building upon the long, well-known discussion of the relationship – or, rather, the antithesis – between theatrical and oratorical performance, Quintilian reveals a number of central ideas about an actor's movement. In 11.3.7–8, while pointing to the significance of the style of delivery, which functions as a core element of a successful speech, he makes a firm connection between oratorical delivery and stage acting.¹⁸ More importantly, in 11.3.66, Quintilian praises the power of dancing, which can be "understood and [be] emotionally effective without the voice" (*saltatio frequenter sine voce intellegitur atque adficit*).

A central part of Quintilian's discussion about the relationship between stage and oratorical gesture is found in paragraphs 85–89. In 85, Quintilian points to the hands' ability to speak (*hae, prope est ut dicam, ipsae locuntur*, "the hands, I might almost say, speak for themselves"), while in the next paragraph, in 86, the rhetorician suggests that certain emotions are expressed through certain gestures. In 87, Quintilian goes a step further: he argues that gestures form a code of communication that can be understood by all humans; in fact, this system and its effects are contrasted to the communication difficulties that can possibly derive from the existence of so many different languages (*ut in tanta per omnis gentes nationesque linguae diversitate hic mihi omnium hominum communis sermo videatur*, "[a]mid all the linguistic diversity of the peoples and nations of the world, this, it seems to me, is the common language of the human race").¹⁹ Finally, in 88 we reach the point which I am mostly interested in: the distinction between gestures that derive "naturally" and the ones that "imitate" things (*et hi quidem de quibus sum locutus cum ipsis vocibus naturaliter exeunt gestus: alii sunt qui res imitatione significant*,

17 Texts and translations of Quintilian are quoted from Russell (2002).

18 In *Inst.* 11.3.11–12, however, the teacher of rhetoric admits that technique is not enough for achieving an effective delivery, which is basically a combination of both art and talent: *primas partis esse naturae*.

19 On this passage and the multicultural dynamics of pantomime, see also Hall (2013) 456.

“[t]he gestures of which I have been speaking all appear to be natural concomitants of *words*”). Quintilian concludes by pointing out that the second type of movement is not suitable for public speaking. In this context, the rhetorician explains that “imitative” gestures are primarily found in “dancing,” that is, in pantomime performances:²⁰

Abesse enim plurimum a saltatore debet orator, ut sit gestus ad sensus magis quam ad verba accommodatus, quod etiam histrionibus paulo gravioribus facere moris fuit. Ergo ut ad se manum referre cum de se ipso loquatur et in eum quem demonstret intendere et aliqua his similia permiserim, ita non effingere status quosdam et quidquid dicet ostendere. (89)

An orator has to be very different from a dancer; he must adapt his gesture to his sense than to his words – which indeed was the practice of the more serious actors too. I would readily let him move his hand towards himself when he speaks about himself, or towards a person whom he wishes to point out, and a few things like that; but I do not approve of his miming attitudes and making a visual display of whatever he says.

This is one of the several cases found in rhetorical treatises which draws attention to the intentional difference between an orator’s movement and that of an actor or dancer.²¹ As Dutsch accurately explains,²² according to Quint. *Inst.* 11.3.89, the use of gestures is different in oratory and theatre as to their main purpose: the orator uses gestures to express his thoughts (*ad sensus*), while the pantomime dancer employs gestures to depict words (*ad verba*). Although Quintilian points to the distinction between “imitative” gestures, primarily found in dancing, and “natural,”²³ this does not exclude the possibility

20 On pantomime performance being based on the “imitation” of words, thus creating “images of words,” see also Montiglio (1999) 266, with relevant sources.

21 On this interest in the affinity between actors’ and orators’ body language and the rhetoricians’ effort for differentiation, see also Zanobi (2014) 17–19 (with relevant sources); also, Aldrete (1999) 53–54; similarly, Corbeill (2004) 114–116, on the importance of an orator’s movement and its manifold relationship with acting. See also the comprehensive study by Fantham (2002), which focuses on Cicero and Quintilian about actors’ movement in association with the orator’s art of delivery. As Graf (1991) 39 indicates, Cicero’s and Quintilian’s emphasis on an orator’s differentiation from an actor “is all the more surprising as both thought it worthwhile to learn from actors.”

22 Dutsch (2013) 422–423.

23 See the figure in Dutsch (2013) 415.

that, according to the rhetorician's understanding, "symbolic" gestures are used in pantomime too. On the contrary: Quintilian's effort to make a sharp distinction between rhetors and dancers might be related to the (often) opaque boundaries between their performative styles.²⁴

As Lucian points out (*De Salt.* 62; on this treatise see also below), the performance of both pantomime actors and orators needs to be clear and intelligible:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμητικός ἐστι καὶ κινήμασι τὰ ἀδόμενα δείξιν ὑπισχνεῖται, ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ, ὅπερ καὶ τοῖς ῥήτορσι, σαφήνειαν ἀσκεῖν, ὥς ἕκαστον τῶν δεικνυμένων ὑπ' αὐτοῦ δηλοῦσθαι μηδενὸς ἐξηγητοῦ δεόμενον.

Since he is imitative and undertakes to present by means of movements all that is being sung, it is essential for him, as for the orators, to cultivate clearness, so that everything which he presents will be intelligible, requiring no interpreter.

Yet, as Lada-Richards also reminds us, "direct corporeal imitation would have been the elemental core of ancient pantomime."²⁵ However, a dancer's successful communication with his audience is not exclusively based on the use of "imitative" movement. Both Quintilian (*Inst.* 11.3.66) and Augustine (*De magistro* 7.19) stress the ability of the pantomime dancer to communicate with the audience without the aid of words.²⁶ In my understanding, if "natural" gesture – a type of gesture that, according to Quintilian, can be universally understood – is to be excluded from pantomime, then pantomime's universal power, largely manifested in several authors, would have been called into doubt. In other words, if we trust Quintilian's suggestion that symbolic gestures are innate and universal to all human beings, then we should expect that such a system of communication is also present in pantomime, a theatrical genre that is heavily dependent upon the performer's movement.²⁷ Thus, in order for this movement to be understood universally, Quintilian's concept of

24 On this "exchange" between theatrical and oratorical movement see also Dutsch (2013) 419–421. As Dutsch (2013) 425 reminds us, Quintilian accepts the possibility that some gestures that are commonly used in theatre could be acceptable also in some rhetorical schools.

25 Quotation from Lada-Richards (2007) 45; see ad loc. for various sources that point to pantomime's mimetic character.

26 For these three sources and their common themes, see Lada-Richards (2007) 44; see also ad loc. about several other sources' emphasis on pantomime's "eloquence" more generally.

27 See the relevant observation in Schlapbach (2008) 328 on pantomimist's gesture as "a medium for signs that can be translated back into thoughts."

gestures as a “universal language” should be applied not only in rhetorical public speaking but also in the pantomimic performance.

At the same time, the performative aspects of pantomime acting and their possible influences from oratorical delivery principles, as these are summarised by Quintilian, should be examined in light of some basic performance trends of the imperial period and late antiquity. Dutsch, by focusing upon the illustrated Terence manuscripts and Donatus’ commentary, has drawn attention to an important performance development of late antiquity (with emphasis on the period that spans between the 4th and the 6th century): the tendency to accompany specific phrases with specific gestures, a tendency that is also found in Quintilian’s observation regarding *gestus ad verba*, “a gesture adopted to the words.”²⁸ If such a “stereotyping” of gestures is to be taken as a basic principle, then such a concept is not irrelevant to the movement of pantomime actors. Along these lines, pantomimic movement can be envisaged as a system that would employ certain gestures to depict specific things.

Lada-Richards, in her aforementioned seminal study on Lucian, makes a relevant, significant observation regarding the development of pantomime performance: “the many centuries of dance tradition on Greek soil must have created a vast repertory of dance sequences and phrases, a convenient (and perhaps more broadly recognisable) vocabulary of postures, gestures and mimetic sequences that could be used to convey facets of character or emotional states or even regular activities, such as running, galloping, fighting, harvesting, and so on.”²⁹ Of course, we would not expect that *every* pantomime performance would be executed in a uniform way; each spectacle would depend on the performers’ skills, the troupe’s finances, the audience, and perhaps the different expectations of the spectators from the metropolises or the provinces of the empire.³⁰ Yet, Lada-Richards goes a step further and makes another, in my view, convincing suggestion: “a pantomime may well have found himself creating corporeal metonyms in order to express contiguous experiences

28 See Dutsch (2013) mainly 425 and 429. See also Demetriou (2015) 192–197 on the influence of pantomime’s use of both symbolic and imitative gestures on Donatus’ commentary and the manuscript illustrations of Terence.

29 Lada-Richards (2007) 28. See also Zanobi (2014) 11: “[t]he long training undergone by the aspiring dancer was needed both to acquire the necessary bodily requirements and to learn the schemata, the standard repertoire of dance steps and sequences”; see also p. 16: “possibly such stylization was matched in the libretto through the adoption of a mirroring ‘formulaic’ vocabulary.” See also Beacham (1999) 143, on the pantomime dancer: “by the conventional nature of the most prominent of the many roles he was expected to learn, the movements of which (a sort of gestic vocabulary) were set by firm tradition from which the actor strayed at his peril.”

30 See Lada-Richards (2007) 38–40.

(signifying, for example, a battle or a war by means of a violent, warlike dance), or adopting a highly symbolic corporeal vocabulary in order to express more abstract concepts, as Lycinus claims with respect to the mysticism enshrined in Egyptian tales (*Dance* 59).³¹

The above observation stems from an important practical issue: obviously, not every aspect of human communication can be expressed through imitation, simply because not everything can be imitated. Based on this critical point, Lada-Richards further investigates whether pantomime would make use of a standard set of gestures. She points to Augustine's testimony in *De doctrina Christiana* 2.25.38, where she rightly traces a suggestion that the attendance of a pantomime spectacle "requires some kind of code-apprenticeship";³² in other words, uninitiated spectators would not be able to follow the spectacle easily. Lada-Richards is quite skeptical about Augustine's firm argumentation in favour of a genre that demands the audience's specialised knowledge; her scepticism is justified by the well-spread popularity of pantomime.³³ At the same time, however, she acknowledges the influence of "the sign language of formal oratory" over pantomime, on the one hand, and pantomime's gradual development of a "unique performance language, fully intelligible only to informed, competent viewers," on the other.³⁴

I agree that pantomime, while being popular and widespread, would be simultaneously governed by certain body language conventions, recognised by the more "informed" members of the audience. In other words, the degree to which each pantomime spectacle was intelligible would depend upon the intellectual capabilities of each spectator. In the following pages, however, I would like to elaborate further on this notion: I argue that the plurality of the spectacles and their manifold nature suggest that actors did not exclusively use one set group of gestures; some of these gestures would, moreover, adhere to what Quintilian would call "symbolic." Therefore, if we accept the – convincing, I believe – assumption that pantomime spectacles would depend, at least to some extent, on some "stereotypes" of gestures and movements which would gradually become standard features of the theatrical genre, then these gestures would inevitably carry a certain degree of symbolism. That is, pantomime performance would have the ability to disclose meaning in a way that presupposes a shared communication system between the dancer and the spectator, as for instance in the way a certain emotion would be expressed through a

31 Lada-Richards (2007) 45.

32 Lada-Richards (2007) 48–49.

33 See also Beacham (1999) 144 on the diversity of pantomime's audience.

34 Lada-Richards (2007) 50.

number of gestures that are not (or cannot be) necessarily “imitative” but have been associated with specific human reactions. As Seneca notes, pantomime dancers should be able to employ the appropriate gestures not only to match their movement with the story that is being narrated, but also to express the relevant emotions (*Epist.* 121.6):³⁵

Mirari solemus saltandi peritos, quod in omnem significationem rerum et adfectuum parata illorum est manus, et verborum velocitatem gestus adsequitur.

We are apt to wonder at skilled dancers because their gestures are perfectly adapted to the meaning of the piece and its accompanying emotions, and their movements match the speed of the dialogue.

Seneca's observation indeed points to a crucial aspect of pantomime performance: the dancer's ability to depict not only things that can be “imitated” but, in addition, abstract concepts, such as the expression of several emotional states.

Let us now examine this point more extensively, by drawing on some of the most important sources on pantomime acting. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, I do not argue for a direct use of Quintilian by the authors under examination. I do, however, claim that these texts can reveal that pantomime acting became fond of some elements that, according to Quintilian's seminal treatise, were initially thought as mere components of oratorical delivery and, at the same time, were (at first) opposed to the principles of the popular performance of pantomime.

3 Apuleius, the Judgement of Paris (*Metamorphoses* 10.30–34)

In Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, a novel full of entertaining inset tales, Lucius, still transformed into an ass, describes a pantomime spectacle,³⁶ whose theme is the well-known myth of the judgement of Paris. The passage attributes special emphasis to the actors' costumes and their components.³⁷ The performers'

35 Text and translation from Gummere (1925).

36 It is uncertain whether here Apuleius recalls a “real” pantomime performance; see Zanobi (2014) 46–47 for points that seem to be deviating from the norm; on this description's unique elements as well as for this passage's significance and position in the novel more generally, see May (2008).

37 On these “individualised items,” see Lada-Richards (2007) 39.

appearance would obviously aim at an impression easily recognisable by the audience. For instance, Venus' attire (§31) is based on a strong semiology regarding the chosen colours: white for the goddess' heavenly descent and blue for her association with the sea.³⁸ This interest in "symbolism" is not limited to this: more interestingly, some points of the narration call for a number of gestures that would evidently convey a "symbolic" meaning, as for instance a passage in paragraph 30:³⁹

Quid mandaret Iuppiter nutu significans, et protinus gradum scitule refrens e conspectu facessit.

Then, after indicating Jupiter's instructions with a nod, he quickly and elegantly retraced his steps and disappeared.

At this point, we have a description of the movement of the actor that performs Mercury;⁴⁰ his nod, *nutus*, would express something quite complicated: Jupiter's instruction that Paris should act as a judge in the beauty contest. Further on, when Juno's expression of promise is described (in §31), the narrator assigns to her "lady-like gestures" (*nutibus honestis*).⁴¹ This particular point suggests a hint of class in the performer's movement, yet with a qualitative epithet that bears a rather general description; in other words, the narrator offers a description of a type of gesture that is certainly not imitative and evidently expects his readers to visualise a (stock) type of movement appropriate for *honesti* characters. In the description of Venus' gesture, the narrator's observation is even more intriguing (§32):⁴²

38 On the "semiotics" of pantomime's "symbolic" costume, see Wyles (2008), esp. pp. 77–78 on the costume's symbolic use. On the pantomime dancer's costume in general, see Zanobi (2014) 9–10; it was primarily "designed to follow and emphasise the movements of the dancer's body" (9).

39 Text and translation from Hanson (1989).

40 As Zimmerman (2000) 372 notes, this is "the first specific reference to the mimic skill of pantomime actors upon which Luc. *Salt.* 62f. elaborates."

41 Zimmerman (2000) 380–381 draws attention also to the phrase *inadfectata gesticulatione*; she rightly points to *gesticulatio* as a term found in association with theatrical spectacles (in V. Max. 2.4.4 and Quint. *Inst.* 11.3.183, there in contrast with an orator). Zimmerman further notes that the term is used by Apuleius only in this instance.

42 As Lada-Richards (2007) 45 wonders, "how exactly did the 'effort of her arms' convey Venus' promise that, if proclaimed victorious, Paris would acquire a bride equal in beauty to herself (*Metamorphoses* 10.32)?"

Haec ut primum ante iudicis conspectum facta est, nisu brachiorum polliceri videbantur, si fuisset deabus ceteris antelata, daturam se nuptam Paridi forma praecipuam suique consimilem.

As soon as she arrived in sight of her judge, she could be seen to promise, with a motion of her arms, that if she were preferred over the other goddesses she would give Paris a bride of surpassing beauty, the very image of herself.

Although the performer's exact movement is not outlined,⁴³ the above passage reminds us of Quintilian's programmatic statement about gestures regarding their ability to "speak"; as the rhetorician notes in paragraph 86, they are also used to "promise." In this same paragraph, Quintilian also refers to a variety of emotions expressed by gestures. Notably, Apuleius presents a relevant case in paragraph 34: Juno's and Minerva's anger would have been evident in their *gestus*:

Postquam finitum est illud Paridis iudicium, Iuno quidem cum Minerva tristes et iratis similes e scaena redeunt, indignationem repulsae gestibus professae.

After the judgement of Paris was completed, Juno and Minerva went off stage, gloomy and acting angry, proclaiming with gestures their wrath at being defeated.

Undoubtedly, some standard principles regarding the use of gestures are expected: naturally, as in both everyday life and oratory, the pantomime performance outlined by Apuleius includes instances in which the performer's gesture expresses specific intentions and emotions.⁴⁴ However, these cases, inevitably, also include instances in which the performer's gestures could be characterised as "symbolic" rather than "imitative." The narrator, like Quintilian's ideal orator, points to several gestures that presuppose the audience's familiarity in order for them to be able to follow the performance enacted before their eyes. Thus, although Apuleius' testimony is certainly not

43 Zimmerman (2000) 391 notes the allusion of *nisu brachiorum polliceri videbantur* to the "complex gestural language of the mime artist."

44 See Zanobi (2014) 49 for a good synopsis of Apuleius' detailed description of all protagonists' movements; as she notes, "[t]he diverse quality of the dancing of the three performers is emphasised by explicit statements about the different types of gesticulation and movements adopted by each."

an extensive one, it nevertheless suggests that a pantomime actor's movement would not be restricted to "imitation." This point, which possesses a central role in my own line of investigation, is evidently noted more extensively in the two most important testimonies to pantomime dancing: Lucian and Libanius.

4 Lucian, *Περὶ ὀρχήσεως*

As Lada-Richards succinctly puts it, "Lucian's treatise is a boldly imaginative document, the first attempt in Western theatrical history to map the somatic and mental qualities required of a successful stage performer."⁴⁵ It is remarkable that Lucian acknowledges that pantomime and rhetoric share common principles, since they are both based on *hypocrisis* (see esp. paragraphs 35 and 65).⁴⁶ Lucian, like Quintilian, recognises the immense ability of gestures to disclose meaning; in this context, he refers to dancing as a kind of communication code that can be understood by all people, even those who speak different languages.⁴⁷ Thus, in paragraph 64, pantomime dancers are presented as potential interpreters and mediators:⁴⁸

“βαρβάρους ἔχω, οὐχ ὁμογλώττους, καὶ ἐρμηνέων οὐ ῥάδιον εὐπορεῖν πρὸς αὐτούς. ἦν οὖν τιнос δέωμαι, διανεύων οὗτος ἕκαστά μοι ἐρμηνεύσει.” τοσοῦτον ἄρα καθίκετο αὐτοῦ ἡ μίμησις τῆς ὀρχήσεως ἐπίσημός τε καὶ σαφὴς φανείσα.

"I have barbarian neighbours who do not speak the same language, and it is not easy to keep supplied with interpreters for them. If I am in want of one, this man will interpret everything for me by signs." So deeply had he been impressed by the disclosure of the directness and lucidity of the mimicry of the dance.

45 Lada-Richards (2007) 12.

46 On these two instances see also Zanobi (2014) 19; see further pp. 20–21 on Quintilian (and Cicero) on pantomime and acting more generally – and the associated dangers for an orator's performance. On Lucian's treatise (as well as pantomime performance in general) being constructed according to various rhetorical techniques and concepts, see Schlapbach (2008).

47 As Manuwald (2011) 186 rightly points out, this ability to follow the performance even without knowing the language of the sung story is the reason that "scholars have seen this type of dramatic entertainment as one of the reasons for the wide spread of theatre throughout all regions of the Roman Empire." For a critical approach of the idea that pantomime acting can be universally understood, see Schlapbach (2008) 329, who points to the diverse gesture conventions of different cultures.

48 Quotations and translations of Lucian's text come from Harmon (1936).

Undoubtedly, the “power” of a pantomime dancer is primarily found in his ability to imitate. More interestingly, however, the dialogue later suggests that the dancers not only imitate but also express “abstract” concepts, such as Hercules’ strength and Aphrodite’s elegance (§73):

ὁ δὲ ἐστὶ μάλιστα ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν ἐπαινέσαι, τοῦτο ἤδη ἐρώ· τὸ γὰρ ἰσχύν τε ἅμα καὶ ὑγρότητα τῶν μελῶν ἐπιτηδεύειν ὁμοίως παράδοξον εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ ὡς εἴ τις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ Ἡρακλέους τὸ καρτερόν καὶ Ἀφροδίτης τὸ ἀβρόν δεικνύοι.

But let me tell you in conclusion what is particularly to be commended in our dancers: that they cultivate equally both strength and suppleness of limb seems to me as amazing as of the might of Hercules and the daintiness of Aphrodite were to be manifested in the same person.

Considering Quintilian’s categorisation, according to which both nouns and concepts are basically demonstrated through “natural” gestures,⁴⁹ the dialogue seems to allow for pantomime gestures that convey a meaning that is expressed in a rather “symbolic” way. A pantomime dancer should be able to show both a strong and an elegant character. The association with Quintilian’s “symbolism” is reinforced by the discussion in paragraph 80, in which the speaker points to the necessity for the dancer’s movement to be clear, so that the confusion between certain mythological characters is avoided. Again, such a statement presupposes the sharing of a certain code, perhaps one that has been established over centuries of dancing, especially in connection with the portrayal of stock roles. Along these lines, Lucian, with reference to cases of “failed” performances, acknowledges that a successful performance is based upon the observance of the genre’s “regulations” (§80):

ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀπὸ γε τῶν τοιούτων ὀρχηστῶν ὀρχήσεως αὐτῆς, οἶμαι, καταγνωστέον οὐδὲ τὸ ἔργον αὐτὸ μισητέον, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν, ὥσπερ εἰσὶν, ἀμαθεῖς νομιστέον, ἐπαινετέον δὲ τοὺς ἐννόμως καὶ κατὰ ῥυθμὸν τῆς τέχνης ἱκανῶς ἔκαστα δρῶντας.

But we should not condemn the dance itself, I take it, or find fault with the activity itself on account of such dancers; we should consider them ignorant, as indeed they are, and should praise those who do everything satisfactorily, in accordance with the regulations and the rhythm of the art.

49 See the diagram in Dutsch (2013) 415.

This “code” of the genre seems to be further related to certain ideas about moderated and exaggerated acting. Thus, in paragraph 83, there is a reference to a dancer that once delivered a failed performance because of “exaggerated mimicry” (εἰς ἀσχήμονα ὑπόκρισιν δι’ ὑπερβολὴν μιμήσεως ἐξοκείλαντα), while, in paragraph 84, a pantomime dancer is praised for a modest and discreet performance:

τοῦ γὰρ ὁμοίου Αἴαντος αὐτῷ γραφέντος οὕτω κοσμίως καὶ σωφρόνως τὴν
μανίαν ὑπεκρίνατο ὡς ἐπαινεθῆναι, μείνας ἐντὸς τῶν τῆς ὀρχήσεως ὅρων καὶ μὴ
παροινήσας εἰς τὴν ὑπόκρισιν.

His antagonist and rival, when cast for Ajax in the same role, enacted his madness so discreetly and sanely as to win praise, since he kept within the bounds of the dance and did not debauch the histrionic art.

Although this last point does not relate to the discussion about the use of mimetic or symbolic gestures directly, it nevertheless conveys a point firmly related to rhetorical theory: rhetoricians, including Quintilian, are heavily concerned with the idea that an orator’s delivery style – including, of course, his gestures – should be governed by modesty (cf. *Inst.* 11.3.118).⁵⁰ Quintilian himself notes that exaggerated gestures constitute a feature of mime (*Inst.* 6.3.29), a sub-literal genre firmly related to pantomime; yet, as Lucian here suggests, pantomime dancing, at least a few centuries later, shares the same “anxiety” for the arrangement of a successful performance. Thus, although we are here concerned with two different performative systems, and a possible influence of rhetoric upon pantomime cannot be clearly traced, nevertheless, pantomime, like oratory, is presented as a genre governed by certain rules and strict limitations. And, as we shall see also in Libanius, these “regulations” could have been also related to the use of a certain “gesture code.”

5 Libanius, *Πρὸς Ἀριστείδην ὑπὲρ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν* (*Oration* 64)

Libanius’ testimony forms the second most important and extensive treatise on pantomime dancing. As the sophist himself explains in paragraph 3,

⁵⁰ See further Graf (1991) 46.

the aim of oration 64 is to show that pantomime dancing is not “bad.”⁵¹ The oration is in fact addressed to an orator, Aristides, aiming at defending pantomime and, evidently, functioning as an answer to the accusations by Aristides (§4), who argues that attending a pantomime performance can be disastrous (§9). Beyond the moral contexts of Libanius’ oration, this testimony, like Lucian’s, reveals a number of central themes concerning both the practices and the theoretical principles that govern pantomime dancing. For instance, in paragraph 28, emphasis is laid on the appropriate combination of musical rhythm and movement, pointing to “the dance as the vigorous motion of the limbs along with certain figures and rhythms” (κίνησιν τῶν μελῶν σύντονον μετὰ τινων σχημάτων καὶ ῥυθμῶν).⁵² Later on, the discussion becomes much more informative for the purposes of our examination. In 62, Libanius addresses Aristides’ concern about the dancers’ imitation of women:

δεῖ γὰρ αὐτούς, εἰ μέλλουσιν εὐδοκιμεῖν, μιμεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ μιμεῖσθαι καλῶς τοῦτο ἔστι δῆπου τῆς ἀληθείας ὅτι ἐγγυτάτῳ γενέσθαι. οὐκοῦν, ἃ παρὰ τούτοις ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐν ἡμέρας μικρῷ μέρει κατὰ μίμησιν, ταῦθ’ ἡμῖν συνεχῶς ἐπὶ τῆς ἀληθείας διὰ παντὸς ὁράται τοῦ χρόνου.

For if they are going to be popular, dancers must imitate, and good imitation is, I suppose, getting as close as possible to reality. So what we can see among them in a small part of the day in imitation we continually see in the real world all the time.

Evidently, Libanius is here concerned with “imitative” gestures, pointing to the importance of verisimilitude. He continues discussing women’s gestures by pointing to their close relationship with “actions”:

καὶ γὰρ προστάττουσα καὶ δεομένη καὶ ὑπισχνουμένη καὶ φοβουμένη καὶ λοιδοροῦσα καὶ διὰ πάντων ἰοῦσα νῦν μὲν μετὰ νευμάτων φθέγγεται, νῦν δὲ καὶ χωρὶς λόγων νεύσει.

When a woman is ordering and asking and promising and being alarmed and reproaching and rushing around everywhere, at one moment she will speak along with gestures and at another she will gesture without speech.

51 As Molloy (1996) 177 notes, Libanius’ objectives are unclear, “as he was not generally in favour of actors and dancers, some of whom had treated him badly in the past.” On Libanius’ work more generally, see also Petkas in this volume (p. 29).

52 Libanius’ text is quoted from Foerster (1908); the translation is that of Molloy (1996).

Like Quintilian, Libanius acknowledges that gestures accompany certain emotions and intentions.⁵³ Therefore, although Libanius' analysis springs forth from the fact that pantomime dancers *imitate* women, by simultaneously noting the fact that they are *imitating* the gestures of women, it also makes a more general point: that women make excessive use of gestures, especially when expressing certain emotions and moods. Thus, following this syllogism, it can be argued that the gestures of pantomime dancers eventually end up "imitating" "symbolic" gestures. In other words, if pantomime dancers' gestures reproduce gestures that are used to express certain emotions and intentions, the dancers' gestures could be eventually considered to be "natural" or "symbolic."

This notion becomes more explicit in the following paragraph. In 63, Libanius, responding to the accusations that pantomime gestures are harmful, makes the following argument: since the dancers' gestures imitate life, then the original gestures (i.e., the gestures that are imitated by the dancers) would have been more harmful. This argumentation gives a new, interesting dimension to the term "imitative." Admittedly, pantomime spectacle is, to some extent, an imitation of reality. Thus, if pantomime dancers follow a "naturalistic" style to make their performance understood and convincing, their gestures should also include symbolic gestures, namely gestures used in everyday communication. In this context, the distinction between symbolic and imitative gestures, as proposed by Quintilian, might not be as sharp as perhaps indicated at first sight. As far as the question of "reception" is concerned, it is important to note that the concept of "imitative," as it is here used by Libanius, while it does not oppose the sense of imitation used by Quintilian, at the same time it develops into a more collective one, which encompasses a strong awareness of Quintilian's "symbolic" sense.

Towards the end of the oration, Libanius finally sets forth the benefits of dancing. In paragraph 103, he describes the dancer's physical characteristics,⁵⁴ which are not very different from what Quintilian describes as an orator's ideal body posture (cf. *Inst.* 11.3.83):

δεῖ δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ αὐχένος ὀρθοῦ καὶ βλέμματος οὐχ ὑπτίου καὶ δακτύλων εὖ πεφυκότων καὶ ὅλως κάλλους, ὃ πλεῖστον ἐν τοῖς τῶν θεῶν πράγμασι, μάλιστα δὲ μεταληπτέον ὀρχηστῇ.

53 With reference to Libanius §67, Zanobi (2014) 12 notes: "[s]uch emphasis on emotionality was directly linked with a preference for stories dealing with intense and extreme situations producing intoxicating passions."

54 On this passage and the pantomime dancer's physique in general, see further Zanobi (2014) 10–11.

And also he needs a straight neck and a look which is not furtive, and fingers naturally well-formed, and in a word beauty, which is an essential attribute in matters to do with stage performances and especially in the case of the dancer.

Like Lucian, Libanius acknowledges some striking similarities between the performance principles adopted by the two professions. In this context, the emphasis upon the dancers' fingers is particularly interesting;⁵⁵ it inevitably reminds us of Quintilian's elaborated system of hand gestures. More importantly, the use of fingers is not only connected with demonstrative gestures; as can be seen in Quintilian's account, it is, more interestingly, related to the use of symbolic gestures.

Finally, in paragraph 113, Libanius points to the ability of pantomime to "instruct" (διὰ τῶν σχημάτων παιδεύει τὸν θεατὴν, "through gestures [it] instructs the spectator"), since it presents several complex, intellectual themes, such as riddles (ταῦτα ποίων οὐ γρίφων ἱκανώτερα ψυχὴν ἀκονᾶν; "are not these things more suitable to sharpening the soul than any sort of riddles?"). Although at this point Libanius does not discuss gestures explicitly, he nevertheless points to pantomime's ability to present a situation that demands a certain level of intelligence and the capability of "interpretation" from its audience. Whatever the exact nature of this instruction is, Libanius points to a central feature of pantomime performance: its sophistication.

6 Conclusion: Quintilian's Rhetorical Theory in Pantomime Performance

The above reading of three representative discussions on pantomime acting in light of Quintilian's theoretical analysis of the orator's ideal gesture can suggest a number of very interesting observations. Based on the seminal study of Ismene Lada-Richards on Lucian's treatise, in all three instances of pantomime narratives, we can discern the idea that pantomime performance, governed by some standard – but not necessarily inflexible – regulations, develops a kind of "vocabulary" of gestures. As argued above, this notion can be illuminated further through its juxtaposition with the archetypical theoretical discussion

55 See also Molloy (1996) 264, ad 103: "The need for well-formed fingers points to the importance of the gestures of the hand during the dance, and the grace of these hand-movements was emphasised by contemporary observers. See for instance IGR XIV 1224 which praises the unnamed 'man who talked with his hands' and IIC on the Dancer."

of gesture that is found in Quintilian's seminal treatise on the methodology of a good orator. The famous rhetorician argues for a clear distinction between "natural" and "imitative" gestures. While the latter are naturally considered as the main feature of a dancer's movement, the above textual sources discussing pantomime suggest that these spectacles would not refrain from the use of "symbolic" gesture. Thus, the "gesture vocabulary" advocated by Lada-Richards is evidently related to what Quintilian would consider as "symbolism," i.e., the use of a code of gesture that presupposes not only a common use but also, more importantly, a shared knowledge between the performer and the audience.

Consequently, the popularity and significance of rhetoric throughout late antiquity leads to an interesting case: while rhetoricians – not only Quintilian but also Cicero – draw attention to the dangers of theatrical gesture, due to its influence upon rhetoric, treatises describing pantomime might attest to the opposite. Thus, if we think of Quintilian's "gesture system" as an *exemplum* of rhetorical movement, in this case we have an intriguing case of reception, according to which rhetoric is present in public life not only through *verba* but also through *gesta*. Consequently, we could suggest that Quintilian's "classical" theoretical concepts are present in pantomime texts and/or performances of late antiquity, although in a rather different way from the one envisaged by the famous rhetorician. More importantly, this case of "reception" contributes significantly to the interpretation of Quintilian's discussion *per se*: "symbolic" or "natural" gestures are not only "innate" movements easily understood by all parties; more interestingly, they form a convention that is based on a shared common experience. Thus, a pantomime dancer could also "imitate" gestures that in Quintilian's understanding would be considered "natural."

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SECTION 2

Literature, Theatre, and Culture



Rhetoric, the Dorian Hexapolis, and Knidos: A Study of the Reception of Ancient Rhetoric in the Greek East and Its Impact on the Second Sophistic

Richard Leo Enos




FIGURE 13.1 1914 map of ancient Knidos by Wagner & Debes (Leipzig)
USED BY PERMISSION FROM THE 1900 MAP COLLECTION [HTTPS://WWW.DISCUSMEDIA.COM/](https://www.discusmedia.com/)

A network of Byzantine walls incorporating fragments of a stuccoed Doric frieze was also bared. Perhaps the source of this building material was the nearby Doric Temple of Apollo Karneios. Also reused in the walls was an inscription, a dedication to Apollo Karneios in honour of a certain Clearchus who had run in the festival of the Karneia. Perhaps this was the very festival which we know from ancient literary sources, Δῶριος ἀγών, which brought members of the Dorian Hexapolis to Knidos every four years to celebrate games in honour of their patron deity. It is tempting to associate

the ancient Dorian god, Apollo Karneios, with these games, and his temple with their site.

IRIS CORNELIA LOVE, *A Preliminary Report of the Excavations at Knidos*, 1971, pp. 398–399



1 Introduction: A Rhetorical Diaspora

Traditional approaches to the study of Greek rhetoric have concentrated on prominent theoreticians, educators, and practitioners, often focusing on their individual theories or orations, such as Susan C. Jarrett's recent work, *Chain of Gold: Greek Rhetoric in the Roman Empire*.¹ Much has been gained from the study of individuals but more still can be learned by studying the sites of rhetoric, in terms of how ancient rhetoric was received and its impact on instruction, theory, and performance. In assessing how ancient Greek rhetoric was received and applied, we are tempted to have what Eric Havelock termed a perspective of "Athenocentrism" or using classical Athenian rhetoric as a hierarchical standard for judging all other manifestations of rhetoric in antiquity.² This chapter not only examines how rhetoric was received by other, non-Athenian cultures, but also adjudicates its features and impact within the context of its own social, religious, and cultural use.

A contextualised approach is taken here because current research, as evidenced in this volume, has revealed that the study of classical rhetoric was a diaspora, not only spreading throughout the ancient Greek world, but also across cultures and over time. However, the reception of ancient rhetoric was far from univocal, displaying a spectrum of manifestations based upon the needs and preferences of cultural and historical contexts. Understanding location and culture provides contextual insights not available when studying theory and practice in isolation and judged by Athenian standards. From this perspective, it is important to note in this study of reception that one of the features of history in ancient Greece is that individual city-states often united to form leagues or confederacies. Some such leagues, like the Delian Confederacy, were initially done to provide a united force to oppose Persian

¹ Jarrett (2019).

² Havelock (1986) 125.



FIGURE 13.2 Villa Julia Vasepainter. Dionysius Festival, two women acolytes, Dionysius in the centre. Red-figured stamnos, middle 5th century BCE 400. Louvre (Museum), Paris, France

IMAGE REFERENCE ART205047, ART RESOURCE. USED BY PERMISSION

conquest. However, Greek cities formed such alliances not only for military reasons but also for religious, economic, political, and cultural/social bonds. The uniting and strengthening of these bonds were often built upon shared ethnic and religious foundations, and regular gatherings included celebratory festivals where competitions were done to honour the gods and confirm shared values. In this respect, confederacies and their accompanying festivals provided a unifying epideictic function of reaffirming common cultural values. Unity was instrumentally facilitated by the reception and assimilation of ancient rhetoric into such festivals.

2 The Triopean Festivals to Apollo and Dionysius: Epideictic Celebrations

Virtually all confederacies in ancient Greece were rooted in a religious foundation. As Laurent Pernot argues, “religious oratory represented a considerable part of the sophists’ rhetorical activity” and “the sophists delivered panegyrics

and hymns at ceremonies.”³ As noted earlier, regular festivals honouring gods such as Apollo and Dionysius also strengthened and reinforced social and cultural ties among participating city-states. The most famous of these festivals, the Olympic Games, is an illustration of such a union, a mixture of business, politics, friendly rivalry, and religious celebration that (in this case) promoted and strengthened Panhellenic ties. The gathering of Greek city-states for such games and festivals was regular. Some of the major games, such as the Olympic, Corinthian, and Delian Games were held every two to four years, but other gatherings were held annually and appear all throughout ancient Greece. The Dorian Hexapolis is an example of such a confederacy that met and held games every four years, celebrating Dorian culture with festivals in honour of Apollo and Dionysius that included games in a variety of athletic and artistic competitions.

Festivals honouring Apollo appear throughout Greece and over centuries extending well into the Roman Empire. Some of the most famous Apollonian festivals include not only the Carneia (at Knidos) – the principal focus of study here – but also the Boedromia, Carpieae, Daphnephoria, Delia, Hyacinthia, Metageitnia, Pyanepsia, Pythia, and Thargelia.⁴ The most famous of these festivals to Apollo is the Pythian Games at Delphi. These festivals occurred at set times in the calendar year and at regular intervals, ranging from annual gatherings to as long a span as once every nine years. Festivals honouring such deities as Apollo and Dionysius included not only religious rituals but also celebrations in the form of *agōnes* or contests; many festivals offered a range of *agōnes* that included not only athletic contests but also artistic contests of the Muses. Artistic contests often included not only music, dance, and drama, but also rhetorical performances such as, for example, those in religious-based rhapsodic odes. All such *agōnes* served an epideictic function of honouring Apollo and Dionysius. In fact, the festivals themselves are best understood as a demonstration of epideictic rhetoric. The religious-based honouring of Apollo, for example, served to reinforce the many values associated with Apollo that included protection, insight to the future, success in colonisation, and a bountiful harvest.

To appreciate the reception of rhetoric into such festivals, we must first understand the composition and nature of the Dorian Hexapolis. At its inception, the Dorian Hexapolis was a union of six cities in the general region of

3 Pernot (2017) 262.

4 For a general discussion of festivals to Apollo, see “Festivals and Temples” under “Apollo the Greek God,” accessed 17 Jan 2020, <https://apollothegreekgod2014.weebly.com/festivals-and-temples.html>.

Caria covering city-states on the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea as well as city-states on the Ionian (Turquoise) coast of what is now modern Turkey: Kos, Knidos, Halicarnassus, Lindos, Ialysus, and Camirus.⁵ The latter three cities are on the island of Rhodes. All six of these city-states had strong Dorian ties and celebrated their annual meetings at the Triopean promontory near Knidos with festivals at the Temple to Apollo and other local sites.⁶ The Triopean Games held competitions, proclaimed to be honouring Apollo in the spirit of Dionysius, and it is more than likely – as this chapter argues – that rhetorical contests were a part of such festivals. Research to determine if rhetoric was indeed a part of such festivals and the nature of rhetorical performances is merited; such inquiry may well provide insights into the rhetoricians and performers of ancient rhetoric that heretofore have been unavailable or under-researched in rhetoric's history. As a starting point, we know from archaeological and epigraphical discoveries that rhetoric was a part of such festivals and games in other parts of Greece.⁷ Epigraphical evidence yielded by archaeological excavations over the last century have further revealed that rhetorical contests were included among such artistic competitions. Festivals to Apollo and Dionysius were sponsored by the Dorian Hexapolis and held at and near the Temple to Apollo at the Triopean Promontory near Knidos.

The archaeological remains of the six members of the Dorian Hexapolis show cities that had sites for public assemblies and specifically theatres, which serve as a clear sign of their collective support of the arts. It is reasonable to assume that participation in the *agōnes* would have been widespread and included rhetorical contests. The epigraphy of sites such as Halicarnassus and Knidos is a likely source to confirm the existence and nature of such rhetorical contests. Early efforts by the British in the 19th and 20th centuries has yielded a substantial amount of epigraphical evidence, but these early collections have not revealed any extant written documentation of contests as has been the case at other archaeological sites. The objective, however, is to continue to engage in on-site research – as is now being done by The Turkish Archaeological Society – so that primary evidence regarding rhetorical contests at Knidos can be determined. That said, what we have discovered from a review of extant epigraphical evidence has been revealing, particularly at Knidos, the epicentre of the Dorian Hexapolis and the site of such festivals.

5 Herodotus 1. 144. For an alleged violation of religious and cultural norms at a festival, Halicarnassus was removed from the confederacy and the number reduced to five.

6 Herodotus 1. 144.

7 Enos (2008) 155–163.

Determining if rhetoric was a feature of festivals of the Dorian Hexapolis provides invaluable information about rhetoric's reception in the eastern Roman Empire and its eventual impact on the Second Sophistic. This reception of ancient rhetoric in cultural activities, as argued here, has the potential to provide new insights into the performance of rhetoric in ancient Greece, the schools of instruction, and the cultural consequences of such a reception. Contemporary study has revealed that rhetoric was also taught in this eastern area of Greece, especially the style of Asiatic rhetoric that was eventually such a force in the Second Sophistic.⁸ Not the least of such consequences is that the schools of rhetoric in the East that emerged because of the popularity of rhetoric eventually established a foundation for the Second Sophistic. The Second Sophistic, a major educational movement in the history of rhetoric, thrived during Rome's imperial period, reaching its height from the 2nd through the 4th centuries CE. The term "Second Sophistic" was labelled by Philostratus who, with Eunapius, recorded not only the activities of the original sophists of the classical period such as Gorgias of Leontini but also their own contemporaries.⁹ In the minds of Eunapius and Philostratus, the Second Sophistic was not only a reception of ancient rhetoric but a renaissance, a re-birth of classical rhetoric as once practised by ancient sophists who were the standard and models for their own time. The reception of ancient rhetoric into such cultural activities as festivals in the Greek East laid the foundation for the Second Sophistic.¹⁰

During the Second Sophistic we know that ancient rhetoric was taught at major cities in the East, such as Athens, Rhodes, Antioch, Smyrna, and Ephesus. However, we know little about the smaller sites of rhetoric in the East, especially along the Ionian coast. Halicarnassus and Knidos are examples of just such sites for the study, performance, and dissemination of rhetoric in the East that established the foundation for the Second Sophistic. The possibility of Halicarnassus as a centre for the study of rhetoric is currently under way, so the attention here focuses on Knidos.¹¹

8 Enos (2020).

9 Philostratus, *Vitae sophistarum* 481.

10 Pernot (2017) 255–258.

11 Enos (2020); Newton and Pullman (1862–1863); Newton (1883).



FIGURE 13.3 Aegean Sea and Greece

ANCIENT WORLD MAPPING CENTRE © 2019 (AWMC.UNC.EDU). USED BY PERMISSION

3 Knidos: A Possible Site for Rhetorical Performance and Instruction

Iris Cornelia Love's account of Knidos in *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites* reveals that the archaeological remains of Knidos provide evidence that the area had the environment to celebrate games when the Dorian Hexapolis gathered every four years.¹² The general sites of convocation included the Temple to Apollo Karneios where the Dorian Games may have been held. There are also the remains of what may be an *ōdeion* akin to the one used in the Athenian agora for public lectures. This structure also may have served as a *bouleutērion* or assembly hall for performances. A Hellenistic theatre reveals stage modifications up to Roman times. There is also evidence of a stadium outside the city wall to the west. In short, the venues that are typical of other sites known to hold games – including rhetorical contests – are found at Knidos.

The importance of rhetorical contests in the social and cultural practices of the eastern Greeks makes it likely that the study of rhetoric was also well received and common among the educational centres of Ionia. Further, the archaeological remains of Knidos reveal that the city had the features and structures for both the performance and study of rhetoric. Archaeological excavations in the late 1960s and into the 1970s under the direction of Iris Cornelia Love reveal that the city had public sites where rhetorical contests could be performed at public festivals as well as sites for rhetorical instruction, such as an agora, a stoa, at least two theatres (*ōdeion*), a Temple to Apollo Karneios, a Temple to Dionysius, a Temple to Aphrodite Euploia (which includes a podium that may have held the famous statue of Aphrodite by Praxiteles), a *bouleutērion* (assembly hall), and even a stadium that existed into the imperial period.¹³ Love offers material evidence regarding these public sites at Knidos that could readily have served as sites for rhetorical performance and study.¹⁴ As Raffaella Cribiore points out in her book, *The School of Libanius in Late Antique Antioch*, “scant information” survives about the teaching of rhetoric in the general area of Caria, but “archaeological finds” have revealed that sites such as Aphrodisias as “a center of higher learning.”¹⁵

In addition to archaeological finds, we have literary sources that shed light on the area of Knidos as a potential site for the study of rhetoric. Lucian, the brilliant rhetorician who later became famous as a master of Greek literary satire, was a 2nd-century Syrian from Samosata, a small village on the banks

12 Love (1976) 459; Love (1972b) 398–399.

13 Strabo, *Geographia* 14.2.15; Cook and Sherwin-White (1996) 354.

14 See respective Love entries (1970), (1972a), (1972b), (1973); Akurgal (1983) 252–253.

15 Cribiore (2007) 67; see also Cribiore (2013), Enos (2014).

of the Euphrates. Coming from a family of modest means, Lucian tells us in his autobiographical account *My Dream* (*Somnium*) that he chose education over a trade and likely studied rhetoric from the schools that were available along the Ionian coast. A brilliant satirist, Lucian's witty *A Professor of Rhetoric* (*Rhetorum praeceptor*) is also a very revealing account on the nature, practice, and study of rhetoric in the East. In this satire, Lucian takes it for granted that all those who aspire to get ahead will want to study rhetoric. Lucian, however, wryly posits a choice. There is the serious study of ancient rhetoric, which requires toil, dedication, and above all a diligent study of models such as Demosthenes, Isocrates, and (worst of all) Plato.¹⁶ With tongue firmly in cheek, Lucian sees this hard path as much too difficult and boring, sarcastically urging his readers to take the easier route where students of rhetoric attend schools where they can learn to seem to be eloquent by mastering superficial claptrap techniques, being urbane in appearance but shallow in reality, and effusive in trivial, insincere praise. Lucian ends by exhorting readers to take the easier, downhill path of his contemporary generation rather than the infinitely more difficult and boring, arduous study of classical rhetoric.¹⁷ Lucian's mocking approach is not only a left-handed compliment to the professors and schools of ancient rhetoric who do engage in serious education, but also a revealing perspective by Lucian on how he feels ancient rhetoric was received in the Greek East. Lucian's satire also reveals indirectly that there are many schools of rhetoric in the East and that they are so numerous that they are engaging in a war of popularity. As Lionel Casson posits, Lucian himself did not attend the first-rate schools of rhetoric in the eastern intellectual centres such as Ephesus and Smyrna, probably because Lucian "couldn't afford the tuition."¹⁸ Criore argues that by the time Libanius held the official chair of rhetoric at Antioch (354–363 CE) there was a "network" of sophists and schools in what she terms the Roman East.¹⁹ Unlike the later Greek rhetorician Libanius, Lucian did not study first at a prominent centre of eastern rhetoric such as Antioch before going to Athens. Rather, it is likely that Lucian learned Greek rhetoric from one of the smaller and less-expensive schools along the Ionian coast before he mastered rhetoric, and left to lecture in Athens and eventually other prominent sites across the Roman Empire. While Lucian eventually became famous as a literary artist, there is no doubt that his education began with studying in the schools of rhetoric on the Ionian coast.

16 Lucian, *Rhetorum praeceptor* 10, 17; Criore (2007) 174–196 et passim.

17 Lucian, *Rhetorum praeceptor* 26.

18 Casson (1968) xii.

19 Criore (2007) 83–110.

While it remains difficult to say with certainty what influenced what, there is no doubt that both schools and festivals that incorporated rhetoric into their respective societies were popular. In addition to established festivals that may have included rhetorical performances as *agōnes*, there is also the possibility that Knidos may have been one of these sites for the study of rhetoric. G.W. Bowersock notes in his work *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire* that Knidos was a site for “the origins of sophists and rhetors” of the Second Sophistic.²⁰ Cicero adds support for considering Knidos as a centre for the study of rhetoric in his *Brutus*, where he mentions a rhetorician named Aeschylus of Knidos and speaks of him as a model of one of the two dominant styles of Asiatic rhetoric.²¹ Cicero refers to Aeschylus of Knidos as if he is a well-known rhetorician and an established model for his mode of the Asiatic style of rhetoric. We know that Cicero went to study rhetoric from 79–77 BCE in Athens, Rhodes, and Asia Minor, and it is quite possible that he would have gone to Knidos to study with Aeschylus. In addition, we know from Diogenes Laertius that Eudoxus of Knidos (c.390–c.340 BCE) was also a famous student of Plato’s Academy.²² While much of Eudoxus’ fame comes from his study of mathematics, astronomy, and philosophy, he is also recognised for his study of rhetoric. Finally, the discovery of epigraphical material provides the possibility of learning more about Knidos as both a site for rhetorical contests at the festivals of the Dorian Hexapolis as well as determining if Knidos was also a site for rhetorical instruction. Examining epigraphy that reveals material evidence of Knidos as a site of performance and instruction will reveal how ancient rhetoric was received and, in turn, helped to contribute toward the foundation of the Second Sophistic.

4 Epigraphical Evidence from Knidos Held in the British Museum

Epigraphical evidence also provides material evidence regarding the study and performance of rhetoric at Knidos. Excavations by the British in the 19th century include numerous pieces of epigraphy; in fact, a vast majority of inscriptions discovered at Knidos are now available in the British Museum for study

20 Bowersock (1969) 21.

21 Cicero, *Brutus* 315–316; see also 104.

22 Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* 8. 86 et passim; Philostratus, *Vitae sophistarum* 484.

either directly or through publication.²³ Unlike sites such as the Amphiareion of Oropos that provide inscriptions of victors at various athletic and artistic contests including rhetoric, the numerous inscriptions at such present-day archaeological sites as Knidos (and Halicarnassus) have yet to offer such direct material evidence of the performance and study of rhetoric.²⁴ Nevertheless, a thorough review of these hundreds of inscriptions at Knidos reveals invaluable (albeit indirect) evidence of the possibility of Knidos being a site for the study and performance of rhetoric.

Several inscriptions from Knidos confirm, as indicated earlier, the archaeological material evidence of building sites that were used at other city-states for the study and performance of rhetoric. Knidos inscriptions refer to a Sanctuary of Dionysius where festivals and games would have been held. Inscriptions from Halicarnassus also make reference to Bacchic contest prizes of tripods similar to those awarded at Knidos.²⁵ Inscriptions have also been found at the site of what archaeologists believe to be a gymnasium, a site normally used for athletic training as well as education.²⁶ Inscriptions from Knidos also reveal that there were various guilds such as athletic guilds, and these would be akin to dramatic guilds with one inscription – according to the recording epigrapher – referring to “a thymele for singers.”²⁷ Interestingly, there are inscriptions of statues honouring women and one statue dedicated to a woman, possibly honouring her musical talents.²⁸ Finally, inscriptions reveal that Knidos was a favourite of powerful Romans – such as Julius Caesar as well as Emperors Augustus and Hadrian – who were also known as being patrons of the arts and may well have sponsored cultural building programs, endowed chairs of rhetoric, and promoted dedicatory artistic contests at Knidos as they did at Rome as well as at other sites throughout the empire such as at Athens and possibly Halicarnassus.²⁹ In fact, inscriptions from Knidos help to explain what G.W. Bowersock described as “the intercession of Theopompus with Caesar on behalf of Cnidos.”³⁰ In sum, 19th-century British archaeologists discovered inscriptions at Knidos and Halicarnassus so numerous and at such a high quality that they assert that “in this district of Asia Minor the development

23 Hirschfeld (1893–1916) esp. 48; Newton (1883).

24 Enos (2008) 155–163.

25 Hirschfeld (1893–1916) no. 786, see also p. 79.

26 Hirschfeld (1893–1916) no. 787, see also p. 15; Herodotus 6. 126.

27 Hirschfeld (1893–1916) no. 794, pp. 10–11, line 9; no. 797, p. 14.

28 Hirschfeld (1893–1916) egs. nos. 788, lines 12–13; 790; 791; 808; 823.

29 Hirschfeld (1893–1916) egs. nos. 798, 869, 892; Enos (2013); Avotins (1975).

30 Bowersock (1969) 43.

of writing was more rapid than in Greece proper.”³¹ From the observations of these pioneering archaeologists on the widespread use and sophistication of writing (see reference to the *grammateuōn*, no. 820) we can justly infer that literacy existed at a higher level in the eastern empire and that advanced study of writing may well have been in practice at Knidos as epigraphical evidence reveals that it was at other neighbouring Asian-based Greek city-states such as Teos.³²

5 Conclusion

Cicero’s brief reference that he studied rhetoric under Aeschylus of Knidos offers historians of rhetoric an enticing hint that Knidos, like Halicarnassus, may well be sites that are lost centres for the reception of study and practice of ancient rhetoric in the Greek East. Normally, confirmation of the study and practice of rhetoric at sites such as Athens was determined on the basis of extant literary evidence that survived transmission in the precarious descent of manuscripts over thousands of years. Recent efforts of archaeological research, however, has both complemented and extended the range of literary evidence that was passed down by scribes and scholars. Expanding the range of primary sources to include such newly discovered artifacts yield evidence for historians of rhetoric that enabled us to realise the breadth, endurance, and quality of Greek rhetoric in the East to the point where we should now consider these manifestations of the reception of ancient rhetoric as laying the foundation for the Second Sophistic. That is, among other benefits, such material evidence helps to explain the emergence of the Second Sophistic as well as other important phenomena in the history of rhetoric.

Using Knidos and the Dorian Hexapolis as an example, this chapter has sought to provide such new insights to the Dorian Hexapolis and Knidos as those just mentioned but also to serve as an illustration of the potential for such an area of research. An examination of the material evidence reveals the possibility that Knidos was a site both for the study and performance of rhetoric that drew individuals from all over the Roman Empire, as was the case at Athens and Rhodes. Moreover, this study reveals that the study and practice of rhetoric was not done only by individuals, nor even Greek city-states acting autonomously, but also that rhetoric was supported and practised by Greek confederacies and leagues, such as the Dorian Hexapolis. These collectives

³¹ Hirschfeld (1893–1916) 56.

³² Enos and Peterman (2014).

cemented cultural relationships by not only practising and performing (epideictic) rhetoric regularly at their gatherings but also – through such social and religious activities – indirectly promoting and supporting the study of rhetoric and fostering rhetoric's widespread reception in the Greek East.

David Constantine's *In the Footsteps of the Gods: Travellers to Greece and the Quest for the Hellenic Ideal* is an engaging, even inspiring, account of European scholars and adventurers (predominantly from France and England) who, as early as the 17th century, travelled into the Ottoman Empire in an effort to recover the lost history of ancient Greece.³³ Often at great personal risk, these courageous individuals sought to recapture through direct, personal, first-hand examination the material evidence that provided clues to the past and the Hellenic ideal that shaped education and European culture. In much this same spirit, albeit in a smaller respect, this essay has sought to reveal a new dimension for the study of the dynamic interaction of rhetoric through its reception with the Dorian Hexapolis, as well as new sites for study such as Knidos and the need for historians to engage in direct research at archaeological sites. Through such on-site work new material evidence may be discovered and, therefore, new insights to the study and practice of rhetoric in the Second Sophistic. As was the case with these early scholars, our own time is also fraught with political instability and even some degree of risk. Yet, like our academic predecessors, we should be emboldened to take up the challenge and make personal commitments to travel to sites where archaeological efforts have revealed new material evidence that can enrich and expand our knowledge of the depth, breadth, and reception of ancient rhetoric.

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“A Feast of Languages”: William Shakespeare’s Reception of Ancient Rhetoric

Michael J. MacDonald

1 Introduction: From Imitation to Invention

It is well known that Renaissance humanism was associated with the revival of ancient Greek and Latin rhetoric and literature. Beginning in northern Italy in the 13th century and gradually spreading across Europe into England, humanism – named after the “studies of humanity” (*studia humanitatis*), including the *trivium* of grammar, logic, and rhetoric – was given impetus by the rediscovery of key manuscripts of classical rhetoric. Among these texts were two masterworks of Latin rhetorical theory: Quintilian’s *Institutio oratoria*, unearthed in the cellar of an abbey in Switzerland in 1416, and Cicero’s *De oratore*, found mouldering in a chest in a cathedral library in Italy in 1421. The influence of Ciceronian rhetoric on Renaissance law, politics, and literature was particularly decisive.¹ In addition to recovering major works of Cicero (including, besides *De oratore*, his *Brutus*, *The Orator*, and *Epistulae ad familiares*),² humanist rhetorical culture also inherited a rich legacy of Ciceronian rhetoric from medieval teachers, in part because a pedagogical tradition grounded in Cicero’s *De inventione* and the pseudo-Ciceronian *Rhetorica ad Herennium* persisted in the Latin West from late antiquity until the 17th century.³ As Francis Petrarch (1304–1374) observes in a letter, humanism “immersed [itself] completely in

1 By contrast, the integral text of Quintilian’s *Institutio oratoria* was not widely known in the Middle Ages, though it did circulate as a *textus mutilatus*.

2 In Tudor England, grammar school boys often began their rhetorical studies (at the age of 6 or 7) with the art of letter writing (the *ars epistolica*), which was used to introduce to the basic structural components of a speech. Manuals of epistolary rhetoric such as Erasmus’ *De Conscribendis Epistolis* (1522) and Angel Day’s *The English Secreterie* (1586) generally adapt the classical parts of the oration – introduction (*exordium*), statement of case (*narratio*), argument (*demonstratio*), and conclusion (*peroratio*) – to the composition of letters.

3 It was these two practical manuals of legal argument and persuasion that introduced most European schoolboys to the art of rhetoric.

the Ciceronian springs,"⁴ to the point that scholars across Europe celebrated the Renaissance as an *aetas Ciceroniana* – a new "age of Cicero."⁵

But for all their nostalgia for an idealised Ciceronian (and republican) Rome, the reception of ancient rhetoric in early modern England went beyond the imitation of classical models. Renaissance writers were not content with parroting ancient authorities or, for that matter, with catechising the precepts of Christian eloquence developed during the medieval period in the arts of letter writing (*ars dictaminis*) and preaching (*ars predicandi*, *ars sermonicandi*).⁶ William Shakespeare, for example, satirises humanist scholars who imitate classical exemplars, describing them as "parrot-teachers" (*MAN* 1.1.132) who merely repeat ancient authors – "Let me example my digression by some mighty precedent" (*LLL* 1.2.111) – without creating anything new. As Holonfernes, one of the sophistic pedants in *Love's Labour's Lost*, puts it (miming the Latin), "*imitari* is nothing" compared to the "jerks of invention" (4.2.125). Instead, early modern writers took up and transformed classical models of eloquence and argument for their own purposes: the reception of ancient rhetoric in Renaissance Europe was less a matter of literary mimesis and *imitatio auctoris* than of reinvention and transfiguration.

Among the most remarkable examples of this creative appropriation of ancient rhetoric in early modern Europe is to be found in the plays of Shakespeare, which dramatise the "entire cosmos ... of rhetoric as such."⁷ To be sure, Shakespeare's dramatic art constitutes one of the "greatest achievements of *classical rhetoric*" (emphasis added)⁸ precisely because it exploits most of

4 Rebhorn (2000) 15.

5 Rebhorn (2017) 387.

6 What seem today like moribund concepts and categories of ancient rhetoric were vital areas of rhetorical theory and practice during the Renaissance. For example, the duties or "offices" of the orator (*officia oratoris*) codified by Cicero and Quintilian receive extensive treatment in Shakespeare. Characters seek to prove (*probare*), to win over (*conciliare*), to delight (*delectare*), to teach (*docere*), and to move (*movere*).

7 Plett (2004) 384. Even arrangement (Gk. *taxis*; L. *dispositio*), the most neglected of the five arts, receives extensive treatment in the plays. *Dispositio* applies to both words and matter; words (*verba*) and ideas (*sententiae*) alike must be positioned effectively (*taxis* means to array one's military forces). Despite its spatial terminology, however, *dispositio* is a matter of time and timing (and thus of the *kairos* or opportune moment), since speech is experienced in its temporal unfolding (the "process" of a speech [*O* 1.3.143]). Shakespeare's comedies are full of "preposterous asses" (*TS* 3.1.10) who fail to sequence their words, ideas, and arguments effectively ("go to it orderly" [3.1.866]). Dogberry, the dim-witted but dogged constable of *Much Ado about Nothing*, illustrates this defective or preposterous arrangement when he announces his charges: "Secondarily, / They are slanders; sixth and lastly, they have / Belied a lady; thirdly, they have verified unjust / Things" (5.1.208–211).

8 Kennedy (1980) 213.

the techniques and formal devices – the “artificial instruments”⁹ – elaborated by Graeco-Roman theorists and teachers.¹⁰ But while Shakespeare was trained in Latin rhetoric at the King’s New School in Stratford-on-Avon, his mastery of style, argument, and persuasion went well beyond a mastery of the codes, models, and *formulae dicendi* beaten into him by his Catholic schoolmasters.¹¹ Shakespeare translates and repurposes ancient rhetoric in his “study of imagination” (*MA* 4.1.224), crafting a popular English vernacular rhetoric suitable for the stage. After all, it is a long way, temporally and geographically, from the agnostic public spaces of ancient Greek and Roman legal and political rhetoric to the fictional royal courts and enchanted green worlds of Shakespeare’s comedies, romances, and tragedies. Moreover, Shakespeare’s reception of ancient rhetoric was filtered through Christianity, French and Italian literary models, and countless native English poetic, dramatic, and rhetorical traditions, ranging from medieval *fabliaux* and morality plays to early modern historical chronicles and travel narratives. The aim of this chapter is to elucidate how Shakespeare takes up and transforms – “figures” and “disfigures” (*TS* 1.2.85) – ancient terms, sources, and precepts to create a new vernacular, dramatic rhetoric appropriate for the London commercial theatre market. After examining Shakespeare’s appropriation of the ancient rhetorical exercises known as *progymnasmata*, I show how his characters deploy techniques of rhetorical delivery, interpretation, and persuasion within the pragmatic universe of their play-worlds.

2 “Priscian a Little Scratched”: Shakespeare and the *Progymnasmata*

An important shaping influence on the form and substance of Shakespeare’s dramatic rhetoric was the series of composition exercises known as *progymnasmata*. Codified by the Hellenistic sophist Hermogenes, the *progymnasmata* was a graduated sequence of 14 preliminary exercises (Gk. *pro-gymnasmata*) that introduced students to the basic modes, structures and processes of discourse and argument, from fable and narrative to description and

9 Kempse [1588] (1966) 233.

10 Tudor grammar school training in rhetoric focused on the imitation of classical models of elegant Latin prose style, especially the prose of Cicero.

11 Corporal punishment was central to the pedagogical regime of the Latin grammar school. Shakespeare’s plays reflect the strict discipline of the Latin schoolroom – a boot camp or “rhetorical Sandhurst or West Point” – in many ways: “And wilt thou, pupil-like, / Take thy correction mildly, kiss the rod, / And fawn on rage with base humility?” (*RII* 419). Rhodes (2004) 84.

argument. The *progymnasmata* include: (1) fable (Gk. *mythos*); (2) narrative (Gk. *diēgēma*); (3) anecdote (Gk. *chreia*); (4) proverb (Gk. *gnōmē*); (5) refutation (Gk. *anaskeuē*); (6) confirmation (Gk. *kataskeuē*); (7) commonplace (Gk. *koinos topos*); (8) encomium (Gk. *enkōmion*); (9) vituperation (Gk. *psogos*); (10) comparison (Gk. *synkrisis*); (11) impersonation (Gk. *ēthopoia*, *prosōpopoia*); (12) description (Gk. *ekphrasis*); (13) theme or thesis (Gk. *thesis*); (14) proposal of a law (Gk. *nomou eisphora*). This battery of composition (and performance) exercises is important to the study of early modern rhetoric for several reasons.¹² First, Priscian emphasises discourse as a mode of action and performance. The exercises are not static genres but ways of doing things with words, such as describing, refuting, praising, and criticising. Second, the *progymnasmata* dominated European rhetorical education from the time of Quintilian (1st century CE) to the 16th century.¹³ These exercises were adopted by Latin rhetoric teachers and transmitted – through translations of Rudolph Agricola, Richard Rainolde, and most influentially, by Reinhard Lorichi – into the rhetorical culture of Tudor England, which placed ancient Latin rhetoric at the core of the grammar school curriculum.¹⁴ And third, Shakespeare was drilled in these exercises as a schoolboy or “breeching scholar” (*TS* 3.1.18), and it is not difficult to see that the *progymnasmata* provide the basic compositional elements of Shakespeare’s plays: the plays are a textual composite or “mingle-mangle” (Lyly 1592: A2 r–v) of discursive forms and strategies derived from these exercises.¹⁵ To illustrate how Shakespeare appropriates these techniques, this section focuses on three *progymnasmata* in action in the plays: the commonplace, description, and impersonation.¹⁶

12 Priscian, a grammarian, was a proto-structuralist in his efforts to identify and classify different discursive forms, genres, and activities in a taxonomy.

13 Of course, teachers of grammar, rhetoric, and composition still assign many of these exercises today.

14 Baldwin (1944); Grendler (1989), (2002); Mack (2002), (2017). Richard Rainolde’s English translation of Aphthonius’ *Progymnasmata* appeared in 1563 (one year before Shakespeare’s birth) and included a declamation on “the Despotism of Richard III.”

15 Even in antiquity, Aristotle’s division of rhetoric into three genres (*genera*) – forensic (legal), deliberative (political), and epideictic (ceremonial) – could not account for the diversity of rhetorical forms and practice. Needless to say, Shakespeare’s rhetors blur the lines between rhetorical and literary genres; the plays are a mixture or composite of poetic and persuasive forms (*genera mixta*).

16 Examples of the *progymnasmata* in action could be multiplied. Confined in his cell and condemned to “speechless death” (1.3.174), the deposed King Richard II assigns himself the exercise of *comparatio*: “I have been studying how I may compare / This prison where I live unto the world; I’ll hammer it out” (*KRII* 5.5.1–5).

2.1 *Commonplace Shakespeare*

In the first entry in his *Commonplace Book*, under the heading, "Commonplaces," the British novelist E.M. Forster confesses to being suspicious of commonplaces, or what Latin rhetorical theorists called *loci communes* (Gk. *koinoi topoi*). For Forster, commonplaces are not really "ideas" but rather "certified topics" that can be "carried around intact."¹⁷ As an example, Forster points to the Bishop of Limerick, John Jebb, who had mastered the art of portable commonplaces so thoroughly that he was never "surprised by anything in his own thought" (1). Nevertheless, while modern writers generally reject *loci communes* as repositories of cliché and opinion, the commonplace was a key composition exercise from the Hellenistic age to the Renaissance. Priscian's *Progymnasmata* was widely taught in the early modern period, and exercises in the commonplace were central to grammar school rhetorical training in England and across Europe. The reason for this is simple: for all its brevity, the commonplace can achieve powerful persuasive effects because it carries the authority of received wisdom and the "already known" (Priscian, *Fundamentals Adapted from Hermogenes* 58). A commonplace "struck off" (59) at the right moment has the "purpose of emphasising something already known, as if the arguments are finished" (59). To dispute a commonplace is thus to dispute common knowledge, if not the structure of reality, and for this reason the commonplace can be an effective technique of persuasion. Grammar school and university students were, therefore, encouraged to cull ideas and phrases from books – *florilegia* or "flowers of reading" – and gather them under thematic headings or *common places* in their notebooks ("virtue," "love," "courage" and so forth). In addition to collecting their own *loci communes*, writers could consult popular commonplace books such as Erasmus' *Adagia* (1500) and *Apothegmes* (1542), which offered writers a stock of proverbial sayings – "sage saws," as Sir Toby Belch calls them (*TN* 3.4.375) – for imitation, moral improvement, and, most importantly, for composing persuasive discourses.¹⁸

The rhetors in Shakespeare's fictional worlds are often masters of the *loci communis*. Polonius, the prolix counsellor to the usurping King Claudius, rattles off a series of commonplaces – a "few precepts" (*H* 1.3.57) – for the moral edification of his son, Laertes: "Give every man thy ear but few thy voice ... neither a borrower nor a lender [be] ... to thine own self be true ..." (see *H* 1.3.57–80). Not surprisingly, Iago, the agile sophist, is cunning in his persuasive use of commonplaces, since he seeks to mask his perverse plot to destroy Othello

17 Forster (1932) 1.

18 Moss (1996), (2006).

under the guise of plain speech and conventional Christian morality. Posing as spiritual counsellor to his lovelorn dupe, Roderigo, Iago uses a commonplace (and echoes the Bible) when he observes, "How poor are they that have not patience. / *What wound did ever heal but by degrees?*" (*O* 1.3.65–66; emphasis added).¹⁹ It is difficult to argue with this commonplace, even if Iago is using it to defraud Roderigo of his estate: it takes time for physical and psychological wounds to heal. An uncommonly powerful example of the commonplace at work occurs when the duke of Venice, after hearing Othello's eloquent legal defence speech ("I will a round unvarnished tale deliver ..." [1.3.91]), tells Desdemona's father that "to mourn a mischief that is passed and gone / Is the next way to draw new mischief on" (1.3.205–206). The duke's commonplace comes close to Priscian's *sententia* – a "general maxim urging us to a certain action or calling on us to refrain" (*Fundamentals Adopted from Hermogenes* 56) – in its appeal to the authority of general experience: dwelling on old injuries may inflict new ones. But Brabantio rejects the Duke's counsel (while also punning derisively on sentence/*sententia*), observing that words alone cannot relieve the heart of genuine suffering: "These *sentences*, to sugar, or to gall, / Being strong on both sides, are equivocal. / But words are words: I never yet did hear / that the bruised heart was pierced through the ear" (*O* 1.3.217–220; emphasis added). Both commonplaces prove their wisdom by the end of the tragedy. The Duke is right: mourning brings new mischief on, since Brabantio languishes over the loss of his daughter to Othello. And Brabantio is right: words cannot mend a broken heart, since Desdemona's elopement proves "mortal to him... Pure grief / Shore his old thread in twain" (5.2.203–204).

2.2 "It Undoes Description to Do It": Shakespearean *ekphrasis*

Another important exercise in the *progymnasmata* is description (*ekphrasis*). Shakespeare, drilled in these exercises, was a master of vivid visual description. This was an especially important skill for the Tudor playwright because the stage was quite bare, thus making description or word-painting necessary to help audiences visualise or "eke" out the action in the "quick forge and working house" (*KHV* 5.0.23) of the imagination. As Aristotle argues in his *Rhetoric*, *ekphrasis* seems to "place before one's eyes" (*pro ommatōn poiei* [1410b 33–36]) with lifelike vividness the events and objects being represented. Adding detail to this portrait, the Renaissance theorist Henry Peacham argues

19 There are, of course, many affinities between theatre and the art of preaching. The Catholic sacrament of the Eucharist was known to Protestants as "the pope's theatre," and the pulpit or *pulpitum* used for delivering sermons (the *ars sermonicandi*) also referred to the scaffolding and platform of the theatre stage.

that *ekphrasis* presents a subject so vividly to the eye of the imagination (the *oculus imaginarius*) that it "seemeth rather painted in tables, then declared in words" (*The Garden of Eloquence* 134). Consider, for example, Shakespeare's description of the rough seas on the journey from Venice to Cyprus in *Othello*, in which he uses imagery of tumult and natural disaster with remarkable vividness. Here natural disorder mirrors political disorder as the waves seem to swell up to drown the stars: "The chidden billow seems to *pelt the clouds*; / The wind-shaked surge, with high and monstrous mane, / Seems to *cast water on the burning bear*, / And *quench the guards of the ever-fixed pole*" (*O* 2.1.11–15; emphasis added).²⁰ Another, more striking, example of *ekphrasis* is Clarence's premonitory dream of drowning in *King Richard III*. Imprisoned in the tower of London and soon to be murdered by his brother, Richard, Clarence dreams of sailing to "Burgundy" (he is indeed on a voyage to Burgundy, since he is later drowned in a barrel of red wine) and offers an eye-opening example of *ekphrasis* when he describes his dream: "What sights of ugly death within mine eyes. / Methoughts I saw a thousand fearful wracks, / A thousand men that fishes gnawed upon, / Wedges of gold, great anchors, heaps of pearl, / Inestimable stones, unvalued jewels, / All scattered in the bottom of the sea. / Some lay in dead men's skulls, and in the holes / Where eyes did once inhabit" (*KRIII* 1.4.23–29). It is not difficult to see that this example of *ekphrasis*, with its emphasis on vision, eyes, and eye sockets, seems less written in words than "painted in tables" like a work of visual art.

While *ekphrasis* is often associated with the vivid visual description of painting, sculpture, and architecture, this technique is also used in judicial rhetoric as a means of vivifying the portrayal of evidence and criminal acts. *Ekphrasis* is a powerful technique of legal argument and persuasion because it turns the reader or listener into an *eyewitness*. For this reason, Quintilian views *ekphrasis* as a species of *evidentia* and *demonstratio* – a kind of visual proof.²¹ A fascinating example of (quasi)legal *ekphrasis* in action is Macbeth's speech after he has rashly murdered the two attendants of King Duncan. The Macbeths had planned to kill the king and frame his attendants for the murder; Lady Macbeth drugs them and then smears their faces and daggers with Duncan's blood ("I'll *gild* the faces for it must seem their *guilt*" [*M* 2.2.54–56; emphasis added]). The blood ("gild" is to be interpreted as visual evidence of their guilt (the "ocular proof" [*O* 3.3.363])). But now that Macbeth has scotched the plan,

20 Classical theorists even had a name for this subspecies of *ekphrasis*: *hydrographia*, or the vivid description of bodies of water.

21 Altman (2010).

he attempts to justify his murder of the witnesses by painting a moving picture of the scene that spurred the “expedition of [his] violent love” (*M* 2.3.108):

Here lay Duncan,
His silver skin lac'd with his golden blood;
And his gash'd stabs look'd like a breach in nature
For ruin's wasteful entrance: there, the murderers,
Steep'd in the colours of their trade, their daggers
Unmannerly breech'd with gore. Who could refrain,
That had a heart to love, and in that heart
Courage, to make's love known? (2.3.109–116)

Macbeth creates a *tableau vivant* for his audience by drawing a visual antithesis between the king and his alleged killers (“*Here* lay Duncan ... *there*, the murderers”) and using vibrant visual imagery such as royal colours (“silver,” “golden”) and gory, striking details (“gash'd stabs,” “daggers ... breech'd with gore”). Nevertheless, the stylised quality of Macbeth's rhetoric, gilded with similes (“like a breach in nature”) and euphemisms (“colours of their trade”), only serves to reveal *his* guilt. Macbeth's breach of rhetorical *decorum* is damning: plain speech, not ekphrastic eloquence, would be more appropriate after finding the king of Scotland murdered in his bedchamber. His words are also unwittingly ironic. It is Macbeth's murder of Duncan that opens a “breach in nature / For ruin's wasteful entrance,” since in medieval and Renaissance political theology the king is head of the body politic as well as of the natural world. As he descends into nihilism, Macbeth proves to be an unnatural tyrant bent on achieving “sovereign sway and masterdom” (1.5.61) over Scotland even if it means seeing “the treasure / Of nature's germens tumble all together, / Even till destruction sicken ...” (4.1.58–60).

2.3 “*I Am Not What I Am*”: Impersonating Shakespeare

A third exercise or *progymnasma* that figures prominently in Shakespeare's art of dramatic rhetoric is impersonation. In the preface to his influential study, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning*, Stephen Greenblatt observes that “self-fashioning is always (though not exclusively) in language” (2004: 9). One resource for this practice of linguistic self-fashioning in early modern England may have been schoolroom training in the art of declamation and, more specifically, impersonation or *ēthopoia* (our third *progymnasma* in action). Originally a sophistic invention that flourished in the Hellenistic period and into late antiquity, especially in the Graeco-Roman Second Sophistic (first to third centuries CE), declamation is the public performance of a fictitious speech, often impersonating

figures from history and mythology (see Gunderson 2017; Pernot 2017).²² As its root word suggests, *ēthopoia* is closely linked to *ēthos*, a mode of persuasion that draws on the moral character of the speaker as it is constructed in the speech itself – even for Aristotle, *ēthos* can be a rhetorical mask or *prosōpon* (*prosōpopoia* is another Greek name for impersonation; see Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1). In ancient Greece and Rome through the medieval period into Renaissance England, schoolboys were required to not only compose but also perform declamations on imaginary themes drawn from ancient law, myth, fiction and politics.²³ This schoolroom training in mimicry, rhetorical delivery and *ēthopoia* – literally, “character-making” – seems to have cultivated a fluid, protean, and theatrical sense of self-identity, a “habit of alterity,” as Enterline (2012: 25) calls it, in early modern English culture.²⁴ I examine Shakespeare’s rehearsal of rhetorical delivery (*actio*) below, but for now it is important to note that Tudor grammar school lessons in *ēthopoia* – fashioning imaginary selves, or *acting* – provided ideal training for budding actors and playwrights like the young Shakespeare. But how do Shakespeare’s characters, themselves *personae* fabricated by the poet, practise *ēthopoia* to achieve their rhetorical goals?

The art of impersonation takes centre stage in Shakespeare’s plays, especially in the tragedies and history plays, in which courtly life often requires the continuous creation of rhetorically stylised *personae* shaped by the exigencies of the political moment. The ability to adapt to changing circumstances is an essential skill for the courtier, and Shakespeare’s rhetors are often protean actors who can alter their corporeal shape – be “that or this / By voluntary metamorphosis” (Bulwer, quoted in Roach 1985: 43) – as the occasion demands.²⁵

22 The transition from Republic to Empire led to an explosion of interest in declamation during the Second Sophistic, prompting the mutation of rhetorical genres into literary genres.

23 The Latin declamations passed down by Quintilian and Seneca the Elder, as well as the declamations of the Second Sophistic period (200–300 CE), which gave rise to the romance, the novel, and other literary genres, exercised a powerful influence on Renaissance drama and literature for another reason. Declamations are rich repositories of lurid and improbable plots, themes and characters – rape, incest, fratricide, matricide, pirates, kidnappings, orphans, mistaken identity, witchcraft, contested wills – to be quarried by aspiring playwrights (see Rhodes [2004: 612] on these “sleazy, more extravagant and sensational themes” in Shakespeare).

24 Enterline argues that this training in impersonation and rhetorical *actio* may account for the rapid rise of the London commercial theatre in the latter stages of the 16th century; see Enterline (2012).

25 In his *Anatomy of Melancholy*, Robert Burton describes the power of fantasy over the body: “So diversely doth this fantasy [*phantasia; imaginatio*] of ours affect, turn, and

They fashion and refashion themselves according to the changing rhetorical environment, much as Richard III can “add colours to the chameleon” and “change shapes with Proteus for advantages” (3*HVI* 3.2.78–80). An exemplary case is Iago, Shakespeare’s true master of *ēthopoia*. Passed over as lieutenant and consigned to the rank of Othello’s ensign (flag-bearer), the ensign makes himself a master of signs. Masking the “native figure” of his heart with “forms,” “visages,” “shows,” “flags,” and “signs” of loyalty to the Moor (*O* 1.1.48–54), Iago artfully fabricates his character – his *ēthos* – as a blunt, honest soldier so successfully that he appears honest to everyone in the play (except his wife, Emilia). Iago reveals his treacherous duplicity as an imposter when he confesses that “in following [Othello], I follow but myself. Heaven is my judge, not I for the love and duty / But seeming so, for my peculiar end ... I am not what I am” (1.1.57–64). In fact, “honest” Iago is nothing without his masks and *personae*: without his disguises, he confesses, “I am not what I am.” Iago tellingly invokes Janus (“By Janus!” [1.2.33]), the Roman god with two faces, one looking backward and one looking forward: like Janus, Iago is two-faced. And like Satan, the shape-shifting sophist, Iago is a demonic double of the true Christian. When he confesses, “I am not what I am,” Iago inverts the meaning of Yahweh’s words (“I am what I am” [Exodus 3:14]) even as he poses as a pious confessor to Othello. For these reasons, Iago’s hypocrisy has become synonymous with the tragic consequences of impersonation and deceptive appearances. But *ēthopoia* also plays a leading role in Shakespeare’s romances and comedies. Combined with masks, role-playing, and cross-dressing, impersonation often serves the noble end of pairing lovers and repairing a damaged social order. “I am not what I am” (*TN* 3.1.139): Viola is not what she seems to be when, impersonating the pageboy, Cesario, she woos Orsino on behalf of Olivia to bring peace to the court of Illyria. Whether in comedy or tragedy, Shakespeare’s characters are masters – and mistresses – of the art of impersonation. Impersonation, however, is one art within a greater, more encompassing art in Shakespeare’s dramaturgy: rhetorical delivery.

3 “I’ll Play the Orator”: Shakespeare and Rhetorical Delivery

3.1 *Rhapsodes, Hypocrites, and Lawyers: Delivery in Ancient Rhetoric*

Although theatre might seem to have a tenuous connection to rhetorical theory and practice, in ancient Greece and Rome theatre and rhetoric were

wind, so imperiously command our bodies, which as another Proteus, or a chameleon, can take all shapes; and is of such force that it can work upon others” (127).

deeply interconnected institutions. Athenian Old Comedy, for example, was performed as public contests (*agōnes*) of rhetoric during the Dionysian festivals. As this competitive, performative context suggests, plays were rhetorical artefacts in that comic and tragic poets had to persuade the judges and audience of the merits of their creations. In other words, ancient comedy and tragedy were genres of epideictic rhetoric that aimed to please, instruct, and persuade (male) Athenian audiences. The Greek theorists even called rhetorical delivery *hypocrisis*, after the word for actor (*hypokritēs*), thus emphasising the theatrical dimensions of rhetorical performance. Moreover, the interplay between rhetoric and acting may have even deeper roots in Greek culture than Old Comedy. According to Aristotle, the origins of rhetorical delivery can be traced to the oral performances of the archaic rhapsodes, who "themselves acted their tragedies" (Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.1.2). And while Aristotle considers the art of delivery "vulgar" (*phortikon* [3.15]) because it plays on the emotions (*pathei*) instead of appealing to reason (*logos*), he nevertheless describes delivery as an art of the "greatest importance" in legal and political affairs: "but since the whole business of rhetoric is to influence opinion, we must pay attention to [delivery], not as being right, but necessary" (3.1.5).

Aristotle's ambivalence toward rhetoric as an art of acting or *actio* – the "graceful regulation of voice [*vox*], countenance [*vultus*], and gesture [*gestus*]" (*Ad Herennium* 1.3) – was even more pronounced in Roman rhetoric. Cicero, for all his patrician contempt for the theatre and the actor's "trivial art" (Cicero, *De oratore* 1.25), also recognised the affinities between rhetoric, theatre, and the law. In theatre, as in the courtroom, rhetoric is a bodily affair. Legal trials in Rome were often public spectacles performed in the Forum (often in the same space as gladiatorial contests), and Cicero, therefore, requires his ideal orator to cultivate the voice of a "tragedian" and the countenance of a "consummate actor" (*summus actor*) (1.28). Cicero observes that by "action the body talks" (*actio quasi sermo corporis*) (see 3.59.220–223), noting that *actio* requires the careful modulation of the voice, the graceful but manly motion of the body (*corporis motus*), and a mobile, expressive face and gaze (*mobilis vultus*). Indeed, for Cicero the lawyer (*advocatus*) is a higher type of actor (*actores* was another name for *advocatus*): lawyers are "players who act real life" (3.50.6). "What actor," asks Crassus, the avatar for Cicero in the *De oratore*, "gives keener pleasure by his imitation of real life than your orator affords in his conduct of some real case?" (2.8). Cicero also draws another connection between rhetoric and theatre when he recommends that the advocate prepare for trial by "playing many roles" (see 3.50) in himself – advocate, adversary, and judge. Shakespeare's King Richard II practises this rhetorical role-playing in his prison cell: "Thus play I in one person many people / And none contented:

sometimes am I king; / Then treasons make me wish myself a beggar, / And so I am: then crushing penury / Persuades me I was better when a king; Then am I king'd again: and by and by / Think that I am unking'd by Bolingbroke" (*RII* 5.5.31–38).

Ambivalence aside, in Greece and Rome rhetorical delivery was a sign of gender and class hierarchy. Training in vocal and bodily performance was a process of "making men" (Gleason 1994) as elite boys learned to enact the noble, virile masculinity of the good man skilled in speaking (*vir bonus dicendi peritus*). The anonymous author of the *Ad Herennium*, therefore, cautions students against lapsing into the effeminate histrionics of "stage actors" or *histriones* ("aping the elegances of the stage" [11.3.184]) or the uncultivated gestures of "day labourers" (*operarii*) (11.3.203). Perhaps Shakespeare had the *Ad Herennium* in mind when, in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, he casts a motley crew of *operarii* or "rude mechanicals" (3.2.9–10) (who rehearse "most obscenely" [1.2.101–102]) in a tragedy to be performed for the Athenian royal court. How does Shakespeare represent the art of *actio* on stage?

3.2 "Action Is Eloquence": Shakespearean *actio*

This classical view of *actio* as acting, in which verbal eloquence goes hand in hand with physical eloquence (Quintilian's *eloquentium corporis*) (*Institutio oratoria* 11.1.2), persisted through late antiquity and the Middle Ages and into the early modern period.²⁶ The discussion of rhetorical delivery in the *Ad Herennium* and the *Institutio oratoria* furnished Renaissance playwrights with a manual for theatrical performance.²⁷ But while the centrality of rhetorical training to the Tudor grammar school curriculum has been well established in Shakespeare studies,²⁸ scholars are only now beginning to explore the role of performance, theatricality, and rhetorical delivery (Gk. *hypocrisis*; L. *actio*, *pronuntiatio*) in this training. To be sure, rhetorical education in Renaissance England (and most of Europe) focused on the analysis, translation, and imitation of ancient Latin exemplars. But this training was not confined to reading and writing – "read, read, read; write, write, write," as T.W. Baldwin puts it (Baldwin, quoted in Enterline 2012: 43). Recent archival research on Tudor

26 In the Middle Ages and Renaissance, letters were a crucial medium of diplomacy that were often read aloud or "performed" by emissaries and ambassadors.

27 Joseph Roach (1985) suggests that the repertoire of gestures and facial expressions codified by the ancient theorists of *actio* dominated stage acting in the Elizabethan age.

28 Building on T.W. Baldwin's magisterial *William Shakespeare's Small Latine & Lesse Greeke* (1944), an account of Shakespeare's grammar school training in Latin rhetoric, scholars such as Marion Trousdale (1982); Brian Vickers (1989); Peter Mack (2002); and many others have demonstrated how the boy bard's training in Latin rhetoric shaped the structure and content of the plays.

grammar school statutes, curricula, and student notebooks, for example, has foregrounded the theatrical aspects of rhetorical training. Thus, in *Shakespeare's Schoolroom*, an analysis of gender, power, and rhetorical pedagogy in the Tudor grammar school classroom, Lynn Enterline argues that "humanism's disciplinary training in imitation relied on the memorial, verbal, bodily, and affective techniques of public performance."²⁹ To understand the role of rhetorical training in the genesis of Shakespeare's dramatic art it is, therefore, necessary to add to the "solitary and scribal model (the textual habits associated with *inventio* and *copia*) the corporal and vocal aspects of Latin performance that were necessary for *actio*."³⁰ While it is difficult to reconstruct what took place in Shakespeare's classroom at the King's New School, the theatrical elements of schoolroom training in Latin rhetoric – from acting, memorisation, and voice training to dialogue, disputation, and the impersonation of mythical and historical characters, both male and female – would have left the boy bard well prepared to compose plays (as well as act in them). But precisely what role does the art of delivery – the bodily and vocal performance of public speech, or suiting the "action to the word, and the word to the action" (*H* 3.2.17–18), as Hamlet calls it – play in Shakespeare's dramatic rhetoric?

Many of Shakespeare's characters are keen critics of rhetorical performance. In *Troilus and Cressida*, for example, Ulysses criticises Achilles' *actio*, especially his gestures ("with ridiculous and awkward action pageants us" [166]) and vocal delivery ("wooden dialogue," "tongue of roaring typhoon," "chime a-mending" [see 1.3.150–160]).³¹ Such criticisms of rhetorical performance often betray anxieties about class and educational status, since training in rhetoric in Renaissance Europe, as in antiquity, was a form of cultural capital that both signified and reinforced class, gender, and racial hierarchies³² – it was the "indelible cultural seal of superiority" (Grafton and Jardine 1987: xiv):³³ "Action and accent did they teach him there: / 'Thus must thou speak and thus thy body bear'" (*LLL* 5.2.99–100). In *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, for example,

29 Enterline (2012) 41.

30 Enterline (2012) 102.

31 Wilson supplies a catalogue of vocal vices (*vitia*) that vitiate the effectiveness of an oration, including "piping," "whistling," "rattling," "cackling," "barking," "gaping," speaking as if with "Plummes" in one's mouth, or speaking too "finely," as if raised in a "Ladies Chamber" (see *Arte of Rhetoric* 219).

32 The corruption of eloquence – already an established *topos* in Quintilian's time (1st century CE) – was often blamed on its popularity among the plebeians. According to Tacitus, for example, rhetoric fell into decay when it was no longer reserved for *nobiles* but could be learned by anyone, like any "vulgar handicraft" (*Dialogue of Orators* 32).

33 In Renaissance Europe, as in antiquity, the ability to write elegant, persuasive speeches and prose compositions (including letters) in Latin and English was a practical skill that opened avenues into law, commerce, politics, the church, and other elite professions.

the Athenian king and queen turn up their noses at the rhetorical performance of Bottom and his troupe of “hempen homespuns” (*MSND* 3.1.25): “He hath rid his prologue like a rough colt; he knows not the stop he hath played on this prologue like a child on a recorder; a sound, but not in government. His speech was like a tangled chain; nothing impaired, but all disordered” (5.1.119–125). In addition to these meta-rhetorical moments of embedded criticism, Shakespeare’s characters often exploit rhetorical delivery to manipulate the emotions of the audience. In rhetoric and theatre alike the body and its “dumb significants” (2.5.21–26) – eyes, mouth, arms, hands, expressions, and gestures “framed for each occasion” (*1Henry VI* 3.3.273) – are so moving because the body speaks a “universal language” (*sermo communis*) rooted in our shared corporeal existence (see Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 11.3.2–14): “Delivery, which gives the emotion of the mind expression, influences everybody, even barbarians” (Cicero, *De oratore* 3.58.216).³⁴ Tears, for example, can be called forth as “prevailing orators,” as Titus Andronicus puts it (*TA* 3.1.26), though *decorum* must still be observed, since copious tears – sometimes prompted by an “onion hidden in a handkerchief” (*TS* 0.2.126) – can hinder persuasion: “Tears will drown my oratory / And break my utterance even in the time / When it should move ye to attend me most, / And force you to commiseration” (*TA* 5.3.89–92). Blood is another effective means of kindling emotion, especially in an age when bear-baiting and public torture and executions were theatrical fare in their own right (as was the case in ancient Rome and Renaissance England). Titus Andronicus thus begs the Roman senators to “witness this wretched stump, witness these crimson / lines” (5.2.22–23), while Edmund, plotting to frame his brother and steal his estate, stabs himself with a dagger to make it appear he has been attacked: “Some blood drawn on me would beget opinion (*Cuts his arm*)” (*KL* 2.1.33–34). The gaze is also a powerful means of evoking emotion,

34 The emotional effect of delivery reveals yet another link between rhetoric and acting: the lawyer, like the actor, must feel within himself the emotion and affects (*adfectus*) he wishes to evoke in his audience. As Quintilian puts it, the advocate assumes “the character of an orphan or a person that has been shipwrecked, or one that is in danger of losing his life, but to what purpose is it to assume their characters if we do not adopt their feelings?” (Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 6.2.36). To summon these emotions, the lawyer must practise the arts of invention and description (an interior art of *ekphrasis*) to help conjure “experiences which the Greeks call *phantasia*, and the Romans *visiones*, whereby things absent are presented to our imagination with such extreme vividness that they seem actually to be before our very eyes” (6.2.28). Seneca, whose declamations were staples of Tudor rhetorical pedagogy (as well as the primary stylistic model for Elizabethan tragedy), recounts the story of Gallus Vibius, who took the method-acting approach to *actio* – inhabiting the role – to an extreme by “going mad while rehearsing the part of a madman”; quoted in Roach (1985) 49.

especially in comedies and romances that give centre stage to love affairs and "the heart's still rhetoric disclosed by the eyes" (*LLL* 2.1.97).³⁵ But the eyes can also be deceptive, of course. In *Troilus and Cressida*, for example, Ulysses recalls Quintilian's notion of *actio* as the "speech of the body" (*Institutio oratoria* 11.1.2) when he describes Cressida as an "open book" and offers a reading of her "speaking looks" (*KL* 4.5.27): "There's language in her eye, her cheek, her lip / Nay, her foot speaks" (*TC* 4.4.56–7). All of these examples demonstrate that "action is eloquence" (*C* 3.2.74), at least in the play-worlds conjured by Shakespeare. To conclude this discussion of Shakespearean *actio*, let us therefore focus on the most important organ of rhetorical delivery: the hands.³⁶

3.3 "Speak Hands for Me!": Shakespeare and the Eloquence of the Hand
 "Speak hands for me!" (*JC* 3.1.83) cries Brutus as he plunges his dagger into Caesar ("They stab Caesar"). Actions speak louder than words, of course, but the inverted word order of the phrase draws attention to the link between words and hands in rhetorical performance. Can hands speak? Like the eyes, with their "heavenly rhetoric" (*LLL* 4.3.58), the hands, too, become organs of eloquence in the act of delivery. Hamlet, therefore, has some handy advice for the actors preparing to "catch the conscience" of Claudius in his play-within-a-play, "The Mousetrap": "Do not saw the air, / too much with your hand, thus, but use all gently" (*H* 2.3.4–5). In fact, without hands, Quintilian asserts, all persuasive action is "crippled and enfeebled since they are almost as expressive as words the hands may be said to speak" (11.3).³⁷ This link between the hands and speech helps us grasp the significance of Shakespeare's notorious treatment of Lavinia's dismemberment in his early revenge tragedy, *Titus Andronicus*, which has puzzled and horrified readers for centuries. After cutting off his hand to win the freedom of his son, Titus plays with rhetorical

35 In his chapter on delivery in *Arte of Rhetoric*, Wilson provides some insight into the eyes as organs of communication: "As the speeche must agree to matter, so must also the gesture agree to the minde, for the eyes are not given to man onely to see, but also to shewe and set forth the meaning of his minde, even as unto a Bore, are given briselles: To a Lion, the tail ..." (221).

36 Besides the mouth, of course. Theatre, like rhetoric, foregrounds the material existence of language as sound and voice (*vox*). Voice training (*pronuntiatio*, *vociferatio*) was another element of grammar school education in the Renaissance. This may be why Shakespeare is so concerned with the physiology of eloquence – the chest, throat, tongue, teeth, and lips and the sounds they produce.

37 In *Chirologia: or the Natural Language of the Hand* and *Chironomia: or the Art of Manual Rhetoric* (1644), the physician John Bulwer attempts to turn ancient theory of *actio* (especially the use of the hands) into a science of manual eloquence with a handbook (*a manualis*), complete with illustrations (chirographic plates) of each gesture.

terminology when he exclaims, “O *handle* not the *theme* of hands / Lest we remember that we have none” (*TA* 3.3.29–30; emphasis added). In another example of Shakespearean meta-rhetoric, Titus alludes to the use of the hands in rhetorical *actio* when he asks, “How can I grace my talk, / Wanting hand to give it action?” (5.2.18–19). These are not merely off-hand references to a *locus communis* of Senecan revenge tragedy. Beyond its campy Senecan gore (Lavinia even carries Titus’ severed hand in her mouth), the dismemberment of Lavinia’s hands and tongue also alludes to the infamous execution of Cicero recounted in Plutarch’s *Lives* (a text familiar to Shakespeare): the assassins cut off Cicero’s head, tongue, and hands. Shakespeare draws an explicit connection between Cicero and Lavinia when we learn that she taught the young Lucius “sweet poetry and Tully’s [Cicero’s] *Orator*” (4.1.14). Much as Cicero’s execution symbolised the severing of reason (the head, or *ratio*) from speech (the tongue, or *oratio*) and writing (the hands), the loss of Lavinia’s tongue and hands – *synecdoches* for speech and writing – spells the loss of her humanity. Like many of Shakespeare’s female characters, however, Lavinia gets her revenge by means of rhetoric, or at least with “signs and tokens.” After mutilating Lavinia, Chiron and Demetrius had tormented her by telling her to “write down thy mind, *bewray* the meaning so, / And if thy stumps will let thee, play the scribe, / ... See how with signs and tokens she can scrawl” (2.3.3–5; emphasis added). But in one of Shakespeare’s most remarkable scenes of reading and writing, Lavinia manages to “bewray” her rapists – “bewray” means both to reveal and accuse – by gesturing toward the “tragic tale” of Philomela in her copy of Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* (“note how she quotes the leaves” [4.1.50]) and scrawling the names of her rapists in the dirt (“upon this earth” [4.1.84]): “*Lavinia takes the staff in her mouth, and guides it with her stumps, and writes ... Stuprum* [L. rape] – *Chiron – Demetrius*” (4.1.78–80).³⁸ Lavinia reclaims her humanity – and her humanism – when she begins to read and write again.

4 “Moralise the Spectacle”: Shakespearean Hermeneutics

In *Motives of Eloquence* (1976), his study of literary rhetoric and *homo rhetoricus* (“rhetorical man”) in early modern Europe, Richard Lanham observes

38 Ovid’s Philomela provides the model for Lavinia’s dismemberment. When Tereus cuts off Philomela’s tongue at its “trembling root,” it silences her forever, but not without giving her something like a last word: “The mangled part still quiver’d on the ground, / Murmuring with a faint imperfect sound” (6.833–834). It is with her eyes and hands that Philomela reveals the crime to Procne: lacking speech, “only her hands, and eyes / Appeal, in signals, to the conscious skies” (*Metamorphoses* 6.916; trans. Dryden).

that the Renaissance rhetor was not trained to "discover reality" but rather to "manipulate reality" (1976: 4). While this is generally true, it is important to note that in antiquity and the Renaissance alike rhetoric was understood (and taught) as an art of persuasion as well as an art of interpretation that seeks to discover reality. Closely linked to the law and legal training, rhetoric evolved into an art of legal hermeneutics that offered methods for discovering the meaning of texts and, importantly, of concrete situations in the world. These methods of interpretation included *stasis* theory,³⁹ topical analysis, the Ciceronian system of *circumstantiae* (the circumstances surrounding a case),⁴⁰ and the distinction between the letter (*scriptum*) and spirit (*voluntas*) of legal texts. As early as Aristotle, for example, the techniques of topical invention and arguing on both sides of an issue were heuristic arts – methods of discovery or invention (*heuresis*) – that helped uncover the "real state" (*Rhetoric* 1.4) of an issue. Topical invention, in particular, is a means of clarifying uncertain knowledge and generating arguments. Derived in part from the categories of Aristotelian ontology (substance, quantity, relation, quality, place, time, situation, etc.), the topics or "circumstances" offer a heuristic method for discovering the meaning of texts and situations. Medieval hermeneutics adapted these methods of rhetorical invention to the analysis of literary and religious texts, a process initiated by Augustine in his rhetorical model of Scriptural exegesis (and his method of allegorical exegesis; see *De doctrina Christiana*).⁴¹ In

39 *Stasis* theory (Gk. "discord," "standing"; L. *status, constitutio*) is an interpretative method for determining the decisive issue (Gk. *krinomenon*; L. *iudicatio*) in dispute in legal cases by posing a series of questions, including: (1) the question of fact: "Did it happen? [L. *An sit?*]" (Gk. *stokhasmos*; L. *status coniecturalis*); (2) the question of definition: "What happened? [L. *Quid sit?*]" (Gk. *horos, horismos*; L. *status definitivus, proprietas*); (3) the question of quality: "What is the quality of the act? [L. *Quale sit?*]" (Gk. *poiôtēs*; L. *status generalis, qualitas*); and (4) the question of jurisdiction: "Is this the right court to decide this issue?" (Gk. *metalēpsis*; L. *status translativus, translatio*).

40 In forensic rhetoric, the *circumstantiae* (Gk. *peristaseis*; L. *negotium, circumstantiae partes*) are the circumstances surrounding a case, including: (1) person (Gk. *prosōpon*; L. *persona*): Who? (2) Act (Gk. *pragma*; L. *actum*): What? (3) Place (Gk. *topos*; L. *locus*): Where? (4) Time (Gk. *chronos*; L. *tempus*): When? (5) Cause (Gk. *aition*; L. *causa*): Why?

41 Augustine takes the Ciceronian distinction between the letter and spirit of the law – its literal meaning and underlying intention – and applies it to the Bible to clarify obscure and ambiguous passages. The Bible, unlike most pagan literature, is composed (in large part) of figurative language, and the goal of interpretation is therefore to clarify its obscurities and secret meanings: "Many things are concealed under a metaphorical style, which the more completely they seem buried under figures of speech, give the greater pleasure when brought to light" (Augustine, *De doctrina Christiana* 6). One must not succumb to the temptations of the letter (literal meaning and alluring devices like rhyme and rhythm) but instead seek the spiritual meaning of the text: wine is not merely wine but the blood

the Renaissance, topical invention was employed in everything from natural philosophy to witchcraft trials as a way of penetrating appearances and discovering “what our seemers be” (*MM* 1.3.54). All of these methods of reading and interpretation inform Shakespeare’s dramatic rhetoric, but two are of particular importance in the plays: the spirit and letter of the law, and topical invention.

4.1 *The Spirit and the Letter in Shakespeare*

The distinction in ancient Roman legal hermeneutics between spirit and the letter, authorial intention and literal text, plays an important role in Shakespeare’s fictional universes. After Brabantio accuses Othello of practising witchcraft to seduce Desdemona, for example, the duke assures him that “the bloody book of law / You shall yourself read, in the bitter letter, / After your own sense” (*O* 1.3.68–70). This distinction between the letter and spirit (“sense”) of the law figures most prominently in *The Merchant of Venice*, a play that foregrounds the difference between Judaic and Christian approaches to the interpretation of legal texts. This distinction is captured, at least from the Christian point of view, in the biblical phrase, “the letter killeth, but the Spirit giveth life” (2 Corinthians 3:6). Shylock, however, insists that the judge cleave to the letter of the text and ignore the spirit of his contract or “bond” with Gratiano: the punishment for defaulting on the loan is the extraction of a “pound of flesh” (*MV* 4.1.303). But while Shylock sticks to the literal meaning of the law, the judge (the disguised Portia, a Christian) pushes this interpretative logic to its extreme by observing that the shedding of blood – a consequence of cutting the pound of flesh – is not stipulated in the letter of the contract. In other words, Portia literalises the letter of the law even further, noting not only what the letter *says* but what the letter *fails to say* (it does not say he can shed Christian blood) to turn this reasoning back against Shylock: “The bond doth give thee here no jot of blood” (4.1.302). At the same time, Shakespeare’s characters often stick to the letter and reject readings that produce “illegitimate constructions” (interpretations) (*MAN* 3.4.45) or project moral or allegorical meanings onto texts. In Shakespeare, sometimes a thistle is just a thistle: “Moral! No, by my troth, I have no moral meaning; I meant plain holy-thistle” (3.3.73–744).

of Christ, for example, just as the *logos* is not merely a word but Jesus as the Word (*Logos*) or divine utterance of God.

4.2 "I Must Be Circumstanced": Shakespeare and Topical Invention

A second technique of rhetorical interpretation in Shakespeare is topical invention as a means of discovering the meaning of texts and situations. In *Love's Labour's Lost*, for example, Shakespeare parodies methods of topical reasoning in a letter to the king from the sophistic "refined traveller," Don Armado: "The time, when? About the sixth hour ... Now for the ground, which? Which, I mean, I walked upon. Then for the place, where? Where, I mean, I did encounter that ... preposterous event ... But to the place, where? It standeth north-north-east and by east ..." (1.1.229–238).⁴² Topical invention in the plays also serves as a means of revealing (and proving) the truth of texts and situations. In *Twelfth Night*, for example, Viola, disguised as a boy, offers to prove that she is actually a woman by means of the topics or *circumstantiae*: "If nothing lets to make us happy both / But this my masculine usurped attire, / Do not embrace me till each circumstance / Of place, time, fortune, do cohere and jump / That I am Viola" (5.1.245–249). But Shakespeare's most remarkable staging of topical argument and persuasion is to be found in *Othello*. Since Iago's case for Desdemona's infidelity is groundless, he must invent "circumstantial" evidence and deploy topical reasoning to lead Othello to the "door of truth" – but not through it: "If imputation and strong circumstances / Which lead directly to the door of truth / Will give you satisfaction, you may have it" (*O* 3.3.409–411). Preparing to stage an apparent confession from Cassio by producing a silent play (Othello *sees* but does not *hear* the alleged confession), Iago deploys the topics or *circumstantiae* to reinforce the likelihood – "thicken other proofs / That do demonstrate thinly" (3.3.432–433) – of an affair between Cassio and Desdemona: "For I will make him [Cassio] tell the tale anew / Where, how, how oft, how long ago, and when / He hath and is again to cope your wife" (4.1.185–187). Ironically, it is Emilia, Iago's wife, who employs the circumstances of forensic rhetoric – Who? What? Where? When? How? – to expose the weakness of the case for Desdemona's infidelity: "Why should he call her whore? Who keeps her company? / What place? What time? What form? What likelihood?" (4.2.138–140).⁴³ As these examples demonstrate, Shakespeare appropriates ancient rhetorical models of interpretation – the distinction between the letter and spirit, topical invention and reasoning, and the system of *circumstantiae* – and puts them to work for his own dramatic purposes. To move toward a conclusion, let us examine how Shakespeare's characters employ two

42 MacPhail (2011).

43 Topical invention is thus related to the concept of propriety or rhetorical *decorum*: "Is there no respect of place, persons, nor / time in you?" (*TN* 2.3.75).

other strategies to effect persuasion in their fictional worlds: the plain style and figures of speech.

5 “Pour My Spirits in Thine Ear”: Shakespeare’s Arts of Persuasion

5.1 “A Round Unvarnished Tale”: Shakespearean *Sprezzatura*

Although sophistic gasbags like Polonius, Don Armado, and Holonfernes are keen to display their eloquence, Shakespeare’s true heroines and heroes – as well as his sophistic “close contrivers” (*M* 3.5.7) – are masters of *sprezzatura*, the “effortlessness” that distinguishes the true courtier (see Baldassare Castiglione, *The Book of the Courtier*). *Sprezzatura* is the art of concealing art so that the courtier’s highly aestheticised speech “appeareth not to be arte” (Castiglione 1959: 43). An effective technique in this context is plain speech. For all its simplicity and humility, the plain style (*L. stylus humilis*) can have terrible power. This is why Augustine likens plain speech to an “axe hewing rock” (*De doctrina Christiana* 3.3). As we have seen, the laconic, “honest” Iago uses the artless art of the plain style to pursue his “peculiar” persuasive ends. But it is Othello, despite being a mercenary who lacks the “soft parts of conversation” (*O* 3.3.270), who delivers a *tour de force* of rhetoric even as he promises a “round unvarnished tale” in his defence. In his narrative overview of the facts of the case (*narratio*), for example, Othello mollifies his potentially hostile audience – he is a black mercenary charged with abducting a “white” Venetian noblewoman – by professing that he lacks persuasive skill: “Rude am I in my speech / And little blessed with the / soft phrase of peace. And, therefore, little shall I grace my cause / in speaking for myself” (see 1.1.82–94). Even as he abjures rhetoric in favour of plain speech, however, Othello alludes to the Pauline epistles (“Rude am I in my speech” [2 Corinthians 11:6]) to project the image of a plain-spoken Christian. Perhaps the most virtuosic example of *sprezzatura*, the artifice of naturalness, is Mark Antony’s funeral oration in *Julius Caesar*. Antony is also a master at exploiting the plain style to conceal his sophistic stratagems. Seeking to win over the hostile crowd at Caesar’s funeral, Antony artfully denies using artful speech even as he builds his ethos as an honest politician, casts Brutus as a deceptive sophist, and begins to manipulate the emotions of the audience (Antony knows that emotion [*e-motus*] is the motive or *motor* of human action): “I come not, friends, to steal away your hearts: / I am no orator, as Brutus is; / But, as you know me all, a plain blunt man, / That love my friend” (*JC* 3.2.209–212). Preparing to steal their hearts, Antony employs the figure of *adynaton* – a confession of one’s inability to express oneself adequately – to begin modulating his funeral oration into a political speech that “ruffles up the

spirits" (3.3.220) of the crowd against Brutus: "For I have neither wit, nor words, nor worth, / Action, nor utterance, nor the power of speech / To stir men's blood. I only speak right on; I tell you that which you yourselves do know" (3.2.214–216).

5.2 "What Is the Figure?": Shakespeare's Figures of Thought

In a brief text titled *Shooting* (*Toxophilus*), Roger Ascham, the rhetoric tutor of Queen Elizabeth I, observes that the English language (and its literature) is inferior to the ancient Greek and Latin venerated by humanist scholars. Yet for this very reason, Ascham notes, the creative possibilities for early modern writers of English are boundless: "As for the Latin or Greek tongue, every thing is so excellently done in them, that none can do better: in the English tongue, contrary, every thing in a manner so meanly both for the matter and handling, that none can do worse" ("To All Gentlemen and Yeomen of England" [n.p.]).⁴⁴ Ascham's observation in this archery manual is on target for the way it identifies an important aspect of the early modern English appropriation of ancient rhetoric: the tension between the authority of Graeco-Roman tradition and the emergence of English vernacular approaches to rhetorical theory and practice.⁴⁵ One of the most important trends in this emergence of vernacular rhetorical theory is the translation of Graeco-Latin terms for tropes and figures into English. George Puttenham, for example, translates the Latin names for figures by casting them as *personae*. *Dialysis* is thus called "The Dismemberer" because it dissects arguments into dilemmas. Similarly, *aestismus* is "The Rebound" because it plays out a quick exchange of verbal volleys, as in a "set of wit, well bandied" (*LLL* 1.1.1). For example, when Richard III tells Queen Elizabeth that her "reasons are too shallow and too quick," she returns his words while twisting their meaning: "O no, my reasons are too deep and dead; / Too deep and dead, poor infants, in their grave" (*RIII* 4.4.361–363). The queen's retort turns Richard's "reasons" into the children he murdered and alludes to the biblical phrase, "the quick [living] and the dead" (2 Timothy 4:1) – and thus to the day of judgement that awaits Richard. It is important to note, however, that Elizabeth's retort or comeback ("rebound") is not a figure of speech but

44 Retrieved from <https://www.archerylibrary.com/books/toxophilus/yeomen.html>.

45 While the advent of William Claxton's printing press in 1476 accelerated the diffusion of ancient rhetoric texts, it also made vernacular manuals such as Leonard Cox's *The Art or Crafte of Rhetoryke* (1529), Thomas Wilson's *Arte of Rhetoric* (1541), Richard Sherry's *Treatise of the Figures of Grammar and Rhetorike* (1550), and Ralph Lever's *Arte of Reason* (1584) available to a rapidly expanding national reading public.

another, more complex type of figure that plays a leading role in the pragmatic universe of Shakespeare's play-worlds: a figure of thought.⁴⁶

What is the difference between figures of speech and figures of thought? While tropes or figures of speech (Gk. *lexeōs schēmata*; L. *figurae verborum*, *figurae elocutionis*) operate at the level of the linguistic means of expression (*verborum*), such as metaphor and metonymy, figures of thought (Gk. *dianoias schēmata*; L. *figurae sententiae*, *sensus figurae*) are broader discursive strategies that operate at the level of conceptual content (*sententia*) over a stretch of discourse, such as irony and allegory.⁴⁷ For this reason, figures of speech are often tactical elements of a more general rhetorical strategy governed by figures of thought, since figures of thought “may include several figures of speech” (Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 3.10).⁴⁸ In *The Garden of Eloquence*, Henry Peacham uses a striking analogy to illuminate the difference between these types of figure: a metaphor is like a “star,” while allegory is like a “constellation” (27) of stars. In other words, figures of speech stand together (*con-stellare*) within figures of thought that are governed by a global rhetorical strategy (27). For George Puttenham, allegory (“The False Semblant”) is the figure of figures or “ringleader” (85) because it creates a “certaine doublness, whereby our talk is the more guileful and abusing” (Puttenham, *The Art of English Poesy* 85). In allegory, words are twisted away from their “natural” sense to a figurative sense that allows courtiers to “speak one thing and think another, so that our words and meanings meet not” (270). The twists and turns (*tropai*) of figurative speech thus provide the rhetor with a means of simulation and dissimulation in a social world defined by false semblances: courtly life is a social allegory – a

46 Modern scholarship on the rhetorical elements of Shakespeare's dramatic art has tended to focus on style and, more specifically, tropes and figures, in the composition of the plays (Parker [1987]; McDonald [2001]; Keller [2009]; see Lyne [2011] on the bard's “cognitive rhetoric”). These analyses have shed new light on almost every aspect of Shakespeare's literary and poetic style, at the same time reflecting the modern restriction of rhetoric to matters of style and figures of speech (to the neglect of figures of thought). Patricia Parker's (1987) brilliant dilations on *dilatatio* and *delatio* in *Othello*, for example, have opened up new ways of analysing the rhetorical terminology woven into the texture of the plays from a feminist point of view.

47 Of course, tropes and figures are also important tools of persuasion. While they may seem of “little importance in establishing a proof by which our arguments are advanced,” notes Quintilian, “they make what we say probable and penetrate imperceptibly into the mind of the judge” (*Institutio oratoria* 20).

48 It is notoriously difficult to distinguish figures of thought (content) from figures of speech (style). In the Greek context, Demetrius differentiates between figures of speech (*schēmata lexeōs*) and figures of thought (*schēmata dianoias*), while the *Ad Herennium*, the oldest extant Latin rhetoric manual, offers a comprehensive account of figures of speech (*exornationes verborum*) and figures of thought (*exornationes sententiarum*).

"long and continuous metaphor" (307) – devised to "winne his purposes and good advantages" (335). What is important for Shakespeare and Puttenham is that figures of thought are not merely stylistic ornaments but persuasive and argumentative strategies. To conclude this chapter, let us focus on how three figures of thought – irony, *paraleipsis* and *chronographia* – function in Shakespeare's play-worlds.

In *Othello*, the sophistic Iago is plotting "double knavery" (*O* 1.3.31): he advises Cassio to press Desdemona to plead with the Moor to reinstate his lieutenancy, while at the same time he persuades Othello that Cassio is "tupping" his wife. Iago thus devises a rhetorical trap, a kind of sophistic machine: the more Desdemona pleads to Othello to reinstate Cassio, the more she appears guilty of infidelity. This leads to one of the most tragic examples of irony in Shakespeare. In pleading with Othello to restore Cassio ("his *bed* shall seem a school" [3.3.24]), Desdemona unwittingly uses legal terms that have erotic overtones: "I'll *intermingle* everything he does / With *Cassio's suit* ... For thy *solicitor* would rather *die* / Than give thy cause away" (3.1.25–28); "I have been talking with a *suitor* here" (3.3.42); and "Nay, when I have a *suit* / Wherein I mean to *touch your love* ..." (3.1.81–82). Thanks to this accidental mingling of legal and erotic connotations, the more Desdemona presses her legal *suit* for Cassio, the more she looks like a *suitor* for Cassio.⁴⁹ Another important figure of thought in Iago's sophistic arsenal is *paraleipsis*, or drawing attention to something while appearing to ignore it. This figure of thought is close to the technique of insinuation (*insinuatio*), or what Wilson calls "a privy twining or close creeping in" (*Art of Rhetoric* 27). Thus, even as Iago counsels Othello to ignore the alleged affair, he spins a semantic web ("privy twining") in his mind with subtle, almost subliminal insinuations:⁵⁰ "Leave it to time; / Though 'tis *fit* that *Cassio have his place*, / For sure he *fills it up with great ability*, / Yet, if you *please to hold him off* a while / You shall by that perceive him, and *his means*. / Note if *your lady strain his entertainment* ..." (3.3.249–255; emphasis added). Iago, the sophistic double-dealer, thus uses *paraleipsis* to talk about two things at once: Cassio's "place," his office as lieutenant, and another "place,"

49 Desdemona says one thing but Othello hears another thing. As a consequence, Desdemona will indeed "die" for Cassio's cause. In Renaissance England "to die" was a euphemism for orgasm – a semantic slippage fitting for a play concerned with death and sex.

50 Much of the tragic action of *Othello* turns on the connotative richness of "office" as duty (*officium*), military rank, object of erotic rivalry, Desdemona's body ("place," "corner," "pond") and copulation itself: "It is thought abroad, that 'twixt my sheets / He has done my office" (1.3.386–387; emphasis added).

Desdemona's body.⁵¹ A final example of a figure of thought as a persuasive tactic in Shakespeare is *chronographia* (Gk. "time writing"), or the description of a historical period or particular time: "[In Christmas season] the nights are wholesome, then no planets strike, / No fairy takes, nor witch hath power to charm, / So hallowed and so gracious is that time" (*H* 1.1.161–163). As a figure of thought, *chronographia* – Puttenham's "Counterfeit of Time" – belongs to what may be called the temporal strategies of Shakespeare's rhetors. It is thus related to the concept of *kairos* (L. *occasio*), or the opportune moment to persuade. In *Julius Caesar*, for example, Cassius seeks to convince Brutus to join the conspiracy by fabricating a moment of crisis and decision for Brutus: "Men *at some time* are masters of their fates: / The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, / But in ourselves, that we are underlings" (*JC* 1.2.140–141; emphasis added). As this example of counterfeit time suggests, Shakespeare's rhetors know how to seize the *kairos* and "weigh time to the utmost grain" (*HV* 2.4.137–138), for better or for worse. The ambivalence of the *kairos* as both hallowed time (as in *Hamlet*) and sophistic opportunism (as in *Julius Caesar*) reflects the ambivalence of Shakespeare's staging of rhetoric in general. In the plays of Shakespeare the *ars rhetorica* can be both toxic and intoxicating, infect the mind with "pestilent speeches" (*H* 4.5.91) and "ravish like enchanting harmony" (*LLL* 1.1.165).

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51 Iago's stealthy rhetoric achieves the desired effect on Othello. "O curse of marriage," Othello laments, "that we can call these delicate creatures ours / And not their appetites! I had rather be a toad, / And live upon the vapour of a dungeon, / Than keep a corner in the thing I love / For others' uses" (*O* 3.3.272–277; emphasis added). The "place" Cassio fills as lieutenant (*lieu-tenant* means "place-holder") becomes, for Othello, the "corner" of Desdemona's body. Iago's remarkable use of connotation and insinuation once again reveals the artful artlessness of "honest" Iago's rhetorical stratagems.

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Ancient Rhetoric on the Silver Screen: *Performing Agōnes* in Michael Cacoyannis' Euripidean Trilogy

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Why would a film director choose to include a “stagey,” formal debate in his cinematic adaptations of ancient Greek tragedy? Michael Cacoyannis (1922–2011), the driving force behind the creation of a Euripidean movie trilogy¹ (a feat so far unmatched by another movie director), elected to have his actors perform these ancient-style *agōnes* in the eye of the camera. This creative decision does not simply reflect his avowed desire to remain faithful to his ancient source texts;² rather it forms part of an overall strategy specifically designed to manipulate the emotional responses of the audience, guiding them towards a particular interpretation of Euripides' *Electra*, *Troades*,³ and *Iphigenia at Aulis*. My discussion investigates this creative agenda and analyses how it shapes the performance of the *agōnes* in the three films: *Electra* (1961–1962), *The Trojan Women* (1970–1971), and *Iphigenia* (1976–1977). This chapter explores how “tragic” rhetoric was conscripted by Cacoyannis and his collaborators in the service of liberal politics and the anti-war movement in the formative decades of the 1960s and 70s. Informed by current debates in performance studies,⁴ and the awareness of “oratory as being intrinsically performanceful” in recent scholarship on ancient rhetoric,⁵ my discussion takes this one step further by adding a classical reception perspective into the mix.

A distinctive feature of Euripides' dramaturgy is the *agōn*, defined by Michael Lloyd as “a pair of opposing set speeches” that convey “the central

1 On Cacoyannis' central role in creating, directing, and producing the trilogy see Bakogianni (2017) 165–166. I have argued elsewhere why it is useful to apply the label of “trilogy” to Cacoyannis' three films; cf. Bakogianni (2013b) 207 n. 3. Cf. Michelakis (2013) 42–43 who has reservations about its applicability.

2 In an interview he gave to John Ardagh about his *Electra* (*The Observer*, March 1963) Cacoyannis stressed his desire to remain faithful to the spirit of Euripides (quoted in Ardagh [1995] 81). In practice, this gave the director plenty of freedom to introduce changes as he saw fit.

3 To distinguish the ancient drama from Cacoyannis' movie of the same title I use *Troades* to refer to the play throughout this chapter.

4 Serafim (2017a) 1–2.

5 Papaioannou, Serafim, and da Vela (2017) 1.

conflict of the play.”⁶ The ancient tragedian favoured this particular method of exploring opposing points of view and made extensive use of it throughout his career.⁷ Euripides’ *agōnes* not only reflect the playwright’s interest in the art of public speaking, introduced to Athens around the middle of the 5th century BCE,⁸ but also the democratic culture of debate in the Assembly and speech-making in the law-courts. But how can this ancient theatrical device, the product of an agonistic, democratic *polis*, be translated into the modern medium of cinema with its emphasis on the visual aspects of storytelling? Cacoyannis not only met this challenge in his Euripidean trilogy, he actually turned it into a powerful weapon in his political and ideological arsenal. The *agōnes* performed in the three films facilitate his overall aim to win the audience’s sympathy for those he clearly views as the victims: Electra, Hecuba, and Iphigenia (as championed by her mother Clytemnestra, who is also portrayed as a victim in the last film).

Drawing on his background in theatre,⁹ Cacoyannis decided to retain the *agōn* as a formal unit in all three of his cinematic adaptations. His interpretation of Euripides’ dramas as opposing all forms of violence and conflict, however, led him to unbalance the ancient playwright’s carefully constructed *agōnes*, whose function was to explore the central dilemmas of the dramas rather than to solve them.¹⁰ Cacoyannis’ Euripidean trilogy, on the other hand, explicitly sets out to condemn war and oppression in all its forms.¹¹ This is made clear in the dedication that appears at the end of *The Trojan Women* which valorises “all those who fearlessly oppose the oppression of man by man.”¹² Cacoyannis’ approach to filming Euripides’ *agōnes* was also shaped by mainstream cinema’s tendency to privilege realism or, to be more precise, the appearance of

6 Lloyd (1992) 1 and 17. For Collard’s definition see (2003) 64.

7 Lloyd (1992) 3.

8 Lloyd (1992) 20–24. For the “rhetorical nature” of Greek tragedy see Conacher (2003) 81. See also Hall (2006) 355 on the impact of rhetoric on Athenian drama. For the cross-fertilisation between oratory and drama, see Apostolakis (2007) 179–180 and Sansone (2012).

9 While living and studying in London (1939–1953) he worked as both a singer and an actor: McDonald (1983) 129. Cacoyannis directed Greek tragedy for the stage as well as the screen. In 1963 he directed Euripides’ *Troades* in New York, performed again two years later in Paris. Post-trilogy, he directed a production of the drama for the Festival at Epidaurus in 1995 and 1997. He directed *Iphigenia at Aulis* in New York (1967), but only ever directed Sophocles’ *Electra* at Epidaurus in 1983, not Euripides’ drama on which Cacoyannis based his most successful cinematic adaptation of a Greek tragedy.

10 Lloyd (1992) 4–5.

11 Lauriola (2015) 90.

12 In an interview Cacoyannis labelled Euripides a “pacifist”: McDonald and Winkler (2001) 74.

realism.¹³ Films that appear to follow a logical narrative sequence and have clearly defined characters have historically tended to be more successful with the wider public. One of the main aims of realism is that it encourages the spectator's identification with the protagonist and his or her "involvement in the story."¹⁴ Cacoyannis considered himself an independent filmmaker and an *auteur*,¹⁵ but he privileged realism in his cinematic receptions of Euripides' dramatic texts.¹⁶ His aim was to appeal to as large an audience as possible, so he deliberately pared down many of the ambiguities of Euripides' plays and used the camera to clarify others. Cacoyannis thus simplified Euripides' ambiguous dramas and their presentation of opposing points of view that are ultimately left unresolved in the plays.

1 The Trilogy in Context

Multiple viewings of Cacoyannis' trilogy with student groups over the years allowed me to witness first-hand its emotional impact on viewers from a variety of cultural, social, and educational backgrounds.¹⁷ Like a successful logographer preparing a speech for his client, Cacoyannis manipulates his audience into supporting one side over the other. Despite his claim to authenticity, Cacoyannis in effect introduced radical changes to Euripides' dramas. In interviews the director stressed the universality of Greek tragedy and sought to avoid explicit connections to specific contemporary events.¹⁸ Such statements must, however, be qualified with an acknowledgement of the ways in which the historical, political, and cultural context shaped his trilogy. Cacoyannis' interpretation of Euripides was conditioned by his experience of living through the blitz in London during World War II, the political, social, and economic upheavals in Greece in the 1950s and 1960s, the dictatorship of the Colonels (1967–1974), and the Turkish invasion of his home island of Cyprus in 1974. His response to these events was to turn to Greek tragedy and enlist its "cultural

13 MacKinnon (1986) 1. On Cacoyannis' neoclassical realism, see chapter 2 of Karalis (2017).

14 Michelakis (2013) 44.

15 An *auteur* does not just work within the confines of a formula, or simply adapt existing works of literature. Instead he utilises the medium of cinema to develop and express a personal creativity that includes but is not limited by ideological perspectives. Stoddart (1995) 40.

16 Bakogianni (2017) 164.

17 I am grateful to my student viewing groups over the years for helping me hone my analysis of Cacoyannis' trilogy. See also Valverde García (2018) 327–328 for his pedagogical experiences with the films.

18 McDonald and Winkler (2001) 74 and 80.

capital"¹⁹ in the service of his directorial vision. Cacoyannis used Euripides' ancient Greek dramas as a powerful tool of resistance and protest by creating a series of poignant set pieces that condemn war, violence, and oppression.

The seeds of Cacoyannis' liberal, anti-war interpretation of Euripides' dramaturgy can be found in his *Electra*,²⁰ but it is in the second and third films of his trilogy that Cacoyannis reclaimed the Trojan War from the Greek Right by inscribing it with an anti-war message. *The Trojan Women* and *Iphigenia* are located at the opposite end of the spectrum from the hyper-nationalistic spectacles that the Greek dictatorship paraded in front of the Greek public in the same period.²¹ Cacoyannis' powerful and moving spectacles of violence perpetrated against non-combatants and the emphasis on loss, grief, and the human cost of war are potent weapons that guide audiences towards a pacifist interpretation of the Euripidean texts he chose for adaptation. In Cacoyannis' reading of these ancient Greek dramas the *kleos* of war that is the flipside of these negative consequences is entirely absent. Euripides' plays have been reconfigured to serve a liberal political agenda. This interpretation of Euripides' war plays, and of Greek tragedy in general, has dominated the history of their performance reception in the 20th and 21st centuries.²² Cacoyannis' Euripidean trilogy is an important landmark within this wider trend of adapting the ancient Greek plays to protest modern conflicts.²³

The three plot lines Cacoyannis chose from Euripides' oeuvre offer viewers an alternative view of the Trojan War, of the lead-up to the conflict (*Iphigenia*), as well as its immediate and long-term aftermath (*The Trojan Women* and *Electra*). Unlike the Greek junta that portrayed the famous conflict as a great patriotic war crowned by a glorious victory, in the second film Cacoyannis emphasises instead the Greeks' cruelty towards the defeated Trojans, thus encouraging his audience to side with them. In the radically modified prologue of *The Trojan Women*, for instance, there are no watching Olympians (*Tro.* 1–97); the focus is on the violence that the victors inflict on the defeated. Instead of the gods, the audience watches as Greek soldiers emerge out of darkness. Amidst the smoke veiling the last remnants of the burning city of Troy these soldiers violently herd their female captives. Mothers are forcibly torn from their children, prefiguring Hecuba's suffering as she loses her remaining children (Cassandra

19 Van Steen (2010) 23.

20 Chiasson (2013) 207–223.

21 For the dictatorship's appropriation of ancient Greece as propaganda, see Van Steen (2015) 271–290.

22 Hall (2004) 1.

23 For a detailed analysis of how Cacoyannis reconfigured Euripides' dramas to condemn war and oppression, see Bakogianni (2015) 291–311 and (2009) 45–68.

and Polyxena), her daughter-in-law (Andromache), and finally her grandson (Astyanax), her last hope for the future. In Cacoyannis' cinematic adaptation *Hecuba*, like *Electra* previously, was given all the rights. The narrator in the prologue makes it clear that the real *casus belli* was the Greeks' desire to plunder the wealthy city. This opening montage of images, reinforced by the words of the omniscient narrator, might well have struck a chord with many contemporary Western viewers, accustomed as they were to the realistic coverage of the Vietnam War on American television and its broadcast on global networks. These were reinforced by the iconic war-photography that emerged out of this conflict that emphasised the human cost of the war.²⁴ Unlike previous wars, where state propaganda tended to downplay these negative aspects in the media,²⁵ the coverage of the Vietnam War was far more critical. How images are contextualised by journalists and news anchors shapes how they are interpreted by the public, and Cacoyannis was an expert manipulator of the moving image, as the deconstruction of his interpretation of Euripides' *agōnes* demonstrates. Euripides' *The Trojan Women* was banned in Greece under the dictatorship,²⁶ thus Cacoyannis' choice of source text was in itself an act of defiance, part of a wider protest movement organised by Greeks living abroad, designed to bring attention to the Colonels' abuses of power and their appropriation of the classical past. In the year of its release the film was primarily geared towards the international market, but its critique of the junta's rule becomes even more pronounced in light of *Iphigenia*.

The corrupt motives behind the decision to go to war are further explored in the last film of Cacoyannis' Euripidean trilogy. The Greek leadership is portrayed as ambitious, corrupt, and greedy for the spoils of war, gold, and slaves.²⁷ The soldiers are lured with promises of wealth and readily, even enthusiastically, accept the sacrifice of a young girl as necessary.²⁸ Cacoyannis' Agamemnon, although sympathetic to a degree, is a weak man easily manipulated by his brother, Calchas, and Odysseus. At heart they are all warmongers prepared to destroy anything and everything on their path to glory and

24 <http://100photos.time.com/photos/nick-ut-terror-war> (accessed 20/05/2021).

25 The practice of embedding journalists to send "live" reports from the warfront dates back to the Crimean War (1853–1856), but it was not until the Vietnam War that such reports influenced the way the war was perceived both in the US and internationally: see Patton (1995) 13. Live television reportage was pioneered during the First Gulf War (1991) by CNN and is now considered standard practice.

26 Goff (2009) 85.

27 Cacoyannis in Sifakos (2009) 213–215.

28 For the key role played by the army in *Iphigenia*, see McDonald (1983) 175; Bakogianni (2013a) 233–239 and 241–243.

wealth. Agamemnon might have doubts and he clearly loves his daughter, but ultimately ambition proves stronger. By the time Cacoyannis was working on his last screen adaptation of Euripides, Greece was a democracy once more (officially on 24 July 1974), but his home island of Cyprus was divided. For Greek and Cypriot audiences, the insidious role of the army in the lead-up to Iphigenia's sacrifice and the destruction of the domestic sphere on the altar of war would have had uncomfortable resonances with the dictatorship's irredentist policies towards Cyprus that at the very least worsened Greek-Turkish relations.²⁹ The poignant scenes of Clytemnestra's maternal suffering in the film have close visual echoes in the suffering of Cypriot mothers recorded by Cacoyannis in his documentary *Attila 74* (1975).³⁰ The director took a cameraman to Cyprus in September 1974 for the express purpose of recording for posterity the human impact of the invasion. Cacoyannis openly admitted that he made this particular movie expressly "to help my country" and donated all proceeds to the refugees.³¹

Even the less politically overt *Electra* condemns oppression by tyrannical rulers (Aegisthus and Clytemnestra) and testifies to the long-term impact of the war at Troy on the families of the victors. In the added prologue, the story opens not with the peasant's speech (*El.* 1–53) but with the triumphant return of Agamemnon from the war. We first encounter him on his war chariot, being cheered by adoring crowds, before meeting his fate in the bath. His murder is portrayed as a crime in the first movie in the trilogy, but after watching *Iphigenia* this position becomes open to re-examination. In 1962, however, audiences were strongly encouraged to align themselves with Agamemnon and his children Orestes and Electra. Aegisthus and Clytemnestra are the villains who humiliate Electra, steal the rightful inheritance of Orestes, and oppress the people of Argos. The context that informs and shapes Cacoyannis' first screen adaptation of a Greek tragedy includes the turbulent nature of post – World War II Greek politics and the brewing tensions in Cyprus.³² In *Electra* bad leadership is condemned, while the sacrifice of the siblings in choosing voluntary self-exile, once they lose the support of the people in the aftermath of the matricide, is valorised. This radical adaptation of Euripides' *deus ex machina* ending sets up Orestes and Electra as political models for imitation. They both elect to leave Argos because of the chorus and the peasants' negative

29 For more details of the historical context of *Iphigenia*, see Bakogianni (2013a) 229–232.

30 Bakogianni (2013b) 216–217.

31 In an interview with Jean-Pierre Cornet for the *Le Quotidien de Paris* (26 November 1975): Kolonias (1995) 167.

32 For more details see Bakogianni (2008) 122–124.

reaction to their killing of Clytemnestra. Beyond Cacoyannis' conviction that Euripides did not really believe in the gods³³ and that all references to them in his plays were meant to be ironic, the movie's radically changed ending signals its engagement with contemporary politics and testifies to the consequences of bad leadership on the community.

With the benefit of hindsight, it becomes clear that Cacoyannis' Euripidean trilogy offers us, like *Attila* 74, important modern Greek examples of the harnessing of Greek tragedy in the service of a liberal, anti-war agenda in the 20th century.³⁴ Like an ancient Athenian speaker in the law-courts or at the assembly, Cacoyannis and his collaborators offer us a skewed view of the events surrounding the war at Troy, reimagining our ancient dramatic source texts for contemporary audiences.³⁵ The permeability of Greek tragedy to multiple interpretations is an integral part of its appeal that keeps us returning again and again to these plays, but the anti-war interpretation of Euripides' *Troades* and *Iphigenia at Aulis* are modern readings. War was a fact of life for Greek tragedy's 5th-century BCE audiences. The attack and capture of cities, the execution of their male populations, and the enslavement of women and children was routine and an accepted practice.³⁶ Many of the dramas might allow room to explore the negative aspects of war, and the pain and suffering it brings to both non-combatants and the soldiers who fight it, but that does not mean that the ancient plays condemn war outright. Making war was a central activity of the Greek *poleis*, and particularly true of Athens in the 5th century BCE, when our surviving corpus of plays was created and first performed. Athens spent vast sums of money on the business of war in this period, much more than it ever spent on the dramatic festivals.³⁷ Furthermore, it is debatable to what degree members of the Athenian audience would have sympathised in a meaningful way with the suffering of their traditional enemies (in our surviving corpus this includes the Trojans, Thebans, and Persians).³⁸ In contrast,

33 McDonald and Winkler (2001) 79.

34 Hall (2004) 1. Hall argues for 1969 as a watershed year for this phenomenon, but the trend dates back even earlier. To give but two examples that predate 1969, Gilbert Murray's translations of Euripides' war plays as protest pieces against contemporary wars at the beginning of the century and the Left's appropriation of the classics in modern Greece in the 1930s and 40s in reaction to the dominant conservative interpretations of the Right. See also n. 41 below.

35 Cf. Valverde García (2018) 328–330, who argues that the changes Cacoyannis introduces to his *The Trojan Women* only serve to reinforce Euripides' intention to protest Athens' behaviour in the Peloponnesian War.

36 Pritchard (2010) 20.

37 Pritchard (2015) 114–115.

38 For a discussion of this issue with reference to Euripides' *Troades*, see Mills (2010) 163–183.

Cacoyannis manipulated viewers into aligning themselves with the victims of oppression and violence: Electra, Hecuba, and Clytemnestra. Nowhere is this more clearly demonstrated than in the adaptation of Euripides' *agōnes* in the trilogy.

To illustrate Cacoyannis' distinctive approach to the translocation and adaptation of the Euripidean *agōn* on screen my discussion focuses on how the Greek-Cypriot director staged three key debates, one from each of his three cinematic receptions of Euripides' dramas. This has the added benefit of allowing me to comment on the development of his portrayal of the *agōnes* scenes in the trilogy in the context of his developing relationship with Greek tragedy. Let us begin our discussion with Euripides' *Electra*, which Cacoyannis chose as his first venture into adapting an ancient Greek tragedy for the silver screen. Euripides' dramatisation of the revenge plot orchestrated by Agamemnon's children is less well known than Sophocles' drama of the same title.³⁹ One of the key reasons why Cacoyannis felt drawn to Euripides, in particular,⁴⁰ was that he was convinced that the ancient dramatist condemned war and all types of oppression and injustice in his plays.⁴¹ This interpretation shaped his portrayal of the mother-daughter relationship in *Electra*, the *agōn* between Helen

39 The revival of Greek tragedy on the theatrical stage in the 1960s contributed to the renaissance of Euripidean drama, although many scholars still tended to be dismissive of his oeuvre. In the 1960s scholarship on *Electra* tended either to categorise the play, along with *Orestes*, as a melodrama, or to dismiss it as an altogether inferior effort, especially when compared with Sophocles' eponymous play. For an example of this view, see Kitto (1966) 330. Conacher (1967) 199 more generously labelled *Electra* "unusual." The Archive for the Performance of Greek and Roman Drama (APGRD, University of Oxford) testifies to the popularity of Euripides' dramas in the 1960s: <http://www.apgrd.ox.ac.uk/research-collections/performance-database/productions> (accessed 20/05/2021). For the modernity of Euripides and the reasons for his popularity in the 21st century, see Walton (2009).

40 The director felt a special affinity for Euripides because "his whole attitude towards war, religion, towards human relationships is just that much closer to us today": see Cacoyannis (1984) 214.

41 Cacoyannis was not alone in adopting this view: there was a marked trend in Euripidean scholarship, particularly in the 1960s, but more recently, too, to interpret Euripides' preoccupation with the theme of war as a sign of his pacifist leanings. In the first half of the 20th century an influential proponent of this view was the classical scholar, translator, and activist Gilbert Murray. One influential translator who also held and promoted this view of Euripides was Philip Vellacott. In his introductions to his popular translations of Euripides' plays, published in four volumes by Penguin Classics in the 1960s and 1970s, he portrayed Euripides as a dramatist who opposed war. McDonald (2003) 97 labels Euripides as "the greatest anti-war playwright of antiquity." More recently, Valverde García, as mentioned above in n. 35, has defended the view that Cacoyannis' *The Trojan Women* is faithful to Euripides' anti-war authorial intentions. On Euripides as an artist who challenged the values of his *polis*, see also Arnott (1993) 204.

and Hecuba in *The Trojan Women*, and Clytemnestra's argument with her husband in *Iphigenia*.

2 Fighting Words

In ancient Greek literature and art Clytemnestra is the “bad wife” par excellence. Antiphon 1, *Against the Stepmother*, offers us the possibility of a connection between the world of theatre and the law-courts, a well-known tragic narrative being exploited in court to gain sympathy for the son of a murdered husband.⁴² In Greek tragedy Clytemnestra behaves like a cruel stepmother to her own children, so a link can be activated. This is also the case in Cacoyannis' *Electra* where Clytemnestra is presented in a particularly negative light, in contrast to Euripides' more sympathetic portrayal.⁴³ In Euripides the *agōn* is the first time we encounter her character, but Cacoyannis added two key scenes at the beginning of his film in which the audience watch Clytemnestra (Aleka Katseli) orchestrate the murder of Agamemnon, then some years later, mistreat and force Electra into the marriage with the peasant. When she is summoned to the peasant's hut by Electra's false story of having given birth to a son, Clytemnestra appears in Cacoyannis' film (as in Euripides) in a chariot attended by slaves. There is a build-up to the actual *agōn*, which not only sets the scene but serves to reveal Clytemnestra's arrogance, selfishness, and love of luxury. Thus, by the time Cacoyannis' adaptation reaches the actual point of the *agōn* between mother and daughter his audience's negative view of Clytemnestra has already been well established. Clytemnestra's assertions that she will exercise restraint in her speech and later that she will allow Electra to speak without any repercussions both ring false.⁴⁴ Like any good logographer Cacoyannis is invested in ensuring his client's victory by undermining the strength of his opponent's argument.

The build-up to the *agōn* begins with the audience, Electra (Irene Papa), Orestes (Yannis Fertis), and the chorus all watching as Clytemnestra's chariot appears in the distance and gradually draws up to the hut. Electra takes the lead from the beginning; it is her plan after all. To begin with she has to help her

42 Apostolakis (2007) 183–187 maintains that the speech contains allusions to Aeschylus' version of Clytemnestra and Euripides' *Electra*. Edwards (2017) 245–250 is more cautious, but does argue for the existence of allusions to tragic narratives in the speech as an essential element of Antiphon's strategy for winning the judges to his side.

43 Lloyd (1992) 56. Cf. Luschniġ (2015) 228 who argues that Cacoyannis' Clytemnestra has redeeming features.

44 Lines 1013 and 1059 respectively.

brother overcome his reluctance at the prospect of having to kill their mother. The audience has already witnessed the siblings plotting to avenge their father in an earlier scene following Orestes' return and the *anagnōrisis*,⁴⁵ but Orestes needs a reminder of the reasons why this is a just killing when the time for the matricide draws near. The director thus reinforces the authority of the older Electra in the face of her younger brother's wavering resolve just prior to her confrontation with her mother. Cacoyannis does follow Euripides' text for the *agōn* fairly closely, but he changes the emphasis of Electra and Clytemnestra's speeches by the skilful use of the camera.⁴⁶ Close-ups of Clytemnestra's eyes reveal her deceit,⁴⁷ even when she invokes Iphigenia's name to justify her actions, as she does at the very beginning when she refers to the three Trojan slaves she has brought with her as "a small recompense that serves to make people envious"⁴⁸ for the loss of Iphigenia. Wealth and status matter to this Clytemnestra.

The setting and costumes strongly signal to the audience whose side they should be on in this court of public opinion. The pomp of Clytemnestra's arrival, her rich garments, jewellery, and heavy make-up all serve to reinforce the viewer's negative impression of her,⁴⁹ particularly when contrasted with Electra's severe black clothes, short hair, and the humble surroundings she inhabits.⁵⁰ Cacoyannis positions his Electra at the top of the hill on which the hut stands and she walks down the steps to meet her mother, a visual metaphor for her moral superiority. In this scene Electra resembles a female relation presented at court for the purpose of eliciting pity in the judges, although unlike female court suppliants she is given a voice.⁵¹ And she uses it most effectively both to condemn her mother's behaviour and to defend her own, thus championing her father's (and brother's) cause. Cacoyannis has Electra and

45 For an analysis of these scenes, see Bakogianni (2011) 181–183.

46 Lloyd (1992) 55 remarks on the sophisticated rhetoric that distinguishes the *agōn* from the rest of the play and on the "finely balanced" arguments on both sides.

47 The close-up shot focuses the viewer's attention on the face of a character, emphasising their emotional state and drawing the audience into their personal space. This filmic technique encourages audiences to share the characters' emotions and see things from their point of view. The close-up is an essential element of Cacoyannis' filmic vocabulary. On the close-up in cinema, see Doane (2003). On Cacoyannis' use of the close-up, see Bakogianni (2011) 175; McDonald (2001) 92–94; and MacKinnon (1986) 49.

48 Note the difference in Cacoyannis' script that emphasises Clytemnestra's desire to be envied by other people.

49 McDonald (1983) 290.

50 On how relatives could be coached to appear more pitiable in court, see Apostolakis (2017) 138–140.

51 Apostolakis (2017) 139.



FIGURE 15.1 Electra vs. Clytemnestra; *Electra* (1962)
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Clytemnestra circle each other as they debate in front of the chorus, which sides with the daughter. As Electra vents her sense of injustice at having lost her status and inheritance Cacoyannis focuses on Papa's eyes, who is visibly holding back tears. The director stresses the pathos and injustice of Electra's position, a kind of "living death" as she calls it.⁵² Irene Papa rejects the caress that Katseli offers, in a parallel scene to the young Electra's rejection of her mother's hand on her shoulder in the prologue. The problematic nature of this mother-daughter relationship is thus visually underlined. In this context Electra's arch look at the mention of Aegisthus' anger becomes less ironic and more comprehensible to the viewer.⁵³ Why should she not savour her secret knowledge of the tyrant's death, while simultaneously lulling her mother into a false sense of security?

Cacoyannis' idealised portrayal of Electra in the film further unbalances the *agōn*. Even her unmerciful attitude towards her mother is softened after she wins their argument. Twice she restrains her mother from entering the hut, where Orestes awaits to kill her. In Euripides, Electra's excuses come across as malicious irony:

52 It is significant that the chorus is also not convinced by Clytemnestra's words. They are on Electra's side throughout the *agōn*.

53 Especially as in the film the viewer witnesses Aegisthus' ill-treatment of Electra first hand. In an added scene Aegisthus bullies and even slaps the heroine when she defies him using the only weapon at her disposal, words (namely a reminder that Orestes is still alive and will return). For details see Bakogianni (2011) 179–180.

Go on into this poor house; take care, I pray you,
that the soot on the building does not soil your
clothes. You will be making the sacrifice you should to
the gods.

EUR. *El.* 1139–1141

In contrast, Cacoyannis again uses the close-up to demonstrate that his Electra truly does hesitate for a moment before she condemns her mother to death.

You don't mind entering such a poor home?
... Mother! Be careful that your robes are not dirtied by the ash.

But more important than the words she speaks is the way Papa performs this scene. This Electra genuinely cares for Clytemnestra, in spite of all her mother's cruelty to her. The viewer has already witnessed her undeserved suffering in the prologue, added by Cacoyannis to explain the background of the story to non-knowledgeable members of the audience.⁵⁴ Cacoyannis took great care to make his Electra more humane than she is in Euripides' source play, thus imbuing her arguments with greater force. As Irene Papa said in an interview "we gave Electra all the rights" in the film.⁵⁵

Some of the camera techniques and angles Cacoyannis utilises to such good effect in *Electra* (and in the trilogy in general) featured in another cinematic reception of a classical drama. Less than a decade earlier saw the release of Joseph L. Mankiewicz's *Julius Caesar* (1953), modelled on Shakespeare's play.⁵⁶ Mankiewicz, like Cacoyannis, chose not to hide his adaptation's theatrical roots, but to turn it into an implicit statement of the artistic quality of his film (what in Greece is referred to as "quality cinema").⁵⁷ The film, starring

54 On the whole, Cacoyannis tends to assume a non-knowledgeable audience, spectators unfamiliar with the mythical story and its reception in tragedy. His expository prologues in all three films demonstrate how he sought to bridge the gap between knowledgeable and non-knowledgeable members of the audience. For a close analysis of Cacoyannis' prologue in *Electra*, see Bakogianni (2011) 172–174; for *The Trojan Women*, see Bakogianni (2009) 62–63; for *Iphigenia*, see Bakogianni (2013a) 234–239.

55 McDonald and Winkler (2001) 89.

56 For another perspective on this famous Shakespearean speech, see MacDonald's chapter in this volume.

57 The much smaller-scale Greek film industry could ill afford to produce films that the Greek cinema-going public did not wish to see. The term "εμπορικός" (profit making) describes the type of films that the industry wished to produce: ones that were successful in the box office and turned a good profit: see Soldatos (2002) 173. The industry avoided films like *Antigone* and *Electra*, "σινεμά ποιότητας" (quality/worthy films), because they

Marlon Brando as Mark Antony and James Mason as Brutus, features a powerful and striking example of how to stage a public debate for the camera.⁵⁸ Brandon's masterful delivery of Shakespeare's famous "Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears" speech (Act 3, scene 2) is further enhanced by great camerawork.⁵⁹ Mark Antony is placed on the steps of the Senate House above the listening, and at first hostile, crowd. The camera often looks up at Brando reinforcing his moral authority and status (as with Papa). At key moments he turns his back to his internal audience as if to conceal the intensity of his grief over the murder of his friend, but close-ups reveal the calculating nature of his movements and gestures. His skilful repetition of the "Brutus is an honourable man" line is designed to gradually instil doubt in the listeners' minds about his opponent's honesty, the modulations of Brando's voice reinforcing this effect. What is particularly notable in this Shakespearean *agōn* is that Mark Antony takes care to appeal to both the audience's emotions and their self-interest (Antony hints of Caesar's bequests to the people in his will) until they reject Brutus' position that Caesar was a tyrant who aspired to be king. By the conclusion of his speech Mark Antony has won his audience over and defeated his opponent by his skilful use of rhetoric. Cacoyannis, too, took sides and gave all the rights not only to his Electra, but also to Hecuba and Clytemnestra. He fatally undermines the arguments of their opponents with his camera and the way the *agōnes* were stage-managed and performed.

In his *The Trojan Women*, Cacoyannis once again marginalised the darker aspects of his tragic heroine, Hecuba (Katharine Hepburn), in favour of highlighting her suffering and pain. His characterisation of the former queen of Troy is demonstrated in the *agōn* when he makes her the clear victor of the argument. Euripidean *agōnes* use sophistic argumentation and language.⁶⁰ The *agōn* between Hecuba and Helen (Irene Papa) revolves around the issue of the latter's guilt for causing the Trojan War. The subject of Helen's responsibility for the war that caused so much suffering and death was expounded on

tended to be unpopular: see Soldatos (2002) 282. Cacoyannis' *Electra* was a risky gamble, especially considering the box office failure of George Tzavellas' *Antigone* (1961) the year before. For a detailed comparison of the two films, see Bakogianni (2008) 119–167. All translations from the Modern Greek are the author's own.

58 The film was produced by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer. Cacoyannis' *Electra* was financed and distributed by United Artists, but the director preferred to work independently of the Hollywood studio system: see Siafkos (2009) 136 and 159–165.

59 For my analysis of this scene I am indebted to Martin M. Winkler's workshop at the Federal University of Minas Gerais in 2012: <http://www.letras.ufmg.br/retorica2/> (accessed 12/12/2018).

60 For an analysis of the *agōn* in the *Troades* in terms of sophistic ideas, see Conacher (1998) 51–58.

by Gorgias in his *Defence of Helen*. In this rhetorical exercise Gorgias absolves Helen of all responsibility for leaving her home in Sparta. Euripides, however, is more concerned with wider issues, namely the chain of causality that led to the outbreak of the war. In the play Helen's arguments have some weight and Hecuba is forced into the unenviable position of defending the Greek view of events in order to ensure Helen's conviction. In the play the debate resolves nothing. Moreover, Hecuba is clearly attempting to curry favour with her enemy Menelaus in the hope that he will kill his unfaithful wife.⁶¹ The former queen is even prepared to label herself a barbarian in order to have her revenge.⁶²

Cacoyannis' portrayal of Helen is decidedly one sided and completely undermines any sympathy the audience might potentially feel for her. He called his version of Helen an "υπέροχο ζώο" [a magnificent animal], proud and disdainful.⁶³ Helen's true character is revealed in another added scene which serves as a kind of preface to her arguments in the *agōn*, in the same way that the rest of the film serves as testimony in support of Hecuba's arguments. The true measure of Helen's power becomes evident in her ability to influence her guards in this largely visual introduction to her character in the film. The soldier guarding her obeys her one-word order of "water" despite his unease. The other women are left to suffer in the intense heat. Helen provocatively strips and washes in the bowl of water that she has been given, sparking a riot of protests by the other women desperate for water. They scream, throw stones, and rush to attack Helen. Only the presence of the guards prevents a physical assault on Helen. Cacoyannis uses his favourite technique of the close-up to focus on Helen's disdainful expression and her proud eyes. Her naked body on display thus becomes the physical embodiment of her arrogance. This introduction to the character of Helen is designed to push the audience into adopting a negative affective disposition towards her.⁶⁴ She is labelled as the unsympathetic villainess of the piece, like Clytemnestra was in *Electra*.

61 Goff (2009) 67–70.

62 Hecuba uses the term "barbarian" twice in her speech against Helen. The first time she scoffs at the story of Paris' judgment in the beauty contest (973) and again when she refers to Helen's delight in her life of luxury at Troy (991).

63 The interview was included among the extras in the collector's deluxe edition of the DVD of Cacoyannis' Euripidean trilogy (Greece 2006). See also n. 79 below.

64 Dislike of a performer/character leaves viewers free to enjoy any violent retribution that is inflicted on them over the course of the story: see Fagan (2011) 242–243. Helen frustrates such expectations in both Euripides and Cacoyannis. In the latter, this is strongly emphasised and the takeaway message is that the guilty do at times go unpunished.

In contrast, we first encounter Hecuba prostrate on the ground weighed down by sorrow and grief.

As in his *Electra* Cacoyannis radically changes the tone of the *agōn* by using the camera as a commentator. In the beginning of the scene Hecuba appears and walks down a hill with the sun at her back, a visual sign of her moral superiority over her opponent. She then proceeds to express her arguments in a dignified and honest manner. In contrast Helen's arguments lose all force by the camera's focus on her sly expression (as with Clytemnestra in *Electra*). Close-ups of her face and eyes reveal that she is playing a game designed to win back Menelaus (Patrick Magee). She portrays herself as a captive of the Trojans who prevented her from fleeing to the Greek camp. Hecuba disproves Helen's claims and urges Menelaus to have her killed now that she has had a fair hearing. According to Cacoyannis Helen might lose the debate, but she wins regardless, purely on the strength of her sexual allure. Her attempt to kill herself is revealed to be nothing more than a coquettish bid to capture Menelaus' attention as her hair unravels seductively and covers her naked back. The costuming choices thus reinforce the characterisation of the protagonists. Helen is the only richly dressed and bejewelled woman in the film. Hecuba and the chorus of women of Troy are dressed in ragged robes in dark, earthy colours.

Helen is also the only prisoner who can throw off the restraining hands of her guards with impunity, as exemplified in her last exit when she proudly walks off-screen, heading towards the Greek ship that will take her back to



FIGURE 15.2
Hecuba vs. Helen; *The Trojan Women* (1971)

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Sparta. She stares down one of the guards and forces him to open up a path for her by pushing back the angry Trojan women. Once again Helen intimidates the guards into protecting her from the other women. The chorus is hostile to Helen and sides entirely with Hecuba whose suffering they share. The last shot of Cacoyannis' Helen is on the deck of the ship preparing to take her back to Greece. In this added scene she exchanges a triumphant look with Menelaus, testament to her ultimate victory, reiterated for the benefit of a non-knowledgeable audience not familiar with the *Odyssey's* portrayal of husband and wife in domestic comfort back in Sparta (book 4). Helen's seduction of her Greek husband demonstrates her power over men, destroying Hecuba's hopes that she will ever be punished. Beauty triumphs over justice in *The Trojan Women*.⁶⁵

In Cacoyannis' *Iphigenia* Clytemnestra (Irene Papa) argues with Agamemnon (Kostas Kazakos) over the fate of Iphigenia (Tatiana Papamoschou).⁶⁶ Clytemnestra champions her daughter's cause as if she were a defendant in an ancient court on a capital case with everything on the line: Iphigenia's life, as well as the future of the house of Atreus. Cacoyannis located Clytemnestra's attempts to change her husband's mind indoors within the king's compound in the Greek camp at Aulis. In the film the young Orestes (Yiorgos Vourvahakis) is the only witness to their quarrel, and his innocence and lack of comprehension adds a touch of pathos to the husband-wife conflict (like a child presented at an ancient court in order to elicit the judges' pity).⁶⁷ Agamemnon enjoys a brief touching moment with his son when he picks him up and cradles him close. Kazakos portrays the king as deeply uneasy and in emotional distress.⁶⁸ In contrast, Clytemnestra remains steadfast in her purpose; she does her utmost to save her daughter, calling up her most powerful weapon, words. She is determined to use every means at her disposal to try to change Agamemnon's mind. Clytemnestra's appeal is carefully stage managed.

65 Note Apollodoros' warning to the judges about the defendant's beauty in *Against Neaera*. For details see Apostolakis (2017) 147. This idea may echo the description of Helen in the *Iliad* 3.158–160. Homer uses the adverb αἰνῶς “terribly” to describe the beauty of Helen which equals that of the immortals. This idea also appears in Rainer Maria Rilke's *Duino Elegies*. I am indebted to Andreas Serafim for this suggestion.

66 Lloyd (1992) 3 does not include this scene among his list of the thirteen *agōnes* from Euripides' surviving plays. He lists the earlier argument between Agamemnon and Menelaus at 317–414 as the *agōn* in the play. In contrast, Collard (2003) 64 and 76 discusses it as an important “formal debate.”

67 Iphigenia, too, will use Orestes as a means of deepening the pathos of her appeal to her father to spare her life. Both mother and daughter thus use this court trick.

68 Cacoyannis' Agamemnon sweats throughout the film, a visual physical sign of his emotional distress: see Bakogianni (2013a) 238–239.

She appears in the doorway with loose hair and wearing a plain, dark robe over her more elaborate dress; both signs of mourning and emotional distress that a Modern Greek audience would immediately recognise. She goes on the attack by accusing her husband of lying to her. "If you were a man ..." she says to him, impugning Agamemnon's manhood for attempting to hide the fact that Iphigenia is to be sacrificed in order for the Greek army to sail to Troy. Clytemnestra reveals the depths of her maternal pain by asking the question softly and in a trembling voice.⁶⁹ At first, Agamemnon tries to deflect her with a display of anger, but Clytemnestra frustrates his desire to escape her words by using her body to block his attempts to abandon the conversation. In Cacoyannis his silence not only condemns him, but is also a sign of his emotional cowardice. He cannot bear to face his wife – or the truth. In the film, the price of war is the sacrifice of an innocent girl. Her death is the result of the Greeks' greed for Trojan gold.⁷⁰ Cacoyannis "eliminates the uncertainties"⁷¹ of this problematic source text. In his cinematic reception the Greek leaders are ruled by ambition and greed, while Agamemnon's decision to sacrifice his daughter is motivated by his desire for *kleos*, the status of leader of the Greek army.

Irene Papa makes effective use of the story evoked in the surviving text of the play that makes this Clytemnestra's second marriage.⁷² She reminds Agamemnon that he killed her first husband, Tantalus, and forced her to marry him. She accuses him of having been motivated not by love, but by a lust for the power and wealth he gained by their marriage: "I gave you everything." She makes it clear that she submitted, but never loved him: "I turned my submission into a strength." Cacoyannis removed any mention of Agamemnon's murder of a baby by Tantalus. Its inclusion would interfere with the perception of Iphigenia's sacrifice as a unique event that destroyed Clytemnestra as a mother.⁷³ Had a similar incident taken place in the past it would have weakened his overall design. The climax of the scene is Clytemnestra's stark warning to her husband:

69 For the effectiveness of a pitiful voice in ancient courts, see Apostolakis (2017) 137.

70 Cacoyannis in Sifakos (2009) 213–215.

71 Gamel (2015) 36. See also Bakogianni (2013b) 209.

72 There are doubts about the authenticity of the text in which this passage appears (1148–1184). Kovacs (2003) 96 attributes it to a reviser and not to Euripides. Cacoyannis effectively incorporates the story into his filmic narrative, using it to explain Clytemnestra's lack of affection for her husband.

73 Bakogianni (2013b) 224.

Αν γυρίσεις, θα σε περιμένω,
το μίσος μου σαν την οχιά!

If you return, I will be waiting for you,
my hatred like a viper!

Papa gets in Agamemnon's face and warns him that all it will take to unleash her vengeance will be the merest of excuses. For the knowledgeable members of Cacoyannis' audience this will be provided by the enslaved Cassandra, whom Agamemnon introduces into his *oikos* as a concubine.⁷⁴ This threat is reinforced by the ending of Cacoyannis' film in which the viewer sees Clytemnestra intently watching the departure of the Greek fleet, her hair still loose, whipped by the wind, like the coils of Medusa.⁷⁵ The threat she now poses to her husband is clear, and thus the trilogy comes full circle back to the murder of Agamemnon in the prologue of *Electra*.

During their *agōn*, Clytemnestra circles Agamemnon and blocks his attempts to retreat, preventing him from turning away from the harsh reality they face. This choreography of move and countermove testifies to the deadly nature of this domestic quarrel between husband and wife. But the one most at risk (at least in the immediate future) is their daughter Iphigenia. Menelaus (Kostas Karras) enters the fray just after Clytemnestra suggests that they draw lots or simply sacrifice Hermione, instead of Iphigenia. Clytemnestra reveals the depths of her anger and desperation when she grabs the back of Agamemnon's tunic. In an attempt to escape his wife, Agamemnon throws open the doors to the courtyard (see Fig. 15.3). She screams at him not to force her to become evil by his actions.⁷⁶ Cacoyannis' aim was to invest Greek tragedy with the kind of emotion that contemporary cinematic audiences could understand and respond to.⁷⁷ The director turned the *agōn* between the king and queen into a domestic quarrel between husband and wife over the fate of their daughter.

74 In this particular instance Clytemnestra's threat is more effective if it is left vague, as indeed it is in *Iphigenia*. Familiarity with Cacoyannis' *The Trojan Women*, where Cassandra is torn from her mother and taken to Agamemnon's ship, suggests the shape of the excuse he gives his wife. However, since the film was banned in Greece at the time of its release (see Goff [2009] 85), contemporary Modern Greek audiences in the late seventies are more likely to have been familiar with the ancient story rather than Cacoyannis' reception of it.

75 Bakogianni (2013b) 217–218.

76 According to Gamel (1999) 317 in the play Clytemnestra only turns evil "when the system she has upheld betrays her."

77 It is worth noting that Mikis Theodorakis' music greatly assisted Cacoyannis in achieving this goal. He composed the music for all three films.



FIGURE 15.3
Clytemnestra attacks Agamemnon;
Iphigenia (1977)
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This *agōn* lies at the heart of how Cacoyannis understood Clytemnestra's motivation for the murder of her husband on his return from Troy. In Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* Clytemnestra justifies her actions to the chorus by invoking her husband's filicide (1521–1529 and 1551–1559) as did Euripides in his *Electra* (1020–1029). Cacoyannis adopted this point of view in *Iphigenia* by refining his second portrayal of Clytemnestra, making her more humane and sympathetic. In his third screen adaptation, Clytemnestra is no longer the simplistic cardboard villain of the earlier *Electra*. Cacoyannis wanted to explain the queen's motivation to cinematic audiences and to excuse her hatred of her husband that leads her to murder him. This time Cacoyannis is on the side of Clytemnestra. The audience is invited to sympathise with her plight as first Menelaus and then Odysseus (Christos Tzagas) arrive to remind the king of his duty to the army. She again attempts to prevent her husband from leaving, but this time she is unsuccessful. He shakes her off violently shouting that there is nothing he can do to prevent the sacrifice: “Δεν μπορώ, τίποτα δεν μπορώ!” (I can't, I can't do anything!). His final decision demonstrates that he truly is the “whore to his army” that McDonald calls him.⁷⁸ His ambition renders him powerless to do anything other than to pander to the whims of the mob. In the final scenes, he rushes up the hill in a vain attempt to save his daughter, but it is already too late.⁷⁹ The winds might have already started to blow before

78 McDonald (1983) 135.

79 In an interview with Thodoris Koutsogiannopoulos (recorded in June 2004 and available in the extras included in the collector's deluxe edition of the DVD of Cacoyannis' Euripidean trilogy, 2006), Cacoyannis specifically stated that Iphigenia dies in his film and that the myth of her miraculous rescue was rooted in the army's guilt over what they had done.

Iphigenia is killed, but Calchas (Dimitris Aronis) was not about to let her escape her fate. Cacoyannis thus emphasises the responsibility of both the army's leaders and the priesthood for the murder of an innocent girl. Clytemnestra is entirely right when she calls the sacrifice an "άνανδρος" (cowardly) and "ύπουλος" (treacherous) murder. There is nothing left for Agamemnon to do, but to don his helmet and assume his place at the head of the Greek army.⁸⁰

3 Conclusion

Over the course of his trilogy Cacoyannis gradually moved away from the formalism and self-consciousness of the Euripidean *agōn*.⁸¹ In his first two films the two opponents present their arguments in an agonistic setting in front of the chorus. In *The Trojan Women* Menelaus acts as both judge and jury for his wife's case. In the third film, however, Cacoyannis naturalises the *agōn* and turns it instead into a domestic quarrel between husband and wife, without an internal audience to pass judgment. The camera acts as the means by which this case is brought before the external cinematic audience who hear and judge it. Cacoyannis, however, did not offer his viewers an impartial presentation of the two sides. Like the logographers writing speeches for their clients in the ancient Athenian courts, his characters expertly create an "us versus them" view of the world.⁸² Before the commencement of each *agōn* he and his collaborators set up the scene in such a way that it unbalanced the ancient plays' expression of the two opposing points of view. Cacoyannis made Electra, Hecuba, and Clytemnestra the clear winners of these debates. He undermined the strength of Clytemnestra's, Helen's, and Agamemnon's arguments by using his camera and the close-up technique to reveal their insincerity and questionable motives to the audience. Cacoyannis thus fundamentally altered the Euripidean design and the function of his *agōnes*, which was to offer the ancient audience a pause during which they could rationally consider the dilemmas at the heart of these plays.

Cacoyannis does demonstrate, albeit in a different manner from Euripides, that rational debate does not always bring about the desired outcome.⁸³ In Euripides the *agōn* cannot change the mythically predetermined outcome.

80 For Agamemnon as trapped between his roles as leader and father in Euripides, see Gamel (1999) 311.

81 Lloyd (1992) 1 and 21. Lloyd calls the *agōn* in the *Troades* "the most self-conscious of all Euripides' *agōnes*" (35).

82 For the use of the "we-they" pattern in court speeches, see Serafim (2017b) 31–32.

83 Lloyd (1992) 17.

In Cacoyannis too, despite the moral victories achieved by his Electra, Hecuba, and Clytemnestra, the outcome remains the same. The matricide still takes place, the Trojan women are forced into exile, and Iphigenia is sacrificed. The change in emphasis, however, divides Cacoyannis' version of the Euripidean world into one of heroes and villains. Cacoyannis' film rhetoric is less complex and relies heavily on visuals, but it succeeds in helping him achieve his stated goal, to portray Euripides as a vocal pacifist. In this aim he was aided by Irene Papa (twice) and Katharine Hepburn. Their performances in the trilogy offer us a timely reminder that delivery always matters, then as now.⁸⁴ It is not just what you say, but also how you say it, or to be more accurate, how you perform your speech.

Women's voices are raised in protest against oppression and war throughout Cacoyannis' Euripidean trilogy and their grief turned into a powerful political weapon designed to arouse his audiences' outrage by moving them to tears.⁸⁵ Cacoyannis and his collaborators sought to manipulate the chemistry between the speaker(s) and their audience (both internal and external) to achieve a specific set of goals. On the surface, Electra, Hecuba, and Clytemnestra have more in common with assembly speakers, who had to be able to respond to a crowd's reactions and adjust their argument as necessary in order to win the votes they needed for their political agenda. But, Cacoyannis (and his collaborators) fixed the game; his claim of fidelity to Euripides' source texts mask a contemporary political subtext that shaped the way the *agōnes* were set up and portrayed in the trilogy. Cacoyannis thus more closely resembles an expert logographer who knows all too well how to manipulate the cinematic medium in order to get the audience to vote the way he wants them to, in favour of Electra, Hecuba, and Iphigenia and against Clytemnestra, Helen, and Agamemnon.

The ancient Athenians were a knowledgeable audience, familiar not only with rhetorical but also theatrical devices, and able to weigh the different sides to an argument. A degree of decorum was expected in the ancient Athenian courts,⁸⁶ so over-embellished rhetoric was considered too theatrical and generally discouraged, but such anxieties reveal the impact of drama on rhetoric. Modern screen audiences tend to prefer simplistic distinctions between right and wrong that reinforce their view of the world. Cacoyannis' Euripidean trilogy has much to offer, but its core message that war and

84 On the importance of delivery and performance in ancient Athens, see Worthington (2017) 13.

85 On female voices of resistance, see Bakogianni (2009) 51–52 and McDonald and Winkler (2001) 75. On the uses of grief for political ends, see Holst-Warhaft (2000) 5.

86 Apostolakis (2017) 134 and Worthington (2017) 23.

oppression is wrong, appealing as it might be to modern liberal audiences, ignores the darker undertones of its ancient dramatic source texts. Electra, Hecuba, and Clytemnestra are complex tragic heroines and their opponents Clytemnestra, Helen, and Agamemnon do in fact raise some valid points. Euripides' characters occupy the grey areas in between easy black and white divisions of the world and their rhetoric is much more complex than what is represented on screen in the trilogy. This is a timely reminder that words matter and the art of rhetoric is more necessary than ever in a world dominated by polarised views and fake news endlessly transmitted via modern media.

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Sport and Peace: Panhellenic Myth-Making and the Modern Olympics

Jacques A. Bromberg

This chapter examines the reception of ancient Greek rhetoric in the modern Olympic movement and, in particular, in the reshaping of ancient expressions of Panhellenism into modern expressions of world peace. The promise of international sport to spread peace and unity throughout the world remains perhaps the most persistent value not only among proponents of Olympism, but across the international sporting community in general. This promise has deep roots in influential readings of ancient Greek texts, to which the organisers and adherents of the modern festival have appealed explicitly and consistently for over a century. In recent years, the rhetoric of the ancient “Olympic truce” (*ekecheiria*) has re-emerged as a tool for promoting peace through sport. Historians have been eager to quip about the *ekecheiria* that no wars stopped during the ancient games and that philosophical articulations of Panhellenic unanimity reflected (at best) wishful thinking. But these criticisms miss the larger point that the proponents of the ancient and the modern games are not bothered by inaccuracy, contradiction, or anachronism. On the contrary, the “productive instability” between unachieved ideal and instantiated reality present in every Olympiad has been shown to be a key element of their enduring success.¹

This essay explores the creation and reception of Panhellenic rhetoric in three stages: (1) how the rhetoric of Panhellenism emerged in response to the horrors of the Peloponnesian War and the perceived dangers posed by Philip II of Macedon; (2) how these appeals to cultural unity against foreign enemies were shaped by ancient writers into an influential narrative about origins of the Olympic truce (*ekecheiria*); and (3) how modern historians and, following them, the organisers and administrators of the modern Olympics embraced these narratives and transformed them into a powerful argument for the global phenomenon of sport.

1 The phrase is from Goff (2011) 8; cf. Coubertin (2000) 209.

1 The Origins of Panhellenic Rhetoric

Historians of sport are especially fond these days of debunking modern misunderstandings and myths of ancient athletics: the marathon race, the torch relay, amateurism, “Graeco-Roman” wrestling, have all been unmasked as modern inventions with only pretensions to ancient origins.² Surely, some will say, the promise of peace through sport is a similar mirage; after all, sport, like warfare, involves competition and conflict. It has winners who don wreaths and dedicate statues, and losers who, as Pindar puts it, “skulk down back alleys away from their enemies, stricken with their misfortune” (κατὰ λαύρας δ’ ἐχθρῶν ἀπάοροι / πτώσονται, συμφορᾷ δεδαγμένοι, *Pythian* 8.86–87). No wars stopped in antiquity during the ancient Olympic festival, nor does any ancient source in fact claim that warfare ceased during the ancient Olympics.³ It has been observed that even the most thorough reader could not detect in the celebrations of the Olympic, Pythian, Isthmian, or Nemean Games in the histories of Thucydides and Xenophon from any diminution in the fighting; and that “warfare would scarcely have been possible” if hostilities ceased around Greece every time one of the ancient athletic contests invoked a “sacred truce.”⁴ In fact, not only did no wars stop during the ancient Olympics, but the Olympic sanctuary was covered in military dedications. Excavations since the 19th century have revealed vast quantities of military votive offerings, including a great deal of inscribed armour, dedicated by Greeks celebrating victories over other Greeks. Paeonius’ famous, towering statue of *Nikē*, to cite only the most famous example, was commissioned by Dorian Messenians after a memorable series of victories during the Peloponnesian War and stood overlooking the very centre of the Altis. The inscription on its base identifies the dedication as, “a tithe from the [spoils of the] enemy” (δεκάταν ἀπὸ τῶμ πολεμίων, *IO* 259.2 = *IG* V.1, 1568).⁵ Olympia was also home to an altar of “Warlike Zeus” (Ἄρειος Ζεύς) where, Pausanias explains, “[the Eleans] say that Oenomaus would sacrifice, whenever he was preparing to start a chariot race against one of Hippodameia’s suitors” (λέγουσι δὲ οἱ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι καὶ ὡς Οἰνόμαος ἐπὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ τοῦτου θύει τῷ Ἀρείῳ Δίῳ, ὅποτε τῶν Ἱπποδαμείας μνηστήρων καθίστασθαι μέλλοι τινὶ ἐς ἵππων ἄμιλλαν,

2 See, e.g., Golden (2011) 2–3. On the “myth” of Greek amateurism, Young (1984) remains the strongest statement.

3 Harris (1964) 155–156; Lämmer (1982–1983); Spivey (2004) 184–192; Crowther (2007b) 74–76; Golden (2008) 136–137 and (2011) 5–7.

4 Harris (1964) 156. A “Pythian truce” appears in Plutarch (Πυθιακὰς ἐκεχειρίας, *Mor.* 413d), and an “Isthmian truce” in Pausanias (δ’ Ἰσθμιακὰς σπονδὰς, 5.2.1). For a “Nemean truce” see Plut. *Arat.* 28 and the brief discussions in Harris (1964) 155–156 (esp. n. 7) and Golden (2011) 6–7.

5 Paus. 5.26.1; Spivey (2004) 186–188; Golden (2011) 5–6.

5.14.6). Reflecting on the phenomenon of international sport, George Orwell quipped that, “serious sport has nothing to do with fair play. It is bound up with hatred, jealousy, boastfulness, disregard of all rules and sadistic pleasure in witnessing violence: in other words, it is war minus the shooting.”⁶ A similar understanding of sport appears in the work of behavioural psychologists and sociobiologists, who see sport as, essentially, “a sublimation of human aggression, channeling our biological urge to fight.”⁷ A standard approach to ancient athletics emerging from this line of thought is the claim that it served not as a prelude to peace, but as training for war – never mind that few of the athletics disciplines at Olympia had specific military application.⁸

The closest we have to such a claim can be found in a famous and influential passage from Isocrates’ *Panegyricus* 43, an oration promoting Panhellenism delivered around 380 BCE at Olympia:

τῶν τοίνυν τὰς πανηγύρεις καταστησάντων δικαίως ἐπαινουμένων ὅτι τοιοῦτον ἔθος ἡμῖν παρέδωκαν, ὥστε σπεισμένους πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ τὰς ἔχθρας τὰς ἐνεστηκυίας διαλυσσόμενους συνελθεῖν εἰς ταῦτόν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ’ εὐχὰς καὶ θυσίας κοινὰς ποιησόμενους ἀναμνησθῆναι μὲν τῆς συγγενείας τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπαρχούσης, εὐμενεστέρως δ’ εἰς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον διατεθῆναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦς, καὶ τὰς τε παλαιὰς ξενίας ἀνανεώσασθαι καὶ καινὰς ἐτέρας ποιήσασθαι.

ISOC. *Paneg.* 43

Now the founders of our great festivals are justly praised for handing down to us a custom by which, having made treaties with one another and **resolved our pending hostilities**, we come together in the same place, where, as we make our prayers and sacrifices in common, we are reminded of the kinship which exists among us and are made to feel more kindly towards each other for the future, reviving our old friendships and establishing new ties.

In this passage, Isocrates credits the founders of the great Panhellenic festivals with inaugurating a truce, during which the Greeks resolved their quarrels and came together in peace. The phrase “having resolved our pending hostilities” (τὰς ἔχθρας τὰς ἐνεστηκυίας διαλυσσόμενους) is in fact the ultimate source of the myth about the ancient Olympic truce, and has sometimes been taken

6 Orwell (1945).

7 Spivey (2004) 2; Giulianotti (2012) 288.

8 This observation is made by many ancient writers including Xenophanes (fr. 2 DK), Euripides (*Autolykos* fr. 282, *TGF* 5.1, pp. 343–346), Plutarch (*Phil.* 3.2–4), and Dio Chrysostom (9.14–18).

as describing a general armistice among all Greek cities.⁹ It is now widely accepted that Isocrates' phrase describes only the attendees of the Olympic festival, for whom it would most likely have been true: "at the festival, competitors and spectators alike did put aside their quarrels, even if they came from cities at war with one another."¹⁰

Ancient writers were more than aware of the enormous quantities of military dedications at their religious sites; some, in fact, seem tormented by it. Plato characterised the Greek cities of his day as "sick and divided by faction" (νοσεῖν δ' ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ στασιάζειν, *Resp.* 5.479c9), and complained about the "pollution" (μίασμα) incurred when making temple dedications of weapons taken from other Greeks (*Resp.* 5.469e–471a).¹¹ Xenophon reported how the Spartan King Agis was prevented by the Eleians from praying for victory in war, "on the grounds that it was decreed from antiquity that Greeks could not consult the oracle concerning war against other Greeks" (ὥς καὶ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εἶη οὕτω νόμιμον, μὴ χρηστηριάζεσθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐφ' Ἑλλήνων πολέμῳ, *Hell.* 3.2.22). These two pupils of Socrates belong to the generation born during the Peloponnesian War, when divisions between Greek communities that had been growing ever since their grandfathers' wars with Persia brought about a war of unprecedented brutality. It was in this period of growing division and mistrust, as the partnerships formed during and after Xerxes' invasion gradually broke apart, that we first find rhetoric in defence of a unified sense of "Greekness." In Herodotus' account of Xerxes' invasion, the Athenians reject the Persian offer of terms, citing "Greek culture, our shared blood and common language, the shared shrines and rituals of our gods, and the like manner of our customs" (τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἔόν ὁμαιμόν τε καὶ ὁμόγλωσσον καὶ θεῶν ἰδρύματά τε κοινὰ καὶ θυσίαι ἡθεὰ τε ὁμότροπα, 8.144). The Athenians address this sentiment not to the Macedonian king, Alexander, who delivers the message from Xerxes, but rather to the Spartan ambassadors, who have come to ensure that the Athenians "do nothing harmful to Greece" (μήτε νεώτερον ποιεῖν μηδὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, 8.142). For them, it is meant as a reminder of "the Athenian character" (τὸ Ἀθηναίων φρόνημα, 8.144), but the episode is clearly also looking forward to tensions between Athenians and Spartans that emerged in the aftermath of the Persian defeat. It is therefore not surprising that we should

9 Norlin (1980) ad loc: "The armistice or 'Peace of God' – the sacred month as it was called at Olympia – during which the states participating in the games ceased from war."

10 Harris (1964) 155–156.

11 Half a millennium later, Plutarch echoed the sentiment, calling such dedications "most shameful inscriptions" (αἰσχίστας ... ἐπιγραφάς, *De Pyth. or.* 15); cf. Cic. *Inv. rhet.* 2.70.

find aspirational expressions of Panhellenism well represented during and in the wake of the violent decades of the Peloponnesian War (432–405 BCE).

In *Lysistrata* (411 BCE), a play that dramatises the exhaustion with war of Athenians and Spartans alike, Aristophanes gives this thought to his title character. Lysistrata scolds the men of both communities for having forgotten their common ritual practice, and specifically names religious sanctuaries (Olympia and Delphi) that were also homes of athletic festivals:

οἱ μίᾱς ἐκ χέρνιβος
 βωμοὺς περιρραίνοντες ὥσπερ ξυγγενεῖς
 Ὀλυμπίαςιν, ἐν Πύλαις, Πυθοῖ (πόσους
 εἵποισι' ἂν ἄλλους, εἴ με μηκύνειν δέοι;)
 ἐχθρῶν παρόντων βαρβάρων στρατεύματι
 Ἑλληνας ἄνδρας καὶ πόλεις ἀπόλλυτε.

AR. *Lys.* 1128–1134

[You] who sprinkle from a single cup the altars at Olympia, in Pylae, and Delphi (and I could list many others, if I had to speak at length), as though you were kin, and while the non-Greek enemies stand by with [their] army, you destroy Greek men and cities.

Lysistrata emphasises the places of common ritual activity, where the shared heritage of both Athenians and Spartans was most apparent. Her mention of “non-Greek enemies” (ἐχθρῶν βαρβάρων) alludes both to the Persian Wars (now at least two generations gone), and to the machinations and shifting allegiances of the Persians during the Peloponnesian War. She also invokes the memory of the Persian Wars by mentioning (alongside Olympia and Delphi) “Pylae,” where the Amphictyonic Council met near Thermopylae.¹² More to the point, however, she characterises this lesson as one inherited from earlier generations: “I listened to the many lessons of my father and grandfather, and was not badly educated,” she explains, before issuing her rebuke (τοὺς δ' ἐκ πατρός τε καὶ γεραιτέρων λόγους / πολλοὺς ἀκούσας' οὐ μεμύσμαι κακῶς, *Lys.* 1126–1127). The ancient commentators (scholiasts) on this passage reinforce Lysistrata's point that these lessons are inherited by explaining that line 1125 is taken from Euripides' *Clever Melanippe* (ὁ στίχος ἐκ σοφῆς Μελανίπης Εὐριπίδου, Σ *Lys.* 1125) and line 1131 from Euripides' *Erechtheus* (ὁλος ὁ Ἰαμβος λέλεκται ἐξ Ἐρεχθέως, Σ *Lys.* 1131).

12 For “Pylaea,” see Her. 7.201 and 213; Aeschin. 3.124; Dem. 18. 147; Plut. *Mor.* 2.409a.

This scene in *Lysistrata* is an early example of the sorts of articulations of Panhellenism that emerge in this period, and it is perhaps not surprising that a majority of these expressions of cultural unity are made at Olympia, the site of the largest and oldest of the Panhellenic festivals. At the next Olympiad, in 408 BCE, Gorgias is said to have delivered his celebrated Olympic oration to the Greeks gathered at the festival. Although the speech itself has not survived, Philostratus offers a brief account in which he characterises Gorgias as a “counsellor of unity” (ὁμονοίας ξύμβουλος) and the oration as “giving political advice on the most pressing matter” (ὕπὲρ τοῦ μεγίστου αὐτῷ ἐπολιτεύθη):

στασιάζουσιν γὰρ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ὁρῶν ὁμονοίας ξύμβουλος αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο τρέπων ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ πείθων ἄθλα ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ὅπλων μὴ τὰς ἀλλήλων πόλεις, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων χώραν.

PHILOSTRATUS, *VS* 1.9.4–5 = Gorgias fr. A1 D-K

For observing that the Greeks were fighting among themselves, he served as a counsellor of national unity by encouraging them to take arms against the barbarians, and urging them to regard as prizes of war not each other's cities but the land of the barbarians.

Gorgias' appeal to shared culture, like *Lysistrata*'s, depends on established perceptions of Persian otherness, and appears to have made a case for Panhellenic unity against a non-Greek foe. A generation later, in 388 or 384 BCE, Lysias opened his own Olympic oration by recalling that Heracles had founded the original games to promote mutual friendship among the Greeks:

ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν ἔργων ἔνεκα, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἄξιον Ἡρακλέους μεμνήσθαι, καὶ ὅτι τόνδε τὸν ἄγωνα πρῶτος συνήγειρε δι' εὐνοίαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ τέως χρόνῳ ἄλλοτριῶς [2] αἱ πόλεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας διέκειντο: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκεῖνος τοὺς τυράννους ἔπαυσε καὶ τοὺς ὑβρίζοντας ἐκώλυσε, ἄγωνα μὲν σωματῶν ἐποίησε, φιλοτιμίαν δὲ πλούτου, γνώμης δ' ἐπίδειξιν ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἵνα τούτων ἀπάντων ἔνεκα εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ συνέλθωμεν, τὰ μὲν ὀφόμενοι, τὰ δ' ἀκουσόμενοι: ἡγήσατο γὰρ τὸν ἐνθάδε σύλλογον ἀρχὴν γενήσεσθαι τοῖς Ἕλλησι τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλίας.

LYSIAS 33.1–2

Among the other many noble deeds for which, gentlemen, it is right to remember Heracles, we should include that out of love for Greece, he first assembled this contest. For up until that time, the cities were unfavourably disposed to one another. And when he had put an end to tyranny

and curbed arrogance, he established a contest of bodily strength, an ambitious display of wealth, and a demonstration of intelligence in the most beautiful part of Hellas, so that for all these things we might come together, some to listen, others to spectate; and he judged that our meeting here would be the beginning of mutual friendship among the Greeks.

In Aristophanes' comedy *Wealth* from 388 BCE, contemporary with Lysias' speech and only a few years before *Panegyricus*, the character of Poverty describes the Olympics as "always bringing together all of the Greeks every five years" (ἵνα τοὺς Ἑλλήνας ἅπαντας ἀεὶ δι' ἑτοὺς πέμπτου ξυναγείρει, 584). Plato, in *Republic*, also characterises *philhellenes* (φιλέλληνες) as those who "consider all of Greece their home" (οἰκεῖαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἡγήσονται, 5.470e9–10) and "have a share in [the same] holy places as the others" (κοινωνήσουσιν ὧν περ οἱ ἄλλοι ἱερῶν, 5.470e10).¹³

These passages illustrate that from at least the final decades of the 5th century BCE, the festival sites and the *ekecheiria* had acquired a unique rhetorical significance, which could be invoked and exploited at moments of political expediency or necessity. In particular, the *ekecheiria* functions as part of a mythology by which these orators connected the festival of their own day with the culture heroes of their legendary past: Iphitus, Lycurgus, and Heracles. By characterising the Olympics and its truce as a *revival* of an even older, nearly lost tradition, Isocrates and Lysias lent them a profound rhetorical authority that helped to justify their Panhellenic projects.¹⁴ It was this powerful mythologising framework, and *not* any specific instances of peacemaking through sport, that Coubertin inherited and adapted for the revived, modern Olympics. For this reason, the myth of peace through sport should not be dismissed as unhistorical in the same way as, say, amateurism or the marathon.

2 Panhellenic Rhetoric as Myth-Making

At least as early as 400 BCE, these philosophers had developed a generally accepted account of the *ekecheiria* and its origins, suitable for their own

13 Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.33; Andoc. 3.21; Dem. 9.30–31. The word "philhellene" acquired some significance in international politics in the early 20th century; even Coubertin wrote an essay "The Philhellene's Duty" (*Le devoir d'un philhellène*) in *Revue Olympique* (1906) p. 64 (= *Olympism*, p. 250).

14 Volonaki (2011) 84–85.

unstable times.¹⁵ The standard narrative, which became widely accepted, involved Heracles and his royal descendants in the Peloponnese, and it is reflected in sources from Lysias and Isocrates in the 4th century BCE to Plutarch, Phlegon, and Pausanias in the 1st and 2nd centuries CE. Even in antiquity, however, the power and authority of the ancient *ekecheiria* derived from its legendary, mythological origins. A majority of the sources characterise the ancient Olympic festival, including the *ekecheiria*, as a revival of still older traditions, borrowing authority from the mythical (or at least, legendary) past. The fullest account comes from Phlegon of Tralles, a freedman of Hadrian who wrote a history of the games through the 229th Olympiad (CE 140):

[2] Λυκούργος δὲ ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος, υἱὸς ὦν τοῦ Πρυτάνεως τοῦ Εὐρυπῶντος τοῦ Σόου τοῦ Προκλέους τοῦ Ἀριστοδήμου τοῦ Ἀριστομάχου τοῦ Κλεοδαίου τοῦ Ὑλλου τοῦ Ἡρακλέους καὶ Δηιανείρας, καὶ Ἴφιτος ὁ Αἴμωνος, ὡς δὲ ἔνιοι Πραξωνίδου, ἐνὸς τῶν ἀπὸ Ἡρακλέους, Ἡλείος, καὶ Κλεοσθένης ὁ Κλεονίκου Πεισάτης, βουλόμενοι εἰς ὁμόνοιαν καὶ εἰρήνην τὸ πλῆθος αὐθις ἀποκαταστήσαι, τὴν τε πανήγυριν τὴν Ὀλυμπικὴν ἔγνωσαν ἀνάγειν εἰς τὰ ἀρχαῖα νόμιμα καὶ ἀγῶνα γυμνικὸν ἐπιτελέσαι. [3] στέλλονται δὴ εἰς Δελφοὺς χρησόμενοι τῷ θεῷ, εἴ σφισιν συνεπαινέι ταῦτα ποιῆσαι. ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἄμεινον ἔφη ἔσεσθαι ποιούσιν. καὶ προσέταξεν ἐκχειρίαν ἀγγεῖλαι ταῖς πόλεσιν ταῖς βουλομέναις μετέχειν τοῦ ἀγῶνος. [4] ὦν περιαγγελθέντων κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ ὁ δίσκος ἐγράφη τοῖς Ἑλλανοδίκαις, καθ' ὃν ἔδει τὰ Ὀλύμπια ἄγειν.

PHLEGON OF TRALLES fr. 1.2–4

[2] The Spartan Lycurgus, being son of Prytanis, son of Eurypon, son of Soon, son of Procles, son of Aristodemus, son of Aristomachus, son of Cleodaeus, son of Hyllus, son of Heracles and Deianeira, and Iphitus, son of Haimon (but according to some of Praxonides), one of the descendants of Heracles, an Elean, and Cleosthenes, son of Cleonicus, a Pisan, **wishing to restore unanimity and peace among the people again, decided to bring back the Olympic festival according to the ancient traditions and to celebrate an athletic contest.** [3] They then sent to Delphi to consult the oracle, whether he approved of them doing these things. The oracle said that it would be better if they did, and commanded them **to announce a truce** to all the cities that wished to share in the contest. [4] Once these things were proclaimed through Greece, a discus was inscribed for the *Hellanolikai*, commanding them to hold the Olympics.

Phlegon's account credits three Peloponnesian kings, including Lycurgus of Sparta, Iphitus of Elis (both descendants of Heracles), as well as the Pisan king Cleosthenes, not with *founding* the Olympic festival, but with *reviving* it "according to the ancient tradition" (εἰς τὰ ἀρχαῖα νόμιμα).¹⁶ He emphasises that the founders' wish in reinstating the (already ancient) games was to restore "unanimity and peace" (ὁμόνοιαν καὶ εἰρήνην) and then credits the Delphic oracle with the command to "announce a truce" (ἐκεχειρίαν ἀγγεῖλαι).¹⁷

Further details appear in two passages from Plutarch's *Life of Lycurgus*. The biography begins by citing Aristotle, whom we know to have compiled lists of Olympic victors, as a source for the story of Lycurgus and Iphitus:

περὶ Λυκούργου τοῦ νομοθέτου καθόλου μὲν οὐδὲν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἀναμφισβήτητον, οὗ γε καὶ γένος καὶ ἀποδημία καὶ τελευτὴ καὶ πρὸς ἅπασιν ἢ περὶ τοὺς νόμους αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν πραγματεία διαφόρους ἔσχηκεν ἱστορίας, ἥκιστα δὲ οἱ χρόνοι καθ' οὓς γέγονεν ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁμολογοῦνται, οἱ μὲν γὰρ Ἰφίτῳ συνακμάσαι καὶ συνδιαθεῖναι τὴν Ὀλυμπιακὴν ἐκεχειρίαν λέγουσιν αὐτόν, ὦν ἔστι καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ὁ φιλόσοφος, τεκμήριον προσφέρων τὸν Ὀλυμπιασὶ δίσκον ἐν ᾧ τοῦτομα τοῦ Λυκούργου διασώζεται καταγεγραμμένον.

PLUT. *Lyc.* 1.1

Concerning Lycurgus the lawgiver, in general, nothing indisputable can be said. In fact his family, travels, death, and above all concerning his laws and constitution all have different accounts, and the years when the man lived are among the most disputed facts, for some say (sc. Apollodorus Grammaticus, fr. 75c Müller) that **he flourished at the same time as Iphitos and arranged the Olympic truce with him. Aristotle the philosopher is among these, offering as evidence the discus at Olympia upon which the inscribed name of Lycurgus is preserved.**¹⁸

According to Plutarch, Aristotle's evidence for their association was also the famous discus at Olympia with Iphitus' and Lycurgus' names inscribed on it. Later in the *Life*, however, Plutarch admits some additional complexity, citing the work of Hermippus of Smyrna, who apparently granted to Lycurgus only a secondary role in the festival and truce:¹⁹

16 For Heracles' role in the foundation of the Olympics, see Pindar, *Olympians* 3 and 10.

17 Raubitschek (1988) 35–36.

18 Perrin (1914) ad loc: "A stay of hostilities was observed all over Greece during the festival." Cf. Timaeus of Tauromenium, *BNJ* 566 fr. 127.

19 Bollansée (1999) and Christesen (2007) appendix VII.

ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τῆς Ὀλυμπιακῆς ἐκεχειρίας ἢ ἐπίνοια πρᾶου καὶ πρὸς εἰρήνην οἰκείως ἔχοντος ἀνδρὸς εἶναι, καίτοι φασὶ τινες, ὥς Ἑρμιππος μνημονεύει, τὸν Λυκούργον οὐ προσέχειν οὐδὲ κοινωνεῖν ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἴφιτον, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνειν ἄλλως ἐπιδημοῦντα καὶ θεώμενον ἀκοῦσαι δὲ φωνὴν ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου τινὸς ἐξόπισθεν ἐπιτιμῶντος αὐτῷ καὶ θαυμάζοντος ὅτι τοὺς πολίτας οὐ προτρέπεται κοινωνεῖν τῆς πανηγύρεως: ὥς δὲ μεταστραφέντος οὐδαμοῦ φανερὸς ὁ φθεγξάμενος ἦν, θεῖον ἡγησάμενον, οὕτω πρὸς τὸν Ἴφιτον τραπέσθαι καὶ συνδιακοσμήσαντα τὴν ἐορτὴν ἐνδοξοτέραν καὶ βεβαιότεραν καταστήσαι.

PLUT. *Lyc.* 23.2

The design of the Olympic truce seems to be the work of a gentle man, one friendly to the idea of peace. Still, there are others, as Hermippus recalls (Hermippus of Smyrna, fr. 85 Wehrli), who say that **Lycurgus is not implicated and does not share in the works of Iphitus**, but that he happened to be in town as a spectator when he heard a voice behind him that seemed human, scolding him and marvelling that he did not encourage his fellow citizens to take part in the festival. But when, after he turned around, there was no speaker in sight, he concluded that it must have been a god, and so he turned towards Iphitus, helping him to make the festival both more reputable and more enduring.²⁰

Plutarch's uncertainty regarding the role of Sparta in the truce reflects an uneasy political relationship between the Spartans and the Eleans during and after the Peloponnesian War. Our sources suggest that Sparta may have occasionally assisted in the Olympic truce, and in fact the Elean *Hellanolikai* were given oversight of the treaty signed between Greek states in 481 BCE to resist Xerxes' invasion.²¹ But the Spartans were also one of only a few Greek states fined for violating the Olympic *ekecheiria*.²² Thucydides describes their exclusion by the Eleans from the Olympics of 420 BCE, "so that they might neither offer sacrifice nor compete" (ὥστε μὴ θύειν μηδ' ἀγωνίζεσθαι, 5.49.1; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.21–23), until they paid a fine of six thousand minae. The charge was that the Spartans sent soldiers to the fort at Phrycon and into Lepreum "during the time of the Olympic truce" (ἐν ταῖς Ὀλυμπιακαῖς σπονδαῖς). Not only that, but the Eleans publicly whipped the Spartan Lichas, who had lent his chariot to some Boeotians, when he crowned the victorious charioteer, "wishing to

20 Cf. Demetrius of Phaleron, fr. 89.5 Wehrli.

21 Crowther (2007b) 76; Kyle (2007) 128–129.

22 Hornblower (2000).

make it clear that it was *his* chariot" (βουλόμενος δηλώσαι ὅτι ἐαυτοῦ ἦν τὸ ἄρμα, Thuc. 5.50.4).

Phlegon's books of *Olympiads* were no doubt Pausanias' source for his own accounts of the *ekecheiria*. Pausanias describes the foundation of the truce at several points in book 5, on Elis, beginning in this passage which follows Phlegon's account closely:

χρόνῳ δὲ ὕστερον Ἴφιτος, γένος μὲν ὦν ἀπὸ Ὀξύλου, ἡλικίαν δὲ κατὰ Λυκούργον τὸν γράψαντα Λακεδαιμονίοις τοὺς νόμους, τὸν ἀγῶνα διέθηκεν ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ πανήγυριν τε Ὀλυμπικὴν αὖθις ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐκεχειρίαν κατεστήσατο, ἐκλιπόντα ἐπὶ χρόνον ὅποσος δὴ οὗτος ἦν· αἰτίαν δὲ δι' ἣντινα ἐξέλιπε τὰ Ὀλύμπια, ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσιν ἐς Ὀλυμπίαν τοῦ λόγου δηλώσω. [6] τῷ δὲ Ἰφίτῳ, φθειρομένης τότε δὴ μάλιστα τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑπὸ ἐμφυλίων στάσεων καὶ ὑπὸ νόσου λοιμώδους, ἐπῆλθεν αἰτῆσαι τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς θεὸν λύσιν τῶν κακῶν· καὶ οἱ προσταχθῆναί φασιν ὑπὸ τῆς Πυθίας ὡς αὐτόν τε Ἴφιτον δέοι καὶ Ἡλείου τὸν Ὀλυμπικὸν ἀγῶνα ἀνανεώσασθαι.

PAUS. 5.4.5–6

At a later time, Iphitus, being of the family of Oxylus, and of the same generation as Lycurgus (the one who wrote the Spartan constitution), **rearranged the contest at Olympia, and re-established from scratch the Olympic festival and truce, which had ceased for a period of who knows how long.** I will explain the reason why the Olympics had ceased in my books that discuss Olympia. [6] **With all of Greece being especially ruined at that time by factional conflict and plague,** it occurred to Iphitus to ask the god at Delphi for a solution to these troubles: and the story goes that it was enjoined upon him by the Pythia that he and the Eleans should renew the Olympic Games.

Like Phlegon, Pausanias emphasises that the festival had been abandoned and then brought "back from its beginning" (αὖθις ἐξ ἀρχῆς), during a time of severe political conflict. Later in the book, he admits that it was nearly forgotten:

μετὰ δὲ Ὀξύλον – διέθηκε γὰρ τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ Ὀξύλος –, μετὰ τοῦτον βασιλεύσαντα ἐξέλιπεν ἄχρι Ἰφίτου τὰ Ὀλύμπια. Ἰφίτου δὲ τὸν ἀγῶνα ἀνανεωσαμένου κατὰ τὰ ἤδη μοι λελεγμένα, τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔτι ὑπῆρχε τῶν ἀρχαίων λήθη· καὶ κατ' ὀλίγον ἐς ὑπόμνησιν ἤρχοντο αὐτῶν, καὶ ὅποτε τι ἀναμνησθεῖεν, ἐποιοῦντο τῷ ἀγῶνι προσθήκην.

PAUS. 5.8.5

After the reign of Oxylyus – for Oxylyus too celebrated the Games – the Olympics ceased until the time of Iphitus. When he renewed the Games, as I have already explained, **people had already begun to forget the ancient traditions:** little by little they began to remember them, and whenever they remembered something, they made an addition to the Games.

Pausanias also describes the famous discus which, he explains, was on display in the Temple of Hera: “Iphitus’ discus contains upon it the truce, which the Eleians announce for the Olympics, and it is inscribed not in a straight line, but the letters run around the *diskos* in the manner of a circle” (ὁ δὲ τοῦ Ἰφίτου δίσκος τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν, ἣν ἐπὶ τοῖς Ὀλυμπίοις ἐπαγγέλλουσιν Ἡλεῖοι, ταύτην οὐκ ἐς εὐθὺ ἔχει γεγραμμένην, ἀλλὰ ἐς κύκλου σχῆμα περίεσιν ἐπὶ τῷ δίσκῳ τὰ γράμματα, 5.20.1). The style of the inscription, which I see no reason to doubt that he saw, corresponds with the manner of other archaic inscribed *diskoi*. One preserved from Kephallenia, which has been dated to the 6th century BCE and is now in the British Museum (1898, 0716.3), was thrown by a certain Exoidas and dedicated to Castor and Pollux. It is one of several inscribed, votive *diskoi* that have been preserved, and naturally, the spiral manner of the writing is significant.²³ Whether or not the discus that Phlegon, Pausanias, Plutarch, and Aristotle described dated to the 8th or 9th century, it seems quite possible that the object that they encountered in the Heraion could, even by Aristotle’s time, have already been a few centuries old.

Next, Pausanias describes an important statue group just inside the bronze doors of the Temple of Zeus: “as one enters the bronze doors, to the right in front of the pillar is [a statue of] Iphitus being crowned by the woman Truce (*Ekecheiria*), as the elegiac couplet upon them says” (τὰς θύρας δὲ ἐσιόντι τὰς χαλκάς, ἔστιν ἐν δεξιᾷ πρὸ τοῦ κίονος Ἰφίτος ὑπὸ γυναικὸς στεφανούμενος Ἐκεχειρίας, ὡς τὸ ἐλεγείον τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς φησιν, 5.10.10). Here stood a statue of the Eleian king Iphitus being crowned by a female figure identified as “Truce,” a personification of the *ekecheiria*, as identified by the elegiac couplet affixed to the sculpture. Later in the same book, Pausanias mentions the statue group again in the context of the many scattered dedications of Micythus: “near the ‘Iphitus of Elis’ and ‘Truce crowning Iphitus,’ come the following dedications by Micythus ...” (ἀλλὰ Ἰφίτου μὲν τοῦ Ἡλείου καὶ Ἐκεχειρίας στεφανούσης τὸν Ἰφίτον, τούτων μὲν τῶν εἰκόνων ἔχεται τοσάδε ἀναθήματα τῶν Μικύθου 5.26.2).²⁴ This time Pausanias calls the statue group “Truce crowning Iphitus,” and reveals that it stood beside

23 Gardiner (1907) 6–8.

24 On Micythus, see Herodotus 7.170; Diodorus Siculus 11.48–66.

another statue of “Iphitus of Elis.” As I have already described above, truces modelled on the Olympic *ekecheiria* appear to have been common features of the other Panhellenic festivals; yet there is no evidence for another instance of a personified “Truce” in all of Graeco-Roman antiquity.

These sources suggest the important place of the *ekecheiria* in the mythology and ideology of the ancient Olympic festival, from at least the classical period (Isocrates, Aristotle) through Roman times (Plutarch, Pausanias). At the same time, it cannot be doubted that some of the most energetic rhetorical appeals to Panhellenism were delivered at Olympia during the Olympic Games.²⁵ During the closing decades of the 5th century, inspired perhaps by the egregious violence of the Peloponnesian War, the rhetoric of Panhellenic unity appears to become increasingly strident.²⁶ I have already mentioned Isocrates’ impassioned plea in the *Panegyricus* 43, where he glorified the Olympic festival as an opportunity “to cement friendships and affirm the cultural communion that made Hellas, ‘Greece,’ a precious entity.” But this style of appeal had become traditional by Isocrates’ time, as the athletic festivals acquired symbolic, Panhellenic status.

To recognise the process of *mythopoïēsis* at work, one has only to look at how these writers characterise the political circumstances in which Iphitus and Lycurgus re-established the Olympic festival and the *ekecheiria*. Lysias, for instance, explains that, “up until that time, the cities were unfavourably disposed to one another” (ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ τέως χρόνῳ ἀλλοτρίως αἱ πόλεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας διέκειντο). Phlegon claims that the founders “wished to restore unanimity and peace among the people again” (βουλόμενοι εἰς ὁμόνοιαν καὶ εἰρήνην τὸ πλῆθος αὖθις ἀποκαταστήσαι). Pausanias maintains that, “all of Greece [was] being especially ruined at that time by factional conflict and plague” (φθειρομένης τότε δὴ μάλιστα τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑπὸ ἐμφυλίων στάσεων καὶ ὑπὸ νόσου λοιμῶδους). These descriptions seem far more applicable to the late 5th and early 4th centuries than to the 8th century, supporting what Nigel Spivey has argued, that “whatever can be termed ‘the Olympic movement’ in antiquity did not exist in 776: it is a phenomenon that should be located over two hundred years later.”²⁷ Pausanias’ language, invoking both plague and factionalism, seems especially to echo Plato, who employs the same metaphors to describe Hellas in his own day. Although the *ekecheiria* never called for a general armistice, a majority of our sources recognised the games’ potential to resolve differences and create feelings of kinship and common purpose. Its historicity matters far less to

25 Volonaki (2011).

26 Crowther (2007a) 55–56, (2007b) 74–76; Spivey (2004) 190–192.

27 Spivey (2011) 21.

these authors than its rhetoric and ideology, derived from its prominent place in the mythology of the ancient Olympic revival.

3 Ancient Rhetoric and the Modern Olympic Truce

Contributing to social peace has been one of the goals of the modern Olympic movement from its earliest beginnings in the late 19th century, reflecting the influence of the international peace movement on Coubertin's philosophy of Olympism and on the structure and evolution of the International Olympic Committee (IOC).²⁸ The initial German excavations at Olympia from 1875–1881 had brought attention to the site, and stimulated interest in the history of the Olympics: “Germany had excavated what was left of Olympia,” Coubertin reflected in 1909, “why should France not be successful in reconstituting its splendor?”²⁹ In the first volume of his *Griechische Geschichte*, published in 1857, Curtius himself had briefly discussed the *ekecheiria*, which he called a “ceasefire” (*Waffenruhe*), explaining that, “the roads to Pisa had to be open and unspoiled, all around the temple in complete safety.”³⁰ Other new histories of ancient Greece, like Victor Duruy's 1887 *Histoire des Grecs*, characterised the truce as “suspending wars” and “introducing feelings of peace and humanity.”³¹ These descriptions of the ancient truce, combined with the Panhellenic rhetoric discussed in the previous section, left a powerful impression on Coubertin, who knew Duruy personally.³² The result was Coubertin's eclectic, but influential interpretation of the ancient *ekecheiria*:

In the 11th century CE, one could still see at Olympia a disk onto which was carved the text of the agreement reached between Lycurgus and Iphitus, king of Elis, to establish the “sacred truce” during the Games. At that time, **all armed conflicts and all combat among Hellenes had to cease**. The territory of Olympia, declared neutral, was inviolable.³³

This understanding of the truce, written in 1929, reflects more than just a popular misunderstanding of the *ekecheiria*. Classical scholars around Europe were

28 Loland (1995); Golden (2008) 136–138; Loland and Selliaas (2009) 57–59.

29 Coubertin (1909) 89.

30 Curtius (1857) 189–190.

31 Duruy (1887–1889) 789–790.

32 Loland and Selliaas (2009) 59.

33 Coubertin, “Olympia,” *Le Sport Suisse* 25 (1929) (= *Olympism*, p. 565), emphasis added.

equally caught up in the fantasy. Duruy's claim echoes in Norman Gardiner's 1910 history of *Greek Athletic Sports and Festivals*:

During this truce **there was to be peace throughout the land**, no one was permitted to bear arms within the sacred territory, and all competitors, embassies, and spectators travelling to Olympia were regarded as under the protection of Zeus and sacrosanct. The effect of this truce, at first purely local, spread with the growth of the festival to all the states taking part in it till the whole Greek world felt its influence.³⁴

Even so great a scholar as Gilbert Murray avows that, "a general truce was, of course, necessary for any such common meeting, and was enforced, as usual, by taboos and curses."³⁵

This pacific reading of the ancient festivals, with its deep roots in the Panhellenic rhetoric of Gorgias, Lysias, Isocrates, and others, had strong appeal in the early history of the modern games. As early as 1892, Coubertin called athletics "the free trade of the future," and "a mighty stay" for the cause of peace:

As for athletics in general, I do not know what its fate may be, but I wish to draw your attention to the important fact that it presents two new features it is democratic and international ... There are people whom you call utopians when they talk to you about the disappearance of war, and you are not altogether wrong; but there are others who believe in the progressive reduction in the chances of war, and I see no utopia in this.

He went on to compare athletics to technological developments ("the telegraph, railways, the telephone") that in his view "have done more for peace than any treaty or diplomatic convention."³⁶ A few years later, in the aftermath of the 1896 Olympics, Coubertin proclaimed that:

Should the [revived Olympic Games] prosper – as, I am persuaded, all civilised nations aiding, that it will – it may be a potent, if indirect, factor in securing universal peace. Wars break out because nations misunderstand each other. We shall not have peace until the prejudices that

34 Gardiner (1910) 43–44, emphasis added. It should be noted, however, that the claim does not appear in Gardiner's 1930 *Athletics of the Ancient World*, Chicago.

35 Murray (1908) 573.

36 "Physical Exercises in the Modern World," Lecture at the Sorbonne, November 25, 1892 (= *Olympism*, pp. 297).

now separate the different races are outlived. To attain this end, what better means is there than to bring the youth of all countries periodically together for amicable trials of muscular strength and agility? **The Olympic Games, with the ancients, controlled athletics and promoted peace. It is not a vision to look at them for similar benefactions in the future.**³⁷

Likewise, William Sloane, a professor of history at Columbia University and the first American representative to the IOC, made peacemaking a defining feature of the revived "Olympic Idea": "how far the Olympic Idea may go is not yet determined," he wrote in 1912, "its definition for present uses is sufficiently fixed on the lines of its first appearance: first, to create and strengthen bonds of friendship, such as ought to exist among all civilised nations, by frequent, peaceful intercourse."³⁸

Moreover, Coubertin felt that he had identified two elements that made sport an effective peacemaker. Writing in 1918, he identified "mutual assistance and competition" as athletic principles that also "serve as the foundations of modern democracy":

We have just seen two characteristics of sport, the bases needed for any athletic group that wants to prosper. These characteristics are *mutual assistance* and *competition*. These same principles serve as the foundations of modern democracy. The economic, industrial, and scientific conditions in which nations develop and evolve today impose harsh and constant individual competition on them. Nothing points to relaxation of this arrangement anytime soon. Mutual assistance is essential in alleviating these conditions sport would seem an excellent preparatory school for our lives these days, and an excellent peacemaker, too.³⁹

This theme appears frequently in his prolific writings, the potential of international athletic competition to bring about and maintain peace: "an inestimable instrument for the establishment of social peace," he called it in a letter from 1919,⁴⁰ and in an essay from a decade later, he again stressed "mutual assistance and competition" as "the only two things that, taken together,

37 "The Olympic Games of 1896," *The Century Illustrated Monthly Magazine* 53.31 (1896–7) (= *Olympism*, p. 360), emphasis added.

38 Sloane (1912), 408–414. Cf. Hugill (1949), esp. 36–37.

39 "Olympic Letter V," *La Gazette de Lausanne* 325 (1918), 1–2 (= *Olympism*, p. 215–216).

40 "Olympic Letter X," *La Gazette de Lausanne* 12 (1919), 1 (= *Olympism*, p. 173).

ensure peace among societies.”⁴¹ To this day, the cause of peace remains a core principle of Olympism, the Olympic movement and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) as articulated throughout the Olympic charter.⁴² In its definition of Olympism, the charter explains that it aims to place sport “at the service of the harmonious development of humankind, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity” (p. 13). Likewise, the charter describes the goal of the Olympic movement as “to contribute to building a peaceful and better world by educating youth through sport practised in accordance with Olympism and its values” (p. 17). Finally, the charter defines the mission and role of IOC itself as “to cooperate with the competent public or private organisations and authorities in the endeavour to place sport at the service of humanity and thereby to promote peace” (p. 18).

It is important we note that Coubertin, the IOC, and more recently the United Nations emphasise their debt to ancient Greece in every discussion of the Olympic truce. It is vital, in fact, to the continuing ideological appeal of the modern Olympic truce that it can be traced back to ancient practices.⁴³ The IOC website, for instance, has a prominent link to a page entitled “Peace through Sport,” at the bottom of which is a footer that explains: “[t]he IOC revived the ancient concept of the Olympic Truce that allowed participants to travel to and from the Olympic Games in total safety with a view to protecting the interests of athletes and sport in general.”⁴⁴ In 1993, in the lead-up to the centennial Olympics in Atlanta, the United Nations passed Resolution 48/11, recognizing the IOC’s efforts to restore “the ancient Greek tradition of the *ekecheiria*, or ‘Olympic Truce,’ in the interest of contributing to international understanding and the maintenance of peace.” A year later, in December 1994, Resolution 49/29 described the ancient *ekecheiria* as “calling for all hostilities to cease during the Olympic Games.” By 1995, the item “Building a Peaceful and Better World through Sport and the Olympic Ideal” had become a biennial agenda item, to be considered by the General Assembly in advance of each summer and winter games. But the description of the *ekecheiria* “calling for all hostilities to cease” remained for the next five years.

We should not be surprised by this. In fact, despite the existence of plenty of evidence to the contrary, the myth that hostilities around the ancient Greek world ceased during each Olympics has remained remarkably persistent,

41 “The Educational Use of Athletic Activity,” *Le Sport Suisse* 1074–5 (1928) (= *Olympism*, p. 186–187).

42 https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf, accessed January 2018.

43 Golden (2011) 4–5.

44 <https://www.olympic.org/peace-through-sport>, accessed January 2018.

and continues to be retold in textbooks of ancient Greek history around the world. In one popular Spanish textbook from 2001, for instance, Francisco Gómez writes that the sacred truce, “temporarily put an end to the conflicts that existed at the time.”⁴⁵ The same claims also appear in two recent, popular books on the Olympics in English, both published in 2004: Tony Perottet alleges that the *ekecheiria*, “banned all wars that might interrupt the successful staging of the event,” while Nigel Spivey affirms that it ensured “a sixteen day cessation of hostilities all around Greece while the festival was convened.”⁴⁶ We might be surprised, however, to observe that the UN recognised and remedied the historical error several years before some historians. It only took five years for the UN to update its description of the *ekecheiria* from “calling for all hostilities to cease” (1993–1999) to “ensuring safe passage and participation” (2001), and finally to “encourag[ing] a peaceful environment and ensuring the safe passage and participation” (2003).

So, do Coubertin’s philosophical and ideological borrowings from antiquity offer a road map toward “a better and more peaceful world” as he dreamed? Or is international sport better reflected in Orwell’s phrase “war minus the shooting”? It has long been observed that tension between the IOC (which emphasises peace, understanding, and solidarity) and the individual National Olympic Committees (which privilege national interests) leaves international sport vulnerable to crisis.⁴⁷ Looking at the bloody history of 20th-century warfare, which has shown no sign of abating in the 21st century, it would be easy to conclude that Coubertin’s vision for international peace through sport was a failure. But such a judgment would be unfair. Consider, for instance, that temporary ceasefire in Bosnia negotiated by the UN and IOC before the 1994 Olympic Games in Lillehammer, allowed for enough of a break in the fighting for an estimated 10,000 children to be vaccinated.⁴⁸ The ancient sources suggest that athletics reflect *both* Coubertin’s and Orwell’s views, and that it would be a mistake to read the two as mutually contradictory – and surely, taking the shooting out of war is a step towards a more peaceful world. The site of Olympia is a case in point: it was not only the place where Greeks would gather every four years under truce to compete and worship, but at the same time, the place where they would pray for and give thanks for their military successes (even those against one another). In the dialogue *Anacharsis*, Lucian

45 Gómez (2001) 136.

46 Perottet (2004) 13 and Spivey (2004) 189–190 respectively. Giulianotti (2012) 287 characterises its aim as “suspending military conflicts.”

47 Heinilä (1985).

48 Wilson (2012) 136.

captures something of this paradox. The conversation between the Athenian sage, Solon, and his Scythian guest, Anacharsis, opens with the latter observing the odd nature of athletic training:

καίτοι κατ' ἀρχὰς εὐθὺς ἀποδυσάμενοι – ἑώρων γάρ – λίπα τε ἠλείφαντο καὶ κατέψησε μάλα εἰρηνικῶς ἄτερος τὸν ἕτερον ἐν τῷ μέρει. μετὰ δὲ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι παθόντες ὠθοῦσί τε ἀλλήλους συννενευκότες καὶ τὰ μέτωπα συναράττουσιν ὥσπερ οἱ κριοί.

LUCIAN *Ana.* 1.5–10

But in the beginning, as I saw for myself, as soon as they took off their clothes, they oiled themselves and took turns rubbing each other down quite peacefully (μάλα εἰρηνικῶς). But I don't understand what has happened to them, for now they push and tug at one another and butt their foreheads together like rams.

Anacharsis finds it hard to believe that such activity actually benefits society, but Solon explains that this activity is “not madness” (οὐ γὰρ μανία, 6.7) and “not done for the sake of violence” (οὐδ' ἐφ' ὕβρει, 6.8). On the contrary, it benefits both the individual and the community: “from these [activities] they win something greater for the entire city and for themselves as well” (ἀλλὰ μεῖζόν τι ἀπάσῃ τῇ πόλει ἀγαθὸν ἐκ τούτου καὶ αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις προσκτώμενοι, 15.13–15). Solon characterises this great prize as “full human happiness” (εὐδαιμονία, 15.18), including freedom, wealth, fame, pleasure, safety, “all of the noblest things which anyone could pray happen for himself from the gods” (συνόλως τὰ κάλλιστα ὧν ἂν τις εὔξαίτο γενέσθαι οἱ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν, 15.22–3). This state of “supreme political happiness” (τὴν ἄκραν πόλεως εὐδαιμονίαν, 30.11–12) is possible, Solon maintains, “whenever our young people appear best prepared for peace and for war pursuing zealously all that is noblest for us” (ὅποτε εἰς τε εἰρήνην καὶ εἰς πόλεμον τὰ ἄριστα παρεσκευασμένη φαίνοιτο ἡ νεότης περὶ τὰ κάλλιστα ἡμῖν σπουδάζοντες, 30.12–15).

Coubertin recognised this paradoxical nature of athletic competition, reflecting in his *Olympic Memoirs* that:

Athletics can bring into play both the noblest and the baser passions; they can develop the qualities of unselfishness and honour just as much as the love of gain; they can be chivalrous or corrupt, virile or bestial; finally, they can be used to strengthen peace or prepare for war.⁴⁹

49 Coubertin (1997) 26–33 (= *Olympism*, 322).

The paradox is evident in some of Coubertin's comments about boxing, which he believed had tremendous peacemaking potential. Coubertin seems especially fond of the anecdote, which he recalls in several places, of English schoolmasters calling boxing gloves "keepers of the peace":

Hand-to-hand fighting and punches – especially punches – are not without a certain usefulness in high schools ... it makes peace more long-lasting and more solid. The English call boxing gloves "the keepers of the peace." Boys are occasionally allowed to practice with their gloves on, because at some point they will have occasion to fight with them off.⁵⁰

In another letter he went so far as to claim that "a boy's education is not complete without some contact with 'combat sports':"

It is not so paradoxical to call boxing a "pacifying sport." In English public schools the masters used to nickname boxing gloves "Keepers of the peace." And in fact they fulfilled this function to the general satisfaction. In New York a police chief opened boxing halls in the districts of ill repute, and there was an immediate drop in the statistics of bloody affairs and lethal assaults a boy's education is not complete without some contact with "combat sports."⁵¹

Sadly, the details of Coubertin's anecdote about the New York police chief appears lost to history. But nearly a full century after Coubertin wrote that letter, in 2015, a New York City police officer opened a boxing gym for at-risk boys in Brooklyn.⁵² Officer Russo acknowledges that the point of his programme is not just to teach boys to box, but rather for them "to get an education and be self-sufficient." As the author of the article explains, "At a time when police-community relations have frayed, Mr. Russo thinks this is one way to heal rifts and prevent young people from making wrong choices that lead to lifetimes of regret." The results of Officer Russo's social experiment are pending, but his thesis that athletics is closely connected with social and moral education is one that many philosophers and historians of ancient athletics would endorse. Some have suggested that "Olympic sport *taught* the ancient Hellenes something about peace, by obliging them to set aside their conflicts,

50 "The Education for Peace," *Le Réforme Social* 2.7 (1889), 361–363 (= *Olympism*, pp. 136–137).

51 "Olympic Letter XV," *La Gazette de Lausanne* 52 (1919), 1 (= *Olympism*, p. 177).

52 <https://nyti.ms/2w7VQxq>, accessed January 2018.

to treat others as equals, and to tolerate difference.”⁵³ Others have emphasised how sport, in its application of rules, demonstrates the concept of *isonomia*, equality before the law, “the greatest contribution made by ancient athletics to world civilization.”⁵⁴ Coubertin’s own view seems entirely in harmony with these views of sport. His impression of boxing’s peacemaking potential emerged from the belief, inspired by English educators, that such games also bred morality. Another French educational reformer of the time, Max Leclerc, shared Coubertin’s belief (and his apparent *anglophilia*), writing in 1894 that “physical education and moral education are directly linked: one cannot function without the other.”⁵⁵

4 Conclusion

Every four years thousands of athletes from hundreds of nations gather in a predetermined, global megalopolis to compete in dozens of sports and disciplines. The three most recent summer games in Beijing (2008), London (2012), and Rio de Janeiro (2016) drew between 3.6–4.4 billion viewers worldwide. Clearly, the modern Olympic jamboree has some claim to the title of the single most influential global reception of Greek antiquity. In both ancient and modern instantiations of the Olympics, however, the truce plays a vital, ideological role, offering glimpses of what a better world was thought to look like, but never claiming to have satisfied this ideal. For this reason, both ancient and modern festivals were framed as revivals of earlier, idealised traditions, and the mythologising rhetoric associated with ancient institutions is one reason for the festival’s enduring success. It might even be said that Coubertin’s appropriation from the Greek orators of the processes of myth-making (and not the idea for the Olympic Games themselves) was his most important and successful reception of antiquity.

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53 Reid (2006), emphasis in original.

54 Dombrowski (2009) 3.

55 Leclerc (1894) 895.

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SECTION 3

Politics, Leadership, and Public Speaking



The Demosthenic Model of Leadership Revisited by Libanius: The Revival of Philip in the Funeral Oration over Julian

Styliani Chrysikou

1 Introduction

Scholars have seen in Libanius' speeches more than a stylistic exercise for didactic purposes or a verbal game confined to a private sphere, thus assimilating his rhetorical art to a way of life that relates to the reality of his time.¹ Although he does not always mention his sources, his influences from Demosthenes are implied "both stylistically and thematically."² Called "Demosthenes the Second" by the Byzantines,³ Libanius placed heavy emphasis in his work on his Attic predecessor,⁴ not only for his style and language, but also for his political role in the city and for his personality⁵ (cf. chapter 2). Considering the eminent place the role and qualities of the ideal political leader occupied both in the work of Demosthenes and Libanius,⁶ I plan to discuss the ways

1 Cribiore (2013) 77–78: "For him, rhetoric was much more than a game or pastime; it was a way of life that gave its devotee the capacity to evaluate real problems and find solutions."

2 Cribiore (2013) 77. Cf. Johansson (2011) 35–44.

3 Cribiore (2013) 108.

4 According to Pernot (2006) 67, Demosthenes occupied a special place in the Greek culture of the imperial era: "Il était la rhétorique incarnée, et incarnée en une période dramatique où s'était jouée le sort d'Athènes. L'analyse de la perfection technique de l'éloquence démochénienne ... se liait, pour les Grecs de l'époque impériale, à la figure de l'homme politique, campée dans son combat pour la liberté de la Grèce et dans son trépas héroïque face aux Macédoniens." On the other hand, Pernot (2006) 67 perceives here a paradox: "Démochène triomphait à l'époque de l'Empire romain, alors qu'il symbolisait la démocratie athénienne, la liberté de parole dressée contre un pouvoir monarchique, et que donc, pour le fond, son éloquence ne pouvait plus être reproduite."

5 Cribiore (2013) 109 speaks of "affinity of character, or at least an affinity with the character of Demosthenes as he perceived it."

6 A number of studies testify to the interest of scholarship in the portrayal of the leader, especially that of Julian, drawn by Libanius; see Amande (1993–1994); Bouffartigue (2002); Cabouret (2002); Malosse (1995a), (2002). In contrast, despite the numerous references to the role and the image of the ideal political leader by Demosthenes, no study has reached conclusions grounded on a systematic analysis of the representation of the political leader

in which the latter has mobilised and adapted the Demosthenic model, and the moral values Demosthenes presented to the Athenian public. Given the considerable extent of Libanius' work, this chapter does not aim to give an overview of the matter by exploring Libanius' corpus in its entirety, but rather to look briefly at certain aspects of the Demosthenic model of leadership and how it is revived by Libanius. To this end, I present a vignette of Philip II and Julian the Emperor, two paradigms of monarchy, whose portrayals dominate Demosthenes' and Libanius' work respectively. The *Funeral Oration over Julian* is taken as reference text, which is juxtaposed with Demosthenic passages centred on Philip's portrait. With reference to Malosse's schema, which provides Julian's psychological profile,⁷ I detect, in the *Epitaphios*, the Demosthenic portrayal of the ruler whose many virtues Philip embodies.

Although he is Philip's sworn enemy, Demosthenes does not hide his admiration for the virtues of his opponent, especially when these traits stand in stark contrast to the weak points of the democratic constitution and serve his criticism of Athenian political morals. On the other hand, Libanius appears to believe that Julian the Emperor complies with his paradigm of leadership.⁸ By focusing on Libanius' treatment of Julian, I discuss the sources he exploited, with the aim of getting a glimpse of how the sophist conceived and reshaped leadership through the classical model, thus tracing, across seven centuries (4th century BCE–4th century CE), the affinities between Demosthenes' and Libanius' art of rhetoric and politics. Although the knowledge and use of classical authors by Libanius have already been the object of Bernard Schouler's monumental study of *La tradition hellénique chez Libanios*,⁹ more flesh should be added to the investigation of the adaptations of the features and presentation of Demosthenes' model of leadership in Libanius' works.

The argument in the present chapter is divided into three essential parts: First, our inquiry opens with an introductory discussion on the primary traits that unite Libanius' and Demosthenes' societies. This leads to an explanation of the affinities between the two orators. Second, the historical conjuncture, a

by Demosthenes. This will be the object of my prospective study. On the various forms of leadership in the age of Demosthenes or more precisely in Demosthenes' work, see Hansen (1983a), (1983b), (1983c), (1991); Pearson (1964); Perlman (1963); Thompson (1981). However, all these studies are related only partially or indirectly to the topic of the representation of the leader in Demosthenes' work.

7 Malosse (1995a) 319–333: “rhétorique et psychologie antiques: éloge des vertus et critiques obliques dans le portrait de l'Empereur Julien par Libanios.”

8 At the other end of the scale, Malosse (2002) 167 describes the typical traits of the bad emperor. Malosse underlines that for Libanius Constance represents the worst traits of a leader: “il est le plus près de fournir un véritable contre-modèle.”

9 Schouler (1984).

major determinant of the political role played by Demosthenes and Libanius, is explored in the following section, which underlines the leading part of the two orators in the public affairs of their cities and reveals the reasons why Julian was chosen by Libanius to incarnate his model leader. Third, the last part of this chapter examines at length the parallel portrayals of Julian and Philip, seeking to establish a link between the Demosthenic model and its revival though their similarities and divergences. This third part comprises four subchapters: 1. "Julian's *philoponia* as a parallel to Philip's *philopragmosynē*"; 2. "*Philoponia* supported by *phronēsis*: Action and intellectual capacities in the two monarchs"; 3. "*Philanthrōpia* and other moral qualities: The emperor's gifted portrait supported by the ideal of the democratic leader"; 4. "*Sōphrosynē* and *eusebeia* in Demosthenes and Libanius: Philip as Julian's counter-example." The comparison of Julian with Philip is followed by a conclusion which attempts to explain the deeper motives that drove Libanius to construct an image of his ideal leader. To what extent does Libanius, although compelled by the rules of panegyric and following the "models of *logos basilikos*,"¹⁰ draw the traits of his emperor from the Demosthenic description of the Macedonian monarch or complete his idealised portrait with reference to the model democratic leader? What follows is an attempt to answer this question.

The societies in which Libanius and Demosthenes grew up, despite their spatial and temporal distance, bear striking similarities. Both of them lived in a period during which their cities suffered radical changes and political upheavals.¹¹ As Christianity is gaining ground over paganism,¹² and shortly before the new religion consolidates its position, Libanius emerges as one of the leading advocates¹³ of a world inextricably tied to the classical era and its ideals. On the other hand, Demosthenes' fight against Philip is perceived by the orator as a struggle against the emerging monarchic foreign forces that

10 See Bouffartigue (2002) 186.

11 For the upheavals in the fields of religion, politics, and society in the age of Libanius, see Stenger (2014) 268.

12 Cribiore (2013) 7 remarks that "Libanius lived his long life at a time when Christianity was celebrating its triumph (although its rise to prominence was not as smooth as historians once thought), while paganism attempted some resistance and licked its wounds."

13 However, Libanius was not a radical follower of paganism. Cribiore (2013) 160–161 acknowledges that Libanius' enthusiasm for Julian was genuine, but, given that "he lived between worlds," he chose to be a moderate pagan. What counted most for him was serving the traditional values and Hellenic virtues, even if that meant supporting Christian students or associating with Christian friends and relatives. After Julian's death and the shock that followed the loss of his beloved emperor, Libanius, among other moderate pagans, "became more aware that religious divisions that were too extreme might damage interactions with people they otherwise valued"; Cribiore (2013) 161.

constitute a threat not only to democracy and to Athens but also to all the Greeks and their culture, a threat greater than the one posed by the king of Persia. Has Libanius seen in his predecessor a man with whom he shared the same ideals about political governorship? He seems to have identified himself with Demosthenes, in his personal struggle against all forms of despotism that threaten to trample on people's and cities' freedom and liberty of speech (παρρησία). The Demosthenic example of a political counsellor (σύμβουλος), revealed mostly through his major speech *On the Crown*, has influenced and inspired the young Libanius who, as Schouler emphasises, considered the Athenian orator "a stylistic model as well as an example of political conduct."¹⁴

Apart from the progressive intrusion of Macedonia into Greek affairs and the external threat of Philip II that led to the decline of Athenian power, further historical evidence needs to be taken into consideration. It is worth mentioning that Demosthenes wrote and delivered his speeches during a period when important changes were taking place in the Athenian economy and politics. Given the increasing importance of the economy and financial management in the 4th century, new financial offices become an important aspect of the political leadership of Athens.¹⁵ ῥήτορες καὶ στρατηγοί ("orators and generals"), σύμβουλος ("advisor"), σύμβουλος ... καὶ ῥήτωρ ("advisor and orator"), προστάτης or προεστηκώς and ἐπιστάς ("leaders"), πρεσβευτής and πρέσβεις ("ambassadors"), οἱ ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἐφεστηκότες ("commanders of the city"), ταμίης ("financial officer"), ἐπὶ τῷ θεωρικῷ τεταγμένος ("head of the Theoric Fund"), and κύριος τῶν φόρων ("chief financial administrator") are only some of the numerous terms used by Demosthenes to describe the new political reality and the updated profile of the political leader with its distinct functions and objectives. The number of references to the image and the role of the political leader confirm the complexity of the matter and its major importance in the speeches of Demosthenes, who pictured himself as one of the city's greatest leaders.¹⁶ More or less explicitly, Demosthenes describes his political rivals, denouncing misconducts and other malpractices he

14 Schouler (2011) 1 (my translation).

15 Perlman (1963) 340: "The politicians filled various regular offices in Athenian democracy. Most of them performed liturgies, which were an important title to influence in public life. There is convincing evidence that leading politicians held central positions, which were a source of great political and economic power."

16 See Serafim (2015) 96–108 for a discussion about the presentation of Demosthenes as advisor to the Athenian *dēmos* in the masterful description (18.169 ff.) of the reaction of the Athenians when the news of the capture of Elatea was announced.

considers disastrous for the normal function of democracy.¹⁷ At the same time, he highlights the qualities of the ideal leader, many of which Demosthenes is supposed to possess, like moral integrity,¹⁸ absence of the desire for material profit,¹⁹ outspokenness, and absence of flattery,²⁰ as well as philanthropy and generosity.²¹ Principles like justice and truth, which Demosthenes honoured while serving as ambassador (πρεσβευτής), are equally underlined. From his exile, Demosthenes reminds people of the faith and devotion he had shown to the city of Athens, remaining uncorrupted and loyal to his civic duty, even if he had to deal with one of the most powerful enemies ever.²²

Under the specific circumstances, both orators played an important and influential role in the political life of their city. While Demosthenes assumes the official position of the *rhētōr-symboulos* by participating personally in political actions, such as embassies or the decision-making in the *boulē*, Libanius, as a sophist and instructor, intervenes in the public sphere and propagates his ideas on philosophical, moral, and practical questions of leadership mostly through his courses, orations, and letters, since he “never held any official position in the imperial administration.”²³ However, he considers his position as a sophist/lecturer a powerful means of action; according to B. Cabouret, Libanius should be seen “as a man passionately engaged in the society surrounding him.”²⁴ The sophist has a precise objective in mind: to put eloquence at the service of action,²⁵ or, in other words, to use his work as “advocacy destined to save the status and the liberty of provincial cities against the pressure of the imperial administration.”²⁶ For Schouler, not only does Libanius remain connected to his time and its challenges, but also his profound knowledge of

17 On Athenian democracy in the age of Demosthenes, see the relevant study by Hansen (1991).

18 Furthermore, moral integrity should accompany rhetorical skill, since the influence of bad politicians with oratorical skill is particularly dangerous (cf. the importance of *logoi* in democracy, *On the Crown* 182 ff.).

19 See *On the False Embassy* 7–8.

20 See *Third Philippic* 3–4 and *On the Chersonese* 1.

21 Speaking of himself, Demosthenes states: τὸν δόντα τι τῶν ἰδίων καὶ ποιήσαντα πρᾶγμα φιλόανθρωπον καὶ φιλόδωρον (“an official who gave some of his personal property and performed a humane and generous act,” *On the Crown* 112).

22 See *Letter* 27.

23 Van Hoof (2014) 7.

24 Cabouret (2014) 162. See also Van Hoof (2014) 7–8. Schouler (2002) 157 speaks of a “militant work” (“oeuvre militante”).

25 Schouler (2002) 157.

26 Schouler (2002) 157 (my translation).

the past allows him to take a critical look over current political issues and matters of leadership.²⁷

During his lifetime, Libanius had the opportunity to meet many emperors such as Constantine, Constance, Gallus, Julian, Jovian, Valens, and Theodosius. However, only Julian was able to exert such an influence on Libanius because of the major part Greek culture and traditional religion played during his reign, especially at a critical juncture for the future of paganism when Christianity was prevailing at the expense of the latter. "Restoration of traditional religion, support for literature and rhetoric, his high level of education and philosophy,"²⁸ as Swain enumerates, are the reasons why Julian was so important to Libanius.²⁹ According to Malosse, despite the misunderstandings and the inequalities in the brief but intense friendship between the two men, Libanius believed that in Julian's person he had found "a restorer of cultural traditions and republican forms of government."³⁰ The importance that was placed on Julian by Libanius is confirmed by the abundant references to his personality, which constructed a laudatory portrait of the emperor. Several commentators have attempted to gather the traits of Julian's personality that are dispersed across Libanius' orations and epistles and even to detect the varied motives hidden behind the complimentary discourses addressed to the emperor.³¹ Others have tried to

27 Schouler (2002) 161–162. Also, in his paper entitled "*Militia philosophorum*: Le rôle des lettrés dans l'entourage des empereurs romains du IV^e siècle," Lançon (2014) 45 focuses on the "mutual dependency" between emperors and scholars in the 4th century CE.

28 Swain (2004) 377. Swain (2004) 373 argues equally that the revival of the pagan religion and the Greek *logoi* during Julian's reign was supposed to reinforce the link between the orator and the Roman emperor. Cribiore (2013) 155 also points out the critical juncture in the history of Hellenism that determined the proximity of the two men: "Because rhetoric and traditional *paideia* were centred on the divine pantheon, an emperor steeped in Greek culture and traditional religion was literally a godsend for the scholar Libanius." See also Cribiore (2013) 164: "... a certain affinity of character ... the seeming rapport of teacher and student, and the possibility of resurrecting Greek studies from the threat of obscurity must also have made the relationship irresistible." Despite Libanius' disapproval of Julian's policy towards the council of Antioch and although the emperor was in favour of an extreme Hellenism, the sophist embraced Julian's restoration of the temples and of letters (see Swain [2004] 398). For Swain, Julian's support by Libanius was careful and planned, even motivated by a sort of self-interest ("If the emperor supported him or his aims, the emperor was good. If not, he was bad," 399).

29 Criscuolo (2011) 191 remarks on a sort of nostalgia for the past on the occasion of the death of "l'homme qu'il avait incarné toutes les valeurs de la *paideia*, le dernier Hellène."

30 Malosse (1995b) 262 (my translation).

31 As Jean Bouffartigue (2002) 176 reveals, apart from Libanius' desire to please a person he admires, along with his ambition to gain recognition, or the hope for a certain reciprocity, the political motives of the orator include his desire to increase the number of Julian's partisans not only during his reign but also after his death.

put together not only the virtues, but also the faults in governing, in order to reveal the Libanian model of leadership.³²

In our case, the emphasis is placed on Malosse's work, which provides Julian's psychological profile, composed of numerous explicit virtues and, to a lesser degree, implied faults. According to Malosse, the flattering image of the emperor is constructed around four main features: *philoponia*, *phronēsis*, *philanthrōpia*, and *sōphrosynē*, virtues that refer to skills required to perform the demanding tasks of the governor and that reflect the quadripartite schema whose origin is found in Plato: *phronēsis*, *sōphrosynē*, *dikaiosynē*, *andreia*.³³

2 Julian's *philoponia* as a Parallel to Philip's *philopragmosynē*

One of the essential qualities attributed to Julian is his proclivity towards swift action. His exceptional inclination to action includes not only the military kind, but also the intellectual one, supported by an outstanding wisdom of every kind, achieved and cultivated with perseverance from his youth (21).³⁴ His *philoponia*, supported by a superior intellect,³⁵ and clearly the reason for devoting himself to fighting his enemies,³⁶ goes together with his passion for the Greek *logoi*, obviously of great importance to Libanius and the Greek oratory he serves.³⁷ Julian's *philoponia* recalls Philip's *philopragmosynē*, a controversial quality that is strongly supported by the absolute power of the Macedonian king.³⁸ Thanks to monarchy, Philip controls powers that provide him with rapidity and effectiveness. While Philip is constantly depicted as a man of action and admired for being so, the Athenians are consumed by

32 See Malosse (2002) "Le modèle du mauvais empereur chez Libanios."

33 Malosse (1995a) 321.

34 For "Julian's Education and Philosophical Ideal," see Smith (1995) 23 ff.

35 See *Or.* 18.72.

36 See Malosse (1995a) 323.

37 Stenger (2014) discusses the way Libanius exploits Greekness based on religious Hellenism and Greek oratory. Cf. *Or.* 15.25: "If I consider all the qualities which make up your humanity, first you are a Greek and rule over Greeks – for so I prefer to describe the opponents of barbarism, and the descendants of Aeneas will not reprove me for it" (Ἐνθυμούμαι δέ, ὅσα σε ποιεῖ φιλόανθρωπον· πρῶτον μὲν Ἕλληνας τις εἶ και κρατεῖς Ἑλλήνων· οὕτω γὰρ ἡδῖόν μοι καλεῖν τὸ τοῖς βαρβάροις ἀντίπαλον, και οὐδέν μοι μέμψεται τὸ γένος Αἰνείου).

38 "Ruler, leader, master of all" (δεσπότης, ἡγεμών, κύριος πάντων, *On the Crown* 236). Cf. *First Olynthiac* 14: "and Philip's habitual meddlesomeness, which prevents him from being content with what he has achieved and remaining at peace" (και την φιλοπραγμοσύνην ἢ χρήται και συζῇ Φίλιππος, ὑφ' ἧς οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἀγαπήσας τοῖς πεπραγμένοις ἡσυχίαν σχήσει).

useless, albeit honest, advice.³⁹ His fondness for action (cf. *Second Olynthiac* 15) along with his insatiable desire for domination or “his grasping for more” (τοῦ πλείονος ὀρεγόμενος, *First Philippic* 42) is the main reason for his military achievements. Philip’s thirst for power and honours, although not appreciated or shared by his people, as Demosthenes points out,⁴⁰ can even be praised as a motive that pushes the monarch to jump into action with passion on the battlefield, defying and “loving danger” (φιλοκίνδυνον, *Response to the Letter of Philip* 22). In the case of Philip, *philotimia* is mostly represented as an excessive ambition, disastrous for his generals and people. Yet the same notion, also equivalent to the aspiration for noble goals in the service of the common good, is repeatedly considered by Demosthenes to be one of the key elements of successful leadership and a quality that he can boast of.⁴¹

- 39 “For when he takes up arms and marches out, willing to risk all that he has, while we are seated – some after delivering speeches about justice, others after listening to them – it is quite natural, I suppose, that actions outstrip words, and that everyone pays attention not to the righteous speeches that we made in the past, or could make now, but to our actions” (ἐπειδὴν γὰρ ὁ μὲν λαβὼν μετὰ ταῦτα βαδίζῃ τὰ ὅπλα, πᾶσιν τοῖς οὖσιν ἐτοίμως κινδυνεύσων, ἡμεῖς δὲ καθώμεθ’ εἰρηκότες τὰ δίκαια, οἱ δ’ ἀκηκοότες, εἰκότως, οἶμαι, τοὺς λόγους τάργα παρέρχεται, καὶ προσέχουσιν ἅπαντες οὐχ οἷς εἰπομέν ποθ’ ἡμεῖς δίκαιοις ἢ νῦν ἂν εἰποιμεν, ἀλλ’ οἷς ποιοῦμεν, *Fourth Philippic* 3). Demosthenes repeatedly emphasises the importance and the need of quick decision-making during war and diplomacy. In his speech *On the False Embassy* 182 ff., the orator explains that, compared with tyrannical and oligarchic regimes, where the commands are being executed immediately, time-consuming procedures in democratic functioning may lead to the loss of valuable opportunities.
- 40 See *Second Olynthiac* 16: “but his subjects do not share in the glory of his achievements” (τοῖς δὲ τῆς μὲν φιλοτιμίας τῆς ἀπὸ τούτων οὐ μέτεστι).

- 41 On the twofold nature, positive and negative, of *philotimia*, see for instance, in the speech *Against Leptines*, Leukon, the ruler, and his *philotimia* as a motive for the benefits offered to the city of Athens, as well as *philotimia* as part of the moral virtues of the general Chabrias, including also his patriotism, his bravery, and his self-sacrifice. See also *Against Meidias* 159, where, on the contrary, Meidias’ wasteful and hedonistic lifestyle is far from a noble ambition: “You should not show any respect or admiration for things like this nor consider it a mark of his desire for honour if someone builds conspicuously or acquires many maid servants or beautiful furnishings, but only if a man shows his distinction and pursuit of honour in those things in which all of you have a share” (οὐδὲ τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἐκ τούτων κρίνειν, εἴ τις οἰκοδομεῖ λαμπρῶς ἢ θεραπαίνας κέκτηται πολλὰς ἢ σκεύη [καλά], ἀλλ’ ὅς ἂν ἐν τούτοις λαμπρὸς καὶ φιλότιμος ᾖ, ὧν ἅπασι μέτεστι τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑμῶν). Moreover, in his speech *On the False Embassy* 223, Demosthenes declares that he would not exchange *philotimia* for any other benefit. At the same time, he regrets the fact that the self-interest and dishonesty of the other envoys were the reasons why he was missing the honours normally due to him. Previously, in his speech, the orator was trying to dismiss any suspicion of pursuing personal ambitions that do not comply with the common good (*On the False Embassy* 71–72).

3 *Philoponia* Supported by *phronēsis*: Action and Intellectual Capacities in the Two Monarchs

What Malosse suggests is that *philoponia* must be in accordance with *phronēsis*, one of the cardinal virtues that rhetoric inherited from Plato.⁴² Libanius insists on the fact that Julian's action, as rapid as it is, is based on intellectual capacities, such as careful and thoughtful planning. According to Libanius, Julian's great achievements in war are ascribed both to military action and *sophia*: "for he always had in his hands either books or arms, for he considered warfare to be greatly helped by philosophy, and because he thought that an emperor has more power if he can use his wits than if he fights in the battlefield"⁴³ (ἀεὶ γὰρ εἶχεν ἐν χεροῖν ἢ βίβλους ἢ ὄπλα νομίζων μεγάλα πόλεμον ὑπὸ σοφίας ὠφελεῖσθαι καὶ μείζω γε φέρειν ῥοπήν βασιλέα βουλευέσθαι δυνάμενον ἢ μαχόμενον, *Or.* 18.72).

Likewise, numerous examples bear witness to Philip's resourcefulness, although at the service of lies, deceit, and injustice.⁴⁴ The monarch manages to overcome the difficulties with a ruse in order to expand his power in Greece. In Demosthenes' speech *On the Crown* 61, we learn not only about the deceitful means (scam, bribery, corruption) the Macedonian monarch made use of in order to divide the Greeks and strengthen his power but also about Demosthenes' fight against imminent tyranny. As "a rogue and a clever manipulator of events" (πανούργος καὶ δεινὸς πράγμασι χρήσθαι, *First Olynthiac* 3), Philip exploits the circumstances, whether "making concessions" (εἰχών), "making threats" (ἀπειλών), or "slandering" (διαβάλλων) the Athenians and their absence. Although this particular capacity worries Demosthenes, especially concerning Olynthus' fate (see *First Olynthiac* 3), he knows that it is a necessary skill for a leader and a quality traditionally approved by Greek civilization.⁴⁵ Speaking of the actions that led Philip to become master of the

42 Malosse (1995a) 325.

43 Translation modified.

44 In *The Response to the Letter of Philip* 1–2, Demosthenes criticises the monarch's capacity to invent out of nothing reasons and unjust pretexts for continuing the war against the Athenians, despite the supposed maintenance of peace with them: "fabricating non-existent reasons and discovering unjust excuses, he has in reality been waging war against our city for a long time, and now he acknowledges it in the letter he has sent" (αἰτίας οὐκ οὔσας πλάσάμενος καὶ προφάσεις ἀδίκους ἐξευρών τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ πάλαι πολεμεῖ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ νῦν ὁμολογεῖ διὰ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς ἧς ἔπεμψεν).

45 In that regard, see *Against Leptines*, where the orator, though he praises the strategic competence of a general such as Themistocles, whose ruse helped him to rebuild the walls by cheating his enemies ("one man acted in secret," ὁ μὲν γὰρ λαθών, 74), at the same time acknowledges the moral advantage of the general Conon, who achieved the same thing by beating his opponents on the battlefield ("the other by defeating the people who stood

Amphictyony and an ally of the Thebans, in his speech *On the Crown* 147, the orator expresses his admiration for the successes of his opponent (θεάσασθ' ὥς εἶ, "how successfully you will see").

Foresight is another crucial political virtue, which is presented as a leader's duty (orator or counsellor). It usually goes together with παρρησία and patriotic enthusiasm.⁴⁶ Demosthenes considers this one of his own qualities, something which he strongly and repeatedly emphasises,⁴⁷ while ascribing it equally to his enemy, Philip. In contrast to the Athenians' slowness and reluctance (ὕστερίζοντας δὲ τῶν ἔργων, "in acting too late," *On the Chersonese* 12), the foresight of the Macedonian monarch (προειδὼς ἃ βούλεται πράξει, "knows in advance what he wishes to do," *On the Chersonese* 11), combined with his readiness and rapidity, are talents that give him the opportunity to excel in diplomacy and war.

A combination of strategy, diplomacy, and intelligence, over brute strength and fighting, is what Libanius considers playing the pivotal role in Julian's pursuit of victory and success: "there was his philosophy and his knowledge that strategy was more effective than brute strength" (ἐν μὲν ἡ σοφία καὶ τὸ τὰ βουλεύματα εἰδέναι χειρῶν ὄντα δυνατώτερα, 18.39). Full of cunning, Julian excels in skilful management and trickery ("with great cleverness he used their desire for gain to purge their souls of cowardice," 18.45). Ruses of war intended to mislead or confuse the adversary (18.111) helped him consolidate his power. His rapidity is combined with "persuasion, force or stratagem" (πείθων, βιαζόμενος, ἐξαπατών, 18.111). The much-vaunted eloquence that, according to Demosthenes, should be accompanied by moral integrity – otherwise it may turn out to be a dangerous weapon in politics⁴⁸ – also gives Julian the

in our way," ὁ δὲ νικήσας τοὺς κωλύσοντας, 74). "Just as it is better to act openly than in secret and more honourable to achieve one's goal by winning rather than by cheating, so was Conon's way of building the wall better than that of Themistocles" (74).

46 See *On the Crown* 189: "for the adviser and the malicious opportunist, who are alike in no other way, differ most in this: the one reveals his opinion before the events and makes himself responsible to those he has persuaded, to fortune, to opportunities, to all men" (ὁ γὰρ σύμβουλος καὶ ὁ συκοφάντης, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἰσικότες, ἐν τούτῳ πλείστον ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρὸ τῶν πραγμάτων γνώμην ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ διδωσιν ἑαυτὸν ὑπεύθυνον τοῖς πεισθείσι, τῇ τύχῃ, τῷ καιρῷ, τῷ βουλομένῳ). See also *On the Crown* 246: "the statesman is accountable to see situations as they arise and to inform the rest of the citizens" (ῥήτωρ ὑπεύθυνος εἶη ἰδεῖν τὰ πράγματα ἄρχόμενα καὶ προαισθῆσθαι καὶ προειπεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις).

47 Only in his speech *On the Peace* does he attribute his foresight to *tychē* out of modesty: "if I have been more successful than others in predicting the future in all these matters" (ὅσα φαίνομαι βέλτιον τῶν ἄλλων προορών ..., 11). Cf. *On the False Embassy* 31 ("foresaw what was to come," προεώρων τὰ μέλλοντα).

48 Cf. the importance of speaking publicly in democracy, *On the Crown* 182 ff.

opportunity to excel. The emperor not only encourages others to speak freely ("allowing any who so desired to speak his mind freely before him," διδοὺς μὲν τῷ βουλομένῳ παρρησιάζεσθαι πρὸς αὐτόν, 18.154), but also has the oratorical skill that resembles great speakers in Homer (18.154). Always wise and cautious, he takes the time to wait for the right moment before he makes his move. Thus, not only his *sophia*, but also his *karteria*, connect him to Odysseus, also known for his patience (18.42). The way Julian makes ordinances also bears witness of his *phronēsis*, since "it is easy enough for the emperors to make ordinances, for that is their prerogative, but not for them to make beneficial ones, for that requires intelligence" (18.151).

On his way to power, and sure of the divine help he enjoys, Julian takes all the necessary measures and precautions not to be considered a cynical usurper. In the aftermath of the events leading to his proclamation as emperor, "it was his decree that none should try to punish anyone who had opposed the recent events: no sword was to be drawn against them, no intimidating looks or threatening word directed towards them: their opponent must be treated in exactly the same way as their supporters.... He had no desire to defile his reign with the shedding of blood, a charge to be levelled against a usurper" (18.100–101). Julian's great concern is "to succeed to the throne without coming to blows with his kinsman, for he had been forewarned by the gods and knew what was to come" (18.105). For Malosse, Libanius takes good care to emphasise Julian's sharp awareness of psychology, realism, and diplomacy. Sensitive and mindful of the way the others see him, Julian, we learn in *The Lament over Julian*, on his way to Greece, tries "not to appear unjust" (τοῦ μὴ δοκεῖν ἀδικεῖν, 17.64).⁴⁹ Would Libanius hint at the emperor's endeavour to cover up any element likely to inculcate him that he had grabbed power in an illegitimate way? It is difficult here not to see in the passage the striking similarity with Philip, particularly concerned to idealise his own image that for Demosthenes is far from the truth. According to Demosthenes, Philip's major concern is to introduce himself as just leader and benefactor. As Demosthenes attests in the speech where he defended the island Halonnesus against the imperialistic designs of Philip, the monarch not only wants to anticipate any Athenian claims but also to make sure that the Athenian people do not blame him for the offences committed against them concerning Potidaea, confirming that "he took it, and now possesses it, justly" (δικαίως αὐτὴν ἐκείνον καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ κεκτῆσθαι, *On Halonnesus* 9).⁵⁰ Certainly, for the orator, this is justice only in

49 Malosse (1995) 327.

50 Cf. *On Halonnesus* 10–11: "These are the unjust actions that he wishes you to ratify outright, by stating that you neither accuse him nor believe that he is wronging you" (ταῦτα

appearance, since Philip himself is fully aware of the crimes he is committing ("Philip is perfectly aware that what he says is unjust," Φίλιππος δ' οὐκ ἄγνοεῖ ταῦτ' οὐ δίκαια λέγων, *On Halonnesus* 5).⁵¹ His reaction is full of discontent and contempt towards the Athenians who attempt to slander him or mistrust his policies.⁵² He considers them as his main setback on the way to complete domination.⁵³ Philip is totally aware that the Athenians perceive his hostile feelings and in return nourish hatred for him. He is therefore very vigilant and keeps a watchful eye on the city's movements ("he is alert," "he stands against you," ἐγρήγορεν; ἐφέστηκεν ἐπὶ τῇ πόλει, *Second Philippic* 19), while at the same time he is offering services to the Thebans and some Peloponnesians, "who he thinks will be satisfied with the present situation because of their greed, and will foresee none of the consequences because of their stupidity" (οὓς διὰ μὲν πλεονεξίαν τὰ παρόντ' ἀγαπήσειν οἴεται, διὰ δὲ σκαιότητα τρόπων τῶν μετὰ ταῦτ' οὐδὲν προόψεσθαι, *Second Philippic* 19).

4 *Philanthrōpia* and Other Moral Qualities: The Emperor's Gifted Portrait Supported by the Ideal of the Democratic Leader

Moral qualities, such as philanthropy, generosity, spirit of freedom, clemency, compassion, and gratitude, observed in Julian's portrait and judged by Libanius as necessary to the exercise of power, are not to be found in the Demosthenic image of Philip, but in the 4th-century democratic leader. If Philip does not have such qualities, it is because, in contrast to Julian, he is a tyrant, who acts against freedom and laws.⁵⁴ For Demosthenes, he is the ultimate counter-example of

δὴ βούλεται τὰδδικήματα πανταχῶς παρ' ὑμῖν βεβαιώσασθαι, ὅτι οὐτ' ἐγκαλεῖτε οὐθ' ἡγείσθε ἀδικεῖσθαι.) and *On Halonnesus* 29: "do you think that he has carefully composed his whole letter to you so as to give the impression that he is doing and saying what everybody agrees to be just?" (ἄρ' ὑμῖν δοκεῖ πεφυλαγμένως ἅπαντα πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐπιστέλλειν, ὅπως ἂν φαίνεται καὶ λέγων καὶ πράττων ἅ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὁμολογεῖται δίκαια εἶναι... ;).

51 A number of verbs such as ἀπεκρύπτετο ("concealed"), προσποιεῖτο ("pretended," *On the Crown* 156) are suggestive of Philip's profound motives and hostility against Greece, the Thebans and Athenians that the monarch attempted to hide. Cf. ἐξηπάτα, *On Halonnesus* 25.

52 See also *On Halonnesus* 18 ff.

53 "He wishes to rule and regards you as his only rivals in this. He has been acting unjustly for a long time now and is himself fully conscious of doing so" (ἄρχειν βούλεται, τούτου δ' ἀνταγωνιστὰς μόνους ὑπείληφεν ὑμᾶς. ἀδικεῖ πολὺν ἤδη χρόνον, καὶ τοῦτ' αὐτὸς ἄριστα σύνοιδεν αὐτῷ, *Second Philippic* 17).

54 In the speech *On the Crown* 235, in order to give emphasis in his supremacy due to his concentration of unlimited powers, Philip is called *autokratōr*, who "had absolute rule over his followers" (ἦρχε τῶν ἀκολουθούντων), but also "ruler, leader, master of all" (δεσπότης,

the democratic leader.⁵⁵ From his exile, Demosthenes remarks how shameful it is for the Athenians, while excelling in intelligence and *paideia*,⁵⁶ to appear “less compassionate than Philip” (ἀγνωμονέστερον φαίνεσθαι Φιλίππου).⁵⁷ Despite the fact that his almost *post-mortem* praise to Philip is applied here mainly to denounce the Athenians’ reluctance to accept him back from exile, there is no doubt that the orator defines *philanthrōpia* as one of the basic ingredients for leadership since it is closely associated with intelligence and *paideia*.

Whereas Philip excels in diplomacy and war, notably thanks to his intellectual capacities, as far as moral virtues and *paideia* are concerned, he is obviously inferior to the Athenian people and its eminent democratic leaders. In fact Demosthenes considers himself to be one of them. Given that humanity is the key feature of Greek culture,⁵⁸ Philip, as a barbarian, a non-Greek, stands in contrast to all virtues espoused by Greek civilization. Demosthenes repeatedly questions Philip’s Greek identity. Not only he is not Greek, “nor even a foreigner from a land to which it is honourable to say that one belongs, but also a wretched Macedonian, from a land from which in the past you could not even have bought a decent slave.”⁵⁹ As a “foreigner, belonging to a different tribe” (ἀλλόφυλος, *On the Crown* 185), the aspiring ruler Philip is the enemy

ἡγεμών, κύριος πάντων). Similarly, in the *Second Philippic* 25, he is described as a “king and tyrant” (βασιλεὺς γὰρ καὶ τύραννος), who “is an enemy of freedom and an opponent of law” (ἐχθρὸς ἐλευθερίας καὶ νόμοις ἐναντίος).

55 According to Demosthenes, Philip is above all an enemy to democracy: “it is against our constitution that he is most at war, and towards its overthrow that his plots and policies are above all directed” (οὐδενὶ μέντοι μάλλον ἢ τῇ πολιτείᾳ πολεμεῖ, οὐδ’ ἐπιβουλεύει, καὶ σκοπεῖ μάλλον οὐδὲ ἐν τῶν πάντων, ἢ πῶς ταύτην καταλύσει, *On the Chersonese* 40). (Cf. *On Halonnesus* 33 ff. and *Second Philippic* 6).

56 “We are thought to exceed everyone in natural intelligence and education” (συνέσει καὶ παιδείᾳ πάντων προέχειν δοκοῦντα, *Letter* 311).

57 Although “badly instructed and brought up without any restriction,” Philip, when proclaimed victorious, “thought he should display a most generous spirit ... and did not dare to chain his opponents in battle, against whom he had risked everything, after learning who they and their fathers were. For unlike some of your orators, it seems, he thought it would be neither just nor honourable to treat everyone the same, but he took into account the additional factor of their worth when judging such matters” (τότ’ ἀνθρωπινώτατα πράττων φαίνεσθαι, ... καὶ τοὺς παραταξαμένους, πρὸς οὓς περὶ τῶν ὅλων διεκινδύνευσεν, οὐκ ἐτόλμησεν δῆσαι τὸ τίνων καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν ἐξετάσας· οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔοικεν ὁμοίως τῶν παρ’ ὑμῖν ῥητόρων ἐνόις οὔτε δίκαι’ ἂν εἶναι πρὸς ἅπαντας ταῦτ’ οὔτε κάλ’ ἡγεῖτο, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ἀξίας προσθήκην συλλογιζόμενος τὰ τοιαῦτ’ ἐπέκρινεν. *Letter* 311–312).

58 See Stenger (2014) 272. On what being Greek meant for Libanius, see Papi in this volume.

59 ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ βαρβάρου ἐντευθεν ὅθεν καλὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὀλέθρου Μακεδόνας, ὅθεν οὐδ’ ἀνδράποδον σπουδαῖον οὐδὲν ἦν πρότερον πρίσθαι, *Third Philippic* 31.

of all Greeks, especially the Athenian people and democracy.⁶⁰ The Athenian orator already in his *Second Olynthiac* misjudges the disgraceful ending of Philip. He estimates that the terms under which he dominated and the means on which he had relied on cannot guarantee the longevity of his power. For Demosthenes, Philip's power is doomed to collapse under the slightest failure, since it is not based on truth and justice. Nonetheless, the orator will be proved wrong in his prediction, since Philip's power turned out to be not at all ephemeral or unstable.

Arrogant, perjurious, unfaithful, unjust, ruthless, vicious, and corrupt, and all of these due to his uncultivated nature, Philip functions occasionally as Julian's counter-example, who, as described by Libanius, has nothing to do with arrogant and intolerant despotism. The emperor may be tough and determined in his confrontation with the enemy, but he knows how to treat with respect and clemency his defeated opponents⁶¹ or even betrayers such as Nebridius, Julian's quaestor, who "deserved to be cut in pieces by the first man who had reason enough to strike him." Instead, Julian saved him. "The humanity (φιλανθρωπία) of our emperor reached proportions like that" (18.110), remarks Libanius on this subject. In the eyes of the sophist, does Julian's humanity confirm his Greek identity, well-known for a particular ethical behaviour based on clemency and tolerance?⁶² Even after the outbreak of the unarmed rebellion, due to measures taken in order to relieve the increasing starvation of the population, he refused to use any kind of extreme violence. Instead, "he chose to avenge himself" on Antioch "by an oration," his famous *Misopōgōn*.⁶³

Furthermore, Julian knows exactly how to handle his own men in order to "induce them to demonstrate their staunchness" (18.65), as in the case of the victorious campaigns he led against the Germanic kingdoms. His finest men

60 Already in the *Second Philippic* 6, Demosthenes puts forward the reasons why he believes that Philip, in contrast to his political rivals, is a real threat for the city of Athens. He concludes that, since the Athenians signed a peace treaty with the Macedonian king (specifically in the year 346), he is constantly serving not their own interests but those of their Theban rivals (*Second Philippic* 7).

61 "Still, he did him no harm: he did not even put him in chains, out of respect for his recent eminence and from consideration of the great effect a single day had produced," 18.62.

62 According to Stenger (2014) 272, "... being Greek is a behaviour which encapsulates all virtues of a civilised man with clemency at the top, hence Libanius' identification of Greeks with mankind, defining humanity as the key feature (*Letter* 75, *Orations* 5.33 and 25–29)."

63 Van Hoof and Van Nuffelen (2011) 182: "In a speech designed explicitly to shape the memory of Julian's reign as a whole, Libanius therefore absolves Julian of any wrongdoing by saying that Julian applied the punishment not of a tyrant but of an orator. According to the *Epitaphios*, then, the *Misopōgōn* shows not so much the emperor's anger but his control of it."

are not afraid of him, as Philip's brave generals are of their leader. Philip's best and most seasoned men are being supplanted and overshadowed by their monarch. His vanity and megalomania make him "regret" (ἄχθεσθαι, *Response to the Letter of Philip* 12) the marvelous achievements of brilliant men.⁶⁴ On the opposite side, Julian's soldiers and subordinates are fond of him and highly appreciate his passion for action combined with his love of *logoi*: "he was loved by every soldier that loved action and by men of learning" (ἦρα μὲν αὐτοῦ πάς στρατιώτης ὅστις ἔργων ἐραστής, ἦρων δὲ οἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους, 18.74). For Libanius, in the case of Julian, ἔργα and λόγοι are not only not competitive and incompatible, but also highly harmonised in a way that benefits both Julian himself and his subjects. This is a quality that is far from what Philip appears to apply regarding his men and people, always complaining⁶⁵ about the unpleasant effects his military operations have on their activities and on agriculture.⁶⁶

5 *Sōphrosynē* and *eusebeia* in Demosthenes and Libanius: Philip as Julian's Counter-Example

The fourth element that completes the Libanian model of leadership is *sōphrosynē*. Besides diplomacy, strategy, and the other intellectual and moral qualities already discussed, it is the good fortune and help from the gods that guarantee the success of each operation (see 18.39–40). For Demosthenes and for Libanius, this goodwill originating from the gods works primarily as the indication of *sōphrosynē* and *eusebeia*. Philip may seem favoured by *tychē*,

64 Demosthenes stresses the monarch's *philotimia*, "unsurpassable" (ἀνυπέρβλητον, *Second Olynthiac* 18), as he calls it, as well as his tendency to push aside any men competent and skilled in war who could overshadow him ("since he wishes to give the impression that every achievement is his alone," βουλόμενον πάνθ' αὐτοῦ δοκεῖν εἶναι τᾶργα, *Second Olynthiac* 18). Any man "sober or generally upright" (σώφρων ἢ δίκαιος) who cannot tolerate Philip's constant excesses is taken away. Philip's circle is composed of thieves, flatterers, and drunkards. According to Demosthenes, "success is good at concealing such disgraces; but if someone stumbles, then these aspects of his life are exposed to immense scrutiny. And ... Philip will be exposed quite soon, if the gods are willing, and if you desire it" (20).

65 "But his subjects do not share in the glory of his achievements; instead, they are always being pounded by this to-and-fro campaigning, and are distressed and endure constant hardship" (τοῖς δὲ τῆς μὲν φιλοτιμίας τῆς ἀπὸ τούτων οὐ μέτεστι, κοπτόμενοι δ' αἰεὶ ταῖς στρατείαις ταύταις ταῖς ἄνω κάτω λυποῦνται καὶ συνεχῶς ταλαιπωροῦσιν, *Second Olynthiac* 16).

66 "Nor are they able to dispose of the little that they produce, since the markets have been closed on account of the war" (οὐτ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔργοις οὐτ' ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτῶν ἰδίοις ἑώμενοι διατρίβειν, οὐθ' ὅς ἂν ποιήσωσιν οὕτως ὅπως ἂν δύνωνται, ταῦτ' ἔχοντες διαθέσθαι κεκλειμένων τῶν ἐμπορίων τῶν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ διὰ τὸν πόλεμον, *Second Olynthiac* 16).

and, for this reason, he is an awesome rival in the eyes of every reasonable man. However, according to Demosthenes, Athenians, as they continue to “act with greater piety and justice than he does” (εὐσεβέστερα καὶ δικαιοτέρα πράττοντες, *The Response to the Letter of Philip* 16–17), have more reasons to enjoy the gods’ favour⁶⁷ and good fortune. Demosthenes identifies the power of fortune in its ability not only to impact human affairs but also to play a decisive role in the outcome of the war against Philip.⁶⁸ As an oppressive ruler, Philip of Macedon cannot keep his kingdom for a long time. Only for as long as his successes last will his defects and errors be concealed; however, after his first setback,⁶⁹ all will come to light. Unlike Philip, Julian’s *sōphrosynē* and *eusebeia* are what lead him to the power. The role of *tychē* is important in Libanius’ work, especially if we think of the central place it takes in his autobiography, whether it has a literary function and “acts as a structuring device to account for the extraordinary turns of fortune in Libanius’ long career” or is a short and simple way of expressing the sophist’s divine protection.⁷⁰ If Philip lets himself be driven by his appetites for luxury and other material desires, the Roman Emperor knows

67 See *The Response to the Letter of Philip* 15, where Philip is acknowledged as “fearsome ... and hard to fight against” (φοβερόν ... καὶ δυσπολέμητον εὐτυχούντα). See also *Second Olynthiac* 22–23, where Demosthenes says that he prefers the Athenians’ *tychē*, which, in contrast to that of the Macedonian monarch, complies with the principles of piety and justice: “if any of you ... sees Philip’s success and concludes that he is a formidable enemy, he is thinking like a sensible man. For fortune is a vital element – rather it is everything – in all human affairs. Nevertheless, if I were given the choice, I would personally choose the fortune of our city, so long as you are willing to do your duty in person, even to a limited degree, rather than his, since I observe that you have many more avenues than he has for gaining the favour of the gods” (εἰ δέ τις ὑμῶν ... τὸν Φίλιππον εὐτυχούνθ’ ὥρῳ ταύτῃ φοβερόν προσπολεμῆσαι νομίζει, σῶφρονος μὲν ἀνθρώπου λογισμῷ χρήται· μεγάλη γὰρ ῥοπή, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ ὅλον ἢ τύχη παρὰ πάντ’ ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἐγωγε, εἴ τις αἴρεσίν μοι δοίῃ, τὴν τῆς ἡμετέρας πόλεως τύχην ἂν ἐλοίμην, ἐθελόντων ἅ προσήκει ποιεῖν ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ κατὰ μικρόν, ἢ τὴν ἐκείνου· πολὺ γὰρ πλείους ἀφορμὰς εἰς τὸ τὴν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν εὐνοίαν ἔχειν ὥρῳ ὑμῶν ἐνοῦσας ἢ κείνῳ).

68 *On the Peace* 9. See also *On the Crown* 192: “for the final result of all actions depends upon the will of heaven, but the choice itself reveals the mind of the statesman” (τὸ μὲν γὰρ πέρας ὡς ἂν ὁ δαίμων βουλευθῇ πάντων γίγνεται· ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις αὐτὴ τὴν τοῦ συμβούλου διανοίαν δηλοῖ). If for the result the only one responsible is *daimōn*, to the counsellor belongs only the *proairesis*. In the same speech, from 193 onwards, Demosthenes describes what he did as a counsellor within his power as a human being while he had against him an enemy who turned out to be much stronger than all Greeks and while *tychē* eventually determined the final outcome. See Serafim (2017) Chapter 4.

69 This is inevitable since Philip carries a burden heavier than he can bear: “such as that man is now likely to suffer, by taking too heavy a burden upon himself” (“ὁ νῦν παθεῖν εἰκὸς ἐκείνον μείζον φορτίον ἢ καθ’ αὐτὸν αἰρόμενον,” *The Response to the Letter of Philip* 14).

70 Swain (2004) 372.

how to control his passions and inclination to carnal pleasures.⁷¹ Always humble, simple and sober, “he believed the sublimity of his reign was due to the exercise of his intellect (*phronēsis*) and the aid he granted the cities therefrom, and that that was what gave him more prestige” (18.191).

In the complimentary speech of Libanius devoted to Julian *post-mortem*, we find most of the features that Demosthenes attributed to Philip, so that we can paint a picture that balances reality and constructed image. At first sight, two points have drawn our attention: (a) In order to compose Julian’s laudatory portrait, Libanius occasionally draws elements, even negative ones, which could correspond to Philip’s description. Even if Libanius insists on the fact that Julian and his way of governing have nothing to do with tyranny, certain features shown in a positive light can easily match Philip, often severely criticised and accused of acting like a tyrant. And although Libanius does not consider them negative traits, they are part of the negative image of the leader-tyrant given by Demosthenes. (b) Other virtues of Julian that are praised by Libanius are not connected with monarchy but are rather related to Athenian democracy and its significant advantages, which contrast, in Demosthenes’ eyes, with other political regimes, especially Philip’s monarchy.

6 Conclusion

In addition to the equivalence that could more or less be easily established between Philip and Julian, two monarchical figures, other evidence of the Demosthenic ideal leader is found in the work of Libanius that is not necessarily connected to the specific form of government but rather to democracy as it is exercised, according to the sophist, in an exemplary way by Demosthenes. In Julian’s person, portrayed by Libanius, Philip’s more or less positive features are combined with the democratic leader’s positive image depicted in Demosthenes’ speeches. Sometimes, the Libanian Julian adopts the image of the dynamic and ambitious king whose way to success is unimpeded. At other times, he draws on resources taken from the democratic leader who, within the framework of the possibilities offered by democratic institutions, walks with caution and according to moral principles.

The constructive dialogue between different types of political organisations and regimes from different eras could actually provide a model of political leader who can set an enlightening example for didactic purposes. The nature of the funeral oration over Julian suggests a constructed image of the leader,

71 18.174. See also 179: “for he had a natural bent towards continence.”

in a speech mainly composed to reveal the virtues of Greek culture rather than to praise the deceased emperor. Apart from the Demosthenic image of ruler, partly incarnated by Philip and revived in Julian as revealed in the funeral oration dedicated to him, further elements of good leadership can certainly be found in other works by Libanius and used as evidence to complete the Libanian model of leadership. In particular, I refer to political orations⁷² addressed to emperors or governors and other high-ranking officials as well as speeches on public issues or letters exchanged with high-ranking persons.⁷³

In Libanius' texts, Julian becomes an amalgam that combines ideal virtues, avoiding, at the same time, the biggest shortcomings in the art of governing. A characteristic example is the total harmony in the emperor's person between ἔργα and λόγοι. If the Athenians are consumed by ineffective speeches while the Macedonian monarch is throwing himself into a frenzied race for war devoid of any sense of morality, Julian is capable of balancing between, on the one hand, the refined education and his love of speeches and, on the other hand, the effective warrior demeanour. What is most important for Libanius, throughout his funeral speech, is not only to express his admiration for Julian, a man who best embodied his concept of leadership, but also to remind his audience of the most important values that the Greek civilization and its admirable representatives, such as Demosthenes, conceived and underscored.

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72 According to Van Hoof's (2014) 83 classification, Libanius' political orations that concern the government of the city of Antioch or of the Roman Empire include the Julianic Orations, namely the discourses composed on the occasion of the riot of the statues at Antioch, the deliberative speeches addressed to Theodosius, the orations for other emperors, such as Constantius and Constans, the orations concerning governors residing in Antioch and the orations addressed to the city council of Antioch.

73 Cabouret (2002) 193, for instance, in his painting of the picture of the provincial governors, puts in hierarchical order the political virtues and merits that, according to Libanius, make them “good governors” (“bons gouverneurs”).

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Rhetoric, Aesthetics, and the State in Renaissance Political Thought

Peter Stacey

This chapter aims to clarify some aspects of the Renaissance intellectual history of a pair of terms, *forma* and *materia*, which famously recur throughout Machiavelli's political philosophy. In both *Il Principe* and the *Discorsi*, Machiavelli lays out an account of the manner in which individuals lock together to form political bodies called *stati*. In describing this process of state formation, he repeatedly resorts to the concepts in question. They first appear together in chapter 6 of *Il Principe*, in which Machiavelli attributes the success of a host of ancient princely figures in founding new states almost entirely to their possession of virtue, rather than to their enjoyment of good luck. These exemplary individuals, he says, "had nothing from *Fortuna* other than the opportunity, which gave them material [*materia*] enabling them to introduce into it the shape [*introdurvi dentro la forma*] which seemed best to them."¹ Machiavelli reprises the language in the concluding exhortation of chapter 26 as he ponders aloud whether the present day offers a similarly opportune occasion for state-building.²

The pair of terms then reappear in the *Discorsi*. In his discussion of how Numa's civil reforms helped shape the *città* of Roma in chapter 11 of book 1, Machiavelli uses them to explain how the Roman king was able to impart a decisive character to the Roman people:

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- 1 Machiavelli, *Princ.* Ch. 6 (35): "non [si vede che quelli] avessino altro da la fortuna che la occasione, la quale dette loro materia a potere introdurvi dentro quella forma che parse loro." I cite the text of *Il Principe* from the edition of Giorgio Inglese (= Inglese [2013]) and the text of the *Discorsi* from the edition of Corrado Vivanti (= Vivanti [1997]), giving the relevant page numbers in parentheses. I frequently rely upon the translation of Russell Price and Quentin Skinner (= Price and Skinner [1988]) as the basis of my own (often with modifications) when citing *Il Principe* in English; and upon the translation of Allan Gilbert (= Gilbert [1958]) for the *Discorsi*.
 - 2 See Machiavelli, *Princ.* Ch. 26 (183–185). For the rhetorical character of the terms in chapter 26, see Stacey (2007) 309–310.

It is certainly true that since those times were very religious, and the men with whom he had to work coarse, he found it very easy to carry out his designs (*disegni*), since he was able easily to stamp on (*imprimere*) them any new form (*forma*) whatsoever... a sculptor will more easily draw out a beautiful statue from a rough piece of marble than from one badly blocked out by someone else.³

Machiavelli, subsequently, develops his conceptualisation of the process of corruption by invoking the same language throughout the book.⁴

The prevalent assumption informing generations of Machiavellian scholarship is that Machiavelli's use of *forma* and *materia* indicates his reliance upon Aristotle.⁵ While such Aristotelian debts are unquestionably visible in some strands of political thinking in Machiavelli's Florence, both humanist and scholastic, there is no discernible trace of such thinking in Machiavelli's account, which is innocent of all the basic metaphysical beliefs required to ground the kind of hylomorphism supposed by such an interpretation. In order to illuminate Machiavelli's understanding of the terminology in question, we need to consider the historical fortunes of a different set of classical resources. Classical Roman rhetoricians deployed the pair of Latin terms *materia* and *forma*, and the aesthetic image of the sculptor which Aristotle had himself used to illustrate his thinking about the concepts, in a theoretical landscape far removed from any Aristotelian commitments. In their expositions of the *ars rhetorica*, Cicero and Quintilian routinely rely upon the language to describe, respectively, the subject matter of a speech – the matter under discussion, as we still say – and the artful shaping of its content to make it conform to one's purposes. But both theorists also use the terms when talking about the formative role which education plays in turning human subjects into good orators. That is to say, in the exposition of their pedagogical doctrines, they treat human beings in the same way that they treat literary works: as bodies of *materia* which need shaping.

Renaissance students of rhetoric seized upon this apparatus, putting it to very extensive use. In what follows, I bring a greater measure of historical

3 Machiavelli, *Disc.* 1.11 (230): "Ben è vero che l'essere quelli tempi pieni di religione, e quegli uomini, con i quali egli aveva a travagliare, grossi, gli dettono facilità grande a conseguire i disegni suoi, potendo imprimere in loro facilmente qualunque nuova forma ... uno scultore trarrà più facilmente una bella statua d'un marmo rozzo, che d'uno male abbozzato da altrui."

4 See Machiavelli, *Disc.* 1.16–18 (240–248, esp. 244); 3.8 (447–448).

5 See, for example, Walker (1975) 2: 169 n. 7; Vivanti (1997) 947 para. 3, n. 1; Bausi (2001) 1: 80, n. 27; Pocock (2003) 164–182; Marcelli and Martelli (2006) 115 n. 27.

depth and conceptual precision to the pre-Machiavellian career of these ideas in Roman and Renaissance thinking in order to illuminate what Machiavelli is doing with them, and to show why they should be identified as the theoretical foundation of “l’arte dello stato,” the phrase which Machiavelli deploys in his correspondence to describe his lifelong dedication to matters political; or rather – to put it in a way which better captures his thinking – to statecraft.⁶

1 *Forma and Materia in the Ars Rhetorica*

Cicero and Quintilian talk about turning materials into shapely bodies when analysing two activities: the composition of a work of art, or *opus*; and the education of the artist, or *artifex*. In their theories, these activities are causally interrelated: the task of transforming the subject matter of a speech into a decent body of work involves equipping the orator with the qualities necessary to ensure its successful completion and delivery. Recognising the need for formal instruction in these activities, Cicero and Quintilian talk, in turn, of a third kind of body: the body of precepts which constitutes the *ars rhetorica*.

1.1 *Subject Matter*

In *De inventione*, Cicero outlines a general definition of the art of rhetoric, declaring the need to “say something about the nature of the art itself, about its function, its end, its materials, its divisions.”⁷ He explains that “by the ‘material’ of the art I mean that with which the art as a whole and the power produced by the art are concerned... the material of medicine is diseases and wounds because medicine is wholly concerned with these; in the same way we call the material of the art of rhetoric those subjects with which the art and power of oratory are concerned.”⁸

What, though, are those subjects? Cicero develops an increasingly imperious vision of oratory’s realm. In his youthful *De inventione*, he merely reports the view, ascribed to the Greek sophist Gorgias, that the rhetorical profession is

6 For the phrase in Machiavelli’s letters, see Vivanti (1999) 297 (and for the presence of the same idea, see also 241).

7 Cic. *Inv.* 1.5.5: *videtur dicendum de genere ipsius artis, de officio, de fine, de materia, de partibus* (I often use the translations provided in Loeb editions of the classical works cited as the basis of my own).

8 Cic. *Inv.* 1.5.7: *Materiam artis eam dicimus in qua omnis ars et ea facultas, quae conficitur ex arte versatur. Ut si medicinae materiam dicamus morbos ac vulnera, quod in his omnis medicina versetur, item, quibus in rebus versatur ars et facultas oratoria, eas res materiam artis rhetoricae nominamus.*

entitled to deal with “a vast – and in fact infinite – material.”⁹ However, by the time of *De oratore*, he boldly declares:

The genuine orator must have investigated and heard and read and discussed and handled and debated the whole of the contents of the life of mankind, inasmuch as this is the field of the orator’s activity, this the material subjected to his purview.¹⁰

This is a challenging proposition; but Quintilian nonetheless endorses it. “I hold,” he asserts, “that the *materia* of rhetoric is everything that is subjected to it for speaking.”¹¹ In making *materia* refer to the range of things “subjected” to discussion in rhetoric, Quintilian is keen to seek authorisation. He first refers to *De inventione* to show that his definition aligns with Cicero’s view that “the material of rhetoric” refers to “the things which are subjected to it.”¹² Then he cites the passage in *De oratore* in which Cicero had presented his all-encompassing vision of the “matter subjected” to treatment in rhetoric.¹³ The fact that rhetoric deals in every kind of subject matter, Quintilian argues, does not mean that it lacks its own characteristic *materia*. Certainly, he concedes, rhetoric deals in “multifarious material.”¹⁴ But that fact hardly distinguishes it from “other lesser artforms” such as “architecture, which operates with everything useful for building”; or from “engraving, which uses gold, silver, bronze, and iron”; or, indeed, from sculpture, whose activity “extends to wood, ivory, marble, glass, and precious stones.”¹⁵

Defining the *ars rhetorica* is of minimal importance for most practising orators, however. They often need only reckon with the content of their own work.¹⁶ In *De inventione*, Cicero declares that rhetorical *materia* can be clas-

9 Cic. *Inv.* 1.5.7: *Hic infinitam et immensam huic [sc. Gorgias] artificio materiam subicere videtur.*

10 Cic. *De or.* 3.14.54: *Vero enim oratori, quae sunt in hominum vita, quandoquidem in ea versatur orator atque ea est ei subiecta materies, omnia quaesita, audita, lecta, disputata, tractata, agitata esse debent.*

11 Quint. *Inst.* 2.21.4: *Ego ... materiam esse rhetorices iudico omnes res quaecumque ei ad dicendum subiectae erunt.* The definition is repeated at 2.21.6; 2.21.20; 3.1.1.

12 Quint. *Inst.* 2.21.4: *Et Cicero quodam loco materiam rhetorices vocat res quae subiectae sint ei.*

13 See Quint. *Inst.* 2.21.6.

14 For the objection, see Quint. *Inst.* 2.21.7–8; for *multiplex materia*, see 2.21.8.

15 Quint. *Inst.* 2.21.8–9: *aliae quoque artes minores habent multiplicem materiam, velut architectonice (namque ea in omnibus quae sunt aedificio utilia versatur) et caelatura, quae auro argente aere ferro opera efficit. Nam scalpura etiam lignum ebur marmor vitrum gemmas....*

16 The discussion is in Quint. *Inst.* 2.21.1–23.

sified into three genres of rhetoric – “the demonstrative, the deliberative, the judicial” – which, as Aristotle had established, basically comprise all rhetorical subjects (Cicero accordingly talks of “the threefold *materia*” with which the *ars* is concerned).¹⁷ Quintilian endorses this view of generic matters.¹⁸ Descending to specifics, he uses *materia* to signify the overall subject matter of an individual work: “any material intended for writing” comprises its general argument.¹⁹ But he also uses *materia* to refer to individual parts of that argument.²⁰ The overarching subject matter of a case is thus broken down in Quintilian’s analysis, its parts as much as its whole described in terms of *materia*.

Quintilian also reconsiders what the *materia* is, rejecting the idea that it is *oratio*, or speech; for “speech” is a string of words put into some definite order: it “is like a statue” inasmuch as it, too, “is a product of art.”²¹ Quintilian then asks whether the *materia* consists in the words that make up speech, but dismisses this view, too.²² Quintilian here distinguishes between *res* and *verba*.²³ “Every speech,” he tells us, “consists either of what is signified or of what signifies, that is to say, of content or of words.”²⁴ Quintilian remains interested in ways of shaping both aspects of speech. But when defining the *materia* of the art itself, his view is the term nominates not the words we use but the things we express with them: our subject matter.

1.2 *Finding Subject Matter*

Finding and forming suitable subject matter is the business of composition. Cicero neatly summarises the process that precedes the memorisation and delivery of a body of work: “the orator must consider three things, what to say, in what order, and in what manner and style to say it.”²⁵ Both theorists posit five main “parts” of oratory into which to divide the artistic process: invention,

17 Cic. *Inv.* 1.5.7: *Aristoteles autem ... tribus in generibus rerum versari rhetoris officium putavit, demonstrativo, deliberativo, iudiciale ... oratoris ars ... in hac materia tripertita versari existimanda est.*

18 See Quint. *Inst.* 3.8.53–54.

19 Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.9: *Quo apparet omnem ad scribendum destinatam materiam ita appellari.*

20 See, e.g., Quint. *Inst.* 4.1.11; 5.7.8; 5.10.31.

21 Quint. *Inst.* 2.21.1: *est oratio efficitur arte sicut statua.*

22 See Quint. *Inst.* 2.21.1.

23 See Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.22.

24 Quint. *Inst.* 3.5.1: *Omnis autem oratio constat aut ex iis quae significantur aut ex iis quae significant, id est rebus et verbis.*

25 Cic. *Or.* 14.43: *Quoniam tria videnda sunt oratori: quid dicat et quo quidque loco et quo modo.*

disposition, elocution, memory, and delivery.²⁶ In examining the composition of *materia*, they are focused on the first three of these tasks.

"Invention," as Cicero sees it, is "the discovery of things true or plausible" in certain definable *loci*, or "places."²⁷ Both Cicero and Quintilian develop the imagery of these "places" which orators visit in order to "find" the subject matter of their discourse. Having located their *materia*, orators must then organise and develop it coherently and expressively. These two tasks are accomplished through the functions of *dispositio* and *elocutio*; and it is in the description of the shaping processes which they involve that the language of formation is at work.

1.3 *Shaping Subject Matter*

Dispositio – "the distribution of arguments in order" – imposes "ordo" on the "discovered" material, ensuring its appropriate organisation.²⁸ When Quintilian turns from *inventio* to *dispositio* in his analysis, he reinforces Cicero's insistence on the importance of orderly speech:

Just as it is not enough in erecting a building simply to collect the stone and the timber and the other building materials, unless the hands of craftsmen are put to work to dispose and assemble them, so also in speaking, however abundant the supply of things, it will be nothing but a random accumulation unless Disposition distributes it in some order, links it up and binds it together.²⁹

Order thus imposes the characteristic of disposition upon an argument. We should find it "evenly distributed throughout all themes (*materias*) and their entire organisation (*corpus*)," ensuring that the whole work coheres as a body.³⁰

When discussing disposition, Quintilian presents the influential thought that literary composition is a matter of weaving words together into a fabric.³¹

²⁶ See Cic. *Inv.* 1.7.9; Quint. *Inst.* 3.3.1.

²⁷ Cic. *Inv.* 1.7.9: *Inventio est excogitatio rerum verarum aut veri similium*. For the language of finding *loci*, see Cic. *Top.* 6–8; Quint. *Inst.* 3.5.20–22. Reinhardt's (2003) 3–74 discussion of topicality in classical rhetoric is magisterial.

²⁸ Cic. *Inv.* 1.7.9: *dispositio est rerum inventarum in ordinem distributio*.

²⁹ Quint. *Inst.* 7. pr. 1.: *Sed ut opera extruentibus satis non est saxa atque materiam et cetera aedificanti utilia congerere nisi disponendis eis conlocandisque artificium manus adhibeatur, sic in dicendo quamlibet abundans rerum copia cumulum tantum habeat atque congestum nisi illas eadem dispositio in ordinem digestas atque inter se commissas devinxerit*.

³⁰ Quint. *Inst.* 3.9.2: *dispositio ... pars rhetorices et per omnis materias totumque earum corpus aequaliter fusa*.

³¹ For weaving (*contexere*) speech, see Quint. *Inst.* 4. pr. 7; 9.4.19; 10.6.2.

He talks of his own ambition to weave together the parts of his analysis of rhetoric into a single *corpus*.³² Quintilian then proceeds to associate closely the noun *textum* with compositional matters.³³

Elocutio is the pursuit of eloquence through the apt expression of our argument. Quintilian describes the act of “amplifying and embellishing things” as the principal characteristic of demonstrative rhetoric.³⁴ But all oratory requires ornamentation, and Cicero and Quintilian give detailed accounts of how to win over an audience with ornate speech. Quintilian’s treatment of the tropes and figures of thought and speech in books 8 and 9 of the *Institutio* amounts to an especially developed theory of *ornatus*.³⁵

In Cicero’s rhetorical theory, the way in which *materia* acquires *forma* is largely tucked into his treatment of the subject of *elocutio*. Cicero maintains that the orator’s task is “to shape (*formare*) an oration, and to vary it and to mark it out with highlights of thought and phrase.”³⁶ He associates formation with the idea of configuration, calling the figures of speech and thought “conformationes verborum” and “conformationes sententiarum” respectively.³⁷

In Quintilian, the emphasis falls somewhat differently. He attaches greater weight to the role of *dispositio* in forming a speech. But in his anatomy of the tropes and figures which constitute the core of his theory of ornamentation, he, too, underlines the role of *elocutio* in bringing shapeliness to our words and thoughts. The basic sense of a figure, he says, is “any shape (*forma*) in which a thought is expressed – just as our bodies, in whatever pose they are placed, are inevitably in some sort of attitude.”³⁸ Every linguistic expression of our thoughts invariably has some shape or other. Figures take advantage of this characteristic of language to create “a configuration (*conformatio*) of language distinct from the common and immediately obvious.”³⁹ To articulate our thoughts better, we alter the form of our language, says Quintilian, just as we change the shape of our bodies.⁴⁰ Figures of speech fashion the way

32 See Quint. *Inst.* 4. pr.7.

33 See Quint. *Inst.* 9.4.13; 9.4.17.

34 Quint. *Inst.* 3.7.6: [*Sed proprium laudis est*] *res amplificare et ornare*.

35 For Quintilian’s understanding of *ornatus*, see esp. Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.1–11; for an analysis, see Skinner (1996) 48–51. For *ornatus* in Cicero, see Michel (1960) 328–362.

36 Cic. *De or.* 2.9.36: *si quisquam dicitur nisi orator formare orationem eamque variare et distinguere quasi quibusdam verborum sententiarumque insignibus*.

37 See Cic. *De or.* 3.52.200; Cic. *Or.* 39.136.

38 Quint. *Inst.* 9.1.10: *qualiscumque forma sententiae, sicut in corporibus, quibus, quoquo modo sunt compositae, utique habitus est aliquis*.

39 Quint. *Inst.* 9.1.4: “*figura*” [sc. *est*] *conformatio quaedam orationis remota a communi et primum se offerente ratione*.

40 See Quint. *Inst.* 9.1.11.

we express ourselves by manipulating linguistic resources. Figures of thought import attractive patterns into how we express our conception of things.

Quintilian urges seemliness in ornamentation: the qualities of a speech should not be submerged under dressy externals or obscured by primping.⁴¹ Effective adornment steers a path between the perils of empty artifice and the danger of drab, dull content. Quintilian encourages us to develop the capacity to paraphrase and reformulate our thoughts in order to vary our presentation of them: we should be “turning them in as many ways as possible, just as one shape (*forma*) after another can be made out of the same piece of wax.”⁴² He also reminds us that adorning the text is not just a question of prettifying it. *Ornamenta* clad arguments in armour, ensuring that they triumph in the battlegrounds of public life.⁴³ Martial imagery heavily informs the rhetorical theory of *ornatus*.

1.4 *The Formation of the Orator*

Quintilian's description of the orator's education bookends his aesthetic theory in the *Institutio*: it is laid out in books 1 and 2, then resumed in book 12. Here *materia* is used to talk about the orator – the subject, we might now call him (and it is always a “he” in Quintilian's world) – while the language of *forma* is applied to the pedagogical practices used to instruct him.

Quintilian's ambition, he says, is “to fashion (*formare*) the perfect orator.”⁴⁴ He aims to proceed “exactly as if a child were put into my hands to be educated as an orator ... I shall shape (*formare*) his studies from his infancy.”⁴⁵ Quintilian's discussion turns on whether the making of a good orator resides more in the nature of the student than in the doctrines of the art which train him. In his view, both elements are crucial:

Nature is the raw material (*materia*) for education: the latter fashions, the former is fashioned. Without material art can do nothing; material

41 See esp. Quint. *Inst.* 8. pr. 19–22.

42 Quint. *Inst.* 10.5.9: [*sumamus sententias*] *quasdam easque versemus quam numerosissime, velut eadem cera aliae aliaeque formae duci solent.*

43 See esp. Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.2; 12.3.5–6. For the significance of the martial imagery, see Skinner (1996) 48–50.

44 Quint. *Inst.* 2.15.33: [*nos autem ingressi*] *formare perfectum oratorem.*

45 Quint. *Inst.* 1. pr. 5: *nec aliter quam si mihi tradatur educandus orator studia eius formare ab infantia incipiam.*

without art does possess a certain value, while the perfection of art is better than the best material.⁴⁶

And he exemplifies his argument with another sculptural analogy:

If Praxiteles had tried to make a statue out of a millstone, I should have preferred a rough block of Parian marble to any such statue. But if he had worked the block of marble, the result would have owed more to his skill as a craftsman than to the material.⁴⁷

Quintilian thus underlines the indispensability of some good qualities inherent in the materials before an artist sets to work on them.

Cicero and Quintilian routinely associate the natural mental aptitude of students with their *ingenium*, which they contrast with abilities cultivated by *doctrina* and *diligentia* in *studium* and *ars*.⁴⁸ Quintilian calls the rhetorical instructor a “shaper of others’ minds” (*alienorum ingeniorum formator*).⁴⁹ He identifies the pupil’s *ingenium* as *materia*, suggesting that a decent supply of the stuff is distinctly advantageous: “I like the raw material (*materia*) at the start to be overabundant, poured out more generously even than it ought to be.”⁵⁰ In time, he goes on, “method will file it down, use will rub some of it away, so long as there is something there to be cut out and chiseled.”⁵¹ Quintilian’s metaphor evokes the processes of pouring, smelting, and filing in metallurgy.⁵² Education thus serves to “draw out” pupils from materials, as if they were objects struck and hammered into shape.

In describing human resources as material, Quintilian is probably thinking metaphorically rather than literally. True, Quintilian at one point broaches a common theme in the materialist philosophy of the Stoics which Cicero had occasionally invoked: the idea that we have “seeds” of virtue naturally within

46 Quint. *Inst.* 2.19.3: *natura materia doctrinae est: haec fingit, illa fingitur. Nihil ars sine materia, materiae etiam sine arte pretium est; ars summa materia optima melior.*

47 Quint. *Inst.* 2.19.3: *Et si Praxiteles signum aliquod ex molari lapide conatus esset exculpere, Parium marmor mallet rude: at si illud idem artifex expolisset, plus in manibus fuisset quam in marmore* (translation modified).

48 For this point, see Lausberg (1998) 502.

49 Quint. *Inst.* 10.2.20: [*Rector enim est*] *alienorum ingeniorum formator.*

50 Quint. *Inst.* 2.4.7: *Materiam esse primum volo vel abundantiorum atque ultra quam oporteat fusam.*

51 Quint. *Inst.* 2.4.7: *multum ratio limabit, aliquid velut usu ipso deteretur, sit modo unde excidi possit et quod exculpi.*

52 This point is brilliantly illuminated in Reinhardt and Winterbottom (2006) at 86–87.

us.⁵³ Seeds need cultivation, of course, in order to develop into young shoots or saplings, but education – on this view, at least – is nevertheless the nurturing of a given nature. The extent of Quintilian's Stoic commitments is unclear, but it is accurate enough to say that the figure of Nature acts as “the efficient cause of artistic eloquence and the patroness of the *Institutio*.”⁵⁴ Sometimes, he thinks, Nature is the greatest *artifex* of all.

As Renaissance students of classical literature saw, the use of *forma* and *materia* to describe the art of shaping bodies was extensive in Roman culture. The terms are deployed throughout Seneca's account of moral instruction.⁵⁵ They are also crucial to Vitruvius' examination of building materials and the architectural forms which can be imposed upon them. Book 2 of *De architectura*, he tells us, is “de copiis materiae”: about building supplies.⁵⁶ Architects need an understanding of their building materials and of where to source them before proceeding to the topic of book 3: how to assemble them. We thus move from questions of invention to those of disposition.⁵⁷ And “disposition,” Vitruvius affirms, is “the suitable assembling of things and their fitting execution in works that are put together with quality.”⁵⁸ The importance of the human body to Vitruvius' account of this process needs no reiteration here.

But Cicero himself had demonstrated the applicability of this rhetorical apparatus to the political realm. In the opening of *De inventione*, he traces the origins of political life to the work of a mythical, monarchical figure whose ability to draw together people into a shared way of life is attributed to his powers of eloquence:

There was a time when men wandered at large in the fields like animals ... they did nothing by the guidance of reason, but relied chiefly on physical strength ... At this juncture a man – great and wise I am sure – became aware of what material (*materia*) there was, and what an opportunity for great things there resided, in the minds of men, if one could develop this power and improve it by instruction ... He assembled and gathered them

53 See Quint. *Inst.* 2.20.6–7; and the discussion in Reinhardt and Winterbottom (2006) at 371–372. For *semina* in Cicero, see Graver (2002) 74–78, 206–207; Graver (2012) 113–114, 119.

54 Fantham (1995) 136.

55 See, e.g., Sen. *Ep.* 50.5; 90.46.

56 *Vitr.* 2. pr. 5.

57 For the topic of book 3 as *de aedium sacrarum dispositionibus*, see *Vitr.* 4. pr. 1.

58 *Vitr.* 1.2.2: *Dispositio est rerum apta conlocatio elegansque compositionibus effectus operis cum qualitate.*

in accordance with a plan ... through reason (*ratio*) and speech (*oratio*) ... he transformed them from wild savages into a kind and gentle folk.⁵⁹

And eloquence remains crucial to the well-being of the *civitas* after its foundation:

After cities had been established, how could it have been brought to pass that men should learn to keep faith and observe justice unless men had been able by eloquence to persuade their fellows of the truth of what they had discovered by reason?⁶⁰

This immensely influential allegory underlined the importance of the rhetorical art to the *res publica*, while simultaneously presenting the eloquent founder's ability to find the disparate material with which to assemble and organise a *civitas* as the embodiment of all the ideas about invention, disposition and eloquence which Cicero subsequently expounds in the book.

2 *Forma and materia in Pre-humanist and Humanist Political Writing*

De inventione played a major part in conveying to medieval Italian readers the basic elements of Roman thinking about the place of *materia* in works of art. The treatise subsequently became a fundamental textbook of Renaissance rhetoric; but Brunetto Latini's systematic exploration of its content helped to anchor the aesthetic terminology within Florentine political discourse.⁶¹ Before his return from exile in France to Florence in 1266 or 1267, Latini had set out to translate and provide a commentary on *De inventione*.⁶² The resulting

59 Cic. *Inv.* 1.2.1–2: *Nam fuit quoddam tempus, cum in agris homines passim bestiarum modo vagabantur [...] nec ratione animi quicquam, sed pleraque viribus corporis administrabant [...] Quo tempore quidam magnus videlicet vir et sapiens cognovit, quae materia esset et quanta ad maximas res opportunitas in animis inesset hominum, si quis eam posset elicere et praecipiendo meliorem reddere [...] ratione quadam compulsi unum in locum et congregavit propter rationem atque orationem [...] ex feris et immanibus mites reddidit et mansuetos.*

60 Cic. *Inv.* 1.2.3: *urbibus constitutis, ut fidem colere et iustitiam retinere discerent qui tandem fieri potuit, nisi homines ea quae ratione invenissent eloquentia persuadere potuissent.*

61 For the importance of *De inventione* in medieval and Renaissance rhetoric, see especially Ward (2006) 3–75.

62 Latini's life and works are expertly summarised in Beltrami (2007) vii–xxvi (useful bibliography for the *Rettorica* is at xl–xli; for *Tresor* at xxxvi–xl). For Latini and Cicero, see Alessio (1979); Nederman (1988) and (1992).

work, known as the *Rettorica*, was left incomplete, but Latini continued to use *De inventione* extensively in the composition of his *Tresor*, the third book of which provides an account of civil science that draws deeply upon Cicero's account of the formation of the *civitas*.

In *Rettorica*, Cicero's precepts on the subject matter of rhetoric reappear at length under the heading "della materia."⁶³ In book 3 of *Tresor*, Latini is briefer: "the subject matter of rhetoric is what the speaker says, just as the sick are the subject matter of the physician."⁶⁴ As the Ciceronian apparatus re-emerges, rhetoric is duly said to consist not only in three genres but also in five "parts" – invention, disposition, elocution, memory, and delivery – which Latini introduces by paraphrase.⁶⁵

Invention – or "trovement" – is a kind of "thinking" which "finds things true or seemingly true" and with which one "proves one's subject-matter."⁶⁶ It is, Latini says, "the foundation and strength of this whole science," since "reasons and arguments have to be found to prove what one says before one says or writes a word."⁶⁷

Disposition, meanwhile, consists in "ordering" materials appropriately. "Ordres" – Latini's translation of *dispositio* – involves "establishing one's words and the arguments which one has found in their due place, so that they acquire the greatest force."⁶⁸ Latini also draws upon the *Ad Herennium* to illustrate how orderly disposition requires considerable artifice.⁶⁹

This task complete, the orator then proceeds to the final compositional phase: *elocutio*. This activity renders material eloquent by "adapting words and phrases suitable to what one has found, because finding and thinking would be of little worth without expression adapted to its material."⁷⁰

Latini's insistence on the fundamental importance of rhetorical learning to the *civitas* emerges in his sustained engagement with the opening allegory of *De inventione*. In his *Rettorica*, Latini explores its meaning; in book 3, chapter 1

63 See Maggini (1915) 53–56.

64 Beltrami (2007) 640 (*Tresor* 3.2.5): "La matire de rhetorique est ce de quoi li parleries dit, autresi come les malades sont matire dou fisicien."

65 See Beltrami (2007) 642–644.

66 Beltrami (2007) 642 (3.3.2): "Trovment est un apensament [de] trover choses voires ou voires semblables, et a prover sa matire."

67 Beltrami (2007) 642 (3.3.2): "C'est le fondement et la fermeté de tote ceste science ... doit il trover ses raisons et ses argumenz, et prover ses diz por faire les croire a çaus cui il parole."

68 Beltrami (2007) 642 (3.3.3): "Ordres est a establir ses dis et [s]es argumenz qu'il a trovez chascun en son leuc, selonc que il puisse miaus valoir."

69 See Beltrami (2007) 656–660 (3.11).

70 Beltrami (2007) 644 (3.3.4): "li atornemenz de paroles et de sentences avenables a ce qu'il a trové; car trover et penser poi vaudroit sans les parables acordans a sa [matire]."

of the *Tresor*, he rehearses its key elements.⁷¹ But he does so only after concluding his discussion of ethics in book 2 with a pertinent observation about the exemplary nature of moral instruction. Moral progress, maintains Latini, consists in following in the footsteps of the best among us. For “just as wax receives the shape of the seal, so, too, are the morals of men formed by examples.”⁷² With this affirmation of the impressionable nature of moral agents, Latini turns to depict the *civitas* as a composition of eminently manipulable rational material, just as Cicero had described.

2.1 *Petrarch and Quintilian*

It is to the reception of Quintilian that one needs to turn in order to explain the increasing prevalence of ideas about form and material in humanist circles. In the centuries prior to the recovery of a complete text by Poggio Bracciolini in 1416, extant parts of *Institutio oratoria* had been “copied, reviewed, excerpted and incorporated” into the work of medieval scholars.⁷³ In the 12th century, there seems to have been a particular concentration on the surviving portions of Books 1 and 2 in which Quintilian discusses educational matters.⁷⁴ These ideas become central to Renaissance humanism because of Petrarch, whose interest in them dates to his acquisition of a manuscript containing the mutilated text of the *Institutio oratoria* in late 1350.⁷⁵

Petrarch already knew the *De inventione* intimately. He invokes its account of the mythical orator in a famous letter on eloquence in book 1 of his *Familiars*.⁷⁶ The fact that Petrarch cites Quintilian, too, in the same letter – which dates to some time before he received the manuscript of the *Institutio* – has already been explained.⁷⁷ Petrarch reworked his corpus of letters before producing a final redaction in 1366. As he revised, he took the liberty of parading his new-found knowledge of Quintilian in his older compositions.

71 See Beltrami (2007) 636 (3.1.7).

72 Beltrami (2007) 630 (2.132.2): “si come la cire [cité] reçoit la figure dou seel, autresi la moralité des homes est formee par exemples.” Beltrami *et al.* here read ‘cité’ rather than *cire* (“wax”), but the simile demands the latter reading, given in the Carmody 1948 edition at 313.

73 Ward (1995) 253. For the extant portions of the text, see Winterbottom (1970) 1, v, n. 2.

74 See Ward (1995) 259–262.

75 See de Nollhac (1907) 2: 83–86; Billanovich (1947) 38, 94. For new work on the connection: Hermand-Schebat (2010).

76 See Rossi (1933–1942) 1: 46–47 (*Fam.* 1.9). I use Bernardo (1975–1985) as the basis of my own translations.

77 See Billanovich (1947) 3–55.

When Petrarch opens his *Familiares*, he describes his choice of subject matter. Grief is an all-too-frequent *materia* in the epistles, he laments.⁷⁸ For Petrarch, *materia* is a term of art denoting subject matter. Like Quintilian, he is fond of imagining the *materia* of his work as threads woven together into a textual composition. To one unidentified correspondent, he reflects on the process of how “to weave artfully out of nothing a friendly letter.”⁷⁹ To the chancellor of Mantua, he recounts his lack of progress in producing a panegyric of Jacopo da Carrara, the *signore* of Padua, admitting that he has “not yet dared to weave together anything sustained about the subject-matter.”⁸⁰

Petrarch underlines his debts to Quintilian in a letter which he penned to the rhetorician, probably between 1351 and 1353.⁸¹ The letter is one of several addressed to classical writers and philosophers which comprise the final book of his collection. In it, Petrarch hails Quintilian’s pedagogical expertise: “you were yourself a great man, but in shaping and educating great men you were the greatest.”⁸² The Roman schoolmaster had closed the gaps in Cicero’s educational doctrine with admirable attention to detail, Petrarch affirms: “so diligently is the orator instructed by him decked out and adorned by you,” he tells Quintilian, “that Cicero seems to have either neglected or overlooked a great deal.”⁸³ Petrarch here appropriates the imagery of the orator’s education as a preparation for war: to be *instructus* and *ornatus* is to be drawn up and fitted for combat.⁸⁴

The influence of Quintilian becomes immediately apparent in Petrarch’s work after 1350. Petrarch relays some considered thoughts about education in 1351 to Giberto Baiardi, a grammar teacher in Parma entrusted with the tuition of his son.⁸⁵ The point of an education in the arts, Petrarch insists, cannot be merely “a knowledge of letters”; such knowledge is assuredly “a great thing,” he

78 See Rossi (1933–1942) 1: 11 (1.1).

79 Rossi (1933–1942) 2: 242 (9.11): [*Michi autem cogitanti quibus artibus*] *familiaris epystola de nichilo texeretur*.

80 Rossi (1933–1942) 2: 329 (11.3): *Nondum itaque de oblata michi materia texere continuum aliquid ausus sum*.

81 For the text, see Rossi (1933–1942) 4: 240–243 (24.8); for the date, see Billanovich (1947) 38.

82 Rossi (1933–1942) 4: 242 (24.8): *Magnus vir fuisti, sed instituendis formandisque magnis viris maximus*.

83 Rossi (1933–1942) 4: 241 (24.8): *Adeo diligenter ab illo instructus orator a te comptus ornat- usque est, ut multa ab illo vel neglecta vel non animadversa videantur*.

84 Underlined in Hermand-Schebat (2010) 195.

85 For the letter, see Rossi (1933–1942) 2: 133–136 (7.17). For its date and context, see Wilkins (1961) 98–99.

concedes, “but greater still is virtue of mind.”⁸⁶ For Petrarch, the aim of education is to impart a moral as much as an intellectual formation. And any educational programme must be founded upon the basic insight that “just as fresh material readily takes on any form, it is also easy to impress upon an as yet unhardened mind whatever habit one wishes.”⁸⁷

Petrarch’s decision to entitle this piece of correspondence an “*institutio puerilis*” forms part of a concerted effort to design pedagogical principles along basically Quintilianic lines. In the following year, Petrarch develops his ideas in a document which he called an *institutio regia*, the first humanist contribution to the genre of writing about a specifically “royal” education which was to culminate with Erasmus.⁸⁸ The work enjoyed a vast diffusion. In Florence, no fewer than sixty copies of the work are extant in various Tuscan manuscripts from the Renaissance period.⁸⁹

2.2 Humanist Pedagogy

Interest in Quintilian’s pedagogical theory was sustained among subsequent generations of humanists writing for princes and citizens alike. Even before the reintroduction of the complete text, Quintilian’s influence is already discernible in Pier Paolo Vergerio’s *De Ingeniis Moribus et Liberalibus Adulescentiae Studiis*, which the author dedicated to Ubertino da Carrara, the young prince of Padua.⁹⁰ After 1416, the Quintilianic content of humanist pedagogical treatises swells.⁹¹ As F.H. Woodward demonstrated, “it is to Quintilian that M. Vegius, Poggio, Guarino, Vergerius, Palmieri or Alberti consistently look for guidance; as does also the most distinguished of all the teachers of all the teachers of the early Renaissance: Vittorino da Feltre.”⁹²

These humanist educators share Quintilian’s belief that instruction in the relevant disciplines should start early. When Vergerio rearticulates this reasoning, he slightly mixes his architectural and sculptural metaphors: character needs building; but the mind needs moulding. It is “in youth therefore,” he asserts, that “the foundations of living well are to be laid, and the mind is

86 Rossi (1933–1942) 2: 136 (7.17): *Magna quidem res est scientia literarum, sed maior virtus animi.*

87 Rossi (1933–1942) 2: 136 (7.17): *facile quamvis formam recens excipit materia, facile quivis habitus nondum duratis mentibus imprimitur.*

88 For the letter see Rossi (1933–1942) 3: 5–17 (12.2). For its place in the genre, see Stacey (2007) 137–143.

89 See D’Alessandro (2007) 20.

90 See Nassichuk (2010).

91 See Woodward (1906) 8–10.

92 Woodward (1906) 8.

to be made to conform [*conformandus*] to virtue while it is tender and easily impressed: the impression it will now take on it will preserve for the rest of its life."⁹³

In book 1 of *Vita civile*, written in the 1430s, Palmieri takes this view to its seemingly logical extreme, laying out some observations about human *materia* at even the foetal stage.⁹⁴ When Palmieri moves from biological to cultural considerations, the language of form appears. Alerting his readers to the impact of childhood fables upon the character of *fanciulli*, he urges them to find the educational value in other "things similarly useful for morally shaping (*a informare bene*) a tender age."⁹⁵

The humanists follow their classical authorities in exploiting a wealth of metaphors to describe the educational process. Some Florentine thinkers pursue the implications of the thought that we have seeds of virtue within us. In book 2 of *Vita civile*, Palmieri compares teaching to agricultural activity: "if the good field is not worked well, it cannot respond well; similarly, a good mind without instruction cannot deliver all by itself the best fruit."⁹⁶ And in *Della famiglia*, written in the same decade, Alberti compares infants to young trees who need the right soil for proper nourishment.⁹⁷ He argues that a father "should be like a gardener in the field who does not mind occasionally cutting some good and fruit-bearing branches in order to sap the life of evil and harmful ones."⁹⁸

But humanists rely upon other art forms to describe the task of instructing the young. Alberti suggests that fathers, looking to identify the nature of their offspring in order to determine what kind of education to give them, should think of themselves as craftsmen looking for precious metals buried below the surface of the earth, or else as architects surveying the terrain upon which to build.⁹⁹ In the latter case, teachers need to search for suitable ground upon

93 Kallendorf (2002) 4: *Iacienda sunt igitur in hac aetate fundamenta bene vivendi et conformandus ad virtutem animus, dum tener est et facilis quamlibet impressionem admittere: quae et nunc erit, ita et in reliqua vita servabitur.*

94 For "materia natale," see Belloni (1982) 21 (and for the use of Quintilian, see Belloni's notes at 17–29; also Bassi (1892)). Bassi (1892).

95 Belloni (1982) 24: "simili cose utili a informare bene la tenera età."

96 Belloni (1982) 60: "El buono campo se non è bene lavorato non può bene rispondere; et similmente l'animo buono senza doctrina non può di sé dare optimo fructo."

97 See Grayson (1960) 37.

98 Grayson (1960) 60: "E vuolsi come suole nel campo fare l'ortolano. Non si cura di calpestrare qualche buona e fruttifera erba per isverglierne le triste e nocive. Così el padre."

99 See Grayson (1960) 44–45.

which to “assemble the edifice” which they plan to construct.¹⁰⁰ The rhetorical jargon of “finding” and “disposing” of materials is threaded through Alberti’s discussion. The process of building moral character commences with the act of locating naturally recurring qualities in the human; education is to be constructed upon solid foundations. These metaphors help the humanists – as they had Quintilian – illustrate their understanding of the relationship between nature and art in the correct formation of students. As far as Palmieri is concerned, the balance is clear: “nature without art – like art without nature – is always weak.”¹⁰¹

2.3 *Humanist Aesthetics*

As Michael Baxandall brilliantly observed, Renaissance art criticism systematically plundered the conceptual resources of classical rhetoric, which had come to occupy a crucial position in the *studia humanitatis* since Petrarch.¹⁰² We now see that Alberti’s *De Pictura* “owes a major literary debt to the *Institutio oratoria*.”¹⁰³ We also better understand the Ciceronian content of *Quattrocento* aesthetics. Cicero’s seminal definition of invention as “the discovery (*excogitatio*) of things true or plausible” became “a key concept in Renaissance art theory.”¹⁰⁴

No writer better exemplifies the capacity to develop the theoretical possibilities of the classical sources than Alberti, who comes to rely upon the concepts of *forma* and *materia* to describe the process of shaping bodies in his moral works as well as in his treatises on art and architecture.¹⁰⁵ In addition to his immersion in the *ars rhetorica*, Alberti was committed to retrieving Vitruvian principles for redeployment in his *De Re Aedificatoria*, composed around the middle of the 15th century. In Alberti’s work, the concepts of *forma* and *materia* are bound into the neo-Vitruvian doctrine that “the building is a certain kind of body.”¹⁰⁶ The impact of this vision upon Renaissance culture requires no underlining (Leonardo da Vinci’s drawing of Vitruvian man remains iconic to this day). After Alberti, the corporal image became all but ubiquitous in humanist aesthetics.

100 Grayson (1960) 45: “[quanto allo edificio sarebbe accommodato, ma] dispongono lo edificio [a meglio ricevere quell che gl’indizii gli prescrivono].”

101 Belloni (1982) 60: “et sempre la natura senza arte et l’arte senza natura si truovono deboli.”

102 Baxandall (1971) 122.

103 Edward Wright (1984) 68–69.

104 Kemp (1977) 348.

105 See Cassani (2004) 111–121.

106 Orlandi (1966) 1: 15: *aedificium corpus quoddam esse* [*animadvertimus*].

3 Machiavelli

In *Il Principe* and the *Discorsi*, Machiavelli steadily transposes a series of concepts from the aesthetic prescriptions of Roman rhetoric in which he had been educated as a schoolboy onto a conceptual grid upon which he begins to elaborate the “*arte dello stato*.”¹⁰⁷ In so doing, he draws upon a wealth of associations which those aesthetic elements had acquired as a consequence of their prior deployment in various other fields of Renaissance theoretical enquiry. In what follows, I concentrate upon elucidating Machiavelli’s handling of *forma* and *materia* in *Il Principe*. Matters become more complicated in the *Discorsi*, for reasons which I shall briefly summarise in my conclusion.

Machiavelli is manifestly not the first thinker to draw an analogy between the body of a literary work and the body politic, but his grafting of rhetorical language onto the field of politics proceeds with unparalleled intensity.¹⁰⁸ It conveys an equally unprecedented emphasis on the role of artifice in politics which is consequent upon Machiavelli’s understanding of the human material involved in state formation. Machiavelli’s view of the nature of that material is controversial, to put it mildly; his view of the structures required to manipulate it into a fitting form no less so. But in presenting these views to his readers, he resorts to a well-known theory which had insisted upon conceptualising works of art – texts, buildings, sculptures – as constructions which should be assembled with the image of a human body very much in mind. Machiavelli considers the state to be just such a construction; and he applies his theory of art to it accordingly.

3.1 *The Body of the Text*

Machiavelli uses the terminology we are examining to describe the composition of two different kinds of bodies: the body of his text and the body of *lo stato*.

Materia in Machiavelli’s writing is above all a term of art. In the *Dedica* which serves as a prologue, Machiavelli announces his intention to present his argument in wholly unadorned style, relying simply upon “the variety of the subject matter (*materia*) and the seriousness of the content (*subietto*)” under discussion in its subsequent pages to command attention.¹⁰⁹ Machiavelli is

107 For Machiavelli’s humanist education, see Black (2013) 14–21.

108 Recent studies of Machiavelli’s rhetoric: Kahn (1994); Cox (1997); Cox (2010); Viroli (1998) 73–113; Viroli (2006); Stacey (2007) 207–311; Stacey (2014).

109 Machiavelli, *Princ.* “Dedica” (5): “[che solamente] la varietà della materia e la gravità del subietto [la facci grata].”

dissimulating his eloquence here: he has already embellished his statement with *varietas* in order to break the monotony: “*materia*” and “*subietto*” act as synonyms in a pattern of use authorised by Cicero and Quintilian. Machiavelli will continue to exploit the same equivalence throughout the *Discorsi*, in which *subietto* returns as *suggetto* to pick out the *materia* of the state.¹¹⁰

In conformity with standard rhetorical practice, Machiavelli employs *materia* to describe his overall theme. But he also uses the word to pick out the subject matter of individual parts of his argument. When, for instance, he opens chapter 15 by announcing that “it now remains to consider what ways of governing a prince ought to adopt towards his subjects and his allies,” he underlines that he is going to “depart very greatly” from the approach of others “in discussing this subject (*materia*).”¹¹¹ Elsewhere, he uses *materia* to refer both to the subject of a single chapter and to specific topics within it.¹¹²

Machiavelli’s account of how he devises his material is similarly couched in rhetorical jargon. When he outlines the content of his *opuscolo* in his famous letter to Vettori of December 1513, he calls it *On Principalities*, and claims to “delve as deeply as I can in thinking through this subject (*cogitationi di questo subbietto*)” in his little work.¹¹³ His choice of word to describe his mental effort is revealing. The same terminology reappears in the *Dedica*:

I have not found (*trovato*) among my belongings anything that I hold more dear or valuable than my knowledge of the conduct of great men, learned through long experience of modern affairs and continual study of ancient history: I have long thought through these matters (*lungamente escogitate*) and examined them with great care, and have summarised them in a small volume, which I proffer to Your Magnificence.¹¹⁴

In presenting what he has found as the fruit of prolonged excogitation, Machiavelli recurs to the language of Cicero’s famous definition: “invention is the devising [*excogitatio*] of things true or plausible.” No reader schooled

110 See Machiavelli, *Disc.* 3.8 (446) (which is entitled “Chi vuole alterare una repubblica debbe considerare il soggetto di quella”).

111 Machiavelli, *Princ.* ch. 15 (109): “partendomi maxime nel disputare questa materia.”

112 See Machiavelli, *Princ.* ch. 19 (131, 148).

113 Vivanti (1999) 296: “[e composto uno opuscolo *De principatibus*, dove] io mi profondo quanto io posso nelle cogitationi di questo subbietto.”

114 Machiavelli, *Princ.* “Dedica” (4): “non ho trovato in tra la mia supellettile cosa quale io abbia più cara o tanto essistimi quanto la cognizione delle azioni delli uomini grandi, imparata da me con una lunga esperienza delle cose moderne e una continua lezione delle antiche; le quali avendo io con gran diligenza lungamente escogitate e essaminate e ora in uno piccolo volume ridotte, mando alla Magnificenzia vostra.”

in rhetoric will have missed the resonance of Machiavelli's claims about his inventive powers.

Machiavelli similarly draws attention to his work's formal qualities. When he relays the disposition of his argument, a vision of one particular artefact emerges. As he embarks upon the proof of his case in chapter 2, he refers the reader back to the summary of his argument in chapter 1, declaring that, in the work that lies ahead, "I shall weave together the warps mentioned above."¹¹⁵ This is a homely image – the production of textiles was central to Florence's economy – but it is also a profoundly classical one, for Machiavelli is reformulating the idea that a rhetorical work is a text, akin to a piece of woven fabric. The process involved in the manufacture of textiles known as *ordire* to which he alludes is all about imposing a pattern on threads. The Italian encyclopedia *Treccani* finds it impossible to avoid resorting to rhetorical language when defining *ordimento* as a technique requiring "the disposition of the threads in prearranged order (*ordine predisposto*)."¹¹⁶ In the strictest possible sense, then, Machiavelli is thinking textually when laying out matters on the page.

When referring to the formal qualities of his writing, Machiavelli reverts to the language of *elocutio*. We have already witnessed a wealth of metaphors in his text, but Machiavelli self-consciously advertises the relevant rhetorical doctrines in his *Dedica*:

I have not adorned (*ornata*) this work by filling it with rounded periods, with high-sounding words or fine phrases, or with any other sort of allurement or external ornament (*ornamenta*) with which many writers customarily describe and adorn (*ornare*) their subject-matter.¹¹⁷

The pre-eminent figure of speech at work here is not *varietas* but *repetitio*, used to stress the presence of precisely what Machiavelli claims to have absented from his writing: *ornamenta*. Again, the claim is ironic – and thus highly figured – but it helps Machiavelli draw attention to the question of how best to adorn bodies.¹¹⁸ We are in Quintilianic territory: the *lenocinia* which he affects

¹¹⁵ Machiavelli, *Princ.* ch. 2 (8): "andrò ritessendo gli orditi soprascritti."

¹¹⁶ <http://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/ordimento/>: "[nella tessitura] disposizione dei fili d'ordito ... nell'ordine predisposto."

¹¹⁷ Machiavelli, *Princ.* "Dedica" (5): "La quale opera io non ho ornata né ripiena di clausule ampie o di parole ampullose e magnifiche o di qualunque altro lenocinio e ornamento estrinseco con e' quali molti sogliono le loro cose descrivere e ornare."

¹¹⁸ For irony in the prologue, see Stacey (2007) 255–258.

to be eschewing are conspicuous traces of Quintilian's teaching on the art of embellishing the body of a text.¹¹⁹

3.2 *The Body of the State*

The image of the body politic is introduced in chapter 1, in which Machiavelli talks of adding "limbs" to the state.¹²⁰ In chapter 3, we learn that a prince who annexes a new state in the same province as his existing one should be able to ensure that it "becomes one single body with their old *stato*."¹²¹ By the close of chapter 3, the analogy is in full flow; by the close of the text, the state has acquired humours, appetites, nerves, and needs.¹²² In the *Discorsi*, Machiavelli's theory of the state is progressively articulated in terms of an extended life cycle: to talk about its birth, its parentage, and its education in book 1; its growth through the acquisition of empire in book 2; and its decline in health or its renewal in book 3.¹²³

Machiavelli sees that successful statecraft must reckon with certain underlying characteristics of people. Some human tendencies recur throughout history, and Machiavelli grapples with the problem of how best to specify these basic ontological properties and situate them within his theory. The thought which he imparts at the start of *Il Principe* about the human material at the heart of any project of state formation is already complex. Adopting a metaphor from the pictorial arts, he observes that the political landscape in which state formation occurs differs according to time, place, and circumstance; so, accordingly, do the materials which present themselves to the creator of a new state, for they often bear the impress of structures which had governed their previous way of life.¹²⁴

This insight becomes powerfully apparent in chapter 6, in which Machiavelli speaks of the formation of entirely new principalities. In introducing some illustrious ancient examples of princely rulers who had successfully created such states, he maintains that they had "obtained nothing from *fortuna* other than the occasion" with which to set to work. Certainly, he concedes, they encountered some luck: sheer good fortune "gave them material into which to be able to introduce the shape which seemed best to them."¹²⁵ For "without

119 See Quint. *Inst.* 8, pr. 26.

120 Machiavelli, *Princ.* ch. 1 (7): "come membri aggiunti allo stato."

121 Machiavelli, *Princ.* ch. 1 (7): "diventa, con loro principato antiquo, tutto uno corpo."

122 For the relevant passages, see Stacey (2013) 187–188.

123 See Stacey (2013) 188–190.

124 For the metaphor, see Machiavelli, *Princ.* "Dedica" (5–6).

125 See n. 1.

the occasion, their virtuous strength of mind would have been spent.”¹²⁶ But “without that virtue,” he adds, “the occasion would have passed in vain.”¹²⁷ He rounds out the moral:

It was necessary, then, for Moses to find (*trovare*) the people of Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, so they would be disposed to follow him in order to escape from servitude Cyrus had to find (*trovassi*) the Persians discontented under the rule of the Medes Theseus could not have demonstrated his virtue had he not found (*trovava*) the Athenians dispersed. These opportune occasions rendered these men felicitous, and their excellent virtue ensured that the occasion was recognised.¹²⁸

Machiavelli thus resorts repeatedly to the language of invention. The virtue of these founders hardly consists in happening upon the right materials. It manifests itself in their discriminating capacity to identify those materials – materials delineated as various peoples – as promising subject matter for their projects. It is one thing to have the opportunity to create something and the necessary stuff with which to create it; it is quite another to be able to discern that fact and respond appropriately.

For Machiavelli, the ancient founders illustrate how to bring *forma* to *materialia*: they were skilled in the organisational tasks which Machiavelli continually associates with the imposition of order. The state derives its formal qualities from pre-eminent acts of disposition. Indeed, in his discussion of the constitutional development of Rome early in book 1 of the *Discorsi*, his notorious suggestion that the guiding assumption in matters of state should be that “all men are wicked” is levelled very precisely at “whoever lays out (*dispone*) a republic and ordains laws (*ordina leggi*) in it.”¹²⁹

This same conception of state formation – in which to dispose of a new state is to lay down *ordini* – is already at work in *Il Principe*. The language of

126 Machiavelli, *Princ.* ch. 6 (35): “sanza quella occasione la virtù dello animo loro si sarebbe spenta.”

127 Machiavelli, *Princ.* ch. 6 (35): “sanza quella virtù la occasione sarebbe venuta invano.”

128 Machiavelli, *Princ.* ch. 6 (36): “Era adunque necessario a Moisè trovare el popolo d’Israel in Egitto stiavo e oppresso da li egizi, acciò che quegli per uscire da servitù si disponessino a seguirlo ... Bisognava che Ciro trovassi e’ persi malcontenti dello imperio de’ medi. Non poteva Teseo dimostrare la sua virtù se non trovava gli ateniesi dispersi. Queste occasioni per tanto feciono questi uomini felici e la eccellente virtù loro fé quella occasione essere conosciuta.”

129 Machiavelli, *Disc.* 1.3 (207): “[è necessario] a chi dispone una republica ed ordina leggi in quella [presupporre tutti gli uomini rei].”

ordini is not confined to descriptions of legislative activity in Machiavelli's work. It is a far more capacious term. But some degree of interpenetration of the concepts is straightforwardly observable in his talk of the activity of *ordinare leggi*: ordaining laws. The history of legislation in the Florentine republic was studded with the passage of *ordinamenti* and *ordinanze*: different kinds of legislative acts which had established its organisational matrix. The ordering function of such acts is obviously etched into the terminology used to describe them; Machiavelli presses this function into the overarching concept of disposition at work in his thinking about how to constitute the state's body.

As for Quintilian, so for Machiavelli, establishing *ordini* is about building structures. The idea that those who give *ordini* to states are laying foundations becomes immediately visible in chapter 6 as Machiavelli turns from his ancient exemplars to consider more generally the situation of those who become princes by a similarly virtuous path. Machiavelli becomes preoccupied with how these rulers might overcome a series of difficulties arising from the "new orders and procedures which they are forced to introduce in order to found their state."¹³⁰ Note how strongly the conceptualisation of *ordini* as foundations re-emerges in his description of the exemplary approach of Hiero of Syracuse to the problem:

He disbanded the old army and organised (*ordino*) a new one; he abandoned the old alliances and took up new ones; and when he had alliances and soldiers of his own, he was able to build any and every building (*edificare ogni edificio*) on the basis of such a foundation (*fondamento*).¹³¹

Machiavelli thus encapsulates the entire process of state formation as a matter of construction.

Once we see the indispensable role attributed to acts of disposition in state formation, we can identify the coherence of Machiavelli's decision to deploy, in chapter 7, the following simile:

Like all other natural things that are born and grow rapidly, states that grow quickly cannot sufficiently develop their roots, trunks and branches, and will be destroyed by the first chill winds of adversity unless those

¹³⁰ Machiavelli, *Princ.* ch. 6 (37): "nuovi ordini e modi che sono forzati introdurre per fondare lo stato loro."

¹³¹ Machiavelli, *Princ.* ch. 6 (40): "Costui spense la milizia vecchia, ordinò della nuova; lasciò le amicizie antiche, prese delle nuove; e come ebbe amicizie e soldati che fussino sua, possé in su tale fondamento edificare ogni edificio."

who have so quickly become their rulers are of such virtue that they know how to make immediate preparations to preserve what Fortune has dropped in their lap.¹³²

Machiavelli is mixing his metaphors; is some incongruity creeping into his theory? Are we now to envisage the state's development more in terms of organic growth, albeit with some artificial tending along the way? What happens, then, to the lapidary imagery which suggests natural material endowed with a set of very different properties?

These queries abate when we recall the central thrust of the theoretical work which the two different images are called upon to perform. Machiavelli is not using them to focus our attention on the material of the state; he is focusing our attention instead on its formation. The material of the state, he tells us repeatedly, consists in an agglomeration of human bodies. What he wants us to see is that the formation of these clumps of individuals into a durable state is a matter of cultivation, instruction, and edification. Notwithstanding their different metaphorical registers, these concepts have a unity which Machiavelli is exploiting: they are all extremely well-established ways of picking out the role of disposition in the formation of young human bodies. In the *Discorsi*, Machiavelli names the processes which he envisages in *Il Principe*, now openly referring to the *educazione* of the state.

Finally, we need to consider the role of *elocutio*. There are, Machiavelli thinks, various ways in which the state can and should be "adorned." One way in which a prince can bring adornment to his possession is to permit his subjects to do likewise to theirs. Machiavelli counsels him to demonstrate that he is a "lover of the virtues" by actively encouraging his subjects in their various economic pursuits.¹³³ Such demonstrations lessen the likelihood that any member of his state "feels afraid to adorn their possessions through fear of having them removed."¹³⁴ He then pairs *ornare* with *ampliare* to develop this insight into the development of the material basis of the state.¹³⁵

¹³² Machiavelli, *Princ.* ch. 7 (42): "gli stati che vengono subito, come tutte l'altre cose della natura che nascono e crescono presto, non possono avere le barbe e corrispondenze loro in modo che il primo tempo avverso non le spenga, se già quelli tali ... che sí di repente sono diventati principi non sono di tanta virtù che quello che la fortuna ha messo loro in grembo e' sappino subito prepararsi."

¹³³ Machiavelli, *Princ.* ch. 21 (164): "[debbe uno principe ... mostrarsi] amatore delle virtù."

¹³⁴ Machiavelli, *Princ.* ch. 21 (165): "non tema di ornare la sua possessione per timore che la gli sia tolta."

¹³⁵ See Machiavelli, *Princ.* ch. 21 (165).

But a new prince has to be concerned with adorning his principality much more directly. Machiavelli emphasises the glory to be had from “having inaugurated a new principality and from having adorned and strengthened it with good laws, good arms and good examples.”¹³⁶ All three manners of adorning the state strengthen its body in different ways. But the importance of equipping the state with arms is paramount. The requisite power to make laws stick ultimately comes from having armed force at one’s disposal. Not only must the prince himself be armed; he must also “adorn” his state by arming it if he wants to retain it.

Again, chapter 6 illuminates this line of thinking. New princes found their state by introducing new orders and procedures. But Machiavelli envisages that their introduction will invariably threaten those who had prospered under “the old *ordini*,” while potential beneficiaries of the new order may be initially lukewarm in their enthusiasm.¹³⁷ The imposition of new laws will certainly help reshape the attitudes of one’s new subjects. But Machiavelli observes that, while laws are fundamental to a state’s formation, they can never succeed in firmly affixing people to the kind of collective mental disposition required to ensure obedience. What makes laws commanding is the force of their author. Machiavelli’s *ordini* enjoy no metaphysical sanction from God or nature; even Moses, he observes, had ensured that the implementation of his legislative programme was accompanied by the threat of force. In explaining the reasoning behind his haunting allegation that only “armed prophets” succeed in state building, Machiavelli contends:

The nature of people is changeable, and it is easy to persuade them of something but it is difficult to hold them to that persuasion: and hence the need to be organised in such a way that, when they no longer believe, one has the power to make them believe by means of force.¹³⁸

These polemical remarks subvert the conventional Ciceronian view that eloquent persuasion is the only force needed to establish and maintain the state. That view was predicated upon an understanding that the human *materia* of the *civitas* was naturally endowed with a latent rationality, requiring nothing

¹³⁶ Machiavelli, *Princ.* ch. 24 (173): “avere dato principio a uno principato e ornatolo e corroboratolo di buone leggi, di buone arme e di buone essempli.”

¹³⁷ Machiavelli, *Princ.* ch. 6 (37).

¹³⁸ Machiavelli, *Princ.* ch. 6 (38): “la natura de’ populi è varia, e è facile a persuadere loro una cosa ma è difficile fermargli in quella persuasione: e però conviene essere ordinato in modo che, quando non credono più, si possa fare loro credere per forza.” For “profeti armati,” see ch. 6 (38).

more than persuasive argument in order to be brought to observe *fides* and *iustitia*. Machiavelli is dedicated to eradicating this conception of human reason entirely from political thinking. It is a people's natural tendency to an immense variability of outlook which must be the point of departure for thinking about the state. Machiavelli has no confidence that people can be trusted to cleave to laws when the latter accord with the just dictates of reason itself. *Fides* and *iustitia* are not so easily secured; people need to be otherwise obliged. Hence why the prince needs to be armed, and why he needs to arm his state.

4 Conclusion

Having seen that state formation is construed by Machiavelli in highly rhetorical terms, we can better interpret his use in the *Discorsi* of the image of the sculptor which we observed at the outset. It occurs in the early chapters of the *Discorsi* as Machiavelli describes what he calls the *educazione* of Roma – the daughter born to Romulus – at the hands of Numa during her early years.¹³⁹ Machiavelli avails himself of all the lessons which we have observed at work in Florentine humanist pedagogy in order to convey a series of points about the impressionable character of the *materia* under instruction. Machiavelli's entire theory is predicated upon a profound belief that humans are intensely changeable, voluble creatures. That plasticity demands careful handling. These are crucial years for the state because they are – we can now say with precision – formative. Its future success will derive from having had the good luck to have met with virtuous legislators who provided it in its infancy with the right instruction. The conjunction of virtue and fortune remains important to Machiavelli's account of the inception of a successful state.

What, though, changes? Two new features of Machiavelli's account of the state in the *Discorsi* oblige him to refine his thoughts. First, the life cycle of the state under consideration is massively more extended than before. Machiavelli revisits his account of the relationship between form and material in order to inject more dynamism into it. He uses the terminology specifically to handle the problem of corruption in chapters 16–18 of book 1; it is reprised in book 3, as Machiavelli examines the failure of Manlius Capitolinus to overthrow the Roman government during the early days of the republic. Manlius would have met with success “if he had been born in the days of Marius or Sulla.”¹⁴⁰ For by that stage in the republic's history, Machiavelli surmises, “the material (*materia*)

139 For Roma's *nascimento* and *educazione*, see Machiavelli, *Disc.* 1.11 (229).

140 Machiavelli, *Disc.* 3.8 (447): “se Manlio fusse nato ne' tempi di Mario e di Silla....”

was already corrupt, and he would have been able to stamp upon it the form (*imprimere la forma*) of his ambition."¹⁴¹

A second challenge issues from the different conceptual structure of the free state now at the centre of Machiavelli's theoretical concerns. In free states, the governors are also the governed: human subjects formed within the embrace of the state come in time to supply the personnel responsible for maintaining their fellow citizens in good shape; no longer able to depend, in slightly lumpen fashion, upon more monarchical interventions of singular statesmen for their political health, they must embody the necessary resources to respond to the state's shifting needs. In encompassing this fact within his theory, Machiavelli has to evade some of the static qualities which his depiction of the creation of a new state in *Il Principe* had tended to suggest. But he nevertheless continues to draw deeply on the conceptual reserves of rhetoric in addressing this new subject matter.

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141 Machiavelli, *Disc.* 3.8 (447): "la materia era corrotta e dove esso arebbe potuto imprimere la forma dell'ambizione sua."

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The Last Orator: Rufus Choate and the End of Classical Eloquence in America

James M. Farrell

When Rufus Choate died in 1859, the *Boston Journal* noted that “A great orator has passed away from our midst.” For thirty years, Choate had been “one of the greatest forensic orators this country has produced,” and his rhetorical skill before the judges “has never been surpassed, if indeed it has ever been equalled.”¹ The *Boston Journal* was not alone in lamenting Choate’s passing. He was considered to be the “first advocate in America,” and “one of the most brilliant orators this country has ever known.”² Choate, who was born in Ipswich, Massachusetts in 1799, and graduated from Dartmouth College in 1819, “early became distinguished for his eloquence and power of argument.”³ After a brilliant career as a lawyer, congressman, senator, and popular orator, he had, by the time of his death “placed himself, as a matter of course, not merely at the head of the jurists and advocates, but of the public speakers of the country.”⁴

Choate’s talents were remarkable, and those who mourned his passing reflected on “his great learning, his astonishing facility and beauty of illustration, and his rare and peculiar mastery of words.”⁵ One judge who eulogised Choate recalled his “transcendent oratorical power” with which “he led away captive the minds of his auditory,” and “made jurors, and sometimes judges, subject to his will.”⁶ During “the Golden Age of American Oratory,” Choate stood out as an orator of “peculiar and unrivalled eloquence,” and as one whose “reputation was established in all quarters, as one of the first, if not the very first of eloquent orators and persuasive advocates.”⁷

1 *Boston Journal* as reported in the *Portsmouth Journal of Literature and Politics*, 30 July 1859.

2 *Congregational Journal* (Concord, New Hampshire) 21 July 1859; *Barre Gazette* (Massachusetts), 22 July 1859.

3 “Death of Rufus Choate,” *Scientific American* 1.4, 23 July 1859, 54.

4 “Address of Edward Everett,” *New York Times*, 25 July 1859.

5 *Times Picayune* (New Orleans), 24 July 1859.

6 *New York Herald*, 25 July 1859.

7 Parker (1857); *New York Post* as reported in the *Ohio State Journal*, 26 July 1859; Cogswell (1884) 412.

This chapter examines the career of Rufus Choate, tracing the origins of his oratorical fame to his complete and enduring purchase in the classical rhetorical tradition. Choate consistently relied on Greek and Roman rhetorical theory and took ancient orators as the models for his professional eloquence and public persona. But Choate was also the last classical orator in America. To be sure, the influence of classical rhetoric in the debates, speeches, and jury arguments of other orators remained recognizable throughout the remainder of the 19th century. It is also clear that some who spoke for a living in politics, in court, and at public commemorations took inspiration from classical examples like Cicero or Demosthenes. Rufus Choate, however, represents the last of an exceptionally rare, and dying breed of American orators. After Choate, there would be nobody who so fully embodied the ideal of the classical orator; nobody who could so justifiably claim to be Quintilian's *vir bonus dicendi peritus*.⁸

The belief that Choate's death signalled the denouement of the classical era in American rhetoric is at least implicitly present in the eulogistic remarks by his contemporaries. At his passing his brother lawyers and fellow cultural elites knew they would never see his like again. However many school boys would read Cicero's orations, or study Quintilian's *Institutes of Oratory*, or, whatever rhetorical artistry might be exhibited in their own, or in future ages, the men who knew Choate best were sure that no orator would ever match the virtue, the beauty, the command of argument, the comprehensive learning, the unrelenting industry, or the classical eloquence of Rufus Choate.

By the time he died at the age of 59, Choate had surely earned oratorical fame, or so thought most of the eulogists and biographers who grieved his loss. "He will have a high place in American history," one newspaper confidently affirmed, "and will be held long in memory by his contemporaries."⁹ At the same time, those who knew Choate, and observed the changes in the professional, social, and political climate in which he had spent his career, could not help but express some anxiety about the lasting reputation of their departed friend. For one thing, while some of his most well-known epideictic addresses had been published along with a few legislative orations, no collection of Choate's forensic speeches existed. He had argued over a thousand cases, but "the causes in which he engaged were private, not public causes, and the great powers he exhibited in conducting them have left no record in history or literature."¹⁰ This absence of an authoritative edition of Choate's forensic

8 Butler (1920) XII.i.1.; Kennedy (1899) 136.

9 *Mirror and Farmer* (Manchester, New Hampshire), 23 July 1859.

10 Whipple (1879) 87–88.

masterpieces meant that he might be “hereafter known chiefly by the traditions of his splendid success.”¹¹ The full measure of his fame was “irretrievably lost to the world.” It was “of necessity a thing too evanescent and subtle to be gathered up; literally like water spilled upon the ground.”¹²

Choate’s former law student, Edward G. Parker, in an effort to preserve the memory and secure the fame of his mentor and friend, published some reminiscences of Choate, even as he recognised the futility of fully capturing in print the impression Choate made on a jury or an audience. Edwin Whipple, another Choate associate, also published a memoir. But, as Whipple reflected on his subject’s career, he, like Parker, questioned whether his short biography would accomplish its goal. “It is sad, in reviewing a career like that of Mr. Choate,” Whipple wrote, “to see on how frail a foundation rests the reputation of a great lawyer and advocate, unless he becomes connected here and there with causes that assume historic importance.”¹³

The sense of loss was still palpable a generation later. Despite the fact that by the end of the 19th century several biographies and memoirs of Choate had been published, along with a collection of some of his most well-known addresses and lectures, commentators and critics could still regret that because Choate had left no published edition of his forensic speeches, and had made only a few speeches in Congress, his memory would quickly fade. What would remain was a “mere tradition of him,” wrote Clement Hill in 1896, a tradition “becoming every year more uncertain, obscure, indiscriminate.”¹⁴ In 1898, when a bronze statue of Choate was unveiled at the Boston Court House, Joseph Choate, son of Rufus Choate’s first cousin, and a noted lawyer in his own right, pondered how the erection of the memorial likeness might preserve the memory of his departed relative. “Many a noted orator, many a great lawyer, has been lost in oblivion in forty years after the grave closed over him,” he remarked in his commemorative address. He was gratified that the Boston Bar and the people of Massachusetts had kept alive “so vividly and so lovingly” the memory of Rufus Choate. But, he was aware that “in a decade or two more, these lingering witnesses of his glory and his triumphs will have passed on, and to the next generation he will be but a name and a statue, enshrined in fame’s temple with Cicero and Burke.”¹⁵

11 Whipple (1879) 8.

12 Anonymous (1863a) 324, 326.

13 Whipple (1879) 86.

14 Hill (1896) 155.

15 J.H. Choate (1911) 5.

What was it that these commentators wanted everyone to remember about Rufus Choate? What was it that they feared would be lost forever in another generation or two after his death? It was not merely the memory of Choate, or the fame of his oratorical triumphs, that was jeopardised by the generational march of time. Rather, what these biographers and eulogists understood was that Choate was the last of his kind. He was the rarest of eloquent advocates. He was the last classical orator.¹⁶

In the introduction to *De oratore*, Cicero told his brother Quintus to observe “how scarce orators are now, and ever have been.”¹⁷ In the dialogue proper, the same theme is echoed by Antonius: “no rarer thing than a finished orator can be discovered among the sons of men.”¹⁸ Quintilian, too, remarked on how Cicero “failed to find his orator in actual life and merely imagines and strives to depict the ideal.” Yet, Quintilian hoped that the ideal orator might one day appear. “Shall I then be afraid to say that in the eternity of time that is yet to be, something more perfect may be found than has yet existed?” Any man could aspire to be the ideal orator, he believed, “and why should not each of us hope to be that happy man?”¹⁹ From his earliest age, Rufus Choate resolved to be that “happy man.”

In one sense, Choate’s educational opportunities were not exceptional. He was born in a small town on the north shore of Massachusetts, in a country that had gained its independence from Great Britain only half a generation before his birth. While a young boy, he demonstrated “startling precocity” in devouring the books in the small village library, including Plutarch’s *Lives* and Rollin’s *Ancient History*.²⁰ He quickly developed a love for the classics “which distinguished him throughout life, and coloured all his speeches and literary works.”²¹ After the usual preparation in Latin and Greek, including study of Cicero’s *Orations* and the New Testament, he entered Dartmouth College in 1815, where he quickly earned accolades as both a classical scholar and an orator. Ira Perley, one of Choate’s Dartmouth classmates, recalled hearing Choate

16 Richard Henry Dana used a marvellous maritime image to emphasise the contrast between Choate and other lawyers. In Choate’s presence he “felt like the master of a small coasting vessel, that hugs the shore, that has run up under the lee to speak a great homeward-bound Indiaman, crowded and freighted with silks and precious stones and costly fabrics, with skysails and moonsails spread to the breeze, and with the nation’s flag at her mast, and navigated on by the mysterious science of the fixed stars, and not unprepared with weapons and guns of defence too” (*New York Times* 21 July 1859).

17 Sutton (1979) I.ii.8.

18 Sutton (1979) I.xxviii.128.

19 Butler (1920) XII.i.21; 31.

20 Fuess (1928) 24; Matthews (1980) 6.

21 Hill (1896) 125.

translate Livy aloud. "After the first sentence or two, I had no doubt who was the first classical scholar among us," he wrote, "or who had the best command of English."²² Many years after his graduation, Choate himself recalled his love of classical studies at Dartmouth. He told a friend that his college life "was so exquisitely happy that I should like to relive it in my son." In particular, he recalled with nostalgia "the studies of Latin and Greek, – Livy, Horace, Tacitus, Xenophon, Herodotus, and Thucydides, – had ever a charm beyond expression."²³

It was at Dartmouth that Choate began to exhibit that "aptitude for classical and historical studies"²⁴ that, in part, prepared him to be America's greatest classical orator. "He did not limit his studies to the curriculum," recalled W.C. Boyden, another classmate. "After the first year he read a great deal beyond the prescribed course, especially in Cicero, of whose works he thus went over several, and took up, besides, some of the Greek authors."²⁵ In particular, Choate made a lifelong commitment to studying classical oratory and rhetorical theory, "schooling himself to daily tasks in law, in rhetoric, in oratory, seeking always for the actual truth, and for the 'best language' in which to embody it."²⁶ He "practiced eloquence every day, for forty years, as a critical study," and pursued the study of forensic rhetoric "with a patience, a steadiness, a zeal equal to that of Chatham and Curran."²⁷ In his personal journal in 1843, twenty-four years after he had left Dartmouth, and when he had already established himself as one of the leading advocates in Boston, he wrote of his commitment to rhetorical study. "I am not to forget, that I am, and must be, if I would live, a student of professional forensic rhetoric."²⁸

Choate was familiar with the rhetorical theory of Aristotle, whose work he considered an "ethical rhetoric." He observed how Aristotle had "laid out a chart of Rhetoric," and "tracked out the principles of the human soul from which it sprang and to which it was applicable."²⁹ He knew Cicero's rhetorical works intimately, and also admired the *Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory* by John Quincy Adams which "treated fully of Aristotle and all the ancient rhetorical

22 Brown (1862) 1: 8, 1: 307.

23 Fuess (1928) 32.

24 Abbott (1929) 96.

25 Neilson (1884) 308. Neilson was certain that had Choate not gone into law, "he would have made a Greek professor, elegant in scholarship, rich in acquisition, energetic and liberal in instruction" (281). See also *Congregational Journal*, 8 September 1852, 138.

26 J.H. Choate (1911) 14.

27 Parker (1860) 123; Thompson (1870) 152.

28 Brown (1862) 1: 65.

29 Parker (1860) 122.

authors.”³⁰ But Choate’s abiding devotion to classical rhetorical study was, in particular, guided by Quintilian. It was the work “by which he directed his studies, and formed himself for the forensic arena.” He kept the *Institutes of Oratory* as a professional manual of practice; “he analysed it, tested its rules, [and] worked by its methods during his whole forensic life.”³¹ Even after he had become an accomplished advocate and orator, he consulted Quintilian, whose “chapters on Writing and Extempore Speech I have read and re-read.”³² Another time, he was disappointed that business had kept him from further reading in Roman rhetoric. “I have written only this translation of Quintilian since Saturday; professional engagements have hindered me.”³³

In that ancient source, Choate could read Quintilian’s advice that orators engage in constant reading, writing, and translation. “Our earlier orators thought highly of translation from Greek into Latin,” Quintilian wrote. “In the *De oratore* of Cicero, Lucius Crassus says that he practiced this continually, while Cicero himself advocates it again and again.” As well, he followed Quintilian’s advice that constant exercise in writing “provides that holy of holies where the wealth of oratory is stored, and whence it is produced to meet the demands of sudden emergencies.”³⁴ Reviewing Quintilian in his journal Choate reflected on the question of how mastery of a language may be obtained. “It is by reading and hearing, – reading the best books, hearing the most accomplished speakers.” The lessons Choate learned “from this excellent teacher” convinced him that “constant writing is the parent of ripe speech.”³⁵

But, while Quintilian was the principal theoretical guide to Choate’s mastery of rhetoric, it was Cicero and Demosthenes who were his models for the practice of oratory. Choate kept a bust of both ancient orators on display in his home. Demosthenes, he considered “the first name in *all* eloquence,” while Cicero was “the one immortal voice of the Latin speech, by universal consent; teacher, consoler, benefactor of all ages.”³⁶ Choate’s dedicated study of both these ancient orators extended beyond the usual school exercises in translation and recitation. It was clear that he saw great value in taking both the Greek and the Roman as patterns for his own speaking, as exemplars worthy of imitation, as models whose ideas and eloquence could be enlisted to address the legal and political challenges of 19th-century America.

30 Parker (1860) 122; Adams (1810).

31 Parker (1860) 242; Brown (1862) 308; Kennedy (1899) 118; Ferguson (1984) 75.

32 Cogswell (1884) 415.

33 Neilson (1884) 68.

34 Butler (1920) X.iv.1–2, X.iii.3. See also Brown (1862) 2: 453–515.

35 Cogswell (1884) 414.

36 Brown (1862) 1: 446, 454.

Choate vowed to “completely master, translate, annotate, and commit” Demosthenes’ oration “On the Crown,” which he considered “the noblest deliberative discourse ever uttered by mortal lips.”³⁷ In like fashion, from his earliest days, Choate adopted Cicero as a model. William Wirt, with whom Choate had prepared for the law, had told young lawyers they should “enflame their emulation by the frequent study of Cicero’s *Orator* and of his *Brutus*,” and aspire to join “that splendid galaxy of Roman orators which he there displays.”³⁸ In turn, Choate told one of his own law students to “soak your mind with Cicero,” whom he considered “a library of eloquence and reason, to form the sentiments and polish the taste, and fertilise and enlarge the mind of a young man aspiring to be a lawyer statesman.”³⁹

Demosthenes and Cicero were Choate’s lifelong companions. “Cicero I never have read without being encouraged and strengthened,” he once wrote, “his views of life are always healthy and cheerful and sound.”⁴⁰ At the same time, some of his contemporaries thought of Choate as “an Athenian Greek kept back for New England.” You might meet Choate walking on his way to court, said Edwin Whipple, but “while he was striding around Boston Common in the age of Buchanan, he was really making himself a contemporary of the age of Pericles,” or otherwise “contesting with Demosthenes a cause before the ‘fierce democracy’ of Athens.”⁴¹

Choate’s internalisation of classical rhetorical theory, as well as his full immersion into the oratorical culture of ancient Greece and Rome, is evident in his 19th-century mastery of the art of eloquence in all its forms. He was a “champion in all the arts of dialectic controversy and successful debate” and a “thorough master of all the rhetoric there was on earth.”⁴² In what follows, then, let us observe that mastery in his superior performance in each of the classical genres of rhetoric, as well as in his pre-eminent command of all the classical offices of the orator.

As a deliberative speaker before the legislative assemblies where he served, Choate spoke infrequently, but always eloquently. During his career he was a member of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, a Massachusetts state senator, a United States congressman, and a United States senator. Choate

37 Fuess (1928) 129–130; Brown (1862) 452.

38 Matthews (1980) 17.

39 Fuess (1928) 222; Brown (1862) 1: 47; Botein (1978) 313–321.

40 Parker (1860) 290.

41 Whipple (1879) 39–40; Parker (1860) imagined that “if Demosthenes had had Choate in the place of Aeschines for his competitor, in the great oration for the crown, he would have been beaten” (18).

42 Anonymous (1863a) 323; Parker (1860) 121.

himself understood his duty as a legislator to be the protection of the “actual and vast ‘interests’ of the community.”⁴³ He defined deliberative rhetoric as the attempt to “persuade to an action.” In order to accomplish that goal, a speaker must “gratify some of the desires or affections or sentiments,” of his hearers, “which are the springs of all action.”⁴⁴ His efforts at legislative speech quickly earned Choate a reputation as among “the first rank of modern parliamentary orators.”⁴⁵ He was, according to a fellow congressman, “the most persuasive speaker he had ever heard.”⁴⁶

His political speeches were “florid, erudite, and fervid” and were “always well-prepared and highly finished productions worthy of note.”⁴⁷ Choate’s best deliberative addresses in the House of Representatives were his 1832 speech on the Revolutionary Pension Bill, his 1833 speech on the Protective Tariff, and his 1834 oration on the deposits in the Federal Bank. His most distinguished Senate speeches were his 1841 speech on the diplomatic crisis created by the arrest of Alexander McLeod, his speech in the same year on the Navy Pension bill, his 1844 oration “Upon the Subject of Protecting American Labor by Duties on Imports,” and his two speeches (1843 and 1844) on the Oregon question. In all these speeches, we can discern the effort Choate made in studying the history of the issue and in mastering the facts related to the disputed question. All his legislative speeches demonstrate his command of the essential deliberative controversy being debated, and exhibit his grasp of the key deliberative topics – the goods to be achieved or the dangers to be avoided – by the policy under consideration. “Our business is not to guess about the future,” he once told his legislative colleagues, “but to discern the duties of the present and to fulfil them.”⁴⁸

Take, for example, Choate’s first congressional address. In the 1832 speech on revolutionary pensions, we see him with the skill of a trial lawyer identify the main point at issue. “Much has been said, and ably said, upon this topic,” he tells his colleagues, “but it seems to me the strong, plain, and narrow ground on which the claims of the militia upon the pension fund are to be placed, and the bill defended, is this: that you have already, and long ago, established a pension system, the principle of which is broad enough to embrace, and does embrace,

43 Brown (1862) 1: 525.

44 Brown (1862) 1: 448.

45 Anonymous (1863b) 209.

46 Hill (1896) 134.

47 Parker (1860) 33; Matthews (1980) 60.

48 R. Choate (1844) 585.

this species of force, and this kind of service.”⁴⁹ His view on the proposal to restrict pensions to those veterans who demonstrate indigence is clear:

It is admitted by every body that, in this, your pension system is wrong. It is also admitted that, instead of any longer attempting to get round it; instead of any longer attempting to relieve against it by inadequate, unsatisfactory, partial, and special legislation, we ought in some way to change the system itself. It is unsound in principle, and it works great actual injustice, that there should be, as there now is, one law for the mass of the community interested in this subject, and another for a few individuals who are so fortunate as to have a friend in Congress; for such exactly is the operation of the existing system.⁵⁰

As he closes the address, Choate employs a more passionate rhetoric, one that frames the issue as both a duty to the heroes of the past, and an obligation to give wise counsel for the future. In tones that echo the appeals of Demosthenes, Choate reminds the members of the House that under the Constitution, they may declare war and maintain armies:

May you not, ought you not, to multiply and present to those who shall serve you in these great crises, inducements to serve you well? You give them wages, bounties, promotion, swords, and medals. May you not, and ought you not, to be able to point them also to the laurels which a grateful country has wreathed around other brows, and to the glory which covers the living and the dead of other fields? May you not secure future service by generously rewarding past service? May you not honour the dead, and pension the aged, that the living and the young may be stimulated to an equally salutary emulation?⁵¹

Much later in his legislative career, his oratorical habits had not changed. In his 1843 Senate address on the Oregon bill, Choate again identifies the central issue: “There is one question only,” he tells his fellow senators.

Does the bill, in its grant, or promise of grant of land, break the convention? In other words: having agreed as a Government, that this Territory of Oregon, and every part of it, shall remain free and open to all the

49 R. Choate (1832) 2452.

50 R. Choate (1832) 2447.

51 R. Choate (1832) 2457–2458.

subjects of England, as well as all the citizens of our own country, until the expiration of twelve months after notice of the termination of the agreement, can we now, before such notice, do an act, as a Government, intended and calculated to exclude the subjects of England from the territory, in part or whole, to parcel it out into farms; to enclose those farms with stone walls; to lay them down in grain and grass; to vest the title to them in American citizens, in absolute property, for the maintenance of which against all the world the public treasure and public faith are solemnly engaged? This is the question, and really it answers itself.⁵²

As J. Matthews has observed, this was Choate's approach to deliberative speaking, "to focus attention on the particular discrete problem to be solved, to begin from the particular circumstances in which it was embedded."⁵³ While he was not known chiefly as a legislative orator, his command of deliberative issues and his commitment to promoting the public good made his political speaking admirable for "its eloquence and learning" as well as for "its humanity and practical wisdom."⁵⁴

Choate also excelled as an epideictic speaker. He understood commemorative oratory in classical terms, as precisely devoted to "lead the meditations of an hour devoted to the remembrance of some national era, or of some incident marking the progress of the nation."⁵⁵ In later generations, when the fresh recollection of his trial speaking had faded, Choate's fame as an orator rested largely on his beloved commemorative speeches. These included "The Colonial Age of New England," "The Eloquence of Revolutionary Periods," "American Nationality," and the "Eulogy on the Death of President Harrison." But of all his epideictic orations, the two for which he earned the widest praise and most lasting fame were his 1843 commemorative address on "The Age of the Pilgrims" and his 1853 eulogy to Daniel Webster.⁵⁶

The address on the Pilgrims, given on the anniversary of the landing at Plymouth, and delivered in New York City to the New England Association, was widely praised as a "noble production" and a "glowing and masterly oration."⁵⁷

52 R. Choate (1843) 222.

53 Matthews (1980) 60.

54 Anonymous (1863b) 208.

55 Brown (1862) 1: 544.

56 See R. Choate (1897) for Choate's epideictic speeches and several of his lectures and Whig political speeches. One epideictic effort not included in that collection, nor in his *Works*, was the 1841 eulogy to President William Henry Harrison. See *Salem Gazette*, 23 April 1841.

57 *Farmer's Cabinet* (Amherst, New Hampshire), 28 December 1843; *New Hampshire Sentinel*, 27 December 1843.

One newspaper described the speech on the Pilgrims as “elegant in style, just in principle, true in history.” The paper hoped that all their readers would “have the courage to master every line of it... it is a shame to this superficial age if such a production cannot obtain a reading.”⁵⁸

In the opening of Choate’s address, one short and one very long sentence, we see both his appropriately elevated language, fit for epideictic celebration, as well as his articulation of the central purposes of commemorative oratory:

We meet again, the children of the Pilgrims, to remember our fathers. Away from the scenes with which the American portions of their history are associated forever, and in all men’s minds, scenes so unadorned, yet clothed to the moral eye with a drama above the sphere of taste: the uncrumbled rock, the hill from whose side those “delicate springs” are still gushing, the wide, brown, low woods, the sheltered harbour, the little island that welcomed them in their frozen garments from the sea, and witnessed the rest and worship of that Sabbath-day before their landing, – away from all those scenes, – without the limits of the fond old colony that keeps their graves, without the limits of the New England which is their wider burial place and fitter monument, – in the heart of this chief city of the nation into which the feeble land has grown, – we meet again, to repeat their names one by one, to retrace the lines of their character, to recall the lineaments and forms over which the grave has no power, to appreciate their virtues, to recount the course of the life full of heroic deeds, varied by sharpest trials, crowned by transcendent consequences, to assert the directness of our descent from such an ancestry of goodness and greatness, to erect, refresh, and touch our spirits by coming for an hour into their more immediate presence, such as they were in the days of their human “agony of glory.”⁵⁹

Classical epideictic discourse aims to make present the heroic deeds of the past, to set before the imagination of the audience those noble actions and honourable attributes of character that are both worthy of remembrance and examples to be imitated. On a solemn occasion such as the anniversary of the landing of the Pilgrims, it was the orator’s duty to retell the heroic story, and help secure the lasting memory of his subjects. The epideictic oration marked out the most cherished memories and put on display the virtues most essential to the continuation of the community. Choate’s oration brought his audience,

⁵⁸ *Congregational Journal*, 11 January 1844.

⁵⁹ Brown (1862) 1: 371.

both present in the auditorium, or those reading the speech, whether in 1843, or generations later, back to the scene of ancestral suffering and triumph. “The genius of the orator had transferred us to the spot,” recalled one witness to the address, “and we saw the rocky shore, and with him mourned the early dead.”⁶⁰

Nearly a decade later, Choate returned to Dartmouth and delivered a remarkable eulogy to the memory of Daniel Webster. Comparing Choate to Demosthenes, Edward Parker considered the “Discourse Commemorative of Daniel Webster” to be “the crown speech of Rufus Choate’s life.” In Parker’s opinion, “no American before or after Webster has ever laid down in his grave with the voice of a panegyric, so sustained, so solemn, so splendid, resounding amid the drums and trumpets of his obsequies.”⁶¹ It was, thought Claude Fuess, “probably the noblest memorial ever spoken by human lips.”⁶²

Choate’s familiarity with Webster led him to offer an intimate portrait of his late friend and mentor, one drawing on the classical epideictic *topoi*:

Others mourn and praise him by his more distant and more general titles to fame and remembrance; his supremacy of intellect, his statesmanship of so many years, his eloquence of reason and of the heart, his love of country, incorruptible, conscientious, and ruling every hour and act; that greatness combined of genius, of character, of manner, of place, of achievement, which was just now among us, and is not, and yet lives still and evermore.⁶³

Speaking to the audience at Dartmouth, where both Webster and Choate had studied as young men, he reflects on “how fit a place is this for such a service! We are among the scenes where the youth of Webster awoke first and fully to the life of the mind. We stand, as it were, at the sources – physical, social, moral, intellectual – of that exceeding greatness.”⁶⁴ Choate praised Webster’s eloquence, his power of “influencing the convictions and actions of others by speech.”⁶⁵ In particular he lauded Webster’s mastery of forensic rhetoric,

60 Neilson (1884) 231. Lawrence W. Rosenfield (1980) 133, 147 explains that well-crafted epideictic “calls upon us to join with our community in giving thought to what we witness, and such thoughtful beholding in commemoration constitutes memorialising.” The community memorialises “not to mark the passing or to worship what once was and is no more (as we do in moods of nostalgia), but to celebrate through our commemoration the gift of having been privileged to dwell with the radiance that was momentarily revealed to us.”

61 Parker (1860) 68.

62 Fuess (1928) 270.

63 Brown (1862) 1: 493.

64 Brown (1862) 1: 494.

65 Brown (1862) 1: 531.

"that whole class of qualities which made him for any description of trial by jury whatever, criminal or civil, by even a more universal assent, foremost." In Webster's trial speaking, one could observe "the unrivalled legal reason put off, as it were, and reappear in the form of a robust common sense and eloquent feeling."⁶⁶ One of Webster's most famous cases, the prosecution of John Francis Knapp in 1830, Choate considered "a more difficult and higher effort of mind than that more famous 'Oration for the Crown.'"⁶⁷

Yet for all his success as a deliberative speaker and epideictic orator, it was his forensic rhetoric that earned Rufus Choate respect and praise in his own time, and laurels from the generation that followed. "Forensic rhetoric was the great study of his life," one writer noted.⁶⁸ In his journal Choate confessed that he delighted in adapting "the lessons of the great teachers of rhetoric to the study of the law and of legal eloquence."⁶⁹ He often turned to Quintilian where "he saw how one should determine the point to be tried, and the deciding principle, the means of attack and defence, the prudence of finding where the stress of the case lies." He followed the Roman's advice "to lead the judge or juror, first to wish well to the cause, then to think well of it, but to consider his change of mind as solely the working of his own judgment." Choate's courtroom strategy was thoroughly classical. From the ancient sources he understood "the art of selecting facts, and putting things in the clearest light, how to press an adversary on concession, how in affirmation each strong argument should be separately advanced, and the weaker collected in mass, while in refutation the process should be reversed."⁷⁰

Choate's success as a trial attorney was unrivalled. Indeed, his mastery of the forensic arena was so acclaimed that, as one newspaper said, "it is almost an evidence of guilt to employ him."⁷¹ His speeches displayed his untiring preparation for every case. "He began to study a case the moment it was brought to

66 Brown (1862) 1: 509.

67 Brown (1862) 1: 511. Choate's praise of Webster may be considered as a form of self-praise given the many similarities in the lives of the two men and their particular devotion to oratorical skill. As Choate would have known, this was a typical practice in Roman oratory; for instance, in Plutarch's treatise on self-praise, the cases where *περιαντολογία* should be employed include: praise of others of similar merits and self-praise interwoven with praise of the audience. See Goodwin (1878) 313–314.

68 Thompson (1870) 152.

69 Brown (1862) 1: 70.

70 Kennedy (1899) 118.

71 *The Daily Mirror*, 17 April 1857. Abolitionist orator Wendell Phillips was not fond of Choate's politics, and disagreed that the lawyer's forensic skills should be honoured. "This is Choate," he said, "who made it safe to murder; and of whose health thieves asked before they began to steal" (Phillips [1863] 254).

him," remarked Isaac Thompson, and he continued to study it "till the day of trial."⁷² That preparatory labour produced not only effective, but eloquent jury addresses, efforts that presented the spectacle of "heightened beauty, from the manifest *grasp* of the whole case which every division of the speech showed."⁷³

And yet, as later biographers and critics have realised, "we are hampered in our analysis of Choate's methods by the fact that most of his arguments were neither adequately reported nor written out by him."⁷⁴ A few imperfect trial records remain. Some were printed in newspapers by courtroom reporters and later published in pamphlet editions of court proceedings. Some, also, were summarised and partially reconstructed after the fact by those who had witnessed the forensic triumphs first hand. But, for the most part, no court stenographer recorded Choate's addresses to juries, and critics and historians have been left to "rely on somewhat meagre accounts which have come down to us from various unofficial sources."⁷⁵

At the same time, accounts of two of Choate's more sensational trials were published, and the pamphlet editions included, if not a perfectly corrected text, at least a stenographic report of Choate's closing arguments to the jury. In 1846, Choate successfully defended accused murderer Albert Tirrell, in a case that Parker called "the most famous criminal defence he ever managed."⁷⁶ Tirrell had left his wife and children and taken up with a prostitute named Mary Ann Bickford. The morning after Tirrell had last visited Bickford, she was found with her throat slashed and her room on fire. Tirrell fled to New Orleans but was captured and returned to Boston.

In a dramatic trial, Choate introduced a complex defence argument on two different points of forensic stasis. In the first place, he takes up the issue of fact and argues that it is improbable that his client committed the murder:

Did any human being see him in that house of Lawrence's that night after 9 o'clock? No. Did anyone see him commit a dreadful homicide on the deceased? No. Did anyone see him set fire to that house? No. Did anyone see him with his hands bathed in blood? No. Did anyone see him fly from that house? No.

72 Thompson (1870) 156.

73 Parker (1860) 191.

74 Fuess (1928) 142.

75 Fuess (1928) 142. See also Black (1943) 436 n. 4.

76 Parker (1860) 52.

Moreover, Tirrell had no motive to murder Bickford. He was infatuated with her. "He may have been criminally guilty of the most idolatrous and devoted passion for this most unfortunate woman ... but he cannot be guilty, when at 10 o'clock at night he was asleep in her arms, and yet before 4 o'clock on the morning succeeding, cut her throat from ear to ear."⁷⁷

Choate provided the jury with a more probable explanation: Bickford committed suicide. "She was the very person to have done so – character gone – reputation lost, no friend left in the world – alienated from her husband and home, her hold probably lost on Tirrell... the improbability of getting any more money from Tirrell – she was the person to do it." He explains further that "she had the physical ability and muscular nerve to do it." Moreover, she had previously "threatened to cut her own throat," and "twice was ready to commit self-murder, and actually attempted it twice."⁷⁸

If we consider the Roman system of forensic invention, and in particular the strategy of examining aspects of the case according to the various "attributes" of the action and of the person, then we can recognise Choate's enlistment of that forensic strategy in his address. "All propositions are supported in argument by attributes of persons or of actions," Cicero explains (1.34, 5.10.23–86).⁷⁹ Even in the brief passages above we can see Choate drawing arguments from consideration of place, time, occasion, manner, motive, and consequences of the alleged action. Likewise, and especially regarding the character and circumstances of Mary Bickford, we can see him focus on attributes of the person, her nature, habits, manner of life, feeling, interest, speech, and purpose to afford the jury good reasons to believe that she killed herself.

But Choate's defence strategy also included consideration of a different forensic issue. In addition to addressing the issue of fact, he proposed a theory that spoke to the qualitative issue. Without conceding that his client committed the murder, he nevertheless included a defence plea suggesting the possibility that if the defendant had killed the victim, then he did so while sleep-walking, and so was not culpable. "If the deed was committed by the prisoner," he claimed, "it must have been done while in the somnambulic state."⁸⁰ Choate called on expert medical witnesses who testified to the possibility of a sleepwalker committing a violent act; he also called others who knew his client to have been a sleep-walker from a young age. However, the controversial sleep-walking theory did not figure into the jury's decision. When returning

77 Weeks (1846) 31.

78 Weeks (1846) 32.

79 Hubbell (1976) 71; Butler (1920) 213–249.

80 Weeks (1846) 34.

their “not guilty” verdict, the trial judges affirmed that the somnambulant defence had no part in their deliberation. They were, apparently, convinced by Choate’s arguments that Tirrell was unlikely to have committed the deed.

Another of Choate’s most well-known defence arguments has survived in a pamphlet edition of the sensational 1857 Dalton divorce case. “There have been but few cases tried in our Boston courts,” wrote one observer, “which have excited more wide and rapt interest.”⁸¹ Frank Dalton brought a divorce action against his wife, Helen, on grounds of adultery. Choate appeared as counsel for the wife and defender of the marriage, and delivered an address that one critic believed “takes rank with Cicero’s defence of Milo.”⁸² For Choate, the central fact was that despite her admitted flirtations, Helen Dalton “never came to love young Sumner with that impulsive, absorbing, engrossing love that endangers virtue and conquers shame.”⁸³

In opening the case, Choate develops a solemn and carefully crafted exordium that appeals to the profound responsibility of the jury. It was of extreme importance, he said, that “you should find this young wife, erring, indiscreet, imprudent, forgetful of herself, if it be so, but innocent of the last and greatest crime of a married woman.” It was their duty to consider all the evidence and to decide a most profound question that would have consequences for both the wife and the husband for the remainder of their lives. He recognised that the jury verdict “will never enable her to recall those weeks of folly, and frivolity, and vanity without a blush.” But, he reminded them:

Whether these grave and impressive proceedings shall terminate by sending this young wife from your presence with the scarlet letter upon her brow – whether in this, her morning of life, her name shall be thus publicly stricken from the roll of virtuous women, her whole future darkened by dishonour and waylaid by temptation, her companions driven from her side, herself cast out, it may be, upon common society, the sport of libertines, unassisted by public opinion, or sympathy, or self-respect – this certainly rests with you.⁸⁴

81 Parker (1860) 477.

82 Kennedy (1899) 124.

83 Durant (1857) 10.

84 Durant (1857) 8. Undoubtedly, Choate is following Quintilian’s recommendation regarding the composition and purpose of an exordium, and in particular using the introduction for “making the audience well-disposed, attentive, and ready to receive instruction” (4.1.5); see Butler (1920) 9.

In a masterful argument, Choate also asks the jury to assist the husband in realising that his wife had not been unfaithful. Frank Dalton had initially accepted his wife's protestations of innocence. Choate, therefore, asked the judges to trust a husband,

who knew his wife so much better than we can know her, who knew how pure as an angel she came to his bed, who knew when she spoke the truth, who knew how tenderly she had loved him, who knew so much better than we can know how to probe her, how to practise upon her, how to surprise her into confession – he who had even a chance to watch over her sleep, and hear the revelations of her dreams, – he loved her, and believed her innocent of these charges.⁸⁵

It was now the task of the judges to

render a verdict that shall assure this husband that a jury of Suffolk, men of honour and spirit, some of them his personal friends, believe that he has been the victim of a cruel and groundless jealousy, that they believe that he has been led by that scandal that circulates about him, and has influenced him everywhere, that he has been made to misconceive the nature and over-estimate the extent of the injury his wife has done to him.

In affording such reassurance by their verdict for the wife, “you can thus enable him to see that without dishonour he may again take her to his bosom.” Is it possible, asks Choate, “if any other human being can do another so great a kindness as this”?⁸⁶

Those who had watched Choate in the courtroom understood that this was his standard approach to a challenging forensic case, to make his main appeals and his most eloquent summary of the argument at the opening of his address. In speaking to a jury, he once told an associate, “a speaker makes his impression, if he ever makes it, in the *first hour*, sometimes in the first fifteen minutes; for if he has a proper grasp of his case, he then puts forth the outline of his grounds of argument.”⁸⁷

85 Durant (1857) 11.

86 Durant (1857) 9.

87 Parker (1860) 267; Matthews (1980) 154.

Exhibiting all “his wonderous resources of wit and wisdom, eloquence and pathos,”⁸⁸ Choate won the verdict for his client. In what some critics have considered “the greatest of his many triumphs,” the jury found Helen Dalton innocent of adultery and did not grant the divorce. The couple reconciled, and according to several accounts, were “now living happily together in a distant state.”⁸⁹

This brief study of the exemplary addresses of Rufus Choate demonstrate his mastery in each of the classical genres of rhetoric: deliberative, epideictic, and forensic. But the successful orator must also demonstrate excellence in each of the classical offices or duties of the orator: invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. From the accounts of those who witnessed Choate’s speaking, we have evidence that he indeed possessed that skill and expertise.

Choate’s resourceful and dexterous rhetorical invention was evident in his extensive preparation of all his legal cases and his legislative and commemorative addresses. “In the preparation of a case he left nothing to accident which he could fix by care and labour. In determining a theory of defence, he was endless in suggestions and hypotheses till the one was chosen which seemed impregnable, or at any rate the best that could be found.”⁹⁰ Following the advice of Quintilian, Choate practised making arguments on both sides of every conceivable variety of legal issue. “His mind was at once comprehensive and acute,” observed Samuel Brown. “No judicial question was too enlarged for its vision, and none too minute for its analysis. To the Court he could present arguments learned, logical, and profound, or exquisitely refined and subtle, as the occasion seemed to require.”⁹¹ Indeed, Choate was a “thorough master of logic,” and his arguments were “distinguished by the closeness of reasoning.”⁹² At the same time, he could as easily enlist the sentiments and feelings of his hearers. “He seems to have studied deeply the works of nature, drank often at her fountains, looked much into the heart and mind of man, and goes before his hearers with noble, manly and instructive ideas, drawn from the great fountains of truth and eloquence.”⁹³ He was, said one observer who heard him speak, “the most interesting man for impassioned oratory I ever heard.”⁹⁴ Choate’s courtroom speeches “brought tears to the eyes of even the cool,

88 Cogswell (1884) 430.

89 Kennedy (1899) 124; Parker (1860) 484. For a longer summary of Choate’s two-day argument for Mrs. Dalton, at the end of a three-week trial, see Brown (1862) 1: 222–227.

90 Brown (1862) 1: 293.

91 Brown (1862) 1: 262.

92 Thompson (1870) 157; *Newburyport Herald*, 21 March 1826.

93 *Exeter News-Letter*, 9 September 1844.

94 Neilson (1884) 55.

philosophic members of the bar around him,"⁹⁵ while his epideictic address on the Pilgrims thoroughly moved the audience which was "flooded with tears, a handkerchief at every face; and sighs and sobs souged through the house, like wind in the tree-tops."⁹⁶

Choate also knew the value of careful arrangement of the parts of a speech. After meticulous study of available accounts and summaries of Choate's forensic addresses, John Black concluded that Choate closely followed the classical outline for a forensic case and used the same pattern, with small variations, in most of his addresses to juries. His pleas contained introductory remarks, a narrative of events, a statement of issues, the argumentative proof of the case, and a rebuttal to objections and a conclusion.⁹⁷ "No one who followed the train of his thought," wrote one witness to Choate's speaking, "would be more impressed by the beauty of his oratory than by the clear statement and logical arrangement of his argument."⁹⁸

Choate's style was both effective and memorable, and perhaps the single aspect of his oratory that most impressed his contemporary listeners and the readers of his work in later generations. His style possessed "true nobleness, a touch of imperial grace, such as has been vouchsafed only to the supreme masters of language."⁹⁹ He was fond of "long balanced periods, which almost take one's breath away when read" and believed "that rhetorical and illustrative imagery, employed with taste and judgment, – pictures to the eye and to the mind, – might add to the spirit and force of an argument."¹⁰⁰ Choate was "an indefatigable student of words" and spent time each day studying the dictionary, working on translations from classical languages, memorising Shakespeare, Milton, Bacon and other English authors, or reading English orations by Grattan, Burke, Curran and others.¹⁰¹ "He seemed to use words not exactly to *convey* ideas to his hearers," observed Brown, "but rather to assist and guide their minds in the work of constructing the same ideas that were in his own."¹⁰²

95 *Baltimore Sun*, 5 January 1838.

96 Cogswell (1884) 412.

97 Black (1943) 444–445, 453.

98 "Letter from Emory Washburn" in Neilson (1884) 318.

99 Brown (1862) 1: 298. See also *Salem Gazette*, 25 June 1824; *New Hampshire Sentinel*, 21 August 1844; *Exeter News-Letter*, 9 September 1844.

100 Hill (1896) 155; Neilson (1884) 113.

101 Thompson (1870) 160.

102 Brown (1862) 1: 299.

Choate also cultivated an orator's memory and consistently exhibited "his remarkable power of acquisition and strength of memory."¹⁰³ To his peers at the bar he was known for having a "memory stored with the choicest literature of our own and other languages."¹⁰⁴ His memory was "exact and tenacious. He could generally repeat considerable portions of what he had recently read; was always ready with an apt quotation, and able to correct those who made a wrong one."¹⁰⁵ Whether speaking in Congress, from the platform, or in a courtroom, he prepared his address ahead, writing it out and committing long passages to memory "so that they would flow trippingly from his tongue." As he spoke, "he usually had a large pile of manuscript before him, although he seldom referred to it."¹⁰⁶

What drew the crowds to the galleries in Congress or in the courts, however, was Choate's oratorical performance. His delivery was always dramatic and effective. Like Demosthenes, he considered "action" to be essence of oratory, encompassing "every bodily element of expression of thought – the vocality, the passion, the whole movement."¹⁰⁷ He spoke with a "strength of expression," and "in tones that linger in the memory like the parting sound of a cathedral bell, or the dying note of an organ" with a voice that was "melodious and rich; his articulation was clear; his gestures were in harmony with his speech."¹⁰⁸ Brown relates an account of the power of Choate's masterful oratorical delivery in recalling one of his early speeches in Congress on the subject of a tariff. "There were but few members present when he rose," Brown recalls, "but as he continued to speak, one after another came from the lobbies to the door, stood a moment to listen, were caught and drawn to their seats by the irresistible charm of his mellifluous utterance, till gradually the hall became full, and all, for convenience of hearing, gathered in a circle about the speaker."¹⁰⁹

In all these aspects of the ancient rhetorical art, then, Rufus Choate was an unrivalled master. No other figure of his time, with the exception of Daniel Webster, so eagerly and nobly embodied the persona of the classical orator. But such renown came at a price. From his classical studies, Choate knew that the skills of Demosthenes were "brought to perfection only by the most

103 Cogswell (1884) 406.

104 "Remarks of Mr. Justice Sprague," in Brown (1862) 1: 263. See also *Ohio State Journal*, 26 July 1859.

105 Brown (1862) 1: 300; Cogswell (1884) 388.

106 Fuess (1928) 221; Hill (1896) 154. See also *State Capital Reporter* (Concord, New Hampshire), 30 January 1852.

107 Parker (1860) 351.

108 Whipple (1879) 73; Parker (1860) 162; Fuess (1928) 237.

109 Brown (1862) 1: 34.

patient labor and severe discipline” and that Cicero’s glory had been earned by “careful, unflagging, untiring study and practice.”¹¹⁰ These were the models that inspired Choate, and he himself became the leader of the Boston bar and renowned for his public speaking by his “untiring industry.”¹¹¹ Yet that same program of constant reading, translation, case preparation, literary study, intellectual improvement, and oratorical practice was impossible for all but the rarest of advocates, and the demands of such a program explain why Choate was the last classical orator in America.

It was certain that “no lawyer at the bar ever excelled Mr. Choate in industry” and it was widely recognised that his excellence was won by “the utmost application and the most zealous and judicious devotion to study.”¹¹² Choate’s expectations regarding the education of the orator were classical in origin – and as demanding as those of Quintilian. Unlike most of his contemporaries, even those among the elite professional class, Choate maintained his fluency in Latin and Greek and continued reading and translating classical works until the end of his life.¹¹³ “His ideal of excellence in oratory,” said Neilson, “may have been so high that he never could have fully satisfied his own aspirations.”¹¹⁴ Indeed, a young colleague said that Choate “taught us to nurse that noble self-discontent which points to a loftier region of culture.”¹¹⁵ What did that entail? Choate believed a lawyer must have “daily converse with Cicero and the ancients,” but also “an equally constant and unflagging study of great modern orators.”¹¹⁶ From his wide and deep reading, Choate crafted his oratorical style and acquired a rich fund of anecdotes, illustrations, and information, the material that comes “in complete measure only to him whom reading hath made the full man.”¹¹⁷

But his constant reading, translation, and practice was also thought to have killed him. During his life, Choate suffered greatly from too much study. At Dartmouth, he had “been overworked, and his health broke down towards the close of his senior year.”¹¹⁸ After preparing for an oration, and then expending all his physical energy in the performance, he would collapse in exhaustion.¹¹⁹

110 Thompson (1870) 147.

111 Charles Sumner to Dr. Francis Lieber, February 1842 in Neilson (1884) 410.

112 *Portsmouth Journal of Literature and Politics*, 30 July 1859; *New York Herald*, 25 July 1859.

113 See Hoeflich (2002) 755.

114 Neilson (1884) 61.

115 Letter of James Fields, in Neilson (1884) 300.

116 *Exeter News-Letter*, 9 September 1844; Parker (1860) 251.

117 Proskauer (1928) 343.

118 Cogswell (1884) 391.

119 See Matthews (1980) 63.

When he died in 1859, many observers concluded he had worked himself to death. "Too close attention to his profession is said to have been the cause of his death," said the announcement of his demise in the *Constitution*.¹²⁰ His health, wrote another paper, was "worn out, it was thought, by his gigantic professional labours."¹²¹

When the New York Bar Association met to commemorate the life of Rufus Choate, the gathering of lawyers reflected on the example he had set. They remarked on how he had "reached this enviable elevation by his literary and classical attainments" by his "untiring industry in the study of the law" along with "the assiduous cultivation of eloquence as the art of persuasion." But Choate's professional companions could not bring themselves to recommend the same effort by the next generation of lawyers. "While we can never cease to admire the brilliant reputation" which crowned his efforts, "we cannot forget that it was earned by the labours of anxious days and sleepless nights, by the loss of health, and the premature sacrifice of life itself." They offered a "voice of warning to avoid the perilous extreme" of too much study.¹²² Few, if any, of the courtroom advocates who came after Choate would attempt to match his accomplishments. The example was too daunting, the personal price too demanding. A generation after his death, the standard he had set seemed impossible to meet. "Let no man seek to follow in his footsteps," said Joseph Choate, "unless he is ready to demonstrate, in his own person, that infinite work is the only touchstone of the highest standing in the law."¹²³

It was true that Rufus Choate was "one of the most remarkable men our country has produced."¹²⁴ But by the time of his death, commentators believed that his oratory "belonged to a style that has passed away in Europe and will soon die out in this country."¹²⁵ The legal profession, too, had transformed to meet the demands of a modern industrialised society. While classicism had shaped the American bar in the early republic, its influence had begun to fade by mid-century. "By 1844," Robert Ferguson explains, "more specialised standards of professionalism existed," and by 1850, Choate was "the last lawyer in America to trace his success to the systematic study and application of classical eloquence."¹²⁶ Thus, although his friends saw him as "the greatest advocate whom the New World has produced" and as one worthy of joining the "splendid

120 *Constitution* (Washington, D.C.), 16 July 1859.

121 *Mirror and Farmer*, 23 July 1859.

122 *New York Herald*, 25 July 1859.

123 J.H. Choate (1911) 14–15.

124 Whipple (1879) 93.

125 Anonymous (1860) 62.

126 Ferguson (1984) 26, 79.

galaxy” of ancient Greek and Roman orators, Rufus Choate was also the last classical orator in America.¹²⁷

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Metaphors in Rhetoric: From Ancient Greek to 21st-Century Politics

Jakub Filonik

As the various disciplines of human enquiry gained their independence over the centuries ... the study of metaphor survived as a curiosity in some and disappeared as irrelevant in others. There was but one discipline in which the study of metaphor was central – rhetoric.

ORTONY (1993) 2



This statement from a book called *Metaphor and Thought* may be surprising to anyone used to studying metaphor as primarily a stylistic, “ornamental” device, more appropriate to poetry than discourse. Some stylistic views of this kind came down to us from classical antiquity, but the ideas inherited from Greek and Roman rhetorical tradition on this matter are much more complex than has often been assumed. Almost a century ago William Bedell Stanford, later a Regius Professor of Greek at Dublin, wrote that “no verbal process is more common and more basic in speech and literature than metaphor,” annoyed with how the expression “this is a metaphorical use” kept serving classicists as an excuse to “evade vital questions of basic meaning.”¹ This chapter shows that this tendency was not always the case and the “cognitive” component is well rooted in ancient Greek theorising on metaphor.

1 Stanford (1936) 1. For a good recent overview of metaphor in Aristotle and later tradition, see Novokhatko (2014).

1 The Ancient Theories of Metaphor

The first to discuss the idea of metaphor was Isocrates in the 4th century BCE, presenting a register of stylistic devices available to poets (*Evagoras* 8–9). Judging from the compound and its later sense, by *metaphorai* he meant those used in the process of “transferring” (*meta-pherein*) meaning from one concept to another.² Isocrates considers them to have a place among other ornaments (*kosmoi*) accessible to poets in their fanciful creative endeavours. He explicitly rejects the idea that prose writers (notably orators), in constant need of being precise with words and neglectful of metrical elegance, could gain similar access to this linguistic repertoire, and should only resort to “civil terms,” or those in everyday usage (9.10: *ta politika onomata*).

Aristotle is usually credited with the standard Greek definition of metaphor.³ In his *Poetics*, he first defines *metaphora* in a rather dry way as “the application of a noun which properly applies to something else,” noting that the transfer may be “from genus to species, from species to genus, or by analogy” (21, 1457b, trans. Heath [1996]). He thus seems to include under one umbrella term what is now commonly distinguished as (1) metaphor, (2) metonymy, and (3) analogy (and in *Rh.* 3.11.6–15, 1412a–13a, he even calls riddles, similes, proverbs and hyperboles “metaphors”).⁴ He further notes that a skilled command of this device, dependent on the ability to see resemblances between things and to coin new meanings, is the mark of a true creative genius, as it cannot be learnt from others (*Poet.* 22, 1459a, cf. *Rh.* 3.2.8, 1405a).⁵ And it is from such skilful poets, thanks to their own inventive metaphors, that one can learn the most in the easiest and most pleasant way possible: “metaphor brings about learning (*mathēsis*) most of all,” says the philosopher (*Rh.* 3.10.2, 1410b, cf. 3.11.6, 1412a), adding that metaphor should ideally “bring things before the eyes” and “make the lifeless things living” (*Rh.* 3.10.6–11.2, 1410b–11b, trans. adapted

2 Cf. Zanker (2017) 164–190 on the spatial metaphor implicit in the term *metaphora*.

3 See Stanford (1936) on metaphor in the classical rhetorical tradition (and late 19th to early 20th-century linguistics).

4 Aristotle considers “metaphor by analogy” to be one of four kinds of metaphor. Nowadays, analogy is usually believed to be an association of markedly similar concepts (from one conceptual domain), as opposed to metaphor that links concepts from different domains: see Vosniadou and Ortony (1989); Lloyd (1966). Metonymy allows reference to a certain thing by its particular characteristic or close association, such as a part for the whole (synecdoche) or object for subject; how often this process is metaphorical in nature is subject to lively scholarly debate, see Lakoff and Johnson (1980) 35–40; Barcelona (2000); Dirven and Pörrings (2003); Nagy (2015).

5 Cf. Mahon (1999), who rightly notes the difference between the usage of metaphors and the coining of new ones, as discussed by Aristotle in his *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*.

from Kennedy [2007]). He also notes that using metaphors is similar to philosophising, since both are based on perceiving – and perhaps reflecting on – similarities in different yet (not obviously) related things (*Rh.* 3.11.5, 1412a, cf. *Poet.* 22, 1459a).⁶

More importantly, however, Aristotle lists metaphor in the *Poetics* as distinct from purely ornamental expressions, Isocratean *kosmoi*,⁷ and in the *Rhetoric* notes that of all stylistic devices – *pace* Isocrates – only metaphor can bring benefit to prose because it is used by *everyone* in conversation. He then gives numerous examples of good metaphors made by public speakers, including Athenian generals (*Poet.* 21, 1457b; 22, 1459a, *Rh.* 3.2.6, 1404b; 3.10.7, 1411a–b, most likely responding to the Isocratean ideas).⁸ This concept of the ubiquity of metaphor is echoed in Demetrius' treatise *On Style*, of unknown date, which acknowledges that metaphors are so commonly used in everyday discourse that hardly anyone notices them (86). Demetrius – an otherwise unknown author – explains that metaphor allows a voice to be called “clear” (*leukē*, lit. “bright”) or a character “harsh” (*trachy*), which are expressions of a metaphorical nature that nonetheless pass unnoticed as if they were proper terms (*kyrioi*) precisely because they are so common (86–87). Not only, then, does metaphor help people conceptualise meaning through literary creativity, it is also the phenomenon that occurs most naturally in everyday speech. This is important because modern cognitive theories of metaphor often present their findings as opposed to the entire classical tradition and create a straw-man argument based on selections from *Poetics* to suggest that Aristotle is to blame for the strictly literary approach to metaphor.⁹

Yet this elaborate view of the role of metaphor in human life, emerging from early Greek literary theory, was somewhat unexpectedly obliterated by Roman rhetoricians. Cicero, in his treatise-dialogue *On the Orator* from the mid-1st century BCE, has Crassus claim that metaphor (*translatio*) is used primarily for pleasure, should be limited to a single word to be grasped properly, and has to be considered secondary to simile (*De or.* 3.155–159, similarly *Orator*, 92;

6 See also Stanford (1936) 29 on this definition.

7 By this word, he might have meant epithets, cf. Stanford (1936) 7.

8 The pseudo-Aristotelian *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, of unknown authorship but possibly written soon after Aristotle (often ascribed to Anaximenes of Lampsacus), sadly has very little to say about metaphor (cf. [Arist.] *Rh. Al.* 23, 1434b).

9 See, e.g., Lakoff and Johnson (1980) 190–193, Ortony (1993) 3; Black (1993) 22; Lakoff (1993) 202. But see Swiggers (1984); Wierzbicka (1986); Kirby (1997); and Mahon (1999) on Aristotle's theories of metaphor with reference to modern cognitive ones and the criticism of the dichotomic separation of Lakoff and Johnson's theory from all earlier tradition.

contra Aristotle).¹⁰ He notes that even peasants use metaphors (155), and adds that it often made him wonder why everyone seems to enjoy metaphors and strange words more than proper and regular terms (159). At least Cicero makes the attempt to understand this curiosity by discussing metaphors' appeal to sensual experiences; but he also suggests one should keep them modest and signal their use by apologising for the expression first (160–168), in which he seems to be following Theophrastus' and the Rhodian school's rhetorical theories (both mostly lost).¹¹ He also dismisses the topic of the invention of more creative metaphors as unnecessary (156).

It seems, however, that it was Quintilian who put the final nail in metaphor's metaphorical coffin by claiming that it is a mere "ornament" that "adorns" language (*Inst.* 8.6.4–18), thus taking metaphor theory back to square one for the subsequent millennia.¹² His treatise, setting new rules for the more docile rhetoric of the Roman Empire, proved to be very influential, but earlier republican tradition offered more complex explanations. One of the earliest surviving rhetorical treatises in Latin (ca. 85 BCE?),¹³ the anonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, repeats Aristotle's definition of "bringing things before the eyes" and praises a good number of the benefits emerging from the use of metaphor, including conveying things more clearly, saying something more concisely, using a euphemism, underscoring or downplaying the matter in question, or – lastly – embellishing speech (4.45). This concept seems to have had no impact on the later Latin theorising on this matter, but the treatise itself was widely read in antiquity and the modern era, not least owing to its mistaken attribution to the incessantly popular Cicero, despite some doubts in this matter expressed already in 1470.¹⁴

Finally, we are lucky to have access to the Greek treatise *On Invention*, surviving under the name of Hermogenes but probably by an author living in the 3rd or 4th century CE, revised as late as the 5th or 6th, and based on the

10 Part of §157 has sometimes been excluded by editors, but McCall (1969) makes a case for its authenticity.

11 See Innes (2003) 17; Calboli (2007); and Novokhatko (2014).

12 For a more nuanced reading of Quintilian's metaphor theory, see Novokhatko (2017).

13 See Winkel (1979) on the dating and the influence of the Aristotelian *Nicomachean Ethics* on the treatise; Cicero's *De inventione* probably predates it by a few years but has nothing to say on metaphor. On the term *metaphora* and Greek influences in Latin stylistic texts before Quintilian, see Novokhatko (2016).

14 Cf. Skinner (2014) on Shakespeare's use of *Ad Herennium* (together with Cicero's and Quintilian's treatises) and its popularity during the Renaissance and in Tudor England. See p. 30 on the first published doubts about its authenticity.

mid-2nd century rhetorical theory of the Second Sophistic.¹⁵ This anonymous rhetorician writes that metaphor is “a matter of using a word whose signification (*sēmantikon*) is not derived from the subject matter at hand but from something else, but which can be applied in common to the subject and a subject brought to light from elsewhere” (which he himself calls *tropē* but which he says grammarians call *metaphora*) (4.10, trans. Kennedy [2005]), one of the most elaborate “semantic” definitions of metaphor surviving from antiquity.¹⁶ Its wording strikingly resembles modern cognitive theories of metaphor and conceptual integration.¹⁷

In *On Types of Style* (*Περὶ ἰδεῶν λόγου* 248),¹⁸ Hermogenes proper (often – but not unarguably – identified with Hermogenes of Tarsus of 2nd century CE)¹⁹ shows good knowledge of the Attic orators and their use of metaphor, but warns that one has to be cautious with strong “metaphorical expressions” (*tropikai lexeis*), such as the Demosthenic “they were hamstrung” (Dem. 13.31), “he sold himself” (19.16), or “he mugged Greece” (9.22), since, instead of being solemn (*semnai*) and grandiose, these can make a speech too harsh, or even – if one is not Demosthenes – “coarse and vulgar” (trans. Wooten [1987]). Aristotle, to the contrary, criticised some unfitting metaphors either as laughable or, indeed, too solemn (*semmen agan*) and tragic (*Rh.* 3.3.4, 1406b), which his later counterpart, with different stylistic taste, apparently favoured.²⁰ Hermogenes also notes that metaphors make speech vivid but *not* beautiful, which is why Isocrates avoided them (229, 248–249, 289–299).²¹ Even more importantly, he advises speakers to use metaphors that are “hardly noticed” by the audience (248: *oude emphainetai*), showing how far from Isocrates the later Greek rhetorical theory came in this respect and how independent it was from the Latin tradition.

15 See Kennedy (2005) xv–xvi; cf. Patillon (2010) 13–17.

16 See Patillon (2010) 314–319 for the discussion of this passage and theory.

17 On conceptual integration (or conceptual blending), see Fauconnier and Turner (2002).

18 Passage numbers given here are page numbers of Rabe’s Teubner edition, also used in Wooten’s translation (not to be confused with Rabe’s marginal passage numbers based on Walz’s and Spengel’s editions of Greek rhetorical texts).

19 See Kennedy (2005) xiii, n. 1.

20 See Vatri (2018) on psycholinguistic approaches to reconstructing the stylistic taste of ancient Greek speakers.

21 Cf. Stanford (1936) 14–15.

2 Metaphor and Persuasion

It is no secret to us today that metaphors are encountered in our lives in everyday speech, and various metaphor theories from Gertrude Buck's (1899)²² through I.A. Richards' (1936) and Max Black's (1954) to Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) have all tried to encapsulate this basic feature. With the latter work, the most influential modern branch of metaphor research began, known as cognitive theories of metaphor or conceptual metaphor theory, with further studies helping contextualise it and redefine its place in culture and discourse.²³ Metaphors are also most prominently present in political rhetoric, even annoyingly so when speakers make too abundant use of them. Linguists have now developed new methods of analysing them more systematically, including critical metaphor analysis (Charteris-Black [2011], [2018]), metaphor scenarios (Musolff 2016b), metaphor identification through corpus queries (Charteris-Black [2004]; Deignan [2005]; Krennmayr and Steen [2017]), and measuring the impact of metaphorical framing through experimental studies (Thibodeau and Boroditsky [2013]; Steen, Reijnders, and Burgers [2014]; Reuchamps, Dodeigne, and Perrez [2018]). In fact, the interest in metaphor has grown in recent decades to such an extent that as early as 1978 a literary critic, Wayne Booth, wondered if by the year 2039 "there will be more students of metaphor than people."²⁴

These studies, both experimental and developing new theoretical methods, are important because they point to a constructive intersection where (rhetorical) theory meets (discursive) practice. At the beginning of his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle urges that a good speech must adapt its style, order, and delivery to the circumstances,²⁵ but most of all has to persuade people (3.1, 1403b). And where he criticises some metaphors used by speakers, it is because they are ill fitting and thus "unpersuasive" (*apithana*, *Rh.* 3.3.4, 1406b). This is much in line with what modern theories have to say on the way metaphor works in discourse, even if they have much more to add. More curiously, Cicero and Quintilian made use of the Peripatetic philosophers in their theorising, while Cicero's own political speeches drew heavily on Demosthenes and employed

22 On which see Mehlenbacher and Harris (2017).

23 See an overview of current methodologies in studying metaphors in political rhetoric in Musolff (2016a).

24 Booth (1978) 49.

25 On delivery in Athenian oratory, see Hall (1995); Serafim (2017) 28–31, 113–136; and essays in Kremmydas, Powell, and Rubinstein (2013) and Papaioannou, Serafim, and da Vela (2017).

many metaphors in doing so.²⁶ In fact, almost all Quintilian's examples of well-applied metaphors come from Cicero.²⁷ It is thus surprising that both authors were so eager to deny metaphor its persuasive power in their treatises on rhetoric. Some of this must have been a matter of cultural aesthetics and social norms, including Roman concepts of *mores*, *decorum*, and publicly voiced rigour, as well as the more rigid rules of using educated Latin.²⁸

Metaphor was certainly a vital – and often contested and renegotiated – element of rhetorical practice in classical Greece, as some of the examples in this chapter demonstrate.²⁹ It does not always seem viable to trace which of these metaphors survived in the history of rhetoric through the continuation of their ancient prototypes and which tend to be universally conceived. Some, such as the “ship of state,” were firmly grounded in Greek cultural experience at least since archaic times and the earliest surviving Greek literary texts, and begin their journey through rhetoric with the Greeks.³⁰ Whatever the source of others, it is useful to remember that the classical education of many ancient and modern public speakers was based on knowledge of Demosthenes and Cicero (the former popular throughout antiquity, the latter in educated circles during the Middle Ages),³¹ not least their rhetorical use of metaphor.³² This did not always go hand in hand with an appreciation of their metaphorical language, particularly in the periods when popular assemblies and popular rhetoric were looked down upon. A good example of this wariness from

26 For example, *struma civitatis* (“a plague on the civil community”) in *Pro Sestio* 135, on which see La Bua (2019) 254–255. Cf. Lavan (2013) and Ando (2015) on metaphorical conceptualisations in Roman political thinking.

27 Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.4–18, cf. La Bua (2019) 273. On Quintilian's use of the terms *metaphora* and *translation*, see Novokhatko (2017).

28 Cf. Stanford (1936) 106–107.

29 For more detailed studies of metaphors in the speeches of Athenian orators, see Wohl (2009) and (2010) on political metaphors and metonymies in selected forensic speeches of Demosthenes and Lysias; Cook (2012) on Demosthenes' and Aeschines' rival use of metaphorical concepts; Kosch (2017) on Demosthenes' conscious break with Isocrates' views on metaphor; and Filonik (2017) on the role of civic metaphors in Lycurgus. See also Cairns (2014) on Homer's and Plato's metaphors of *psychē* and *thymos* and (2017) on emotion metaphors in tragedy.

30 On the “ship of state” metaphor, see Brock (2013) 53–67.

31 See Pernot (2006), Canevaro (2018), and Canfora (2019) on the ancient and Byzantine reception of Demosthenes and Blanshard (2019) on the modern. On the reception of Cicero, see essays in Steel (2013) and Altman (2015); see Murphy (1981) 106–123 and Ward (2015) on his mediaeval reception; cf. Skinner (2014) 25–33 on Cicero, Quintilian, and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (ascribed to Cicero at that time) as major components of the rhetorical education in Tudor England.

32 See La Bua (2019) 274 on the importance of imitating Cicero's metaphors in speakers' education.

English history would be Samuel Parker, the bishop of Oxford and father of the famous writer and translator, who in 1670 attempted to introduce an act of Parliament banning “fulsome and luscious” metaphors, incidentally confirming their power.³³

The presence of a metaphorical layer in some of the examples quoted below should be clear without much explanation. In the case of others, some knowledge of how metaphors have been studied by linguists since the 1980s might prove useful. Lakoff and Johnson (1980), in their conceptual metaphor theory (CMT), define metaphor as understanding one *conceptual domain* in terms of another, in a surprisingly similar vein to their forefather Hermogenes (even if they fail to acknowledge it). Among its principles, it postulates the existence of some basic conceptual structures called *image schemas*, based on the qualitative analysis of numerous metaphors and the deduction that much metaphorical thinking derives from human bodily experience (*embodiment*). The most important schemas are usually distinguished as *containers*, *paths*, *forces*, *balance*, and *links*.³⁴ Their objective existence has been questioned, but they prove useful as overarching notions in analysing the predominant conceptual domains from which metaphors take their language and meaning. CMT also argues that metaphors operate by highlighting certain aspects of concepts while downplaying others, not that far from what we learn from the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (4.45). The significance of metaphors in discourse, however, as opposed to their more universal aspects rooted in human biology, has been only fully explored in later studies, and their role in rhetoric is also the focus of the overview to follow, without any claims to comprehensiveness.³⁵

3 Containers and Structures

The focus here is on specific metaphors and their uses in rhetoric, rather than on schemas, but one schema – that of CONTAINER, based on spatial relations between the human body and surrounding objects – is given extra attention. This schema allows us to imagine abstract notions or unconfined entities in relation to a limited physical space, such as a house or a box. This can prove useful in political rhetoric, when states, associations, political systems, or their constitutive parts are metaphorically presented as *vessels*, in which

33 See Chilton (1996) 2; see also Musolff (2016a) 309.

34 On image schemas in more detail, see Hampe and Grady (2005).

35 For more examples (and comparisons) of ancient and modern metaphors, see Filonik (2018), with further bibliography.

things or ideas are placed, or as *structures*, with abstract concepts imagined as their architectural elements. For example, when in *On the False Embassy* Demosthenes tries to emphasise the importance of giving public speeches based on truth in democratic deliberation, he says (19.184):

οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔσθ' ὃ τι μείζον ἂν ὑμᾶς ἀδικήσειέ τις ἢ ψευδῇ λέγων. οἷς γὰρ ἔστ' ἐν λόγοις ἢ πολιτεία, πῶς, ἂν οὗτοι μὴ ἀληθεῖς ὦσιν, ἀσφαλῶς ἔστι πολιτεύεσθαι; ἂν δὲ δὴ καὶ πρὸς ἃ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς συμφέρει δῶρά τις λαμβάνων λέγῃ, πῶς οὐχὶ καὶ κινδυνεύετε;

There is no greater crime someone could commit against you than to speak false words. For how could people *whose government is based on speeches* govern themselves securely unless the speeches are true? And if someone is bribed to speak in support of policies that favour the enemy, how does that not also put you at risk?

Trans. adapted from YUNIS (2005)

Recognising that there is something figurative in the speaker's wording is immediate, but some help from the cognitive perspective may help us understand how it operates. This is not to say that the Greek here is unambiguous. The clause οἷς ἔστ' ἐν λόγοις ἢ πολιτεία can be understood either as (1) "those for whom the state (or state administration) is *placed in* words (or public speeches)" or (2) "those for whom the state (state administration) *rests upon* words (public speeches)."³⁶ In sense (1), the Greek preposition *en* should be read as "in," a *container* metaphor that makes public speeches themselves an underlying structure, into which the state is placed as an object, while in (2), it should be understood as "on" or "at," a *structure* metaphor, with speeches conceptualised as fundaments, that is the supportive part of the state's architecture (the latter being seen as the main structure). We might learn more about modern conceptual thinking about the state than what Demosthenes thought of it from the fact that recent English translations of the speech prefer variant (2) as the right way to render the Greek expression here, with the state seen as the paramount edifice.³⁷

36 Literally, the entire sentence runs as follows: "How can it be safe for those for whom state administration is placed in (based on) public speeches to run their state, if the speeches are not truthful?"

37 See both D.M. MacDowell ("is based on words") and H. Yunis ("is based on speeches"). But R. Waterfield goes for "depends on words," with the state conceptualised as a pendulous object hanging down from words perceived as something solid. The secondary,

Whichever of the two possibilities we prefer, the government “placed in” or “relying on” speeches is presented as a fragile object, contingent on the truthfulness of political rhetoric and the goodwill of the speakers, particularly with its independence endangered by a foreign force powerful enough to make it collapse.³⁸ According to the orator, it appears as such to all citizens taking part in public deliberation in a democracy and making their decisions based on the speeches delivered at the assembly.³⁹ With reference to this, Demosthenes soon uses another metaphor by saying that whoever wastes time and delays or neglects public decision-making in such a constitution, “simply *breaks off* the city’s policies” (19.186: τὰ πράγμαθ’ ἀπλῶς ἀφήρηται).⁴⁰ Not very far from this is Lycurgus who claims that the ephebic oath is “what *holds* democracy *together*,” or “keeps it from falling apart” (1.79: τὸ συνέχον τὴν δημοκρατίαν), trying to convey the idea that the constitution of Athens is a set of dispersed building elements from which the state is “combined” and which need to be kept together by the oath as a binding construction material (these elements are the magistrate, the judge, and the private citizen).⁴¹

This conceptualisation highlights the importance of each of these elements to the well-being and survival of the entire construction. Yet Lycurgus was not the first speaker in Athens to make use of this metaphor rhetorically. Andocides portrayed the oath (1.9) and Demosthenes the courts (24.2) as such a “binding material” – thus extolling their significance – in the larger *structure* of the Athenian polity (again conceived as a structure, but metaphorically framed with reference to the *link* and *force* schemas). But pointing out the fragile *foundations* of a structure does not have to be a call for more consideration, as it was in Demosthenes’ “state in speeches” example.

In the beginning of the so-called Long Telegram, US diplomat George Kennan, when outlining the proposed American policy towards Soviet Russia, stated that “Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form, *fragile* and *artificial* in its psychological *foundations*”

instrumental meaning of *en* seems to be inferred from this basic, locative sense (referring to an area or confined space): see Luraghi (2003) 82–94.

38 On the “logocentricity” of Athenian polity and the orators’ rhetoric based on such argumentation, see also Hesk (2000) 163–179; cf. Ober (1989) 156–191.

39 On the language of this passage, see Paulsen (1999) 201.

40 Cf. Dem. 15.30–33 for similar political ideas expressed through a whole set of different metaphors. See also Aeschin. 3.253, where Aeschines calls Demosthenes a pirate in his public activities, sailing through the state on mere words (or speeches, whose surface allows the movement, that is the politician’s “progression” in the state, a metaphor coined on the basis of the *path* schema).

41 Lyc. 1.79: τρία γὰρ ἔστιν ἐξ ᾧν ἡ πολιτεία συνέστηκεν, ὁ ἄρχων, ὁ δικαστής, ὁ ιδιώτης. Cf. Brock (2013) 165 on similar imagery in the orators.

compared with the fundamental strength and stability of contemporary Western countries.⁴² Such conceptions of the state and its institutions have often been used to communicate meaning in politics, with the “state is a building” (often a house) metaphor occurring almost ubiquitously in modern rhetoric and public discourse.⁴³ Winston Churchill, referring to the newly founded United Nations Organisation in his “Sinews of Peace” speech (1946), urged that its foundation required action, not mere words, and claimed – with a biblical reference – that it should be a “true *temple* of peace,” built “not upon shifting sands or quagmires, but *upon the rock*.”⁴⁴ In quite a different context, Donald Trump in his 2017 Inaugural Address made use of the “state is a structure” metaphor, mentioning “a great national effort to *rebuild our country*,” with emphasis as much on construction as on ownership.⁴⁵

In post-war Poland, on 18 June 1945 the future Communist Party leader Władysław Gomułka declared that the communists “were offering a *place in their house*” to the Polish democratic leaders residing in the UK. This was soon explained as “a place in the government” and “being *joint householders* of Poland” (showing that he took the “country” to mean the “government” and vice versa).⁴⁶ A more inclusive version of the “our house” metaphor – focused on both the collective effort in the building process and on the shared space – can be found in Jawaharlal Nehru’s rhetoric, attempting to put end to the fighting in an ethnically and religiously divided country. In a speech full of metaphors, now commonly labelled “Tryst with Destiny,” delivered on the eve of the proclamation of India’s independence, he urged: “We have to *build the*

42 George Kennan, “The Long Telegram” (1946), full text in Wilson Center Digital Archive, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/u16178.pdf>; cf. Chilton (1996) 142.

43 See the general remarks on this metaphor in Chilton and Lakoff (1995) 53–54. See Brock (2013) 25–42 on Greek imagery.

44 Winston Churchill, “Sinews of Peace” (speech, Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, 5 March 1946), America’s National Churchill Museum, <https://www.nationalchurchillmuseum.org/sinews-of-peace-iron-curtain-speech.html>. The phrase quoted is most likely a reference to the New Testament, Mt. 16:18 (“and upon this rock I will build my church”). Churchill’s full quote runs: “Before we cast away the solid assurances of national armaments for self-preservation we must be certain that our temple is built, not upon shifting sands or quagmires, but upon the rock.”

45 Donald Trump, “Inaugural Address” (speech, Washington, D.C., 20 January 2017), full text at CNN, <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/20/politics/trump-inaugural-address/index.html>. See Filonik (2018) 26–27 on ancient and modern *ownership* metaphors in politics.

46 See Władysław Gomułka, “Władzy raz zdobytej nie oddamy nigdy” (speech, Moscow, 18 June 1945), Przemówienia.com, <http://www.przemowienia.com/kategorie/przemowienia-znanych-osob/wladyslaw-gomulka-wladzy-raz-zdobytej-nie-oddamy-nigdy/411-wladyslaw-gomulka-wladzy-raz-zdobytej-nie-oddamy-nigdy>, trans. mine.

noble mansion of free India where *all her children may dwell*" (and alluded to Gandhi as "the architect of this freedom").⁴⁷

Concepts such as this can be found in the rhetoric of virtually all modern states, as they are also commonly present in language and have the potential to influence people's thinking. The famous "iron curtain" metaphor was coined in 1945, long before the first bricks were laid for what was to become the Berlin Wall in 1961 – the phrase first used by Goebbels about the forthcoming Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe (*ein eiserner Vorhang*), then by Churchill (together with the "iron fence" expression).⁴⁸ In the Western world it was soon endowed with a symbolic significance, that of permanent separation of the East from the West, either through the claims of the Soviets' conscious separatism or in the urging for even more "containment."⁴⁹

Perhaps the most famous metaphorical notion from the conceptual domain of "house," used and reframed in discourse year by year, is that of the *common European house*, prevalent in the Cold War rhetoric of the 1980s (*cold war* itself being Walter Lippmann's metaphorical coinage from 1947).⁵⁰ In 1981, Leonid Brezhnev first used the "common house" idea in a speech given in Bad Godesberg, and Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko made it more explicit in January 1983 in Bonn when he said that "both the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union live *in one European house, under one roof*," metaphorically presenting the geopolitical space of Europe as a shared dwelling.⁵¹ As Paul Chilton has discussed in his book on Cold War security metaphors, the timing was no accident, since Gromyko's choice of words was meant to serve a particular political agenda: the USSR's intervention in the German election campaign at the time when Germany was expecting a consignment of nuclear missiles, about to be deployed under the decision of NATO in response to a similar move by the USSR (one protested against by Western Germany's opposition leaders and part of the populace).⁵²

But it was under Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership that the "common European house" metaphor really caught everyone's attention, as soon as he started using it publicly during his frequent visits to the West after taking office

47 Jawaharlal Nehru, "Speech on the Granting of Indian Independence" (speech, 14 August 1947), Internet History Sourcebooks Project, <https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1947nehru.asp>.

48 See Chilton (1996) 163–164.

49 See Chilton (1996) 164 on the implications of the "iron curtain" metaphor, and pp. 190–247 on the American "containment" policy in Cold War international relations.

50 See Schäffner (1996) 33–34; Chilton (1996) 251–323.

51 See Chilton (1996) 264.

52 Chilton (1996) 264–265.

in 1985; it became popular in 1987, with his subsequent speeches and his book *Perestroika*, reflecting the “new political thinking” in the USSR.⁵³ While it is impossible to tell the extent to which his original answer was altered in the Soviet newspaper *Pravda* (“Truth,” ironically known for its blatant lies and pro-government propaganda), it reported him saying in a television interview in France: “We live in a single house (*dom*), although some go into that house from one entrance, others from another entrance.”⁵⁴ Yet this metaphorical expression did not go uncontested for long.

What Gorbachev referred to here – and kept repeating later – was a typical large, multi-storey Soviet apartment block, with separate single-family apartments, but also with certain shared rules of conduct and neighbourly interaction (and, in the idealised model, cooperation). But this was not the way his expression was read in Western European countries, used to the prototypical stand-alone house in private ownership and usually occupied by only close relatives, with no similar shared space but with free movement between all its constitutive parts, the kind of house where communist and capitalist cousins could hardly live together.⁵⁵ The rendering of his words in other languages as “home,” due to the ambiguity of the Russian (and generally Slavonic) word *dom*, certainly did not help to clear up such first impressions.

For the Soviet leader, it seems that the metaphor was originally a non-hostile way of shifting away from the Brezhnev doctrine of interventionism in the Soviet sphere of influence and opening up to the West without dismantling the entire international order, but in Western Europe his conceptual framework gave rise to rival interpretations and a lively discussion of possible implications, including various aspects of relations between the USSR, Western Europe, and the USA, as well as the future reunification of Germany.⁵⁶ It was also constantly questioned and creatively reframed in discourse, with the emphasis on the structural elements of such a house, as apparent from a commentary in *The Economist* from October 1987:⁵⁷

Despite much Russian and East German talk about the “*shared house of Europe*,” old European fears are plainly far from disappearing (Poles like to point out that *the shared European house* is the one where they have to lie in the corridor and get trodden on).

53 See Chilton (1996) 270; Schäffner (1996) 33–34.

54 Chilton (1996) 266.

55 On the original meaning and reception of this metaphor, see Chilton (1996) 265–275; Schäffner (1996) 34.

56 See Chilton (1996) 269–270.

57 *The Economist*, 31 October 1987; quoted by Schäffner (1996) 34 (her emphasis).

Commentators also questioned whether all Europeans could “live happily under one roof,” when “Europe is still a pair of *semi-detached houses*” and is separated by a wall,⁵⁸ based – again – on a different understanding of the concept in question, which Soviet officials tried to address in further discussion of their idea of a *house*.⁵⁹ Such ongoing reinterpretations provided a safe way of discussing intimidating subjects in the years 1987–1989, such as the future fate of the divided city of Berlin or of the German state(s).⁶⁰ Paul Chilton has even argued that this long-lasting discourse, focused around house metaphors between Soviet and German (and other western European) politicians, prepared the way for a more material reinterpretation of existing structures, eventually leading to the tearing down of the Berlin Wall since 9 November 1989 and the collective reopening of the Brandenburg Gate on 22 December, followed by visa-free movement between both sides of Berlin and of Germany.⁶¹

After years of contested concepts surrounding the “common house” and after such a definite conclusion of this particular international debate, similar metaphors in the early 1990s tended to focus more on the *architecture* of the new European order, with the single market as its *foundation* or NATO as its *supporting pillar*, than on its resemblance to a house.⁶² But the house metaphor made its return soon enough in the debates about Europe, reflecting and potentially influencing the ways in which it was envisaged. For instance, Britain and Germany portrayed each other in their rhetoric as a problematic “neighbour” for others, in addition to the broader “structure” metaphor being present in these debates (e.g., one of the presidents of the European Commission being called the “architect of the modern European Community”), as discussed in more detail by Andreas Musolff.⁶³

In 1997, Chancellor Helmut Kohl defended the euro by saying it was the *weight-bearing pillar* of the *European house*.⁶⁴ Around the same time, *The Times* went back to the Maastricht Treaty’s “three *pillars* of integration” when it pointed to “*cracks* opening up between France and Germany, the *pillars* of ‘the European construction.’”⁶⁵ And in the UK, the monetary union itself was criticised by the Conservative opposition leader William Hague as “a building

58 E.g., *The Economist*, 23 April 1988; see Schäffner (1996) 34 and Chilton (1996) 304–308.

59 See Chilton (1996) 272.

60 Cf. Chilton (1996) 271, 305–308.

61 Chilton (1996) 308.

62 See Chilton (1996) 300–304, 348–354, 357–389, 395–396; cf. Schäffner (1996) 39–40.

63 Musolff (2000).

64 Musolff (2000) 222.

65 *The Times*, 17 June 1997, quoted in Musolff (2000) 22.

without fire-escapes” and a “burning building with no exits.”⁶⁶ The general “construction” metaphors, and specific ones from the domain of “house,” thus kept supplementing each other in both praise and criticism of new European policies. It is illustrative what Margaret Thatcher wrote about the intricacies of such discourse from a Eurosceptic perspective in 1993: “anyone dealing with the European Community *should pay careful attention to metaphors*. We in Britain were inclined to minimise their significance ... We had to learn the hard way that by agreement to what were apparently empty generalisations or vague aspirations we were later held to have committed ourselves to *political structures* which were contrary to our interests.”⁶⁷

The conceptual domain of “house” also played a crucial role in 20th-century American political discourse, not least in the portrayal of Central and South American “neighbours.” In the tensions of the Cold War, one of the metaphors that came to the fore was that of the “backyard,” based on the central place of individual home ownership in North American culture.⁶⁸ But in politics, this concept served to support the idea of imperialistic spheres of dominion as something that is rightfully *possessed*. When in the 1980s US President Ronald Reagan urged support for the right-wing terrorist guerrilla groups in Nicaragua, he insisted that anything short of this would send “an unmistakable signal that the greatest power in the world is unwilling and incapable of stopping communist aggression *in our own backyard*.”⁶⁹

More curiously, this thinking survived the Cold War and returned under President Bill Clinton, who, with reference to the consequences of a *coup d'état* in Haiti, supported the US military intervention in 1994 by saying in an unscripted interview: “the United States has an interest, it seems to me, in the post-Cold War world in not letting dictators break their word to the United States and to the United Nations, especially *in our own backyard*.”⁷⁰ Keith Shimko has argued that in addition to individual ownership, in American thinking the concept of “backyard” evokes another one, that of family relations at home with children playing in the backyard of the house and parents watching over them – in connection with the visual imagery of Uncle Sam keeping an eye on the children of Latin America, a clearly paternalistic rhetorical construct.⁷¹ Moreover, the backyard may be seen as an extension of the house and also part of one’s property, making one an owner of this space

66 Musolff (2000) 225.

67 Thatcher (1993) 319, quoted in Musolff (2016c) 11.

68 See Shimko (2004) 211–213.

69 Shimko (2004) 212.

70 Shimko (2004) 212.

71 Shimko (2004) 212–213.

responsible for setting it in order, rather than someone else's independently governed territory.

4 States as Persons

Uncle Sam taking care of other states as his children is itself a good example of a metaphor based on personification, very common in Western political discourse. It can also be traced back to the ancient Greek world, but it seems more universal than any single rhetorical tradition.⁷² In one of the prosecution speeches written for his clients shortly after 403/2, the logographer Lysias tried to persuade the judges to condemn the defendant Agoratus, put on trial for his actions that benefitted the short-lived oligarchic junta of the Thirty in Athens, by saying:

ὅστις φησὶ μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου <πεποιησθαι>, τὸν δὲ δῆμον, ὃν αὐτός φησι πατέρα αὐτοῦ εἶναι, φαίνεται κακῶσας ... ὅστις οὖν τὸν τε γόνῳ πατέρα τὸν αὐτοῦ ἔτυπτε καὶ οὐδὲν παρεῖχε τῶν ἐπιτηδείων, τὸν τε ποιητὸν πατέρα ἀφείλετο ἃ ἦν ὑπάρχοντα ἐκείνῳ ἀγαθὰ, πῶς οὐ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν τῆς κακώσεως νόμον ἄξιός ἐστι θανάτῳ ζημιωθῆναι;

He claims to have been <adopted as a citizen> *by the People*, but it is the People – whom he describes as *his father* – that he is shown to have wronged ... If a person struck down his natural father and failed to provide him with the necessities of life, or if he robbed his adoptive father of the things he already possessed – surely such a person deserves the death penalty for this reason, according to the *law on maltreatment of parents*.⁷³

13.91, trans. adapted from TODD (2000)

The law he refers to applied to those who did not take care of their elderly parents (clearly intended for individuals, not entire city-states), so half of what the speaker refers to is purely metaphorical, with the *dēmos* – conventionally embodying the Athenian state – presented as the defendant's parent, in need

72 Cf. the discussion in Filonik (2018) 27–31, with notes.

73 The word “adopted” (πεποιησθαι, lit. “made”) in the text is a conjecture required by the syntax, but whether we accept it in this form or not, the metaphorical sense is equally clear based just on the text preserved in the manuscripts. Cf. Wohl (2010) 222–223 on this metaphor in Lys. 13.91.

of human-like care.⁷⁴ Similarly, the orator Lycurgus asks the judges what punishment they will consider enough for a man who “did not repay his fatherland for nurture” (1.53: οὐκ ἀπέδωκε τὰ τροφεῖα τῇ πατρίδι), emphasising that the city-state (or indeed the *fatherland*, with its familial and territorial connotations) is a “nurturing parent.”

In 1949, Churchill revised his earlier “structure” imagery, whether as a conscious reframing effort or not, only to resort to a different metaphorical conception when he argued: “human beings and human societies are *not structures* that are built *or machines* that are forged. They are *plants that grow* and must be tended as such.”⁷⁵ But elsewhere in modern political rhetoric societies and states are unambiguously presented as human beings, with personality traits and the ability to establish human relationships. In August 1914, with the war looming large, British Foreign Secretary and Liberal MP Edward Grey, speaking before the House of Commons, observed:⁷⁶

For many years we have had a long-standing *friendship* with France. [An HON. MEMBER: “And with Germany?”] I remember well the feeling in the House when the late Government made their agreement with France – the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations, who *had had perpetual differences* in the past, *had cleared these differences away*.... But how far that *friendship* entails obligation – it has been *a friendship between the nations* and ratified by the nations – how far that entails an obligation let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself.

In choosing this metaphor, Grey in fact distances himself from it by drawing attention to the fact that it is a friendship “between the nations” and one “ratified” by the nations, not a word one would normally use with reference to interpersonal relations. In response to this, Labour Leader Ramsay MacDonald, though accepting the metaphorical “friendship” frame, rejected any far-reaching implications it might have:⁷⁷

74 See a more comprehensive discussion of similar metaphors in Lycurgus and their relationship with Athenian laws in Filonik (2017) 244–245; cf. Filonik (forthcoming a) on family and “state is a household” metaphors.

75 Winston Churchill, “MIT Mid-Century Convocation” (speech, 31 March 1949), International Churchill Society, <https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/mit-mid-century-convocation/>.

76 65 H.C. Deb., 3 August 1914, cc1815 (cf. <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commmons/1914/aug/03/statement-by-sir-edward-grey>).

77 65 H.C. Deb., 3 August 1914, cc1830.

So far as France is concerned, we say solemnly and definitely that no such *friendship* as the right hon. Gentleman describes *between one nation and another* could ever justify one of those nations entering into war on behalf of the other.

This “friendship” between nations and various calls in support of a “global community” have been one of the most common ways of framing political matters in the rhetoric focused on international relations, usually followed by a list of those nations’ “enemies.”⁷⁸ Such imagery of states as friendly or hostile people has been readily used by many politicians before numerous audiences as a helpful way of addressing people’s sentiments more directly and making them emotionally invested.⁷⁹ It also simplifies the narrative about policy issues, making it easier for politicians to manipulate it. As Chilton and Lakoff have observed, the “maturity” of a country is seen as its economic growth and industrialisation, which carries an assumption that “underdeveloped” countries are not mature and should be treated as children by their elders, being forcefully reprimanded if necessary.⁸⁰ The many possibilities for such interpretations of the metaphor become apparent when one recalls the example of Uncle Sam making sure that South American children in the backyard behave (discussed above).

Such use of political metaphors has also often led to ideologies dangerously resembling social Darwinism, not least the concept of “equilibrium of power,” according to which a metaphorical force field is stable as long as both opposing forces are equal in value, with no human decisions being otherwise able to maintain the balance. This idea has often been used to interpret the international relations between political superpowers according to the tenets of *Realpolitik*.⁸¹ Another related metaphor drawing on the laws of physics and prevalent in the Cold War period was that of a “power vacuum,” a space devoid of either US or Soviet influence that must be filled by one or the other, with no third possibility.⁸²

78 See, for example, US President Jimmy Carter’s speech on 22 May 1977 at Notre Dame University, full text available at The New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/1977/05/23/archives/text-of-presidents-commencement-address-at-notre-dame-on-foreign.html>.

79 Cf. Beer and de Landtsheer (2004) 27–28; Charteris-Black (2011) 320–323.

80 Chilton and Lakoff (1995) 43.

81 Cf. Chilton and Lakoff (1995) 41, 51.

82 See Shimko (2004) 205.

But the metaphor that has probably been used the most in Western history in innumerable variations is the conception of “body politic.”⁸³ It started to become internalised with descriptions of civil strife (*stasis*) in archaic Greece, and entered Western political discourse for good through classical Greek authors. Plato was probably the most influential in this respect, but among the orators, for example, Aeschines in his forensic speech *Against Ctesiphon* addressed the judges in 330 BCE by saying:

πρὸς μὲν τοὺς στασιαστικούς λόγους ἐκεῖνο αὐτῷ ὑποβάλλετε· ὦ Δημόσθενες, εἰ σοὶ ἦσαν ὅμοιοι οἱ ἀπὸ Φυλῆς φεύγοντα τὸν δῆμον καταγαγόντες, οὐκ ἂν ποῦ' ἡ δημοκρατία κατέστη. Νῦν δὲ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν μεγάλων κακῶν συμβάντων ἔσωσαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ κάλλιστον ἐκ παιδείας ῥῆμα φθεγξάμενοι, μὴ μνησικακεῖν· σὺ δὲ ἐλκοποιεῖς, καὶ μᾶλλον σοὶ μέλει τῶν αὐθμερὸν λόγων, ἢ τῆς σωτηρίας τῆς πόλεως.”

In response to his divisive claims, you should give him the following answer: “Demosthenes, if the men who restored the people from exile from Phyle had been like you, the democratic constitution would never have been re-established. As it is, after great disasters, they *saved the city* by pronouncing the noblest words an enlightened education can provide: No recriminations. But you *inflict wounds* and are more concerned with the arguments of the moment than with the *safety of the city*.”

3.208, trans. CAREY (2000)

In addition to the general imagery of the *polis* as a person who needs to be *saved* and *kept safe* by those coming to its rescue, there is a specific metaphor of “opening (old) wounds” (*helkopoiein*) in the city-state by dividing it

83 On the modern cultural variation in its use, see Musolff (2016b) 55–71, 115–125; on some examples of its use in Near Eastern, Far Eastern, and classical antiquity, see Harvey (2007) 4–22. For a more detailed discussion of the *body politic* in Greek political imagery, see Brock (2000) and (2013) 69–82; and now Serafim (2020) 673–695. Brock identifies two explicit mentions of the “body of the *polis*” in Athenian oratory, in Dinarchus (1.110) and Hyperides (5 col. 25 Kenyon = 1.25 Jensen), although some caution seems necessary, since the first is a spurious reading (but probably correct, considering the papyrus reading in P. Oxy. 49, 3436, cf. Worthington [1992] ad loc.) and the second is probably a different metaphor from what is normally assumed, as rightly noted by Kucharski (2016) ad loc. (“they took bribes on the security of the state’s body,” that is endangered the state’s “personal” freedom, a reference to the abolition of enslavement for debt by Solon, based on a more generic “body = person” metonymic substitution in classical Greek, cf. *some-body* for *some-one* in English; see Harris [2002] on Solon’s law).

politically when it needs “healing” after the civil war of 404/3, according to the terms of the amnesty.⁸⁴

Unsurprisingly, in modern times the metaphorical language of the “healthy” body politic and its “purification” has been favoured by extremist movements, from Nazi propaganda through the Ku Klux Klan to ethnic “cleansing” in former Yugoslavia.⁸⁵ This tendency stems from the fact that such groups’ ideology depends on the perceived unity and homogeneity of society and the state, and on the presentation of anything foreign or external as a disease and something harmful to this body-of-the-state’s posited purity and integrity. Its roots in ancient Greek thinking seem to be different, as deriving from the egalitarian political culture of the *polis*, or citizen-state, in which the “disease” of the city is emerging from internal hostility (political division or civil strife), and where all enfranchised “members” are equally part of the state and its government (a few steps behind modern democracies in inclusiveness but still more democratic than any large political unit in the centuries to come).

5 Political Games and Political Battles

Concepts coming from the domains of sport and war have been influencing each other since antiquity, probably from the time when the first chariot races were organised not just to fight or train for war but to enter a competition. This imagery has come down to us not just through visual imagery but also literary texts, not least those from classical Athens, with well over one hundred written versions of its publicly delivered speeches surviving to this day. Many of their metaphorical conceptions resemble our modern ones, even if only some of the technical language is recognisable to us now.⁸⁶ Aeschines, just two passages before mentioning the “body politic,” refers to yet another kind of bodily activity when he tells the judges to make his court opponent, Demosthenes,

84 Cf. Brock (2000) 29 = (2013) 73 on the metaphor. See Joyce (2014) on the expression *mē mnēsikakein* (lit. “not to hold a grudge for past wrongs”) quoted by Aeschines and on the amnesty of 403. On the arguments from history in Athenian rhetoric, see Westwood (2018) with further bibliography.

85 See Chilton and Lakoff (1995) 44–45; Musolff (2010); and Musolff (2016b) 73–92. Cf. Gregg (2004) (esp. pp. 64–65) on anti-communist “body politic” metaphors in US discourse in the inter-war period and during the Cold War.

86 See Hawhee (2004) on the technical language of athletics in ancient Greek oratory, Kyle (2015) on sport as spectacle throughout antiquity, and Pritchard (2013) on the relations between war, sport, and democracy in classical Athens. Cf. Chetwynd (2016) on modern sporting metaphors.

maintain his “position” (and keep to the point in court in a trial for an illegal proposal), as if this was a boxing match:⁸⁷

Ὡσπερ οὖν ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσιν ὁρᾶτε τοὺς πύκτας περὶ τῆς στάσεως ἀλλήλοις διαγωνιζομένους, οὕτω καὶ ὑμεῖς ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως περὶ τῆς τάξεως αὐτῷ τοῦ λόγου μάχεσθε καὶ μὴ ἐάτε αὐτὸν ἔξω τοῦ παρανόμου περιστάσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐγκαθήμενοι καὶ ἐνεδρεύοντες ἐν τῇ ἀκροάσει, εἰσελαύνετε αὐτὸν εἰς τοὺς τοῦ παρανόμου λόγους, καὶ τὰς ἐκτροπὰς αὐτοῦ τῶν λόγων ἐπιτηρεῖτε.

So be like the *boxers in athletic contests* you see *competing with each other for position*; in the same way, you, too, must spend the whole day *fighting* with him *about the disposition* of his argument in defence of the city, and you must not let him *step outside the limits* of the issue of illegality; you must sit there on guard, *lying in wait* for him as you listen, and *drive him back* to the argument about illegality, and watch out for his *attempts to divert* the case.

3.206, trans. CAREY (2000), slightly modified

In fact – Thucydides’ grim view of the political world aside – the internal matters of Athenian democracy are usually presented as competition or sport rather than war.⁸⁸ In the same speech, Aeschines asks the judges to act as “referees judging the contest in political excellence” (*agōnothetai politikēs aretēs*), bestowing awards on the most virtuous citizen-competitors (3.180, 232). Similarly, when Demosthenes praises the democracy’s open competitive spirit, as opposed to Spartan elitist homogeneity, he makes the point that in Athens the “good men” enter a competition (*hamilla*) for prizes (*dōreiai*) awarded by the *dēmos* (20.106–108).⁸⁹

Speakers in Athens were also eager to present various political struggles as battles and having to remain in a battle “order,” *taxis* (often with reference to hoplite warfare, even though many Athenians more often would have experienced different types of fighting, not least in the navy). In his assembly

87 See Hawhee (2004) 33–34 for a slightly different translation of the technical terms and the double meaning of the term *stasis* in this passage (“position”/“position taken up in litigation”), cf. pp. 27–39 on the speech’s athletic metaphors. Incidentally, even Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* used boxing metaphors to describe rhetorical activity (3.14.11, 1416a.1–3).

88 See Filonik (forthcoming b) for a more detailed discussion of agonistic metaphors and the concept of *agōn* in Greek political discourse (including Thucydides).

89 See Canevaro (2016) 369–370 on this passage and similar Greek metaphors; see Kremmydas (2012) 377 on the antithesis.

speech *For the Freedom of the Rhodians* of ca. 350 BCE, Demosthenes urges his fellow citizens:

ἐχρῆν γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διάνοιαν ὑμᾶς περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τάξεως ἣν περὶ τῆς ἐν ταῖς στρατείαις ἔχετε. τίς οὖν ἐστὶν αὕτη; ὑμεῖς τὸν λιπόντα τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τάξιν ταχθεῖσαν, ἄτιμον οἴεσθε προσήκειν εἶναι καὶ μηδενὸς τῶν κοινῶν μετέχειν. χρῆν τοίνυν καὶ τοὺς τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν προγόνων τάξιν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ παραδεδομένην λιπόντας καὶ πολιτευομένους ὀλιγαρχικῶς ἀτίμους τοῦ συμβουλευεῖν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ποιεῖσθαι ...

You should have the same attitude *towards constitutional discipline*, Athenians, as you have *towards military discipline*. What do I mean? You think that a man *who deserts the position* assigned to him by the general should be deprived of his civic privileges and allowed no share in the community.⁹⁰ In the same way, those *who desert the constitutional position handed down to them by their ancestors*, and whose political conduct is oligarchic, should be deprived of the civic right to offer you advice.

15.32–33, trans. TREVETT (2011), slightly modified

In using this inventive metaphorical framing, Demosthenes is aware that its meaning may not be obvious to the audience and goes on to explain what it entails after adding a rhetorical question as a metaphor cue (lit. “*What is this order, then?*”). He uses the concepts coming from the experience of Greek warfare to impose the idea of fulfilling one’s civic obligations as being equal to military discipline on an audience consisting of approximately six thousand Athenian citizens. It is now very difficult to tell if all of them would be eager to accept such metaphors in public rhetoric. Just as they might share one prevalent idea of “household” based on their common experience of one culture and one legal and political system, one has to wonder if the economically privileged citizens who actually were able to serve as hoplites would have seen the metaphors often drawn from hoplite warfare ideology differently from all other citizens. But perhaps allowing them to imagine themselves as a single hoplite army of Athens was powerful enough as a rhetorical image, since we see it recurring over and over again in Athenian oratory and visual imagery.⁹¹

90 “Having a share in the *polis*” is a metaphorical concept commonly used in Athenian oratory for rhetorical purposes, on which see Filonik (2017) 237–240 with notes; cf. Filonik (2018) 26–27.

91 On the representation of the war-dead as hoplites in Athens, see Loraux (2006) 66–69.

In their conception of interstate politics, on the other hand, the Athenians were no better than modern-day imperialists. When, in his *First Philippic*, Demosthenes addressed the matter of the spheres of influence shifting from Athens to Macedonia under Philip II, he called northern tribes on the Balkan peninsula Philip's "prizes of war," which the Athenians were in his view mistakenly reluctant to reach for, even though these were "lying in the open," only waiting for someone to claim them as his:

εἰ δέ τις ὑμῶν ... δυσπολέμητον οἶεται τὸν Φίλιππον εἶναι, σκοπῶν τό τε πλῆθος τῆς ὑπαρχούσης αὐτῷ δυνάμεως καὶ τὸ τὰ χωρία πάντ' ἀπολωλέναι τῇ πόλει, ὀρθῶς μὲν οἶεται ... εἰχόμεν ποθ' ἡμεῖς Πύδναν καὶ Ποτειδαίαν καὶ Μεθώνην καὶ πάντα τὸν τόπον τοῦτον οἰκεῖον κύκλῳ, καὶ πολλὰ τῶν μετ' ἐκείνου νῦν ὄντων ἐθνῶν αὐτονομούμενα κάλεῦθερ' ὑπῆρχε, καὶ μᾶλλον ἡμῖν ἐβούλετ' ἔχειν οἰκείως ἢ 'κείνῳ.... Φίλιππος ... εἶδεν ... τοῦτο καλῶς ἐκείνος, ὅτι ταῦτα μὲν ἐστὶν ἅπαντα τὰ χωρὶ' ἄλλα τοῦ πολέμου κείμεν' ἐν μέσῳ, φύσει δ' ὑπάρχει τοῖς παροῦσι τὰ τῶν ἀπόντων, καὶ τοῖς ἐθέλουσι πονεῖν καὶ κινδυνεύειν τὰ τῶν ἀμελούντων.

If any of you thinks that Philip is hard to wage war against, considering the size of the forces at his disposal and *our city's loss of all its properties*, he is quite correct. Once *we had* Pydna and Potidaea and Methone and the whole surrounding region *as our property*, and many of the peoples that are now on his side were autonomous and free and preferred to be on familiar terms with us more than with him. Philip knew very well that all these places *lie in the open as the prizes of war*, and that *the possessions of those who are absent naturally belong* to those who are present, and *of those who are negligent* to those who are willing to toil and face danger.

4.4–5, trans. adapted from TREVETT (2011) and modified

That is a statement no political "hawk" today would be ashamed to make, perhaps in more convoluted language (as in the "equilibrium of power" metaphors discussed above). Here, the extra force of the message comes from the fact it was said in public and expected to win over the people's votes for the policies proposed in the citizen assembly, with no attempt to hide the real intent. It draws on a common conceptualisation of territories as objects, portrayed as if they could be picked up and carried away as someone's belongings, based on a much more primary conception that land does in fact *belong* to individuals or groups the way *their* mobile objects do, reflected in the politics, economy, laws, and wars of modern states.

Both Greek and Roman theorists have noticed that metaphor has a certain emotive function. Modern scholars have argued that this function in politics often consists in reassuring the audience by presenting them with something tangible and comprehensible instead of discussing abstract and complicated policy issues, since the former have the ability to simplify and swiftly explain the changing and threatening world, or divert attention from real problems to imaginary and rhetorically constructed ones.⁹² When response to political problems is presented as “war” (on drugs, poverty, or terrorism), both real causes and real solutions become less important, and an apolitical, emotional approach tends to dominate the public debate.⁹³ This is no less grave when it comes to the use of metaphors in actual wars, especially when they are portrayed as a sporting contest, merely a “match” or a “game.”⁹⁴ Such war-normalising metaphors in public discourse tend to suggest that war is just another normal kind of activity and should be treated as such, and are often used to help raise the support for military solutions (and spending).⁹⁵

An illustrative case is the recurrent metaphorical references to football in the official discourse surrounding Operation Desert Storm in 1991 (the First Gulf War). Those metaphors allowed the military operation to be framed as a mere sporting match, with no human cost involved other than losing a contest, reducing the decision-making process to how to best win a game.⁹⁶ General Norman Schwarzkopf, leading the operation, tried to present the deceptive attack he commanded on the enemy forces as a “Hail Mary pass” known from American football, a desperate play by a losing team that needs divine intervention to succeed, but one that may lead straight to victory if successful. Not only was the metaphor harmful, it was also misguided, since the under-trained Iraqi army stood virtually no chance against the well-funded, technologically superior, and carefully prepared invasion, involving the “largest aerial and ground assaults in military history” to date, which nonetheless has been

92 See Beer and de Landtsheer (2004) 27–29; Hartmann-Mahmud (2002); Charteris-Black (2011) 320–323.

93 See Hartmann-Mahmud (2002) 427.

94 See Lakoff (1991) and Chilton and Lakoff (1995); cf. Musolff (2016b) 7–23 on the “politics is war” metaphor.

95 See previous footnote, together with Jansen and Sabo (1994); Gavriely-Nuri (2008) and (2009); cf. Koteyko and Ryazanova-Clarke (2009) 121 on the use of the “secure house” metaphor by President Vladimir Putin to promote military spending in Russia.

96 See Herbeck (2004); cf. Chilton and Lakoff (1995) 47–48.

applauded by US military enthusiasts who accepted this framing.⁹⁷ However absurd, it shows how rhetorical attempts to influence the reception of military decisions can be framed with reference to the conceptual domain of “sport,” downplaying and hushing up the atrocities of war, and together with “body politic” metaphors, easily leading to the violation of human rights and even to its public approval from voters.⁹⁸

6 Metaphors in Discourse and in Rhetorical Tradition

Some metaphors discussed in this chapter – such as *body politic* – have had direct continuation from antiquity to the 21st century, even if not all of their routes can be easily recreated. Most should probably be considered common tropes and modes of thinking reappearing in various places and periods based on similar conceptualisations and experience of the world, and entering political rhetoric to persuade audiences and shift attitudes.⁹⁹ Whether “ornamental” or not, according to Demetrius and Hermogenes on the one hand and modern experimental studies on the other, the most inconspicuous of them, hiding in everyday speech or often “fossilised” in language, should be considered equally important as rhetorical devices and no less – if not more – persuasive.

When presenting examples from modern political discourse, this chapter has focused on conscious attempts to sway public opinion through metaphors. This is not to say that their role is only negative, as metaphors have also proved highly persuasive in everyday communication, promoting socially important issues, helping to deal with psychological difficulties or health problems, and advancing public awareness and specialised knowledge.¹⁰⁰ On the other hand, the dangers of abusing metaphor are not limited to politics, and have been identified in various kinds of discourse, including convoluted ways of promoting corporate ideology and misleading customers in advertising, potentially with serious consequences to people’s health.¹⁰¹

97 See an uncritical appraisal of the strategy on a military-focused Internet forum: Dick Cheney [pseud.], “Schwarzkopf’s Left Hook Was a Miracle,” 08 January 2015, <http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?676819-Schwarzkopf-s-Left-Hook-was-a-Miracle>.

98 Cf. Filonik (2018) 36, with further bibliography, on “pest” and “parasite” metaphors, and Musolff (2015) on the metaphors used to portray immigrants as a threat.

99 Cf. Szymański (1993) on metaphoric hyperbole and bodily metaphors in Sanskrit and Greek literary theory and practice.

100 See, e.g., Gibbs Jr (2013); Keefer *et al.* (2014); Burgers (2016); Frezza (2016); Törneke (2017); and essays in part V of Semino and Demjén (2016) (cf. chapter by Colston and Gibbs in that volume on metaphor processing).

101 On both verbal and visual metaphors in advertising, see, e.g., McQuarrie and Phillips (2005); Jeong (2008); Martín de la Rosa (2009); and the chapter by Hidalgo-Downing and

As this chapter has argued, the power of metaphor as both a rhetorical device and a conceptual process has been recognised since Aristotle and partly reflected – and even elaborated – in later rhetorical theory, but was mostly lost in the Roman tradition, which influenced later thinking and theorising. Nonetheless, metaphors continued to be used throughout antiquity and later eras to communicate meaning and persuade audiences, and did not require Isocrates' or Quintilian's approval to be effective in uninterrupted rhetorical practice.

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SECTION 4

Pedagogy and Gender

∴

The Reception of Ancient Rhetoric in Modern Argumentation Theory and Pedagogy

Christian Kock

Argumentation theory, argumentation studies, and argumentation pedagogy – these are endeavours that, under those names, have only recently appeared in the world of scholarship. Until the middle of the 20th century, there were no organised intellectual initiatives bearing those names. Yet over the centuries there have certainly been anticipations and efforts that have presented themselves as concerned with argumentation, and some of them, if not all, have been studied and exploited when argumentation scholarship presented itself on the intellectual scene. However, during the many centuries preceding our own time, “argumentation” was not an officially recognised subject as such nor deemed worthy of defining an autonomous discipline.

The tradition of rhetorical thinking in antiquity, as inaugurated by the Sophists, Isocrates, and Aristotle, has provided most of the ideas and insights that, if that notion had existed, might have been designated “argumentation theory,” and which in various ways have been taken up by contemporary argumentation scholars (on the Sophists, see also chapter 2 in the present volume). Other such efforts are to be found in work that placed itself under the aegis of either “logic” or “dialectic.” Much of the work that today presents itself as argumentation studies draws primarily on philosophical work in one of those two categories.

It is worth considering for a moment the history and meaning of the term *argumentation* itself. Ancient Greek has no separate term that corresponds to it. The Latin verb *arguo* is related to the Greek words *argēs* “white” and *argos* “bright”; *arguo* means to make clear, make known, show, prove. *Argumentum* in Latin has some use, as referring to the means by which something is made clear or proved; Cicero says in the *Topica*: *argumentum est ratio, quae rei dubiae facit fidem* (2.7: “an argument is a reason which causes men to believe a thing which would otherwise be doubtful”). *Argumentatio* also has some use as, for example, in Cicero (*De inventione* 1.40; *De partitione oratoria* 13, which defines it as “argumenti explicatio”), and several times in Quintilian. But in Greek as well as in Latin rhetorical thinking we find that passages relating to what

would nowadays be called argumentation theory or the like appear under other heads: *heurēsis*, invention, topics, logic, *disputatio*, dialectics, and others.

1 Rhetorical Argumentation Theory in the Renaissance

A wave of resuscitation of ancient rhetorical thinking occurred during the Renaissance, but not under the name of argumentation studies. A major example is the monumental *Rhetoricorum Libri V* by George of Trebizond from 1433. (On George, see also chapter 10 of the present volume.) His native language, Greek, allowed him to draw freely on ancient sources from Aristotle onwards. As the first full-scale “Ciceronian” rhetoric of the Renaissance, covering all the five parts of the discipline, this work is, as far as argumentation is concerned, noteworthy in several respects that reflect Aristotle’s rhetorical thinking – as well as Latin sources such as the anonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and Greek texts little known in the West, such as the writings of Hermogenes. George sees rhetoric as centred on civic issues, thereby affirming a domain-based view of rhetoric as “a science of civic life in which, with the agreement of the audience insofar as possible, we speak on civil questions”;¹ likewise, key terms in the *Ad Herennium* are *in usum civilem* and *adsensio*. George holds that in such matters demonstrative proof is not possible, as the scholastics would have wanted, and that emotional appeals are legitimate and necessary; these views also point back towards ancient thinking on civic rhetoric as well as forward to foundational thinking in contemporary rhetoric in the work of Chaïm Perelman (see in particular Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958]).

Similarly, the composition of the influential work of Rudolph Agricola, *De Inventione Dialectica Libri Tres* (1479), would have been impossible without massive ancient inspiration – from Cicero in particular. Benefiting from Gutenberg’s invention, it first appeared in print in 1515, with numerous editions following, influencing Erasmus, Melanchthon, and other rhetorical thinkers. An aspect of Agricola’s ostensible project was to reduce the domain of rhetoric in favour of “dialectic”; this is ironic since what he did was in effect to move the rhetorical theory of invention and the theory of argumentation a major step forward. By “dialectics” he really meant topics – not in the Aristotelian, but the Ciceronian sense, as in the *Topica*. He developed, expanded, and exemplified Cicero’s already elaborate and systematic typology of *loci*, with the distinction between “internal” and “external” *loci* at its base, and proposed that

1 Kennedy (1999) 235.

those who will have others believe them (*fidem facere* – i.e., not prove deductively) should run their subject or issue through his system, looking for “places” where potential arguments might be located. This systematic process he called *ekphrasis* (a term used in ancient rhetoric for something else, namely a passage that conjures up images before the eyes of the audience/readers), holding it to be crucial in *inventio*; but although that term had designated one of the *canons* of rhetoric since the early Cicero, Agricola designates his system of *inventio* as “dialectic,” possibly because scholastic thinking was still strong and the Renaissance of rhetoric not yet in full swing. In reality, he built on rhetorical thinking to extend the resources it provided for argumentation; but one effect of Agricola’s work was to narrow down the domain of rhetoric, as many later thinkers defined it, including Petrus Ramus, to whom rhetoric was little more than *elocutio*. (On Ramus and Ramism, see also chapter 3 of the present volume.)

Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466–1536) wrote some of the most successful works of rhetorical pedagogy ever. Both his *De Duplici Copia Rerum et Verborum* (first edition 1511, many later) and *De Conscribendis Epistolis* (1522) contain numerous ideas relevant for a rhetorical view of argumentation. In these works, as well as in *Ecclesiastes* (1535), his work on homiletics, he gave highly insightful advice for those who would persuade, drawing on key concepts in ancient rhetoric. Systematic theoretical thinking in conceptual dichotomies was not his strong suit, but his understanding of rhetorical practice, which encompasses the idea of “the art, the fine and useful art, of making things matter,” as Thomas B. Farrell has said in our time (1998), was second to none. This art, as rhetors and rhetoricians have always known, affects different individuals differently, and it can do so only by degrees, not by abruptly shifting them between binaries like “true/false” or “Yes/No.” In all the three books just mentioned, Erasmus emphasised and exemplified just that art in his discussion of, among other things, *dilatatio* and *amplificatio* (Aristotle’s *auxēsis*), drawing not least on Quintilian as well as on practical examples from Cicero. As amplification is the rhetor’s prime instrument for adding weight to his argument by degrees, a broad spectrum of different methods was demonstrated.

Another insight from ancient rhetoricians deployed in Erasmus is the awareness of different argumentative *functions*, as distinguished by Cicero and by St. Augustine in *De doctrina Christiana*: one may teach, one may delight, and one may move. Furthermore, Erasmus, in *De Conscribendis*, copiously demonstrated that persuading someone to believe and encouraging them to act on what they have come to believe are different functions – a difference also strongly urged by Augustine. Such insights should be central in argumentation

scholarship and are among the needed contributions that the rhetorical tradition could make. (A fuller treatment of Erasmus can be found in chapter 7 of the present volume.)

2 Long Years of Low Esteem

A crucial figure in understanding how ancient rhetoric and its view of argumentation were received in the 17th century is Thomas Hobbes. As the historian Quentin Skinner has argued, Hobbes was brought up on Renaissance humanism with its emphasis on a neo-Ciceronian conception of rhetoric, according to which there would always be two sides to a question – “a more generally questioning and anti-demonstrative approach to moral argument encouraged by the emphasis placed by the culture of humanism on the *ars rhetorica*.”² However, in his attempt to build a “civic science” that would help secure peace, Hobbes reacted against this background and wanted to set up a “science of Vertue and Vice” in which good and evil were not subjects of endless rhetorical manoeuvring, but subject to deductive reasoning. Yet, in a final turn, Hobbes re-embraced rhetoric; Skinner ascribes to Hobbes the view that “our arguments will never be persuasive unless we enforce them with the arts of eloquence” – as Hobbes found them not just in Aristotle but even more in Cicero, Quintilian, and the *Progymnasmata* of Aphthonius (translated in Kennedy 2003). Under the inspiration of these figures, Hobbes’ considered position was that “our watchword ought to be *audi alteram partem*, always listen to the other side.... The appropriate model will always be that of a dialogue, the appropriate stance a willingness to negotiate over rival intuitions concerning the applicability of evaluative terms.”³

If we follow this reading, it is wrong to see Hobbes unequivocally as a spokesman for the contempt and neglect in which rhetoric is often held to have sunk in the eyes of leading intellectuals in the later 17th century and the age of Enlightenment. True enough, contempt is clearly expressed, for example, in Locke’s *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), which dismisses rhetoric as a “powerful instrument of error and deceit” (II, book III, x), and, a century later, in Kant’s *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, which deems rhetoric to be “gar keiner Achtung würdig” (section 53, footnote). It is also undeniable that the religious wars of the 1600s, the English Civil War, as well as the advances of the natural and mathematical sciences inaugurated by Newton, helped promote

2 Skinner (1996) 9.

3 Skinner (1996) 15.

a general intellectual suspicion of rhetoric, which was suspected (not without reason) of having stoked religious fanaticism and of obstructing the progress of scientific knowledge. Meanwhile, the belief of Descartes and Spinoza in a deductive, quasi-mathematical method of reasoning and argument (*more geometrico*) gained much intellectual adherence. But this is far from being the full picture, and the once prevalent views of the intellectual history of the West that tended to completely marginalise rhetorical thought have rightly been challenged in recent decades; one example of this is Skinner's work, in particular on Hobbes, whom we may now see not as an enemy of rhetorical argument in the ancient tradition but rather as a practitioner of it and a believer in its necessity.

It may be said that Hobbes turned to ancient rhetorical thought as a philosopher's response to the formidable, one-eyed, and often inflammatory rhetoric coming from both sides of the great religious divide of the time – with Jesuit orators on one side and followers of Luther and Calvin on the other, schooled by a wealth of massive textbooks and treatises. So the idea that rhetorical practice and theory died out in the 1600s is decidedly wrong; but it may be true, as the historian of rhetoric Thomas Conley puts it, that rhetorical thinking as a non-religious intellectual pursuit was for a long time after the Renaissance cultivated more in the “hinterlands” than in the metropolitan centres.⁴ However, cultivated it was, and throughout the period of its neglect by trend-setting intellectuals, brilliant rhetorical thinkers here and there contributed to a non-deductive understanding of argumentation, more or less explicitly recognizing ancient rhetorical insights and keeping alive a tradition that remained an alternative to the barren logical paradigm dominated by syllogistic proofs. One outstanding example of this is Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), a historian and philosopher of law, history, and education, active at the University of Naples. His critique of the Cartesian *ratio studiorum* is now widely known, and so is his defence of the rhetorical tradition of topics; less well known are his lectures, *Institutiones Oratoriae*, given over three decades (1711–1741). A highly original and insightful theory and typology of argumentation (*persuasio*) is at the centre here. Rhetoric is defined accordingly as *facultas dicendi apposite ad persuadendum*, and Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian are invoked. Squarely in the rhetorical, non-syllogistic tradition, the subject matter of rhetoric is not proofs of incontrovertible truths, but argument on collective action: “that which falls under deliberation of whether it is to be done or not to be done.”⁵

4 Conley (1990) 216.

5 Vico (1996) 9.

Voices on the value and uses of rhetoric like that of Vico were little noticed in their lifetime and have only in our time received the attention they deserve. During the Enlightenment, leading thinkers in the intellectual centres lambasted a “straw man” version of rhetoric, which they saw as specious and deceptive ornament, and threw it in the same bin as obsolete syllogistic drills. An example of this is the brilliant Danish-Norwegian polyhistor and playwright Ludvig Holberg (1684–1754), in whose comedy *Erasmus Montanus* (1723) a conceited student fails to impress the good folks in his home village with his scholastic skills.

But even during the Enlightenment, rhetoric was not what the leading lights of the age thought it was. A strong proof of this is the work of the Scottish philosopher, minister, and theologian George Campbell (1719–1796). His *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1776) on the one hand embraces Enlightenment thinking as represented by Locke, as well as Hume and the other Scottish philosophers of the age, but on the other hand it essentially reaffirms central tenets of ancient rhetoric as revived in Renaissance humanism. Campbell’s references to ancient rhetoricians are sparse except in his chapters on the role of emotional and “ethotic” appeals and on stylistic devices, where especially Quintilian is invoked with some frequency; but in regard to argumentation, he firmly relies on the ancient and humanistic view of rhetorical argumentation as non-demonstrative reasoning, aimed at moving the passions and influencing the will of others. These are two of the four goals that rhetorical discourse may aim at, the others being to “enlighten the understanding” and “to please the imagination.” It is precisely the enlightenment understanding of the human mind that should tell the philosopher to acknowledge this broad spectrum of rhetorical goals and to recognise that argumentation in human affairs is not a science that proceeds *more geometrico*.

The broad, multifunctional view of what rhetoric does is one reason to take Campbell seriously today. Another is his insight, based on the rhetorical tradition from antiquity, into the working and the varieties of argumentation. His basic distinction is between argumentation with “intuitive” force and argumentation that offers what he calls “deductive evidence.” We may see the former kind as exemplified in the “self-evident” truths appealed to in the American Declaration of Independence from 1776, the same year as Campbell’s book; no evidence needs to be given for such truths. “Deductive” argumentation simply means that a claim is not self-evident but is backed by reasons. This broad category covers more than the narrow ground of logically “valid” reasoning: it comprises both what we have called demonstrative (or “syllogistic”) proof, as in logic and mathematics, and the much more comprehensive class of what Campbell calls “moral” reasoning. This latter category, which Campbell sees as

the central domain of rhetoric, may be defined as concerned with human values and actions. Here he posits a typology, distinguishing between arguments based on experience, analogy, testimony, and probability. Because rhetoric is a different domain than demonstrative inference, there are several usable argument types (ancient rhetoricians would say *topoi* or *loci*); also, “moral” reasoning has certain distinctive features separating it from demonstrative inference. For example, one can meaningfully argue for the opposite claim, since there are generally reasonable reasons on both sides of an issue; and arguments may have varying degrees of force. In all these respects, Campbell’s view of “moral” argumentation reproduces and builds on insights laid down by ancient rhetorical thinkers; at the same time, he anticipates a foundational modern thinker like Chaïm Perelman, for whom “argumentation” and “rhetoric” were synonymous terms.

However, in the 19th century and well into the 20th, many leading intellectuals continued to hold even the name of rhetoric in contempt. It is also true that in many contexts where “rhetoric” was still taught, it tended to become, in Gérard Genette’s term, a “rhétorique restreinte” (1970), dealing with little more than the proverbial “tropes and figures.” Yet there were significant exceptions. Richard Whately (1787–1893), an Oxford academic and cleric who later became archbishop of Ireland, reached a large audience with his *Elements of Rhetoric* (1828 and several subsequent, enlarged editions), which placed written argument (“argumentative composition”) at its centre. Rhetoric according to Whately is audience related, being defined as concerned with persuading others of views that the arguers themselves have arrived at by means of thought. In his plan for the book, Whately declares that it is “to treat, first and principally, of the Discovery of arguments, and of their Arrangement; secondly, to lay down some Rules respecting the excitement and management of what is commonly called the *Passions*, (including every kind of Feeling, Sentiment, or Emotion,) with a view to the attainment of any object proposed, – principally, in the strict sense, Persuasion, *i.e.* the influencing of the WILL.”⁶ In all this, the rhetorical thinking of Aristotle shines through – and Aristotle is explicitly acknowledged as “the best of the systematic writers on Rhetoric.”⁷

It may be said without undue simplification that the figures who keep rhetorical thinking from atrophying during its long period of low esteem, until its still-ongoing revival in our time, are those who placed at the centre of rhetoric its argumentative resources for influencing the will of others to act. All the thinkers so far discussed may be seen as belonging to this category.

6 Whately (1828) § 1; capitals and italics in the original.

7 Whately (1828) § 2.

The main emphases laid by these thinkers are not, of course, entirely identical; some focus on rhetoric's inherent concern with civic issues, i.e., decisions on collective action, while others, instead of this "social" aspect, stress the more "psychological" aspect of rhetoric as addressed to audiences, with the aim of influencing their will. A major thinker who emphatically embraced the latter conception of rhetoric was Friedrich Nietzsche. In 1874, as a young professor of classics in Basel, he gave meticulously prepared lectures on ancient rhetoric (in a private home and to a minimal audience – which reflects the low general esteem in which rhetoric was still held at the time by most intellectuals, including many classicists). In these lectures he defined rhetoric as "*a further development, guided by the clear light of the understanding, of the artistic means which are already found in language*" (English translation in Nietzsche and Blair [1983]; emphasis in the original): in other words, language is essentially rhetorical to begin with, and there is no basic or "natural" state of language without rhetoric, because its defining nature is to influence the will of others: "language does not desire to instruct, but to convey to others a subjective impulse and its acceptance."

Thus, the two main emphases in the thinkers who keep rhetorical theory vibrant during its centuries of supposed eclipse are *collective action* and *the will of the audience addressed*. These are necessarily connected: one presupposes the other. And it is on this foundation that contemporary rhetorical theories of argumentation are built.

Among those thinkers in the 20th century whose achievement it is to have given rhetoric a second Renaissance, such names as Ivor Armstrong (I.A.) Richards, Kenneth Burke, Ernesto Grassi and Chaïm Perelman stand out (listed here in order of birthdates). Of these, Perelman (1912–1984) is the one who has most firmly placed argumentation at the centre of his conception of rhetoric – or one might put it the other way around, since to Perelman, what he chose to call "*la nouvelle rhétorique*" is equated with "argumentation" as he defined it (and conversely).

That is why the most path-breaking work in modern scholarship about argumentation is the massive *Traité de l'argumentation: La nouvelle rhétorique* from 1958 by Perelman and his collaborator, the sociologist Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (1899–1987). An English translation appeared in 1969 and has since become a standard reference in academic work about argumentation. Perelman – a Belgian Professor of Philosophy with a Polish-Jewish background – was mainly responsible for the general and theoretical aspects of the work, whereas Olbrechts-Tyteca's contribution lay mainly in providing most of the innumerable apt examples and cases-in-point that distinguish the book.

From the very first pages the authors invoke Aristotle's authority in taking issue with the concept of reason and reasoning represented by Descartes –

reasoning that proceeds *more geometrico*, aiming at demonstration, i.e., deductive (“apodeictic,” “syllogistic”) and hence incontrovertible proof. Rhetoric/argumentation, by contrast, cannot and does not aim at “proof” in this sense. Aristotle’s pluralism regarding modes of reasoning is invoked; he “had analysed dialectical proofs together with analytic proofs, those which concern the probable together with those which are necessary, those which are used in deliberation and argumentation together with those which are used in demonstration” (3). Notice the fundamental distinction applied here between deductive demonstration on the one hand and those used in deliberation and argumentation (= rhetoric) on the other. Also note that from the start, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca connect rhetoric/argumentation (the non-demonstrative kind of reasoning) with “the use of reason in directing our own actions and influencing those of others” (3) – in other words, deliberative reasoning defined as reasoning on what actions to undertake (what Aristotle called *bouleusis*).

The authors’ interpretation of Aristotle’s thinking lays a decisive emphasis, as in the quotation just given, on reasoning or deliberation about *action* as a distinct domain of reasoning; around this domain rhetoric is centred, and political and ethical deliberation also belong to this domain. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca have several formulations of this sort; but they have looser formulations as well, where the domain of rhetoric/argumentation is defined as also comprising dialectical and probable reasoning in a wider sense – i.e., domains not necessarily concerned with action, but where opinion and uncertainty are nevertheless given conditions. For example, we are told that “the theory of argumentation is the study of discursive techniques allowing us *to induce the mind’s adherence to the theses presented for its assent*” (p. 4; italics in the original). This definition casts a much wider net than the one where “action” is the *diaphora* of rhetoric/argumentation. The emphasis in the definition just quoted is instead on notions such as “the mind’s adherence” and “assent”: here the (most) distinctive feature of rhetoric is that it is not reasoning *in abstracto*, but reasoning that aims to influence a specific addressee or audience in an intended way – not to prove that some thesis or claim is “true,” but to win or increase the adherence to it of the audience addressed. But whether one addresses a specific audience or proposes a specific action, or both, the fact remains that one is engaged in a category of reasoning that deserves to be seen as distinct from the kind of reasoning involved in, e.g., a geometrical proof.

One main inspiration that argumentation scholars draw from Aristotle, and one that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca have certainly drawn from, is precisely this distinction between types of discourse – which may differ from each other in regard to their respective domains, functions, and the rules and practices that characterise them.

While emphasising rhetoric's domain of issues and its audience-centredness, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in effect reject Aristotle's genre-based circumscription (we might also say: his "extensional" definition) of rhetoric as public, monological speeches. But the "New Rhetoric" is Aristotelian in at least one other major respect. Its main purpose is to show how reasonable argumentation is not just possible but needful, even where deductively valid demonstration is not possible. The work achieves this by turning to the tradition of topical thinking, as demonstrated in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as well as in several of his other writings (such as the books on ethics). The body of *The New Rhetoric* offers a systematic typology and a wealth of examples of *topoi* (or, as the authors prefer to say, *loci*) that are actually used and are relevant in rhetoric/argumentation.

The fundamental distinction proposed is drawn between *loci* used in reasoning about truth on the one hand and on the other *loci* concerning values – what the authors call *loci of the preferable*. It is a fundamental fact about humans that they have different preferences regarding what states of affairs they would like to obtain in the world, and what social and ethical *values* they acknowledge. It is also true, of course, that to a large extent the values individuals believe in are the same, but what is certainly not the same from one individual to the next is their relative rankings of these values, or, in the terms of *The New Rhetoric*, their individual value *hierarchies*. The central place accorded to value-based preferences in *The New Rhetoric* is a fundamental reason why rhetorical argumentation theory differs from logic-based theories, which tend to take for granted that all argumentation concerns the truth of some proposition. The fact that one individual's preferences, for example in regard to a proposed policy, cannot, in any epistemic sense, be considered "true," and, likewise, that another individual's preferences cannot for that reason be inferred to be "false," is the essential reason why deductive demonstration is outside the scope of rhetoric/argumentation. It is also the underlying reason why rhetoric instead provides a large storehouse of other means by which an arguer can try to achieve – not "proof," but *adherence* from its audience. Hence, in *The New Rhetoric*, everything that the arguer does – including, for example, use rhetorical "figures" such as metaphors – is (or may be an integral part of) her argumentative effort, just as are her choice of *loci* and her way of seeking a "communion" with her audience. All this is in complete alignment with the thinking of Aristotle, who is, along with Quintilian, the most cited thinker in *The New Rhetoric*.

3 American Argumentation Theory and Pedagogy

In a paper written in 1983, the American rhetorician Wayne Brockriede looked back on the preceding 25 years of rhetorical scholarship and declared that during that period a renaissance had occurred in the study of argument (Brockriede 1992). The year at the beginning of that period was, of course, 1958. And the publication of *Traité de l'argumentation* was not the only seminal event for rhetorical argumentation scholarship in that year. Another landmark was the appearance of *The Uses of Argument* (1958) by the British philosopher Stephen Toulmin (1922–2009). Essentially, Brockriede argued in 1983, these two works caused the renaissance that subsequently occurred. As it happened, Toulmin's work was the first of these two to foster new thinking on argument on the American rhetorical scene – if for no other reason because it was in English. Brockriede and another rhetorician, Douglas Ehninger, soon launched a new approach in the teaching of argument in US colleges, based on Toulmin's ideas; an influential paper published in 1960 helped lay a basis for argumentation pedagogy in courses and textbooks in several countries.

In fact, Toulmin's 1958 approach, and the pedagogy that drew on it, bore little or no relation to ancient thinking on argumentation or ancient rhetoric altogether – a tradition with which Toulmin himself was unacquainted at the time. His book essentially stated a new, Wittgenstein-inspired position emphasizing the manifold, different roles and uses of argument in academic disciplines; accordingly, it was exclusively concerned with epistemic, not practical reasoning. Arguably, this focus actually made Toulmin's theory and his much-cited argument model less suitable for teaching practical argumentation, as known from politics, ethics, etc. Such issues, however, later came into Toulmin's ken. He collaborated with Allan Janik and Richard D. Rieke on a college textbook on argumentation (1979), and together with the biomedical ethicist Albert Jonsen he published *The Abuse of Casuistry* in 1988, which shows how Toulmin had come to see his own thinking as congenial with the rhetorical tradition; a central insight in that book is this: "practical moral reasoning today still fits the patterns of topical (or 'rhetorical') argumentation better than it does those of formal (or 'geometrical') demonstration."⁸

As for the work of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, its American publisher and promoters chose to launch the 1969 English translation under the book's subtitle: *The New Rhetoric*, and it did not impact argumentation theory and pedagogy as early and as strongly as did Toulmin's ideas. Had it done so, the

8 Jonsen and Toulmin (1988) 326.

study of argumentation in the US would have acquired a much firmer rooting in ancient rhetorical thinking. There were of course exceptions. One observant philosopher, Henry Johnstone Jr. (1920–2000), who had done work in deductive logic, took an early interest in “the new rhetoric.” He invited Perelman to the US and made his ideas known in the philosophical and rhetorical communities, while turning his own thinking in the direction of a rhetorical view of argument – as evident, e.g., in his *Validity and Rhetoric in Philosophical Argument* (1978). Other scholars, primarily in rhetoric, continued the task of interpreting and building on the foundation for argumentation theory laid by *The New Rhetoric*; one example is James Crosswhite, who has delved into its use of topical thinking and its sometimes baffling ideas of audience (1989, 2008, and 2012).

However, most North American argumentation scholars who are not themselves rhetoricians have regrettably been content to use as their point of departure the most current philosophical definition of rhetoric (or rhetorical argumentation), i.e., that it is strategic discourse aiming to “win” – a view that goes all the way back to Plato’s *Gorgias* (453a); hence they have shown little interest in and knowledge of what ancient rhetoricians actually had to say, or how ancient rhetorical thinking has been developed in Perelman and others. (On Plato’s anti-rhetorical stance in the *Gorgias*, see chapter 2 in the present volume.) For example, the philosophical argumentation scholars Harvey Siegel and John Biro automatically adopt the Platonic definition of rhetoric, while also denouncing rhetoric when they describe an attempt to win a dispute “irrespective of the rationality of our argumentative exchange” as a “slide” into rhetoric ([1997] 282–283). Even the Canadian “informal logician” Ralph Johnson, co-originator of a school of argumentation theory that has more in common with rhetoric than most philosophers, reiterates the view that rhetoric is defined by the aim to be persuasively effective; he simply opposes “the logical criterion of goodness” to “the rhetorical criterion of effectiveness.”⁹

Among self-declared rhetorical scholars who have worked on argumentation, it is a matter of course to know the ancient rhetorical tradition; mostly, though, that acquaintance is noticeable more as an undercurrent of assumptions that are taken for granted, but not referenced specifically. Some notable figures among these scholars will be mentioned below; clearly, there are others who might also have deserved mention.

Michael Leff, a rhetorical theorist as well as a standard-setting practitioner of rhetorical close reading, studied some of the neglected subjects in ancient rhetorical theory, in particular topical thinking; also, he offered sophisticated

9 Johnson (1990) 285; italics in the original.

discussions of the identity of rhetoric in ancient thinkers as well as in its modern embodiments in the American academe, drawing on a strong knowledge of both. Yet the central issue in his work was mostly the rhetorical discipline as a whole, its definition and “habitation”; like many of the other leading American rhetoricians in our time, he did not see himself as an argumentation theorist.

David Zarefsky is one of the foremost rhetorical scholars writing about argumentation in the US. While he has mostly done case studies and historical studies of rhetorical luminaries like Lincoln, he does base his thinking on central theoretical insights in Aristotle and other ancient rhetorical thinkers. He cites, for example, Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric as the “faculty of discovering the available means of persuasion *in a given case*,”¹⁰ rather than as strategic argument, and he insists, with Aristotle, that from the perspective of rhetoric, “argumentation can be said to be the practice of justifying claims under conditions of uncertainty ... Rhetorical argumentation always is concerned with things that could be otherwise”,¹¹ hence “we do not deliberate about matters that are certain,”¹² which also goes to explain the importance of *ēthos* and *pathos* appeals and of audience adaptation.

G. Thomas Goodnight is another rhetorician who has sought to base a theory of argumentation on principles drawn from ancient rhetoric. In a much-cited paper, he asks: “How could rhetoric simultaneously be accountable to the rules of communication while performing its function to persuade to action?” – in other words, “how to relate a discourse ethics to the wider, public world of social action.”¹³ He finds that “the genius of the Aristotelian system is in its connection of theoretical and practical reasoning through dialectical argument” (p. 329), and since “[r]hetorical argument is informed action,”¹⁴ the answer to the initial question is this: “A responsible rhetoric is one whose argumentative practices take into consideration in the particular case both the need to engender effective deliberative outcomes *and* to preserve the communicative relationships that make such action meaningful to all concerned.”¹⁵

Jeanne Fahnestock and Marie Secor (1982, 1985, and 1988) are rhetoricians who have tested and affirmed the value of applying an adapted version of *stasis* theory in argumentation and writing pedagogy. The theory of *stasis* (or *status*) was a pivotal element of ancient rhetorical thought. It primarily concerned the main standpoint or “strategy” that an arguer might choose when

10 Zarefsky (2014) 9.

11 Zarefsky (2014) xvi.

12 Zarefsky (2014) 5.

13 Goodnight (1993) 330–331.

14 Goodnight (1993) 334.

15 Goodnight (1993) 335.

accused of having committed a criminal act. He may argue that he did not in fact commit the act; that is the first *stasis*. Or he may claim that although he did commit the act, it was not a crime; that is the second *stasis*. Or he may concede the act as well as its criminal nature but argue that its particular circumstances fully or partly exonerate him; that is the third *stasis*. In their reinterpretation of the theory, Fahnestock and Secor distinguish between the definition of a phenomenon, its causes and consequences, the evaluation of it, the prediction of its future, and recommended actions to take in relation to it. They see these topics not just as aids in invention but also as providing a default structure or *dispositio* of a text in specific argumentative genres. Not all written products will require a full treatment of all these aspects; rather, the list may be an aid in focusing by reflecting on the question, “why is this audience being addressed in this *stasis*?”¹⁶ Kock presents another reinterpretation and generalisation of the system.¹⁷

Michael Mendelson is an argumentation scholar and educator who finds his main inspiration in the great rhetorical thinkers of the Roman world. With a good deal of justice, he laments that in American higher education, “the preeminent model for the practice and pedagogy of argumentation continues to reflect, in one guise or another, the formal, abstract, non-relational procedures of logical rather than dialogical reasoning”¹⁸ – in other words, “the Platonic, Cartesian, Rationalist mode.”¹⁹ Against this he posits a “Protagorean antilogic,” based on Protagoras’ dictum that “in every issue there are two arguments opposed to each other” – a stance that becomes the model for Cicero’s rhetorical theory and practice, with its emphasis on the notions of *multiplex ratio disputandi*, *controversia*, and argument *in utramque partem*. Even more, it permeates Quintilian’s theoretical method as a rhetorical thinker as well as an educator.

4 Schools of Argumentation Studies

In the 2000s, argumentation studies have been pursued, under that name and with an ever-growing output, by numerous scholars from several disciplines, including many who have come to see themselves first and foremost as dedicated argumentation scholars. There are a couple of academic centres where

¹⁶ Fahnestock and Secor (1988) 430.

¹⁷ Kock (2012) 279–295.

¹⁸ Mendelson (2002) xvi.

¹⁹ Mendelson (2002).

argumentation studies are seen as a discipline in its own right. The two most firmly established and productive of these centres are located in Canada and Holland respectively.

The oldest organised academic centre of argumentation research is based at the University of Windsor, Ontario. It was here that two philosophers, Ralph Johnson and Anthony Blair, wrote the first edition of their textbook *Logical Self-Defence* (1977), and at about the same time they launched the *Informal Logic Newsletter*. It became the journal *Informal Logic* and provided the watchword for a group of prolific scholars now mostly based at the “Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric” (CRRAR). Some of the senior scholars affiliated or associated with this group have been – besides Johnson and Blair – Trudy Govier, Hans V. Hansen, David Hitchcock, Christopher Tindale, and Douglas Walton.

While never distancing themselves from their identity as philosophers, these scholars reacted against the dominance of formal logic in the teaching of argumentation and critical thinking in North American colleges. In fact, their main objection was not to formalisation, but to a paradigm that in effect considered logical validity (= deductive or syllogistic demonstration) to be the sole yardstick in argument evaluation; in the turbulent 70s, students were asking for better tools for the analysis, assessment, and production of real-life argument about politics and social issues. Such a need was already reflected in several publications in the United States, such as Kahane’s.²⁰ Blair has put it this way: “informal logic is not strictly-speaking informal. And if you understand by logic the study of axiomatised deductive systems, informal logic is not logic.”²¹

The rejection of deductive validity as a goodness criterion aligns informal logic with Perelman’s thinking and hence with a basic insight into the ancient rhetorical tradition. There is also a shared interest between rhetoric and informal logic in considering and appraising current, authentic specimens of argumentation. But in many other respects there is less overlap. Informal logic is primarily geared towards analysis, less towards production. Its exponents tend to cast about for a replacement for the discarded, dichotomous valid/invalid criterion, but, being philosophers, they tend to come up with related, allegedly objective concepts such as “cogency” or “sufficiency” that are in effect as dichotomous as “validity,” only less clear – as, for example, in Govier (1992), an otherwise admirably clear discussion by one of the strongest theorists among the informal logicians. They are skeptical of a more graded argument appraisal and even more of admitting anything resembling subjectivity in it – which to

20 Kahane (1971).

21 Blair (2015) 28.

rhetoricians seems inevitable when value premises are involved, given the different value “hierarchies” of individuals. Philosophers, including the informal logicians most of the time, tend, in Platonic fashion, to see all argumentation as essentially of the same kind, laying down truth as the sole goal of all argument in a way that seems to leave little place for choice or legitimate disagreement in matters of, e.g., politics or ethics. Most of their references and invitations to rhetoric imply a definition of rhetoric as argument with effectiveness as its aim.

In the loosely connected group of informal logicians, the one with the strongest grounding in ancient rhetoric and classics generally is Christopher Tindale. His view of the relationship between “argumentation” and “rhetoric” shows as much influence from Aristotle as from Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. His emphasis is on rhetorical argumentation being “always ‘in audience.’”²² Seeing the concept of rhetoric as a *dynamis*, a “capacity,” as Aristotle says (*Rh.* 1355b), implies its being not just “the driving force of an active rhetorical agent,” but also a corresponding capacity in the audience “to recognise rhetorical messages and judge them in line with our own interest and desires. In this way resulting choices are our own – audiences are persuaded not passively.”²³

The University of Amsterdam is home to an active and prolific group of scholars who study argumentation, primarily following principles laid down in the “pragma-dialectical” approach to argumentation. In several ways the activities and publications emanating from the Amsterdam school have been instrumental in powering and disseminating argumentation research and pedagogy internationally, through publications, journals, conferences, etc. The pragma-dialectical approach, founded by Frans van Eemeren and the late Rob Grootendorst, with the former as its central figure, was established in the early 1980s with inspiration from new developments in logic and the philosophy of science. It is an interesting development that since around 2000, the school has made increasing use of the term “rhetoric” in publications and in the naming of research groups, study programs, etc., whereas in its first phase, up until ca. 2000, rhetoric as a concept and a tradition was often treated with suspicion and cursorily brushed aside. In the current version of pragma-dialectical theory and pedagogy there is a strong attempt to integrate rhetorical insights (e.g., van Eemeren 2017). However, in pragma-dialectical work, rhetoric is implicitly defined as argumentation aiming at effectiveness, whereas the “dialectical” component of the approach, included in the name of the school, has to do not just with the views of all argument as dialogical but also with the need

22 Tindale (2004) 152.

23 Tindale (2015) 43.

for argumentation to be reasonable and, to secure that, rule-governed. In its post-2000 version, pragma-dialectics (articulated in writings by van Eemeren and the late Peter Houtlosser, e.g., [1999] and [2000]) recognises that argumentation in practical contexts can and should be both reasonable and effective; the contribution of “rhetorical insights” concerns the latter requirement. Rhetoric becomes near-synonymous with what pragma-dialecticians call “strategic manoeuvring,” i.e., arguing in order to “win” arguments, but constrained by dialectical rules which secure that this rhetorical aim is not “derailed” into unreasonableness.

The theory states that strategic manoeuvring primarily takes three forms: (1) topical selection, (2) audience adaptation, and (3) stylistic devices. Any rhetorician will recognise these three components as identical with an important part of the classical rhetorical doctrine. It is thus clear that pragma-dialectical thinking about argumentation draws a great deal of insight from ancient rhetoric, as it also professes to do (see, e.g., van Eemeren 2013). Where the main discrepancy arises between the pragma-dialectical conception of rhetoric and the rhetorical tradition is – once again – in the definition of rhetoric itself. Pragma-dialectics sees rhetoric as defined (1) by its alleged *aim* (to be effective) and (2) by its characteristic *means* (those which constitute “strategic manoeuvring”); by contrast, the rhetorical tradition, as sketched in this chapter, sees the *differentia specifica* of rhetorical argumentation in the *domain* with which it is concerned: it is argument relating to *action* – which is why it becomes imperative to influence the *will* of others. In this domain, the use of topical selection, audience adaptation, stylistic devices, and everything else from the rhetorical storehouse becomes relevant precisely because, as we have seen, demonstrative proof is unavailable. Considered this way, the strategic *aim* of rhetorical argumentation and its distinctive *means* are merely corollaries of rhetoric’s essential nature; they are, in Aristotle’s terminology as used in the theory of the predicables (*Topics* 101b), mere *ideai* that follow from its *diaphora*: its *domain*, centred on action and the influencing of the will.

5 Argumentation Theory and Pedagogy Outside the “Schools”

Argumentation theory and pedagogy have become central concerns of an international community of scholars, not least thanks to the activities of the “informal logicians” and the pragma-dialectical school. The series of conferences that have been organised by, respectively, the “Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation” (OSSA) and the Amsterdam-based “International Society for the Study of Argumentation” (ISSA) deserve special mention, and

recently other series of argumentation conferences and seminars have also emerged. Scholars outside the established “schools” and conceptual frameworks have taken up argumentation as a central concern in various countries and several academic centres.

Argumentation dans la langue (ADL) is a term chosen by the linguists Oswald Ducrot and Jean-Claude Anscombre for an approach to language description that sees the fundamental function of language as being argumentative, rather than referential (e.g., Anscombre and Ducrot [1989]). For example, they would say that the meaning of a word like *expensive* is not essentially to refer to the specific cost of something, but is determined by the claims that the word can be used to *argue* for – such as “X is expensive, so we should not buy X.” From a certain stage in the development of their theory, they adopted the rhetorical term *topoi* as a key concept. The meaning of *expensive* then becomes all those *topoi* that may be invoked when using *expensive* to argue for a claim; for example, “If it is expensive, it must be good,” “If it’s expensive, we should not buy it.” In adopting the term *topoi*, the authors are, by their own admission, “reprenant de façon peut-être abusive l’expression aristotélicienne.”²⁴ It might have been more accurate to choose the Aristotelian term *doxai*. The notion is also related to Toulmin’s “warrants.” *Topoi*, in this sense, provides another way of saying that a word or expression has a certain “argumentative orientation” (as Ducrot and Anscombre originally said) – without having a specific referential meaning.

Several scholars writing in French work on argumentation in ways that, like ADL, straddle the dividing line between rhetoric and linguistics. Ruth Amossy, Emmanuelle Danblon, Marianne Doury, and Christian Plantin are among the foremost names. In their work, doctrines and ideas from ancient rhetoric are mostly present as undercurrents. Michel Meyer, successor to Perelman’s chair at the University of Brussels, is a prolific thinker who in his work attempts a new, systematic identification of rhetoric and rhetorical argumentation based on a broad definition of rhetoric as “the negotiation of distance between subjects” with regard to a question or problem.²⁵ Argumentation is one subdomain of the field thus circumscribed, and much of the thinking about it is based on classical notions, mainly in Aristotle.

In the German-speaking countries, *topoi* and topical thinking, as found in ancient rhetoric, have been adduced in a different way as a resource for a modern argumentation theory. The Austrian linguist and classicist Manfred Kienpointner has been a key figure. Also, he has defended what he calls

24 Anscombre and Ducrot (1989) 88.

25 Meyer (1996) 334.

“rhetorical relativism” against indictment from the pragma-dialecticians, basing his case on linguistic pragmatics as well as on the ancient rhetorical tradition of the Sophists, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian: rhetoric, he argues, may be seen “as a means to transcend relativism by supporting a synthesis of contrary opinions via pro- and contra-argumentation. But this requires political systems where all parties involved have equal chances to argue pro and contra.”²⁶ Theodor Viehweg (1907–1988) is foremost among the jurists, primarily in Germany, who have based theories of legal argument on ancient rhetorical thinking, as he did in his dissertation on topics and law (1953 and several later editions). Another figure is Joseph Kopperschmidt, who was among the first to suggest seeing ancient rhetoric as a resource for argumentation theory (1981). Rapp and Wagner (2013) have explored the many ways in which modern argumentation theory has drawn, and may continue to draw, on Aristotle’s thinking.

In Britain, the Scottish jurist Neil MacCormick (1941–2009) asserted the similarity between legal and rhetorical argument (2005). An example of close adaptation of classical rhetorical doctrine to work on argumentation is due to the classicist Malcolm Heath, who translated and explicated Hermogenes’ work on *stasis* (1995) and put it to use in argumentation pedagogy. Heath finds it an “especially powerful resource for rhetorical invention”:²⁷ “the ancient rhetoricians who devised (and went on using) this system of invention knew their business. This form of issue-theory enables students quickly to start generating arguments that have some merit.”²⁸

6 Untapped Resources

An overall impression that will remain with anyone who, with a passable knowledge of the ancient rhetorical tradition, surveys the contemporary scene of argumentation pedagogy and theory is that although in many individual scholars we will find ideas drawn from ancient rhetoric insightfully reinterpreted and put to use, there is still much of value in that tradition that remains unexploited in modern times and much that could be more fully exploited, as well as a good deal that has been superficially understood or even distorted. As we have seen, the Platonic habit of defining rhetoric by the rhetor’s alleged aim to “win,” i.e., persuade by any means, continues, sometimes in watered-down

26 Kienpointner (1991) 50.

27 Heath (2007) 109.

28 Heath (2007) 120.

versions, to this day. Correspondingly, there has been a neglect of the definitions offered by rhetorical thinkers themselves – which tend to see rhetoric and rhetorical argument as discursive practice centred on issues of collective action where demonstrative proof is not available. Many contemporary theorists and educators in the field of argumentation seem simply not to have read the rhetorical tradition with care and without prejudice. That goes for many who offhandedly decry rhetoric as well as for many who claim to have integrated its insights. This may be a somewhat disconcerting conclusion to the present overview; but on the other hand, it is a stimulating thought that there is still much in the ancient rhetorical tradition to bring out of its comparative oblivion.

Among the valuable intellectual resources in ancient rhetoric that are still inadequately known or underexploited by current argumentation theory and pedagogy are the following:

The anonymous *Rhetoric to Alexander*, possibly earlier than Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, has been decried as “relativistic” even by classicists (e.g., Fuhrmann [1984], who also edited a scholarly edition of the work), but it can also be seen as a source of topical invention for practical and political argument. (On the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, see also chapter 6 in the present volume.) The Dutch linguist and rhetorician Antoine Braet has been one of the few to show positive interest in this work (1996).

Aristotle's pathbreaking definition of rhetoric has only been partly absorbed by argumentation theorists. While many are aware that he defines rhetoric, not as persuasion *per se*, but as the capacity to “find the available means of persuasion” (1355b) in a given case, hardly any have noticed that he connects rhetoric firmly to collective decisions, i.e., to the things on which we “deliberate” (*bouleuein*; *Rh.* 1357a); this concept, together with *proairesis*, choice, further connects rhetoric with ethics and politics in Aristotle's work, as well as in later rhetorical thinkers, as emphasised by Kock (2009, 2017). Unfortunately, Aristotelian experts who have studied the philosopher's ethical and political works mostly ignore the *Rhetoric*, and rhetoricians who study that book rarely relate it to the ethical and political works – with Eugene Garver (1995) and Martha Nussbaum (1996) as notable exceptions.

Also, Aristotle's thinking on the relevance for argument of the emotions in book II of the *Rhetoric* is a resource insufficiently tapped. Here, there is a need for theory that seeks to specify *when* and *how* emotion may be relevant in argument, instead of seeing it as either paramount or dangerously irrelevant, with Fortenbaugh's analysis (1970) as a suitable point of departure. The predominance of purely emotional rhetoric in, e.g., contemporary populist rhetoric underscores this need.

Cicero's works on rhetorical theory and his practical oratory could be more firmly connected with his ethical and social thinking, where his ideas of *controversia* and argument *in utramque partem* might be seen as integral to a "pluralist" theory of ethics and social action.

The works ascribed to Hermogenes, the main rhetorical theorist of the East Roman Empire, are all available in modern translations by now,²⁹ but they are far from fully exploited, perhaps not even known, by argumentation scholars within or without the rhetorical community. Hermogenes' work on "types of style" (*ideai*) presents a fruitful, alternative way of approaching the stylistic aspects of persuasive discourse, to supplement or replace more simplistic doctrines of "levels" of style. His elaborate version of the *stasis* system could be a rich source of inspiration for argumentation pedagogy and theory.³⁰ His work on *ergasia*, the "working up" of arguments (in *Peri Heuresēōs*), is, as Conley has noted, "a long way from the sort of syllogism-based notion of argument familiar from, say, Aristotle's *Rhetoric*,"³¹ but argumentation theorists seem unaware of it. (More on Hermogenes' works can be found in chapter 6 in the present volume.)

Theories of *stasis* (or *status*), as in Hermogenes, are just one branch of topical thinking in ancient rhetoric; it offers several other practically untapped sources of potential inspiration for modern argumentation theorists interested in types and typologies of argument, as studies by Rigotti (2009), Rigotti and Morasso (2010), and Rigotti and Greco (2019) have shown. Also, as suggested in Braet (2004, 2005), contemporary theories of "argument schemes," advanced primarily by Douglas Walton (e.g., 2013), might find firmer conceptual foundations here and become more systematic and comprehensive.

These are only examples of ancient rhetorical resources that argumentation theorists and educators might still exploit to their own and their students' advantage. They would gain a deeper and more specific understanding of what rhetoricians have always emphasised: the inextricable involvement of argumentation in civic life and human action.

29 Heath (1995); Patillon (1997); Kennedy (2005); Wooten (1987).

30 On argumentation pedagogy: Heath (1995). On argumentation theory: Braet (1987); Hohmann (1989); Hoppmann (2008); Kock (2012).

31 Conley (1990) 56.

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Ancient Forensic Rhetoric in a Modern Classroom

Sima Avramović and Gerhard Thür

1 Law Students, Courts, and Rhetoric¹

At the end of class, on the day we held an Athenian law-court simulation at the University of Belgrade's Faculty of Law, a student of mine quoted an introductory monologue from Shakespeare's *As You Like It*: "All the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players." The parallel with the different roles that a man plays during his life in Shakespeare's play and the different roles that a citizen plays in the Athenian city-state (*polis*) was obvious. Indeed, the ancient Athenian court was a stage, a theatre, and rhetoric was a part of it. All citizens of democratic Athens who reached legal adulthood were players and parties in courts, but also in the Assembly, democratic executive bodies, local territorial or remaining tribal-based bodies like the *phratries* or *demes* etc. Athenian citizens had "their exits and their entrances, and one man in his time plays many parts," as Shakespeare went on to say. By holding short-term office in courts and executive bodies (usually lasting one year), Athens' direct democratic system enabled every free adult male citizen to perform a certain role in the city-state governance, at least as a lifelong member of the Assembly or by holding different offices quite frequently.²

Acting as a democratic *zōion politikon* and being involved in the political and legal context of the city-state in Athenian democracy, entailed primarily verbal communication in decision-making processes. In order to participate in public life, everyone had to be a *rhētōr*, a more or less successful and skilled public speaker. Nevertheless this word was usually applied mostly to

1 This and the following section belong to S. Avramović.

2 In a relatively small city-state which only had a few tens of thousands of adult male citizens with full civil rights, more than a thousand citizens held some type of office each year, usually chosen by lot and changed frequently. In addition, the Athenian supreme court (*Heliaia*), which was from the 4th century BCE in charge of almost all the civil and penal cases, consisted of six thousand members, chosen annually by lot among eligible citizens over the age of thirty. The *Heliaia* was divided into chambers of 201, 401, 501, 1,001, etc., depending on the type of the case, and sessions were held in an open space, under the sun (*hēlios*). Those institutions enabled every citizen to be engaged in some form of democratic political process throughout his life. Among many books on participatory Athenian democracy, see particularly Hansen (1991); Sinclair (1988); Thorley (2005).

professional politicians – orators. Proper and clever speech was expected not only in the Assembly and other political and administrative bodies, but an individual had to be an even more convincing and skilled public speaker at the popular court before lay judges. In general, oratorical traditions in the ancient Greek city-states were oral. When written laws appeared at some point,³ the importance of oral presentation – considering both individual and general social issues – remained the principal method of persuasion, predominantly in the courts, regardless of whether it was a democratic city-state or not.⁴

Court speeches written by professional speechwriters (*logographers*) in democratic Athens are an immense resource not only for legal history, but also for the art and theory of persuasion.⁵ Surviving ancient Athenian court speeches were written by *logographers* for particular litigants in court cases intended to be delivered in the *heliaia*. Both plaintiff and defendant were obliged to present their case in person and speak without any support of professional lawyers during the hearing. The only backing during the trial could come from *synēgoros* (co-speaker), a layperson, who was usually an unpaid friend. The *synēgoros* was supposed to give statements mostly about the character and general behaviour of the party or his opponent, in contrast to a witness, who had a duty to present the facts of the case. The preparation of the court speech was, therefore, necessarily supported by a *logographer*, skilled in both the law and rhetorical matters. He had a complicated duty to write a court speech for his client, without *precisely* knowing the opponent's arguments, approach, and tactics, even though the opponents would present their evidence at the *anakrisis*, so one side would have a *general* idea what the other side was going to argue. This general impression about the speaker and his overall appearance and performance were often as important as the arguments of the parties, law, and equity. Audience reaction and that of the jury in the Athenian courts in the 4th century BCE was often impacted by interpretative elements and the persuasiveness of the speaker rather than by facts. This is, indeed, the case among the students today who take part in an ancient Athenian court case simulation. Performance and presentation of the case is of vital importance, particularly in jurisdictions with the jury system like Athens, as well as in common law jurisdictions today.

3 Gagarin (2008).

4 Already the famous Homeric trial scene in the *Iliad* depicts an oral altercation between the parties in a homicide case: see further Avramović (2017). Also, the oldest surviving ancient Greek (and European) written codification of laws from the aristocratic city of Gortyn at Crete (the so-called Code of Gortyn, mid-5th century BCE), attests that litigants were orally debating in courts: see Gagarin (2001) 49.

5 Serafim (2017).

The number of surviving ancient Athenian court speeches, the professional excellence of their writers, and the variety and number of seminal topics they discuss inspired me to apply a new teaching approach at the University of Belgrade's Faculty of Law more than twenty years ago. That line of thinking was inspired by moot courts or mock trial competitions, which were thoroughly developed in recent decades, mostly in US law schools.⁶ Consequently, the Faculty of Law students in Belgrade were invited and encouraged to test their rhetorical skills in a simulation of Athenian court cases, relying on documented, real, and preserved forensic speeches. This extracurricular activity within the Comparative Legal Traditions course stresses the pertinence of ancient Athenian legal history today, shows how it can be presented in a modern way, and demonstrates how useful it is for a contemporary student to assess and use legal facts and develop performance skills.⁷

The students were enthusiastic and excited to assume and act out roles as litigants in Athenian cases and they undertook considerable effort to improve their appearance, performance, and verbal communication skills. The outcome was particularly impressive with the first-year students, newcomers without prior experience in rhetoric or public speaking. I shared my approach with colleagues from other universities, and some of them expressed interest in the method. Professors Gerhard Thür from Munich, Graz, and Vienna, Alberto Maffi from Milan and Trieste, Andriaan Lanni from Harvard,⁸ Kalliopi Papakonstantinou from Thessaloniki, and colleagues from ex-Yugoslav universities have tested this model with good results, and some have expanded it to their teaching of Roman law and conduct a similar in-class staging of legal cases.⁹ Various student competitions from different universities were occa-

6 There is a slight difference between the two: a *moot court* is mostly connected to the simulation of appellate court procedure or arbitration cases, including drafting memorials and defending memorials orally, while a *mock trial* simulates a jury trial and bench trial. These simulations usually do not include testimonies, witnesses, cross-examinations, and evidence presentations, and mostly focus on the application of the law. In our ancient Greek simulation cases, in accordance with the Athenian judiciary procedure and the jury trial system, those evidentiary elements and issues of fact play an important role, particularly from the rhetorical point of view. Some colleagues compare this teaching method with the so-called *legal clinics*, now a popular extracurricular activity at law schools all over the world, although within legal clinics students usually work on real cases with real clients.

* S. Avramović.

7 Avramović (2002), (2010).

8 For a brief report about the Harvard attempt, see London (2006) with a comment by A. Lanni that "re-enactment of a Greek trial is perhaps the most vivid way for students to get a feel for the procedures that governed Athenian justice."

9 Thür (2006), (2018).

sionally organised. Their outcome was not only the exchange of experiences about the teaching method, but they always ended with discussions about the importance of rhetoric in court speeches.¹⁰ It became evident that classical rhetoric could be a very useful tool in legal education today as a way of learning through hands-on experience.

2 Belgrade Approach: Theatre-Like Process

The chief pedagogical goal of the ancient court case simulation was to encourage students not only to learn history and theory, but also to understand legal phenomena and develop their practical abilities. It includes organising a theatre-like environment as close as possible to the one in the Athenian court, with the use of a water clock (*klepsydra*) which measures the set time for speeches of both parties, voting by two voting-disks (*psēphoi*) with short pegs running through their centres (one peg with a hole in it and the other solid), which prevents the public from seeing how the judges vote in a voting urn.¹¹ Students usually wear ancient togas (by simply wearing a white sheet over their clothes), use an improvised *klepsydra* (usually clay garden pots), *psēphoi* (usually drilled and undrilled coins), and urns (usually made of cardboard, one painted in bronze). Sometimes they inherit these “court devices” from previous generations or simply raise hands to vote when there is not enough time. In any case, all members of the group are involved in the case as judges, while some of them are selected to be the parties, witnesses, *synēgoroi*, the presiding court officer, etc. They get their cases about a month ahead, which are selected

10 The last event was organised as part of the Sommerseminar *Recht und Magie* [Law and Magic] held at the University of Belgrade's Faculty of Law on 28–30 April 2018, see Thür, Avramović, and Katančević (2020). It was based on the Roman case “Against Apuleius,” depicting an event in the life of Apuleius, a famous Latin prose writer, when he was accused of using magic to seduce a wealthy widow. Two teams participated in the case (one from Vienna and the other from Belgrade's Faculty of Law) with role-playing by students Helmut Lotz and Karin Wiedergut (Vienna), Veljko Milosević and Djordje Stepić (Belgrade). The audience (in the role of judges) regularly votes for the team with a better performance, independent of scholarly perfectionism.

11 The voting procedure in ancient Athens was very curious: judges voted by holding the ballot with a thumb over one end of the peg and a forefinger over the other, allowing them to hide whether it is with a hole or solid. They would hold one ballot in each hand, and put the ballots in a bronze or a wooden urn. The bronze urn was shaped so as to enable judges to put only one ballot in it, as only those ballots were counted as decisive. The solid disc was a vote for the defendant and the hollow one for the plaintiff. The second ballot was put into the wooden urn and discarded, with a simple majority deciding the outcome.

by a professor out of the many interesting surviving speeches of ancient court speechwriters. Students then divide the roles of plaintiff and defendant, prepare their colleagues for different characters in the process, and the students' legal theatre is set to proceed.

Students take their roles seriously, enthusiastically, at times quite emotionally, much like real actors in a play. They start immersing themselves in their roles before "the trial," but also go on to discuss it with their colleagues even days after the simulation ends. In order to stimulate students' legal reasoning, imagination, and rhetorical skills, they are allowed to include different elements, documents and other proof not included in the original ancient speech, which serve as a background and fit the logic of the case and the relevant legal system. Authenticity of the case is of course important, but allowing a bit more freedom when it comes to details helps students to learn in practice the most important general procedures better than from books. While encouraged to keep within the law and spirit of ancient Athens, students do not have to follow strictly the rules of these judicial procedures, particularly as they changed slightly during the century from which the forensic speeches date (between 420–320 BCE).

For example, according to the ancient Athenian procedure, parties had an opportunity to present two speeches each – the first as the main, longer speech, and the second as a short response. A statement by witnesses and evidence could only be presented during the main speech. The statement was written in advance so that a witness had only to verify his statement. However, we combine the previous procedural approach including oral statement by witnesses, which was in use before the 4th century BCE, with written witness statements to enable more emotional and vivid setting. We do not apply cross-examination, as it was not widely used in the Athenian court, but different challenges and direct questions to the speaker by the public are allowed. Bearing in mind the famous Athenian passion for lawsuits and their litigiousness, so well documented in many sources,¹² one could imagine that it was not possible to prevent the public from interrupting the proceedings. It could dramatise the case, make it more vibrant and attractive, it gives a chance to the student-speaker to react rhetorically. Many students create a dramatic appearance and scene which make an impression on the audience. In that way, students learn both legal history and rhetoric in practice.¹³

12 Most exploited in that context is the famous dog-trial scene and its political and social significance in Aristophanes' *Wasps*, vv. 891–1008. Detailed analysis in Olson (1996) 129–150. See also Todd (1993) 147–154; Christ (1998); Carey, Giannadaki, Griffith-Williams (2018).

13 Many interesting questions about procedural aspects of ancient Athenian trial appear through court role-play by students, including some that traditional scholars did not think about or have certain answers to: see Avramović (2002) 192.

Once the trial is over, discussion follows about the strong and weak points of all participants, both from a legal point of view (pertaining mostly to the procedural and logical inaccuracies) and issues of facts, but usually most comments concern the trial's presentation and rhetorical points. The performance, self-confidence, and persuasiveness of the litigants and witnesses are frequently the first elements to be examined. Students are expected to use proper gestures and body language (facial expressions, eye contact with the audience, and movement), manner of speaking, voice volume, articulation and pronunciation, rhetorical pauses, speech strategy, proper selection and disposition of arguments, the use of visual proof and supporting materials (different objects, documents, examples, testimonies, etc.), appropriate appeals to the emotions of the public, more or less successful ways of avoiding unpleasant issues, effective reaction to challenges, etc. All these issues are carefully commented on, helping students to improve their rhetorical skills. Students learn how to handle the audience and how to speak without reluctance and shame, and they come to understand the power of effective speech delivery and arguments in trials. In short, thanks to the simulation of ancient trials students have the possibility to test different rhetorical components without serious consequences as in real-life legal procedures. Due to its effectiveness, the simulation of ancient trials has become popular and an important part of the legal history teaching for the entire faculty.

The outcome is that students often come to the conclusion that it is not only the facts of the case but how the case is presented that has the decisive impact. Law students understand that persuasive powers are sometimes more important than the legal grounds, particularly when lay judges are deciding the case. They learn in taking on these roles how to keep their speech within the acceptable time limits, how to find the strongest evidence, and how to best arrange and represent available arguments. And, of course, the students enjoy practicing, inventive and proper use of humour, as well as many other attractive rhetorical elements.

Every single court case and forensic speech in all jurisdictions inevitably involves a rhetorical approach. Common law-courts with the jury are a specific legal theatre *per se*. But the ancient Athenian law-court with hundreds of lay judges was a rhetorical theatre *par excellence*. Training law students in applied rhetoric as early as possible contributes not only to their professional maturity but also to their awareness of the significance of performance and rhetorical skills. The experience of the members of the Faculty of Law at the University of Belgrade corroborates the view that the ancient Athenian court-simulation teaching method gives the best results with the first-year students, as it combines both demands of legal reasoning and proper expression of arguments at an early stage of their academic growth. It can be well adapted to

the environment of the Roman law-court,¹⁴ as well as to other legal systems in history. It is very helpful for students' future studies, particularly for the moot court students in various fields. Those who participated in the "Athenian legal theatre" are regularly among the most successful students in international moot court competitions. Furthermore, moot court and mock trial trainers, and the participating students, often ask for the assistance of professors and students with experience in the ancient court simulations. With their experience in the ancient court simulation, students pay more attention to their performance and often report that it was an important part of their success.

3 (Former) Graz Approach: Sophisticated Preparation¹⁵

Like Sima Avramović with his books on *Isaeus* (1988 and 1997), I spent some years of my youth studying the Athenian court speeches, resulting in *Evidence* (*Beweisführung* 1977). So, from 1983 onwards a fruitful cooperation started. No wonder I got fascinated by his idea of simulating the Athenian court procedures with his students, and I partly imitated it in my own way between 2004 and 2008.¹⁶ Then teaching in Graz, my idea was to introduce the students to all stages of preparing and performing an Athenian court speech.

In Athenian courts, a case was decided by the facts. The *logographoi* masterfully manipulated the relevant facts. Statutes quoted by the Athenian litigants are mostly clear and (though sometimes used in a distorted way) seem to fit a case exactly as presented in a speech. It is the facts of the case that usually are disputed. The facts, not law, are the primary topic of oratory. To this day Athenian oratory is useful to every erudite person, not only to law students, because it presents facts in a persuasive way. In everyday life everybody has to convince an "audience," and to be successful in doing so he or she needs to use rational elements (a well-arranged, persuasive narrative) as well as emotional ones. Either method can be studied in classical Greek sources. I have mostly used private speeches in my teachings at the Faculty of Law.

My starting point has been to observe that the *logographoi* rarely resorted to simplistic lies in order to support their clients' positions; instead, they typically created distortions that the audience was largely unable to unravel. They would

¹⁴ Bablitz (2007).

¹⁵ This part belongs to G. Thür.

¹⁶ See Thür (2006), (2014), and (2018).

isolate the facts that belonged together and, by using psychological links, combined individual aspects of an issue that were true on their own, but perhaps not when combined. This art of lying – or manipulation – involved attributing typical psychological motives, personal enmities, greed, etc., to the opponent; there was a broad range of possibilities because a person's actual motives always remained in the dark. Thus, out of a set of true facts the *logographers* shaped an overall impression that was false but met the needs of their client's case. In court, the litigants used this technique of portrayal to their advantage by informing the audience in a thorough but guided manner. Through careful preparation of their speeches, the plaintiffs were able to keep their opponents from swaying the judges with new facts; every relevant fact had to be mentioned somewhere in the plaintiff's speech, but not necessarily in a coherent order. The defendants, on the other hand, by evoking strong emotions tried to highlight different aspects of the case from those their opponents would presumably produce. Because of the Athenian system of litigation by speeches composed in advance, there was no room for direct forensic dispute between the parties. The opportunity of checking each other's positions was given in pre-trial meetings (*anakrisis* and the official *diaita*). Here the litigants had to answer each other's questions and disclose all documentary evidence to be used in court. Given the requirements that Athenian law placed on a particular claim (*dikē*), the true state of the conflict (one party's assertion and the other's counter-assertion) can successfully be reconstructed out of just one oration through a logical synthesis of the details that the speaker reports disparately through what I called "Isolierung der Fakten" (*isolating the facts*).¹⁷

Fast forward to the 21st century and one may ask whether it makes sense to teach our students the sophisticated art of lying by manipulating an audience. Admittedly, detecting the technique of isolating the facts is a rather extreme method for studying classical oratory, combining philological, historical, sociological, and juristic aspects with mass psychology. Searching for the overall intellectual guidelines for court speeches one cannot benefit much from the ancient textbooks (*technai* or *institutiones*). Since every actual case preserved in classical court speeches was different, to achieve this aim an intensive study of forensic practice is necessary. A modern lawyer can profit by isolating the facts only in a very restricted way. Today, through cross-examination and forensic dispute, law-courts are better equipped to find the truth than the ancient Athenian *dikastēria*. In Athens the huge panels of lay judges in private

17 Thür (2018), thoroughly discussed by Plastow (2018).

cases were completely dependent on the opponents' speeches, performed in continuous blocks, which were only interrupted by reading aloud short documents – as strictly observed in the method of lawsuit simulation performed with my students. Nevertheless, in present-day penal cases, every prosecutor or attorney-at-law in his or her summation tries to manipulate the judges by stirring up emotions, in order to stress or diminish the significance of facts, just as Demosthenes or Hyperides did.

Today the art of isolating the facts, and exerting emotional manipulation, survives wherever mass psychology counts, in the fields of both politics and economics. This concerns every citizen. As it is generally known, for generations the most successful players in politics in Europe and the United States¹⁸ have improved their natural abilities by studying classical oratory, and business executives are now trained in emotional "limbic presentation." Therefore, a responsible citizen also needs some knowledge of the tools of oratory and mass psychology in order to penetrate political propaganda and commercial advertising. This ability is a welcome by-product of rhetorical education.

The main goal in my teaching of classical oratory has been to furnish intellectual and formal guidelines of perfect self-portrayal in public speaking and, in the same way, in writing applications and speaking on TV. All of these techniques can be learned by studying and practising the classical art of persuasion. My idea was to practise oratory throughout all stages from *heuresis* (*inventio*) to *hypocrisis* (performing, *actio*, or *pronuntiatio*). The didactic aim was to perform cases preserved in classical literature, according to the pattern of an Athenian trial: adapting the preserved speech and inventing the opposing plea. Thus we strictly observed the following rules: a written *enklēma* (complaint), disclosure of all documents in *anakrisis* (a pre-trial session), a strict time limit in speaking controlled by a *klepsydra*, a prohibition on interrupting the speeches (unless by uproars, *thorybos*, in the audience – the speaker has to learn to cope with this behaviour), the use of testimonial depositions only as short, written documents read out loud – that means no oral performance by and questioning of the witnesses – followed by secret voting with pebbles immediately after the speeches.

Preparing such a performance in a seminar takes a whole term. The first step is that all participants (10–15 law and classics students) analyse the chosen Athenian court speech, e.g., the murder case in Lysias 1. In term papers, several students reconstruct and discuss the legal, historical, and sociological background of the case, the facts presented by the speaker, his legal arguments

18 E.g., for President Barack Obama, see Higgins (2008).

(either strong or weak), and the possible counterarguments of the opponent. Thereby the students also learn how to tackle manipulations by isolating the facts. Then, the rest of the group is separated into the roles of jurisdictional staff (presiding magistrate and court secretary), and the two parties, plaintiff and defendant with the supporters on both sides. Both sides, respectively, draft the documents of complaint (*enklēma*) and defence (*antigraphē*). The parties separately sketch the outlines of their arguments, check the statutes (*nomoi*) and draft witness depositions (*martyriai*) – thus far the stage of invention (*inventio*). Later, after the *anakrisis* (in which the litigants formally question each other and disclose their written documents to their opponents respectively), the speakers attend to composition and style: *dispositio* and *elocutio*. Finally, they learn their speeches by heart (*memoria*) and, at the end of the term, perform the trial (*pronuntiatio*) before a public audience.

The performance is always a great event that takes place in a larger classroom of approximately seventy seats. Students from different fields are invited to attend the trial. Fifty individuals among those watching the mock trial (the figure of the smallest Athenian law-court, and the limit of our equipment), randomly chosen, get “judge tablets” and take their seats in the front rows. Thus, the litigants fighting for life or death are confronted by a real, critical audience. They keep to the wording of their well-composed speeches; average Athenian litigants did so too, and normally did not risk improvising. Athenian judges were very accustomed to rhetorical performance and did not forgive the smallest of mistakes. Therefore, intellectual, emotional, and technical preparations were of the same importance. The duty of the presiding magistrate (*archōn*, one of the seminar students) was – and remains – only opening the session, giving the floor, taming uproars, and directing the voting procedure. Due to different pebbles for guilty and innocent (see above), voting is secret and counting the votes takes time. The outcome, which is eagerly anticipated and fills the air with tension, brings either a great exultation or disappointment. As in the Belgrade approach, the majority of votes is decisive.

This, to a certain extent theatre-like performance of an Athenian lawsuit, is a passionate introduction to ancient legal history. Everyone, including the audience, takes role-playing seriously, and the participants in the seminar gain some theoretical insight into the psychological background of persuasion techniques. A necessary precondition for a successful spectacle is to provide a short explanation about the procedures of the ancient Athenian lawsuit from the outset. Then the show can begin. The teams are not graded in terms of which one is better, but rather a realistic democratic decision is made between two opposing parties: victory or defeat.

4 Conclusion¹⁹

Fundamentally, both of us pursue the same goal: filling a gap within central-European legal education by exploiting the treasure of ancient Athenian court speeches. Performing such speeches in simulated court cases provides an excellent training in rhetorical skills, completely neglected by law schools (and other) curricula. That said, law schools produce strict, logical, deductive reasoning. However, court speeches are not theoretical academic demonstrations, but rather are transformed into fights for personal recognition. In practice, every lawyer and even an ordinary citizen will come across situations when it is necessary to assert oneself. In the same way, oratory promotes the rational ordering of one's arguments in combination with their emotional value. Studying the antique technique of "manipulating the facts," on the one hand, tempts one to sophisticated lying, but on the other, helps to decode/understand messages in politics and advertising – the antithetical problem of rhetoric since antiquity. In any case, the physician has to know the disease.

Regarding these general thoughts, the differences between the two methods of performing the cases (see the diagram below) seem nearly to vanish. Every professor sets, and hopefully will set, different personal priorities; the two patterns depicted above are certainly not the only possible ones. Certainly, the Belgrade style mainly puts emphasis on emotions. Narrative witness depositions and cross-examination, though unhistorical, make the show more vivid and demand some improvisation. Voting by show of hands, as practised in the Belgrade Summer Seminar 2018, is not authentic but shortens the play. The audience knows all these items very well from (American) court-trial movies and the performance needs no historical introduction.

The historically more authentic Graz style concentrates on the speeches themselves and cancels any accessory part. The course of the trial seems a little strange to a modern audience and needs a historical introduction. With this it reaches exciting highlights. By keeping strictly to previously drafted texts, the litigants, average citizens (like in Athens), learn to understand the demands of facing a critical audience, the crowd of judges. Only extremely gifted speakers (like the student performing the accused "Apuleius" in Belgrade)²⁰ are/were able to reply extemporaneously and still keep to the time allotted for speaking. The court honoured this risk and the excellent acting effort with an acquittal; when the speeches were read verbatim the case seemed less clear. As stated at the beginning of this chapter: "All the world's a stage."

19 G. Thür and S. Avramović.

20 See Thür, Avramović, and Katančević (2020) 192–213.

The Belgrade and Graz models

	The BELGRADE model	The GRAZ model
Preparation	Individual preparation	In a seminar
Performance	Public	Public
Court	Audience = judges	Audience = judges
Speech time	No strict measuring	Measuring with water clock
Witness depositions	Speak freely	Acknowledge a written text read out by the court official
Witness questioning	Cross-examination	None
Voting procedure	Showing of hands	Secret voting with pebbles
Sentence/verdict	Pronouncing the result by the court official who counts hands <i>pro et contra</i>	Pronouncing the score by the court official after the voting pebbles are counted
General intention	Focus on oral performance, vivacity, improvisation	Focus on written preparation and oral performance
Approach	More theatre-like performance	More academic strategy
Final impression	Performance is more important than the historical trial and the facts of the case	Performance tries to keep to the historical case and trial as far as possible

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The Rhetoric of Gender in the *Heroides* of the French Renaissance: Revisiting Female *Exempla*

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Ovid's *Heroides* is a collection of letters written in the 1st century BCE supposedly by women, mainly from Greek mythology.¹ What is striking about this relatively early Ovidian work is that scholars seem to have been indecisive regarding the nature of its literary and extra-literary significance. Are these epistles repetitive and uninteresting elegiac laments of women in love?² Are they mere rhetorical parodies of *suasoriae* and *controversiae*?³ Or perhaps a fascinating literary field of intertextual dialogues, limited nonetheless to reflective adaptations of the myths' Greek originals?⁴ Ovid's *Heroides* have fostered to this day many debates among critics that extend from rhetorical and gendered readings to generic and intertextual interpretations. Despite the thematically rich scholarly interest in this collection, Ovidian readers still hesitate to examine systematically the rhetoric of these feminine laments in context. What encourages the modern reader to contextualise the rhetorical exploration of "feminine" voice in Ovid's *Heroides* is, as I argue in this chapter, the historicised reception of these "female" letters in the literature of the Renaissance.

In the Renaissance, the ancient Graeco-Roman literary *corpus* is revisited in order to serve the pedagogical ends of humanist education, as a prototype of rhetorical models and moral examples.⁵ *Mimēsis* is a major concern of humanist pedagogy, as it privileges, in the form of practical exercises, the recovery and creative appropriation of pre-existing reference sources.⁶ Adapted to suit

1 With the exception of *Letter* 15, "written" by Sappho. Also, the double *Letters* include the epistles of three men, namely Paris, Leander, and Acontius.

2 On the marginalisation of Ovid's elegiac collection of letters, see Farrell (1998) 307.

3 See Sabot (1976) 296–330.

4 See Dangel (2007) 34–35; Jolivet (2001); Spentzou (2003). On the reprise of the Greek texts in Ovid's letters, see, for example, Jouteur (2009) 67–88.

5 On humanist education, see Witt (1982) 1–35, who refers to this grammatical-philological movement as coexisting with *ars dictaminis*. See also Grafton and Jardine (1982) 51–80 on its debated nature, goals, and triumphs. On rhetoric in the Renaissance, see Rigolot (1982) 25.

6 On the significance of *mimēsis* in the Renaissance and its definitions, see Hutson (2006) 80–109. See Boutcher (2000) 27 on examples of Ovid's epistolary tales in male education as the basis for early exercises in letter writing.

the moral tastes of the French Renaissance, a period marked by fundamental intellectual, political, and social changes, the *Heroides* inspire the production of translations, editions, and manuscripts more than any other Ovidian work.⁷ “One feature of the collection which may account for its popularity in this period is its ‘overt rhetoricity,’” White argues.⁸ The epistolographic exploration of gendered rhetoric reappears in the form of both fictional female writing and writing about fictional women as a conjunction of voice and subject matter⁹ in the works of quite a few Renaissance writers who reshape the accounts of the *Heroides*,¹⁰ inspired by ancient rhetoric whilst nurtured by a culture that informs the language of misogyny.

In the following pages, I show that the portrayals of fictional heroines in the Ovidian collection are revisited in the literature of the French Renaissance as rhetorical *exempla*, and that Ovid is perceived by the Renaissance authors not only as a love-poet but also as a rhetorician of gender. According to the traditional division of rhetoric, the Aristotelian paradigm (παράδειγμα) is part of *inventio*, whereas Quintilian’s *exemplum* falls within the scope of *probatio artificialis*.¹¹ Whether its function is to convince, as evidence, or to exhort, as a model for imitation or deterrence, the *exemplum* participates in literary discourse as a rhetorical technique of characterisation.¹² In the case of female rhetorical *exempla*, the indirect attribution of characteristics through the metaphorical technique of paradigm is further shaped with traits of gender, a system that is socially constructed, with the intention to determine the cultural limits of femininity and masculinity.¹³ As shown in the following pages, the Ovidian text presents gender roles in a way that is open to scrutiny, an ambivalence that is evident in the contextualisation of women’s portrayals from the

7 See LeBlanc (1996) 71. “To understand this aberration of aesthetic taste we must look beyond literature to the political and religious world,” mentions Wells (1894) 11, in reference to the Renaissance as a period of unrest. See Van Orden (2001) 818 and Scollen (1967) 20–31 on the popularity of Ovid’s *Heroides* in the Renaissance. Cf. Brown (2010a) 184 and White (2009) 17.

8 White (2009) 29.

9 Van Orden (2001) 818.

10 On expressions of misogyny in the Renaissance, see Nash (1997) 379–410, who mentions at p. 384: “The Bible was considered a valuable and reliable source in the Renaissance by many defenders as well as attackers of women. Misogynists and profeminists alike looked to theology and the Bible to supply them with arguments and anecdotes and examples of both bad and good women.” On women’s explicitly claimed privilege of authorial publication in early modern literature, see Gallagher (2000) 309. On the literary images of women in the Renaissance, see Lazard (1985).

11 Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.6. See a discussion in Demoen (1997) 129. Cf. Price (1975).

12 De Temmerman (2010) 29; Demoen (1997) 126–127.

13 On a historically rounded examination of gender in antiquity, see Holmes (2012).

realm of myth to the historical reality of the court in early modern literary texts. I, eventually, put forward the claim that the Ovidian representation of women participates in the refashioning of female exemplary behaviour in Renaissance letter writing, strategically serving their authors' political agendas.

In section 1, I examine passages from the epistles of Andrelini (c.1462–1518), an Italian poet who writes under the name of Anne de Bretagne, with the aim of praising the King Louis XII.¹⁴ By focusing on the mythologising of historical events, such as the triumphal celebration of the king's Venetian victory, I shed light on the controversial depiction of the queen. I show that the chaste and faithful wife *exemplum*, which alludes to Penelope's Ovidian illustration, is interwoven in Andrelini's portrayal of Anne de Bretagne with that of the powerful woman, an example which reflects the well-known, anti-exemplary character of Medea in Ovid's *Letter* 12. Gender terms and images serve as rhetorical ornaments and may be employed for character delineation as constituents of *topoi* and as devices of *insinuatio*.¹⁵ The study of such terms and images, in passages that describe fictional and historical women in mourning or in celebration, invites us to see the reception of Ovid's female portrayal in the French exploration of elegiac-like laments through the merging of conflictual rhetorical *exempla* that are assimilated: whether in the foreground or in the background, through name mentioning or allusion, they lend, as shall be argued, different interpretations to the meaning of the text.

In section 2, I examine the *Quatre Epistres d'Ovide* by André de la Vigne (1470–1526)¹⁶ – secretary to the Duke of Savoy in 1496, court poet to Charles VIII and then to Queen Anne, as well as chronicler to Francois I – and in particular the account of Philistine in “De Philistine à Elinius,” in comparison with Phyllis' and Ariadne's accounts (Ovid, *Heroides* 2 and 10 respectively), to discuss the reception of rhetorical anti-*exempla* in female epitaphs. The reception of such epitaphs is studied as a response to Ovid's letters, and, therefore, as part of the “reply literature” of the Renaissance; with reference to the *Contrepistres d'Ovide* by Michel Amboise,¹⁷ who penned a male version of the *Heroides*. With a focus on *Letter* 21 of the Ovidian collection, a reply letter presumably written by Cydippe, I show that the epistolographic reply concept is already explored in Ovid's “female” laments. Most likely composed during

14 Mazzuchelli (1753); Tournoy-Thoen (1985–1987) 53–56; Tiley (1904) 143.

15 Santoro L'Hoir (1992) 1.

16 On André de la Vigne, see Scollen (1967) 75. See also Zumthor *et al.* (1981) 494 and de Kerdaniel (1919).

17 On Michel Amboise, see LeBlanc (1996) 76. See also Goujet (2009) 327–358; Harf-Lancner *et al.* (2009) 80; LeBlanc (1995) 192.

Ovid's *relegatio* at Tomi,¹⁸ the final letter presents allusions to the poet's strategic request for salvation, further developed in his *Tristia*. I suggest, finally, that the contextualisation of female rhetorical *exempla* in Ovid's letter writing acts as a means of persuasion, for the author's literary survival as well as the restoration of justice for both the exiled poet and his fictional heroines, that may have served as an allusive rhetorical paradigm for the composition of early modern replies to the ancient poet's work, life, and death. Indicative are the historical fictions of two 17th-century French writers, Jean Binard¹⁹ and Marie-Catherine de Villegieu,²⁰ who revisit, in *Les Regrets d'Ovide*, and *Les Exilés de la cour d'Auguste* (1672–1678), respectively, the exiled poet's myth and reality to save him from banishment.

With emphasis on the intermingling of rhetorical theory with literary representations of women, I explore the Ovidian “cross-voicing” in the female *prosōpopoiia* of early modern literature, in order to provide examples of literary *imitatio* and eventually to show that the study of female rhetorical *exempla* and anti-*exempla* is crucial for our understanding of Ovid's reception in the Renaissance.²¹ By presenting some of the ancient paradoxes and complexities that marked women's representation in Renaissance literature, this reading provides insights into the role these Heroidean-like women played as cryptic political stratagems and strategists, for their own as well their poets' survival.

1 Female *exempla* and Male Triumphs

The creation of Heroidean-style letters in the Renaissance invited modern researchers to investigate the relationship between the work of Ovid and that of early Renaissance writers²² who often present the Christian church and the medieval literary tradition as their main reference points.²³ Medieval writers were attracted to the *Heroides* because they saw in them the illustration of

18 See Michalopoulos (2014) 29–30.

19 Binard translated Ovid's *Tristia* in 1625. See Taylor (2017) 47.

20 Taylor (2015) 49–63.

21 Heller (2003) 189–191: “Even the most blatantly positive writers tended to reinforce, rather than to challenge, early modern standards for female virtue; typically, they used admirable female *exempla* to illustrate those rare instances in which ‘exceptional women transcended the usual expectations of sex and gender.’”

22 On the reception of Ovid's works in the Renaissance, see Stanivukovic (2001).

23 See LeBlanc (1996) 71.

moral *exempla* within the tradition of *exegesis*.²⁴ The rewritings of the collection were didactic in purpose, despite their entertaining character, as they promoted models of faithful love, religious engagement, and political loyalty. Attuned to the significance of *ars dictaminis*, they strived to imitate both the rhetorical complexity and legalistic resonance of the original.²⁵

However, from Aristotle's *paradeigmata* (*Rhetoric* 1.2.1356b) to the early modern *exempla*, the relationship between "orator" and "listener" changed: the aim is not so much to convince, as *exemplum* is no longer used exclusively as part of a plea, but is employed in preaching, with the intention to convert.²⁶ In order for Ovid's *Heroides* to become an appropriate model in the Renaissance, some adaptations are required: the loyal spouse needs to be depicted also as a good Christian and politically conscious of her role as a wife who supports the cause of her soldier husband.²⁷ Creatively revisited, the ancient elegiac letters are resituated in the French political realm, particularly in Andrelini's epistles.²⁸ Fausto Andrelini, an Italian of the French royal court, writes many letters in the Heroidean fashion and presents allegorically a number of political activities of the court, in a fusion of mythical constructions, historical events and biblical allusions with the objective to please the queen.²⁹ Louis' victory in 1509 at Agnadello is the focus of this creative set of texts. Notably, personages and events are real, despite the fictional character of the letters; history and fiction are interrelated in an amalgam of the rivalry between France and Italy and the author's classical heritage. The readers were at this time particularly concerned by the Franco-Italian wars and matters of contemporary Italy became of great interest to them, but they were also fascinated by the mythological accounts of classical literature that Andrelini creatively introduces in his work,

24 On moral *exempla* and the tradition of *exegesis* in the Renaissance, see Rigolot (1998) 557–563 and in particular p. 557. On the three prominent strands in the *exegesis* of the Ovidian *Letters* – in the context of formal education, the presentation of ancient history and myth, the education of women, and the construction of their role in society and the learning of the Latin language – see White (2009) 49.

25 On the *ars dictaminis*, see Witt (1982) 1–35. On forensic *mimēsis* in the Renaissance, see Hutson (2006) 90. On a legal interpretation of Ovid's epistles, see Videau (2004). Cf. Kenney (1967) 212–232 and Alekou (2018b) 311–334. On the rhetorical utility of the *Heroides* in the Renaissance, see White (2009) 71 ff.

26 Demoen (1997) 153. On the reception of *paradeigma*, see chapter 6 in this volume.

27 Such is the case of the most influential translation of the Ovidian collection during the period under examination, namely, Octavien de Saint-Gelais' *Les Vingt et Une Epistres d'Ovide*, composed towards the end of the 15th century. Many other authors followed his example, in composing Heroidean-style letters. See LeBlanc (1996) 73.

28 On Andrelini's work on the wars of Italy and their elaboration of royal power and national consciousness, see Provini (2009) and in particular parts 2 and 4.

29 Brown (2010a) 182; LeBlanc (1996) 81–82.

along with the aforementioned historical subject matter. The mythologising of historical events is not surprising.³⁰ In fact, scholars have often drawn attention to the Ovidian inspiration of the depiction of the queen, arguing that her portrayal presents convergences with that of Ovid's Penelope, rather than, for instance, Dido or Phyllis, whose depiction in the *Heroides* seemed a much less appropriate model for praising the queen.³¹ Before attempting to re-evaluate this assessment, we may accept that the model of the faithful wife appears as a clear parallel to Anne de Bretagne, who is depicted as a woman lamenting the long and lonely nights in an empty bed, following the Ovidian heroine's example:³²

... Qu'est-il plus triste a veoir
Que se trouver ainsi vefve du lict
Ou bien pourrait prendre honneste delit? (vv. 16–18)³³

Laments were cast in female voices which would have otherwise remained silenced, as objects of male desire.³⁴ "It is almost as if this extreme rhetorical and pictorial discourse was the only one that authors and artists knew how to deploy in depicting female emotion," argues Brown.³⁵ As prescribed by the behavioural limits of female exemplarity, the queen speaks and acts in accordance with specific male-sanctioned categories of what constitutes feminine discourse.³⁶ What is particularly interesting here, however, is that the female *lamentatio* is gradually enriched with political resonances, as focus is eventually laid on the queen's anxiousness to learn about the fate of her soldier husband:

Telle victoire acquise fait penser
Mes feminins plaintz et pleurs compenser,
En regrettant fantasies nublueuses.

30 See Albouy (1969) on the incorporation of mythology in French literature.

31 LeBlanc (1996) 82. On Penelope's depiction in the Renaissance, see also White (2009) 223–239.

32 See Ov. *Her.* 1.7–8: *non ego deserto iacuissem frigida lecto, / nec quererer tardos ire relictas dies*; ("Then had I not lain cold in my deserted bed, nor would now be left alone complaining of slowly passing days;"). I follow the Loeb edition for the Latin text, unless indicated otherwise. On the abandonment motif, see Ciccone (1997) 3.

33 For the cited text, see LeBlanc (1996) 81–82, particularly on Guillaume Cretin's translation of Andrelini's epistle into French. Also see Chesney (1977) 327–338.

34 Van Orden (2001) 802.

35 Brown (2010a) 210.

36 On male-constructed images of women as vulnerable, see Brown (2010a) 182 and n. 4.

Qui sur mon sueur faisoient playes perilleuses
 Ne plus ne mains que le soleil luisant
 Explulse hors la tempeste nuysant
 Du firmament, et si bien l'enlumine
 Que ses rays l'obscurité termine (vv. 45–52)³⁷

Both the lament and agony are inspired by Penelope's Ovidian letter.³⁸ Andrelini previously refers directly to Ovid's Penelope in his text: "Combien qu'escripz Penelope transmist / Souventes foiz et son estude mist / A s'enquerir d'Ulixes a toute heure, / Encor pleuroit sa trop longue demeure . . ." (fol. 2r–2v). The *exemplum* is presented in this passage by the mention of the name of the character in question, whereas the short addition enables the reader to identify the relevant episode; the reader understands the message completely, because the history to which the *exemplum* refers is known to him/her.³⁹ However, the mythological *exemplum* is here recontextualised.⁴⁰ A point where the Ovidian text and its later adaptation differ is that, in Andrelini's letter, the chaste wife is also a ruler, who must subordinate her loneliness to patriotic pride and her personal needs to national demands. As opposed to Penelope's rather personal closure of the letter (1.115–116),⁴¹ the queen's request for her husband's return is, thus, elevated to a political necessity:

La chere espouse ayant le cueur marry
 Pour le destour de son loyal mary,
 Joyeuse aussi pource que conquerir
 Va ses pars et triumphe acquerir,
 En contemplant neantmoingt l'avanture
 De guerre extresme et douteuse rupture
 Aussi qu'il est en estrangere voye,
 Ce triste escript luy transmet et envoie;
 Penser douteux fort opprime et tourmente,

37 For the cited text see LeBlanc (1996) 83.

38 On the absence motif in the collection, see Hardie (2002) 106–142.

39 Demoen (1997) 142.

40 "The use of mythological example is per se a basic feature of elegiac writing," as mentioned in Barchiesi (2009) 50, who adds that we find *exempla* that can be taken as "intra-textual as well as intertextual. Ovid's *Heroides* is such a text."

41 See Ov. *Her.* 1.115–116: *Certe ego, quae fueram te discedente puella, / protinus ut venias, facta videbor anus* ("as for myself, who when you left my side was but a girl, though you should come straightway, I surely shall seem grown an aged dame").

Quant en grief dueil de tristesse saisie
De plaisirs deubz est toute dessaisie. (fol. 2r)⁴²

The distinction between male and female spheres, i.e., external male politics and internal female lament, emphasised by scholars,⁴³ progressively fades away. This should not be seen as a paradox, as the aim of Andrelini's epistle is to celebrate the French victory over the Italians by also praising the king with an encomiastic piece, and not to disclose the female perspective on love, an objective often attributed to Ovid's composition of *Heroides*, as already mentioned. In fact, the blending of classical myth and contemporary history, particularly present in this early modern text, has been identified by scholars as one of the hallmarks of 15th and early 16th-century literature.⁴⁴ This, like other Ovidian-style letters, may thus be further examined as a valuable historiographical source on the role distinguished women were expected to play not only in the literary world of their era but also in the social and political contexts of this world. As the use of real people as models for behaviour actively participates in the Renaissance fashioning of female *virtus* through the moral instruction of *exempla*, the letters' role becomes twofold: both prescriptive and descriptive, they extol as well as advocate specific patterns of behaviour. In fact, one may suggest that the epistles employ rhetorical constructions of cultural stereotypes from which we may learn about gendered norms and ideologies. What we witness in Andrelini's work is the real and fictitious author's preconceptions about women's behaviour, evident in the exploration of gendered stereotypes.

The cultural stereotypes that define the limits of femininity are often inspired by religious norms, as the sources from which the early modern *exempla* can be drawn include not only mythology but also history and the Bible.⁴⁵ In the French text, the chaste wife *exemplum* that apparently alludes to Ovid's Penelope seems to be further enriched with traits of the Christian wife *exemplum*. In the passage below, the queen assumes the conventional stance of a woman praying on a bended knee before Notre Dame, whereas her Christian-inspired prayer points, paradoxically, to that of Ovid's Laodamia,

42 For the text and translation, see Brown (2010a) 209. Andrelini's letter, written in Latin, is translated by Villebresme. The *recueil* is housed at the National Library of Russia, in Saint-Petersburg. See de Laborde (1936) 147–149 for a description and a brief analysis of the manuscript.

43 On the contrast between male (external) and female (internal) activity, see Brown (2010a) 210.

44 LeBlanc (1996) 83.

45 Demoen (1997) 154 and n. 96.

confirming that Andrelini's depiction of the queen discloses a complex interdependence between myth, religion, and history:

Or en temples je me suys transportee
Ou de bon cueur j'ay offerte portee
Aussi priay le plus devotement
Que j'ai peu faire en mon entendement. (fol. 5)⁴⁶

*Parcite, Dardanidae, de tot, precor, hostibus uni,
ne meus ex illo corpore sanguis eat!
non est quem deceat nudo concurrere ferro,
saevaue in oppositos pectora ferre viros;
fortius ille potest multo, quam pugnat, amare.
bella gerant alii; Protesilaus amet!
Nunc fateor – volui revocare, animusque ferebat;
substitit auspicii lingua timore mali.
cum foribus velles ad Troiam exire paternis,
pes tuus offenso limine signa dedit.
ut vidi, ingemui, tacitoque in pectore dixi:
“signa reversuri sint, precor, ista viri!”*
OV. *Her.* 13.79–90

O ye sons of Dardanus, spare, I pray, from so many foes at least one, lest my blood flow from that body! He is not one it befits to engage with bared steel in the shock of battle, to present a savage breast to the opposing foe; his might is greater far in love than on the field. Let others go to the wars; let Protesilaus love! I confess now, I would have called you back, and my spirit strove; but my tongue stood still for fear or evil auspice. When you would fare forth from your paternal doors to Troy, your foot, stumbling upon the threshold, gave ill sign. At the sight I groaned, and in my secret heart I said: “May this, I pray, be omen that my lord return!” Of this I tell you now, lest you be too forward with your arms. See you make this fear of mine all vanish to the winds!

By alluding to mythological, as well as historical and biblical models, the *Eigenbedeutung* of the *exemplum* becomes open to different interpretations.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ For the cited text see Brown (2010a) 218.

⁴⁷ *Eigenbedeutung* is defined as “the meaning that quoted history has in itself” in Lausberg (1973) 421.

As scholars argue, women prayed more often than men, and therefore prayer may be seen as a touchstone for interpreting feminine laments.⁴⁸ The Christianisation of the Ovidian heroine is a *topos* in Renaissance literature, as argued in the following pages. What is interesting at this point is the way that the rhetorical constructs of gender forge a sense of identity that is turned to religious as well as political ends, as female laments embrace a set of behavioural values for women with social and political ramifications.⁴⁹ Women's epistles become at the same time a powerful political tool to further the ambitions, manoeuvrings, and rhetorical negotiations of their real as well as fictional author.⁵⁰ Marked with historical verisimilitude, the careful fashioning of female writing leads to the shaping of epistolary networks that cross the literal boundaries of space and time as well as the figurative ones of rank and gender.⁵¹ Gender characterisation in letter writing participates in the persuasion process as a rhetorical tool and a manipulative "sign" within a social discourse.⁵² Thus, gender characteristics are deployed strategically, whereby the epistolary representation of men and women is strongly related to matters of power. The ways in which female power in letter writing is defined, limited, or promulgated by men demonstrate how female and male rhetorical *exempla* are explored often to please the male audience, associated with competition and aspirations to political achievements (*laus/gloria*), and reflecting, perhaps, the poet's quest for glory.⁵³

The assumption that the representation of gender bears political connotations is evident in a scene which provides an example of power play and gendered performance in the French text, and this is the king's triumphal celebration of the victory over the Italians (fol. 8r), followed by the queen's reaction to it (fol. 8r). In the two passages below, marked with several alliterations, rhymes, and homoeoteleutons, as well as strong evidence of paronomasia, Anne's fictional voice discloses the news regarding the king's Venetian victory, and his glorious political achievements are juxtaposed with the queen's "feminine" pose as a response to these developments. Her depiction reveals the conventional pose of attentively controlled female behaviour, that of a devoted

48 Van Orden (2001) 836.

49 Van Orden (2001) 803.

50 Sadlack (2010) 692.

51 Sadlack (2010) 692.

52 See Ige (2001) 52–70 on the gendered perception of rhetoric as it is expressed in Cicero's rhetorical speeches. The scholar also explores at pp. 362–365 the role of women in politics.

53 See Ige (2001) 52–57, 314–326. On rhetoric in Renaissance political thought, see chapter 18 of this volume.

wife, limited to the interior sphere, while gazing at the male-dominated exterior world:

Ha! Cher espoux, quant ta lectre receu
 Dont ta victoire et triumphe je sceu,
 Tost je l'a leu sans faire aulcune attente
 Pour tost avoir de ton beau fait l'entente.
 La mille foiz, ce croire, la baisay,
 Puys replyee en mon seing la pousay.
 Vray Dieu, combien furent mes sens ravis
 De joye extresme, alors que je la vis.
 A dire vray, langue tant fort diserte
 A l'exprimer ce trouveroit deserte. (fol. 8r)

Lors tout a coup de dueil mes vestmens
 Je espouillay et pris mes ornemens.
 Sur estoumac mys airain precieux,
 Et dedans doitz anneaulx solacieux,
 Après avoir mes cheveux preparez,
 Qui de long temps n'avoient esté parez.
 La tost survint en la mienne maison
 De toutes gens une grande foyson . . .
 Puys aulx temples aller je n'actendy
 Esquelz graces a mon Dieu je rendy . . . (fol. 8v)⁵⁴

This rather theatrical scene enables the reader to note the queen's swift transformation from a woman in mourning, examined in the previous pages, into a woman in controlled celebration.⁵⁵ Andrelini's direct invocation of Ovid's Penelope in the opening lines of the poem places the queen's literary complaint in the tradition of Ovid's *Heroides* (Combien qu'escripiz Penelope transmist / Souventes foiz et son estude mist / A s'enquerir d'Ulixes a toute heure, / Encor pleuroit sa trop longue demeure . . . fol. 2r–2v), suggesting that the author's goal is principally to honour the queen by equating her with the example *par excellence* of fidelity, as argued by Brown.⁵⁶ However, a more

54 For the cited text see Brown (2010a) 211, who comments on this first Saint Petersburg manuscript letter.

55 Brown (2010a) 216.

56 See Brown (2010a) 211. Interestingly, the portrayal of the "ideal wife," resumed in Penelope's depiction and originally attested in a Greek source, Homer's *Odyssey*, is revisited by Ovid in a less-exemplary fashion than one would expect. This Penelope, a Roman

complex association emerges in the passage that describes Anne's reaction to her husband's triumph. This dramatic scene alludes to a different heroine who is also a *regina barbara*, namely the fictional writer of *Letter 12*. In the epistolographic account of Medea's myth, the *regina Colchorum* (*At tibi Colchorum, memini, regina vacavi*, "And yet for you, I remember, I the queen of Colchis could find time," 12.1) is found trapped in the interior sphere of the *domus* writing a letter to Jason while he celebrates his matrimonial union with Creusa:

*ut subito nostras Hymen cantatus ad aures
venit, et accenso lampades igne micant,
tibiaque effundit socialia carmina vobis,
at mihi funerea flebiliora tuba,
pertimui, nec adhuc tantum scelus esse putabam;
sed tamen in toto pectore frigus erat.
turba ruunt et "Hymen," clamant, "Hymenaeae!" frequenter –
quo propior vox haec, hoc mihi peius erat.*

When, all suddenly, there came to my ears the chant of Hymen, and to my eyes the gleam of blazing torches, and the pipe poured forth its notes, for you a wedding-strain, but for me a strain more tearful than the funeral trump, I was filled with fear; I did not yet believe such monstrous guilt could be; but all my breast none the less grew chill. The throng pressed eagerly on, crying "Hymen, O Hymenaeus!" in full chorus – the nearer the cry, for me the more dreadful.

OV. *Her.* 12.137–144

Here, too, the hero's presence is sketched as a public, political triumph:⁵⁷ Jason appears in gold, leading a procession and driving a team of horses, as a *vir triumphalis*, admired by a singing crowd ("*huc modo, mater, adi! pompam pater,*" *inquit*, "*Iason / ducit et adiunctos aureus urget equos!*") "Mother, just come over here. A procession is coming, and my father Jason leading it. He's all in gold, and driving a team of horses!" 12.151–152).⁵⁸ The Ovidian description of the Greek wedding episode enables us to witness a Roman practice that bears political resonances, as it points to the ambivalent cultural interaction between

rhetorical construction of a Greek original, seems to have lost her epic and heroic traits and is adapted to suit her elegiac profile as a powerless woman in sorrow. On the Ovidian heroine's differentiation from her Homeric prototype, see Davis (2006) 68.

57 See Alekou (2019) on the interpretation of this scene as a Roman triumph.

58 Cf. Ovid's use of triumph in *Am.* 1.2.19–53.

the Greeks and the Romans, well discussed by scholars and a prominent theme in Ovid's era.⁵⁹ Jason's Romanisation may in fact suggest that his triumph comments critically on Roman *mores* that include the Romans' philhellenic display of Greek-like extravagance.⁶⁰

The ritual of triumph also appears in Anne's letter ("Dont ta victoire et triumphe je sceu; (8r); Joyeuse aussi pource que conquerir / Va ses pars et triumphe acquerir" (8v)), with explicit political significance, as it alludes to the French king's Venetian victory. Even though it is not obvious whether the issue of the Graeco-Roman conflict that is allusively raised in the Latin text is replicated in the Renaissance letter in the form of a Franco-Italian battle, another point of convergence between the Latin and the French texts suggests that we read the two letters in parallel, to understand further their ideological exploration of rhetorical *exempla*. The dramatisation of the episode in the French text is completed with a detailed description of what happens "backstage," in the inner and hidden space of the household, and, as I would suggest, backwards in time, towards Ovid's *Heroides*. A comparative reading with the Latin passage points to many thematic and stylistic convergences in the two female portrayals:

*protinus abscissa planxi mea pectora veste,
tuta nec a digitis ora fuere meis.
ire animus mediae suadebat in agmina turbae
sertaque compositis demere rapta comis;
vix me continui, quin dilaniata capillos
clamarem "meus est!" iniceremque manus.*

Then straight I rent my cloak and beat my breast and cried aloud, and my cheeks were at the mercy of my nails. My heart impelled me to rush into the midst of the moving throng, to tear off the wreaths from my ordered locks; I scarce could keep from crying out, with my hair all torn, "He is mine!" and laying hold on you.

OV. *Her.* 12.153–158

Emphasis is given to the women's clothes, ornaments, and body parts, namely, their breasts, their fingers, and their hair ("Lors tout a coup de dueil mes vestmens / Je espouillay et pris mes ornemens. / Sur estoumac mys airain precieux, / Et dedans doitz anneauz solacieux, / Après avoir mes cheveux

59 On the paradoxes of this cultural dialogue in Ovid's work, see chapter 5 in Dufallo (2013).

60 On extravagance as a Greek trait, see Rudd (1986) 162–163 and 175.

preparez,” (8v)). This parallel reading reveals, nonetheless, one very important divergence: the Ovidian heroine appears with hair all torn and her cloak ripped, beating her breast and hurting her face with her fingers (12.152–156),⁶¹ whereas in Andrelini’s epistle, the same *imago*, with focus on the same body parts, is mentioned in reverse, as the dishevelment and disarray that are associated with grief are converted into a contained and positive female image, deemed more appropriate for Queen Anne (fol. 8v).⁶²

Body language may be viewed as a *locus* for inference: the description in the texts under examination includes, among other things, the movements, the features and elements of the face and the voice that become indications of (temporary) *pathos* and, by extension, potentially of *ēthos*.⁶³ The juxtaposition of the two passages and of the two female portrayals shows how permanent characteristics (*ēthos*) and temporary feelings (*pathos*) interact and redefine *ēthopoia*: as attested in the *progymnasmata* and other rhetorical treatises, emotions are – or may become – indications of character and appear, for this reason, among the *loci a persona* in invention theory.⁶⁴ Emotional or pathetic *ēthopoia*⁶⁵ is crucial in our understanding of the *ēthos* attributed to the two queens, the historical and the fictional *reginae barbarae*. On the one hand, in the French letter Anne, the exemplary woman, is restricted within the well-defined limits of her specific gender and social status and celebrates, gracefully, joyfully, and in moderation her husband’s triumph; on the other hand, in the Ovidian letter Medea, the anti-exemplary woman, wished to express violently her claim over the hero and, perhaps, also over his triumph; she chooses to remain silent, nonetheless (*vix me continui, quin dilaniata capillos / clamarem “meus est!” iniceremque manus*. “I scarce could keep from crying out, with my hair all torn, ‘He is mine!’ and laying hold on you.” 12.157–158).

Sorrow dissolves the conventional comportment of women, rocking their bodies, contorting their faces with screams; broken down, they become the antithesis of the feminine perfection the authors usually project, because of their excessive grief, argues van Orden.⁶⁶ But the depictions of the two women

61 See Vaiopoulos (2015) 110 who refers to Medea’s tragic vengefulness as “converted into a behaviour typical of heartbroken women, quite common to the Roman everyday life of the poet’s era.” The scholar adds that “[t]his exaggeration in tone brings an ‘inferior’ aspect of [...] Medea to the surface.”

62 See Brown (2010a) 216 on a comparison between Anne and Laodamia.

63 See de Temmerman (2010) 38–39 for indicative examples.

64 Cic. *Inv.* 24–25; Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.23–28.

65 Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 9.28–36.

66 Van Orden (2001) 802. On the vivid representation of female emotion and the Latin models for lament in Western culture, with reference to Medea’s *exemplum* in particular, see Holford-Strevens (1999) 379.

do in fact coincide after all, as Medea's reaction is also, eventually, controlled and only illustrated in writing; Anne's inability to express sufficiently in words her positive feelings ("A dire vray, langue tant fort diserte / A l'exprimer ce trou-veroit deserte." 8r) is a reticence that reflects the barbarian heroine's silenced voice, in her description of the dismembering of her brother, Absyrtus (*deficit hoc uno littera nostra loco. / quod facere ausa mea est, non audet scribere dextra. / sic ego, sed tecum, dilaceranda fui.* "In this one place my pen fails. Of the deed my right hand was bold enough to do, it is not bold enough to write. So I, too, should have been torn limb from limb – but with thee!" 12.114–116).⁶⁷ The seemingly controlled use of words takes the form of a *praeteritio* in the heroine's tackling of crimes, but is further employed in her attempt to restraint herself from extending her hand towards the hero (*me continui*, 12.157) and from crying out *Meus est* (12.158).⁶⁸ What the Ovidian letter alludes to in her rhetoric of silence is a gesture related to the Roman legal notion of *manus iniectio*, which would enable the heroine to claim Jason as her own property.⁶⁹ By mentioning what is not being said, Ovid's barbarian woman attributes to herself characteristics of a Roman citizen in a subtle twist of female exemplarity; if women's silence, particularly relevant to the context of a Roman courtroom, is considered not only a female quality but also an obligation, the rhetorical exploration of silenced allegations through *praeteritio* enables women's texts to speak louder than words. The same can be argued for the rhetorical *exemplum* through allusion, and such may be the case in Anne's letter, whose text could thus say something more about the person mentioned in the *illustrandum*.⁷⁰ Even though the exemplary character is not named, it is possible to recognise and identify the *exemplum* as such, given that the reader is acquainted with the history to which the specific allusion is made.⁷¹

67 As correctly argued by Conley (2000) 133, "des langages fantasmatiques naissent du silence; la politique determine son écriture." In two other occasions, Medea employs *praeteritio*, in reference to Pelias' murder (*Quid referam Peliae natus pietate nocentes / caesaque virginea membra paterna manu?* "Why rehearse the tale of Pelias' daughters, by devotion led to evil deeds – of how their maiden hands laid knife to the members of their sire?" 12.129–130), and her children (*quos equidem actutum – sed quid praedicere poenam / attinet? ingentis parturit ira minas.* "Whom, hark you, I will straight – but what boots it to foretell your penalty? My ire is in travail with mighty threats." 12.207–208).

68 The procedure of *manus iniectio* concerns the signal of the buyer who places the hand on the slave's shoulder, to express the claim to acquire him as his property. The enslavement image reflects Jason's offer (*effice me ... tuum*, "make me thine for ever," 12.82), by which he is self-portrayed as the heroine's possession.

69 See Ducos (1996) 33–34 and 184.

70 *Illustrandum* is defined as "the case or the matter under discussion" in Price (1975) 219 n. 1.

71 Demoen (1997) 142.

If in Ovid's version Roman law appears more powerful than ancient Greek ritualistic expression, as it overshadows the wedding scene, Christian religion seems to be overshadowing Roman law in the queen's response to the ancient gesture of claim (*clamarem "meus est!" iniceremque manus*. 12.158), as she chooses to express her gratitude by giving offerings to God instead ("Puis aulx temples aller je n'actendy / Esquelz graces a mon Dieu je rendy . . ." (8v)). The Christianised depiction of the queen is emphatically situated in the context of the Franco-Italian wars.⁷² An intercultural association is inevitably created in the Ovidian letter as well, since it is presumably written by a barbarian woman in Latin and is meant to be read by a Greek hero. We are called to consider, again, the confrontation between two cultures, this time, that of the Greeks and that of the Romans. One wonders whether Ovid's Romanisation of the Greek wedding ritual, through the allusion to Roman triumph and the use of legal language, could have inspired the Christianisation of the *regina barbara* in the Renaissance text, as a responsive cultural cachet.⁷³

In ancient rhetorical theory, the *paradeigmata* are based on similarity and analogy.⁷⁴ But can we assume that a cultural analogy between the Graeco-Roman and the Franco-Italian interaction in the two letters is valid beyond doubt? Another convergence between the depictions of the two women may shed light on this reading. As indicated below, Anne is also depicted as a powerful ruler and a brave warrior, to distance her portrayal further from the rhetorical *exemplum* of the powerless woman in mourning. The construction of Queen Anne is inspired by Medea, perhaps also, because Medea, unlike Penelope, is a woman in power. Penelope's conscious self-portrayal as legally powerless (*Tres sumus inbelles numero, sine viribus uxor / Laertesque senex Telemachusque puer*. "We number only three, unused to war – a powerless wife; Laertes, an old man; Telemachus, a boy." 1.97–98; *nec mihi sunt vires inimicos pellere tectis*. "nor have I strength to repel the enemy from our halls." 1.109) distances her from Anne's depiction as an influential ruler,⁷⁵ suggesting that

72 On the Franco-Italian conflict, see Michelet (1982) 137 ff.

73 Barchiesi (2009) 43 argues that "appropriating Roman *exempla* entails confronting a tradition where Roman identity consists of itself plus the appropriation of Greek models, from another culture and another time. This is a very promising theatre when Christian culture has to decide what to do with the Roman heritage: the creation of a category of 'Roman exempla' entails acceptance of a tradition that is already loaded with baggage."

74 Ps.-Ael. *Ar. Or.* 538.

75 Anne held a chief place both in the palace and in the nation according to Denieul-Cormier (1968) 27. She had persuaded Louis XII to promise to marry their eldest daughter, Claude, to the future emperor, Charles V, a union that would have delivered Brittany and the extensive Orleans lands into the hands of the Habsburgs and left an imperilled France to Francis, count of Angouleme, upon Louis' death. See Major (1994) 94.

the queen could or should be seen differently, as her behaviour exceeds the restricted traditional female *exempla*, to imitate more controversial Ovidian models instead.

However, the comparison between the French and the Latin letters is not limited to the identification of convergences between a female *exemplum* and a female anti-*exemplum*. It confirms, most importantly, how rhetoric pervasively influences literary compositions by postulating a shift from the application of rhetorical techniques in argumentative texts to their reappropriation in a secondary, literary environment, often to serve both the author's and the character's ideological agenda.⁷⁶ We should bear in mind that the judicial sense of "se plaindre," "to register a legal complaint or object to a ruler's actions in war or governance," reveals the political character of lament, as it discloses the people's reaction to great historical events, by expressing the suffering of those who do not have the consolation of glory.⁷⁷ The *complainte* offers thus a platform for political critique and is eminently suited to expressing unofficial opinions.⁷⁸ The rhetorical exploitation of gender in female laments is informative particularly regarding the way real women behave, as the laments in writing mobilise gendered *exempla* to respond to the needs of a civil society in crisis.⁷⁹ Thus, laments are not only effective at transmitting warnings and forging sentiments of obedience, to God as well as to the king, but also at visualising the otherwise unseen and giving voice to the otherwise unsaid; in their exploration of female silence, they form, in a metaphorical sense, a sort of *praeteritio*.

To interpret the queen's letter as the complex rhetorical argument, we need to broaden our understanding of women's paths to power in the Renaissance,⁸⁰ as opposed to the conventional gendered roles often attributed to them. Interestingly, the literary construction of Anne's profile differs from what the historical sources reveal about her political and private life. In fact, a closer examination of Anne's presence in early modern literature may suggest a re-evaluation of her portrayal as a conventional woman lamenting the absence of her beloved husband. We know that her marriage to the king followed the marriage to Maximilian I of Austria and that to Charles VIII; it is reported that, after Charles VIII's death in 1498, and following an agreement to secure

76 See a discussion in Kennedy (1999) 3 with regard to this shift in ancient rhetoric and its evolution from "primary" to "secondary" rhetoric.

77 See Van Orden (2001) 818 and Wodsak (1985) for an overview of the political complaints from the time of the French revolution and in particular pp. 27–88.

78 Van Orden (2001) 819.

79 Van Orden (2001) 840.

80 On powerful women in the Renaissance, see Franklin (2010) 13–20.

the annexation of Brittany, Anne had to marry his cousin, Louis XII, who was the new king.⁸¹ The circumstances of these weddings are particularly interesting regarding the role of women in politics during this period. Like Medea who was married secretly in a dark cave, and like other powerful princesses both fictional and historical, such as Dido and Cleopatra,⁸² Anne had to marry Charles VIII discreetly and urgently at dawn, because the union was illegal due to the marriage by proxy with Maximilian and the forbidden fourth degree of consanguinity.⁸³ Her wedding to Louis XII is also the result of political and legal arrangements, as the contract provided that the spouse who outlived the other would retain possession of Brittany, but also stipulated that if the king died without male heirs, the queen would marry his successor, in order to ensure the French kings a second chance permanently to annex Brittany.⁸⁴ In fact, the sources reveal that Louis XII was already married to the daughter of Louis XI and sister of Charles VIII when the terms of the queen's marriage contract came into force; Anne's agreement to this union was given on condition that Louis XII would obtain an annulment within a year.⁸⁵

The queen's wedding is thus not the outcome of love and devotion but the calculated result of political synergies. Interestingly, there is a copy of Saint-Gelais' translation of the *XXI Epistres d'Ovide* that may have belonged to or was made for the queen and Louis XII, prepared around the time of her marriage to Louis in 1499.⁸⁶ The equating of the king's victorious celebration to that of Jason's (Romanised) mock triumphal wedding ceremony may thus point to the politics of arranged matrimonial settlements, such as Caesar's marriage arrangements for his daughter, Julia,⁸⁷ or Anne's politicised unions mentioned above. The moral, political, and legal issues that arise from Anne's historical account reflect similar ones in the ancient fictional text, particularly in the reiterated theme of Creusa's dowry as the main motive in Jason's wish to wed her (12.25–30, 53–54, 103–104). The excessive love, not of the daughter

81 On Anne's weddings, see Denieul-Cormier (1968) 15, 24, 27.

82 These women are all barbarian queens married to very influential men. Their unions, of questionable legal validity, still foster debates in scholarship. On Medea and Jason, see Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 4.1128–1152 and Ov. *Her.* 12.67–71 and the discussions in Abrahamsen (1999) 111; Antoniadis (2009) 210 ff.; Benton (2003) 275–276; Cherry (1990) 244–266; Treggiari (1991) 54–57; Weeda (2015) 135 ff. On Cleopatra's wedding, see Plutarch, *Life of Antony* 31.1–5. For Dido's union with Aeneas, see Verg. *Aen.* 4.337–338.

83 Brown (2010b) 178.

84 On the politics of marriage in the French court, particularly regarding Anne de Bretagne, see Garrisson (1991) 93.

85 Brown (2010b) 86.

86 Brown (2010a) 193.

87 See Cass. Dio 54.6 and Tac. *Ann.* 1.53.

of Creon, but of political power, wealth, and domination is what forges the triumphal invasion in the Ovidian epistle (*quam tibi tunc longe regnum dotale Creusae / et socer et magni nata Creontis erat!* "How far away then from your thought were Creusa's dowry-realm, and the daughter of great Creon, and Creon the father of your bride!" 12.53–54). If we accept the parallel reading with Andrelini's text, then we may question the political motives that lie beneath the French king's triumphal invasion and we may further doubt, in an absolute demystification of love already suggested by Ovid, the validity of Anne's illustration as a loving spouse. Images of the royal couple appear in the manuscript of Saint-Gelais' translation mentioned above: a portrait of Louis XII alluding to Acontius (fol. 112), and a portrait of Anne of Brittany alluding to Deianira (fol. 46).⁸⁸ None of these illustrations indicates an upstanding behaviour for the king and the queen.⁸⁹ Anne's portrayal may thus be far less conventional, conceived through the Ovidian filter of powerful women's literary depictions. In fact, the female *exemplum* of loyalty and devotion, lamenting in an empty bed, gives way to a female warrior, a real heroine, one who, in the scholars' minds, has acquired male traits:⁹⁰

Par maintesfoiz me suys deliberee
 D'icy partyr en armes preparee,
 Pour tost aller ton fier ost rancontrer
 Et de carcas et fleches m'acoustrer
 Et porter arc comme Samiramys,
 Affin que fust par mes propres mains mys
 En dur estour quelque vng de tes aduers,
 Auec les corps sanglants tout à l'enuers.
 Aussi affin meue d'enhortemens
 Que vraye amour faict aux loyaulx amans
 Qu'eussions peu lors demeurer la nous deux
 Après l'exploict en champ victorieux,
 Ou que vaincuz sur la terre estanduz
 Noz esperits eussions a Dieu renduz. (fols. 4v–5r)

88 See Brown (2010a) 193 on Figures 32 and 33.

89 "[F]ocus on the visual dominates the reader's experience": Brown (2010a) 198. See section 2 of this chapter on Acontius and Cydippe's account.

90 See also Franklin (2010) 13 who notes that "[w]arrior women, of the many exemplars extracted from the classical past for purposes either of emulation or disapprobation, presented Renaissance humanists with a unique site for addressing issues of gender and the role of women in society."

The reconstructed Anne expresses the wish to have fought in the battlefield on her husband's side, despite the real Anne's very pacifist portrayal in historical sources,⁹¹ a depiction that reveals her dissociation from the traditional image of the mourning and powerless woman. Andrelini employs what scholars have described as a belligerent military language to emphasise female contribution in the political, public, and male-dominated arena, reflecting Semiramis' depiction in multiple accounts as a powerful woman, a female warrior, and a builder of cities.⁹² But Semiramis is also known for her incestuous relationship with her son, and is "definitely no model for a Queen," as the scholars note.⁹³ Semiramis and Medea share a similar fate through their heroic actions and martial battles for their husband's sake, as well as through their condemnable moral behaviour vis-à-vis their children.⁹⁴ The use of these figures as examples demonstrates that they can "easily be altered to support either a defence of or an assault on women."⁹⁵ The rhetorical *exempla* are employed in an ambiguous fashion in Anne's letter and reflect the ambivalent readings Ovid's *Heroides* have so far inspired. This multi-layered illustration of female exemplarity may further suggest that *exempla* can be valuable in explicating the characters who have become, along with their stories, commonplaces and stock examples in later literature.⁹⁶

The study of the reception of Ovid's female portrayals as rhetorical *exempla* in Andrelini's letters has shown that the depiction of women may indeed have its roots in Ovid's collection of "female" love-letters or in other Heroidean-like depictions of women, not so much – or at least not exclusively – in the conventionally devoted wife of *Letter* 1, but in the controversial representation of powerful women who are still being condemned in literary tradition. One may justly wonder whether by pleasing the queen, the author displeases the king, or whether this peculiar portrayal of the female ruler does please the queen. What seems plausible is that the male author gives a constructed voice to a female historical character, enabling the reader ultimately to learn "as much about male cultural expectations concerning the queen in particular and

91 On Anne's pacific portrayal, see Baumgartner (1994) 71.

92 Brown (2010a) 217–218 refers to the female-warrior image of Semiramis that inspires Anne as an isolated scene that distances her for only a while from her exemplary behaviour.

93 See, for example, Brown (2010b) 73.

94 See Brown (2010b) 72–73 on Boccaccio and Dufour's depiction of Semiramis, as well as on Medea's positive depiction by Christine, Martin Le Franc, and Champier.

95 Brown (2010b) 74 mentions the significance of the condition of Semiramis' hair when a messenger announces that Babylon had rebelled. In my opinion, this illustration invites us to associate her with both Anne and Medea, whose description of hair may therefore not be meant to allude exclusively to an elegiac *topos*.

96 Demoen (1997) 147.

women in general as Anne of Brittany's own perceptions about contemporary political and personal events."⁹⁷ Political tensions at the court were likely to be represented and even resolved through female personification allegories, a literary device by which authors "mediated between examples of powerful females and contemporary realities about women's roles."⁹⁸ The exploration of rhetorical *exempla* in literary texts may indeed shed new light on underlying sexual and political tensions between the king and queen at the time. The exploitation of the Ovidian model may in fact reveal the French author's reluctance to imitate the ideologically mandated depiction of exemplary women, as focus is also laid on these figures' heroism. As we shall see in more detail in the following pages, by shaking up the distinctive standards of female *exempla*, the Renaissance authors often encourage a re-evaluation of women's perception as the silenced Other, and invite us to question their conflictual representation in literature as either worthy of praise for being innocent and powerless or as condemnable for being powerful and therefore dangerous.

2 Female Anti-*exempla* in Epitaphic Writing

Notwithstanding the emphasis on love in Ovid's *Heroides*, the study of female rhetorical *exempla* in the previous pages has revealed a focus on gendered power play that confers to the female laments a socio-legal and political nuance, also present in French Renaissance writings. In this section, I elaborate the argument that the ancient text under examination is not exclusively devoted to the subject matter of *amor* but extends its focus to the rhetorical paradigms of *mors*, that are revisited in specific French Renaissance writings. In particular, it is demonstrated that the passages that describe or allude to death scenes show that Ovidian heroines act as rhetorical *exempla* in André de La Vigne's *Quatre Epistres d'Ovide*. Finally, the political connotations of Ovid's biographical allusions are discussed with reference to Binard's *Les regrets d'Ovide* and Marie-Catherine de Villegieu's *Les Exilés de la cour d'Auguste*.

Death, a key element in Ovid's *Heroides*, is often presented as the only means for female compensation and survival.⁹⁹ The *Heroides* systematically allude to suicide notes, funerary epigrams, and funereal inscriptions,¹⁰⁰ and

97 Brown (2010a) 211.

98 Brown (2010a) 13.

99 On the opposition between love and death, see Van Orden (2001) 804, with regard to Saint-Gelais' portrayal of Venus and Adonis.

100 See Ramsby (2005) 365: "The 'authors' of Ovidian inscriptions are mainly women, a non-traditional source of public record or monumental representation, and yet principal

one may justly argue that they compose a collection of epitaphic texts and literary memorials which recall incidents of tragic losses, murders, and suicides. Loss in Ovid's *Heroides* is tackled in multiple ways, as the funerary letter becomes the literary refuge for women who experience physical isolation and social alienation or have been marginalised and often exiled, both in the mythological sphere and in literary tradition.¹⁰¹ While Ovid gives shelter to these female figures, enabling them to compose their ultimate words, the subject of death creates a sort of emergency and plays a decisive role in our perception of these female writers as sympathetic victims. Dying becomes a means for persuasion through characterisation; as a *locus* in rhetorical theory relevant to character depiction,¹⁰² death participates in the construction of Ovid's women to conceptualise specific traits attributable to them. The rhetoric of epitaph actively participates in the construction of the self, in a subjective narrative in which the "I" is both the author and main character of two texts, namely, the letter and the funerary inscription, the latter being embedded in the former. This paradox is further reinforced by the fictional nature of a real activity: the act of writing – of the letter and the epitaphic text – distances the Ovidian women as authors from their mythological roots, elevating them to the realm of Roman life, and, inevitably, of Roman death.¹⁰³

Love and death form a common narrative pair of topics in the reception of the *Heroides* in the Renaissance also and are explored to serve early modern authors' specific political, religious, and legal agendas. Interestingly, Renaissance writers often place their heroines in an exotic landscape and avoid attributing French-sounding names to them; they remain "blank figures undefined by an earlier literary heritage," with echoes of earlier medieval courtly romance.¹⁰⁴ Such is the case of André de La Vigne's *Quatre Epistres d'Ovide*, where lack of identity recognition and topographical indications underline the Otherness that emerges as a defining element in the depiction of the correspondents which is, nevertheless, juxtaposed with the women's Christian ethical code. Early modern authors such as La Vigne act as medieval clerics:

agents in the process of lament in the ancient funerary context." The scholar adds that the Ovidian heroines do not wait for commemoration, as "on their own they condense and transform their poetic pleas into lasting, petrified forms of expression."

101 See Alekou (2020) 71–97 on the depiction of Ovid's exiled women.

102 De Temmerman (2010) 26.

103 See Fried (1986) 615: "An inscription on a gravestone is an extreme form of writing aware of itself as writing." The scholar mentions that to read the epitaph is to visit a topography and review a *topos*, namely the *memento mori* all epitaphs dramatise in their tight-lipped lapidary fashion (pp. 615–616). See also Ramsby (2005) 383: "The inscriptions serve to marry the fictional world the heroines inhabit to the physical Roman world."

104 LeBlanc (1996) 73.

they reshape the interaction between love and death, already present in the Ovidian *exemplum*, to expose a moral lesson and to warn the reading public against the consequences of irrational passion.

Writers like La Vigne chose stories of illicit love, that concern either premarital or extramarital relationships, such as the accounts of heroines who launch epistle-like speeches similar to those of Ovid's *Heroides*, both to create links with the Ovidian work in question and to distance their texts from them. In line with a Christian conscience, these authors focus on unmarried women who "lose their place of respectability in society because of their folly."¹⁰⁵ It seems reasonable to suggest that, as opposed to Ovid's *Heroides*, death in Renaissance literature seems to take the form of paradigmatic punishment and no longer emerges as a rescuing get-away. This shift is noted as one of the most important points of divergence between ancient and early modern *exempla*, according to Jacques Goff, whose definition of medieval *exemplum* is on point: "un récit bref donné comme véridique et destiné à être inséré dans un discours (en général un sermon) pour convaincre un auditoire par une leçon salutaire."¹⁰⁶ The shift concerns, among others, the means and the aim of persuasion: the persuasiveness of the *exemplum* is less linked to the prestige of the hero and more focused on the history that the hero experiences, a history that is recounted in the form of preaching and with the aim of converting the reader.¹⁰⁷

Specific Ovidian female letter writers are revisited as rhetorical anti-*exempla* to meet Renaissance moral demands. Ovid's Ariadne, Medea, and Hypermnestra, depicted as a threat to *patria potestas*, represent in their filial disobedience the female enemy of societal stability and are explored as ideal anti-paradigms; reconstructed as female anti-*exempla*, these "deceptive" creatures are depicted in their reception as suffering consequently from isolation and alienation that lead to a dishonourable ending of their lives. One theme appears to be a loan of Ovidian origins, namely, the "noble death" motif.¹⁰⁸ Both the early modern and Ovidian heroines who are found in isolation express their wish to have died well, refer to specific funerary rituals with regard to burial and mourning, and compose their own epitaphs, with the aspiration to be remembered. La Vigne's account of Philistine is a case in point. *De Philistine à Elinus* is a letter that discusses how the son of the king of Persia is forced by the king of India to flee, when the heroine is thrown into a hideous dungeon

¹⁰⁵ LeBlanc (1996) 76.

¹⁰⁶ Bremond *et al.* (1982) 27–38.

¹⁰⁷ Demoen (1997) 152–153.

¹⁰⁸ On suicide as a "noble" death, see Shelton (2013) 28.

as a consequence of their forbidden love. Elinus is killed, and Philistine, when committed to the sea in a boat with the body of her lover, writes a letter to him and meditates on her own end to come:

Ma destinée ordonne & veult que face
 Une escriptoire des deux yeulx de ma face
 Ou plongeray la plume de mon cueur
 Es doulces lermes & la moite liqueur
 Yssant d'iceulx, car je n'ay point d'aultre ancre
 Pres mon amy mort ou suis à l'ancre.
 Papier feray de sa face pallie
 Incontinent que la larme saillie
 Sera de l'œil sur luy degouttera
 Qui pour empreintes certes denotera
 Que fais mes plains, mes douleurs & mes cris
 Pour le papier dessus lequel j'escrrips.¹⁰⁹

In exposing her regrets, she expresses the wish she had died with her mother by her side and been properly buried, in the presence of people mourning their death and shedding tears on their tombs. Philistine's request for an honourable death is satisfied in the imaginative world of letter writing, in a fascinating manifestation of fictional, albeit, realistic, images: her letter refers to the description of an imagined sepulchre by which she envisions an alternative end of her life. The poetic integration of such an image may further reveal the importance that the real author places on literary memory: in the fictional letter writer's imagination, chroniclers, inspired by the tomb, would compose epitaphs in her name.¹¹⁰ Her wish echoes the repeated regrets expressed by the Ovidian heroines who are also cast to the sea, alienated from society, exiled, and imprisoned,¹¹¹ and particularly echoes Phyllis' final words, written in her letter in the form of a funerary inscription, with the aim of ensuring that her

109 For the cited text see de Saint-Gelais (1538). Cf. Scollen (1967) 25.

110 Philistine's desire to be remembered is echoed in many late medieval and early Renaissance texts, notably the *Première Epître de l'Amant Vert* (1505) by Jean Lemaire de Belges. In this Ovidian-style work, the bird-lover contemplates death as the only relief for his suffering and describes how his tomb will become a pilgrimage spot for future lovers, with a maiden who will recount his story to visitors. He pens his own epitaph. On classical inscription in the Renaissance, see Saxl (1940–1941) 19, who mentions that “[i]t is often touching to observe how Greek and Latin epitaphs were being circulated and hailed among the humanists. Every inscription might one day yield a vital truth.”

111 See, for example, the cases of Briseis (*Letter* 3), Dido (*Letter* 7), Ariadne (*Letter* 10), and Medea (*Letter* 12).

story survives through her death (*Inscribere meo causa invidiosa sepulcro. / aut hoc aut simili carmine notus eris: / PHYLLIDA DEMOPHOON LETO DEDIT HOSPES AMANTEM; / ILLE NECIS CAUSAM PRAEBUIT, IPSA MANUM.* "On my tomb shall you be inscribed the hateful cause of my death. By this, or by some similar verse, shall you be known: DEMOPHOON 'T WAS SENT PHYLLIS TO HER DOOM; / HER GUEST WAS HE, SHE LOVED HIM WELL. / HE WAS THE CAUSE THAT BROUGHT HER DEATH TO PASS; / HER OWN THE HAND BY WHICH SHE FELL." 2.145–148).¹¹²

Dying (well) in Philistine's and Phyllis' texts is directly linked to literary remembrance and therefore "survival," for it ensures a sort of textual immortality. The Ovidian and Ovidian-like heroines' epitaphs and inscriptions enable them to get through the cruel isolation. To write (and to be read) means to be commemorated and therefore to survive; the act of memory becomes the very substance of both writing and reading, for the fictional and the real writer, as the heroines' reference to their memory coincides with Ovid's literary remembrances of his sources of reference.¹¹³ In fact, the rhetoric of memory actively participates in the reconstruction of both the text and the heroine's portrayal through a number of tropes and figures predominant in the collection.¹¹⁴ Repetitions of words, rhymes, word plays, and alliterations engage the reader and the poet in a reading process that facilitates its recollection, as instructed by the rhetorical *memoria*.¹¹⁵ Philistine's and Phyllis' references to rhymed and repeated epitaphic words composed in their memory points to the double function of textual compositions as both mnemonic and memorable, and may allude to *memoria*, the canon that aided the orator to craft and deliver a speech successfully.¹¹⁶

As pointed out by scholars, "the inclusion of a self-penned epitaph is a common feature as the heroine imagines her own death."¹¹⁷ In fact, "[f]ictitious epitaphs, which addressed passers-by, might have reminded the reader of his role as a metaphorical wayfarer."¹¹⁸ Erected to inspire the composition of

112 On Phyllis' epitaph and Saint-Gelais' "unsatisfactory" reprise, see White (2004) 180.

113 See, for example, the Ovidian introduction of the Argonauts' voyage in *Letter* 12, which presents similarities to the treatments of the myth in Euripides, Apollonius of Rhodes, Ennius, and Accius. See Thomas (1982) 144–164 on this matter.

114 On the rhetoric of memory in Ovid's *Heroides*, with focus on *Letter* 12, see Alekou (2018a).

115 Cic. *De. Or.* 2.350–360 and Quint. *Inst.* 11.2.1–26.

116 "Ancient mnemotechnics are closely tied to the idea of movement: it is recommended that the orator imagine a room or place where he can 'store' single points of his speech – to recall the items in the correct order, he simply has to revisit them by going through that place." See Blum (1969); den Boer (1986); Höschele (2007) 336; Yates (1972) 1–49.

117 See White (2009) 33 and the examples of *Her.* 2, 7, and 14.

118 Höschele (2007) 365.

more rhymed epitaphs to her memory – and perhaps also, at least implicitly, to the memory of the Ovidian heroines – Philistine's graved sepulchre reveals the character of most Renaissance Ovidian-like compositions as responses to Ovid's letters, and places the reader in this metaphorical role of a traveller who receives the text and is asked to respond to it. Early Renaissance writers' works, like the *Contrepistres d'Ovide* (1546), by Michel d'Amboise, were influenced by the medieval tradition of "reply literature."¹¹⁹ It is interesting to note that if the ancient poet's individual letters appear with no reply in the Ovidian collection, allusions to the reprise of their storytelling as dictated by the fictional "female" writer may suggest that the idea of using a replying voice in letters was already shaped in Ovid's mind at this early stage of his literary career. Ariadne's request that the reader of her epistle remember her in his narration of achievements (*me quoque narrato sola tellure relictam! / non ego sum titulis subripienda tuis* "tell, too, of me, abandoned on a solitary shore – for I must not be stolen from the record of your honours!" 10.129–130) points to this evaluation, whereas the employed vocabulary echoes that of Phyllis' epitaphic inscription (2.145–148), implying that in this second, intersected, narration of her life, she will already be dead. The death motif re-emerges therefore in the French text as a rhetorical *topos*, to urge the fictional reader to react quickly and to reread the *exemplum* differently. The technique of *exemplum* used is indirect and metaphorical, but the identification of the rhetorical model through allusion reveals important information about the outcome of the story: we know that these women too shall pass away. Such use of rhetorical *exempla* appeals to the erudition of the readers, sharpens their attention, and gratifies, perhaps, their vanity.¹²⁰

The "reply" concept in Ovidian letter writing is fully developed in the poet's double *Heroides*, written at a later stage, perhaps during Ovid's *relegatio* in Tomi.¹²¹ The subject of death is prominent in the poet's exilic poetry, particularly in his autobiographical texts, and acts as a means for persuasion for his return to Rome.¹²² The rhetorical exploration of death in Ovid's work is in line with ancient theories of rhetoric, as dying participates in the conceptualisation of the fictional character's *ēthos* and, as will be shown, of that of its author. As part of *loci a persona* in invention theory, death participates in

119 A lover's lament couched in the form of a bestiary is accompanied by the lady's retort. The use of male voices in love complaints has a long history in the Middle Ages with Alain Chartier's *La Belle Dame sans Mercy* as the most influential example. See White (2009) 189, who examines to what extent the notion of replying lays bare the various mechanisms of response to the literary text.

120 Demoen (1997) 142–143.

121 See a discussion in Fulkerson (2009) 78–80. Cf. Casanova-Robin (2007) 7.

122 On Ovid's exilic work in context, see McGowan (2009).

prosopographical and biographical literature and directly relates to theories of praise.¹²³ In Theon's discussion of character, death and "after-death" appear as constituents of narrative, and correspond to the *loci* of encomiastic rhetoric.¹²⁴ The rhetoric of death is particularly explored in Cydippe's account (*Heroides* 21), in a fictional letter presumably written by the elegiac *puella* par excellence, and is revisited by Ovid in his *Tristia* to emphasise the nature of his isolation.¹²⁵

In *Letter* 21, the final letter of the collection, writing is conceived as therapeutic to the dying heroine. In dealing with the young woman's illness, a consequence of involuntarily reading Acontius' inscription on an apple, Ovid revisits the account of Callimachus (*Aetia* 3.67–75) to underline the force of oratory and its "side-effects": Cydippe, immediately before confessing her willingness to give in to the masculine rhetoric (*teque tenente deos numen sequor ipsa deorum, / doque libens victas in tua vota manus*; "and since you hold bound the gods, I myself follow their will, and gladly yield my vanquished hands in fulfilment of your prayers," 21.239–240),¹²⁶ prompts Acontius, whom she calls a "great poet" (*magne poeta*, 21.110), to demonstrate his oratorical skills by writing another *littera* in order to convince the gods to show mercy to her ([...] *nisi si nova forte reperta est / quae capiat magnos littera lecta deos*. "[...]unless perhaps you have found some new writing the reading whereof ensnares even the mighty gods." 21.237–238). The request to be saved through writing, that of yet another letter (*nova littera*), points to the power of *scriptum* (*scriptumque*, 21.1) as also lifesaving. Interestingly, this *nova littera* could prove to be life saving for the real author of the letter as well. Cydippe's request for a divinely poetical intervention points to the possibility that her state of health may change for the better, perhaps, with the assistance of some god, or some *vates* (*hoc deus, hoc vates, hoc edita carmina dicunt*, "this is what the god says, this his prophet, this the published oracle," 21.235), and appears as precautionary from the fictive standpoint of the letter. Ovid too is punished for having said too much, just like his last heroine (243), who extends her hands (*victas manus*, 21.240) while

123 Lausberg (1998) 376.

124 Theon, *Prog.* 78.24–26 Sp. II.

125 According to the Callimachean account (*Aet.* 67–75), Acontius saw Cydippe during the festival of Artemis at Delos and wrote on an apple the words "I swear by Artemis that I will marry Acontius," throwing it at her feet. Cydippe picked it up, read the words aloud, and was found involuntarily engaged to him. She was betrothed several times, but always fell ill before the wedding took place. The Delphic oracle declared the cause of her illnesses to her father to be the wrath of the goddess and her father consented to her marriage with Acontius.

126 This verse has been misleadingly read as an allusion to the "happy" ending in Callimachus' account. See Michalopoulos (2014) 263 and Ziogas (2016) 229.

(s)he states: *cetera tua est*; “the rest must be your care;” (21.243).¹²⁷ Ovid implicitly underlines that the future of his text lies in its reception, and encourages the reader to identify the real author behind the fictional one by exploring the rhetoric of self-representation.

Ovid’s Cydippe, a first-person narrator, seems to act as a device of self-representation that serves to influence the representation of the poet. If we accept that all behaviour is part of strategic self-presentations of individuals so that they safeguard their reputation as members of the intellectual and political elite, then we need also to acknowledge that rhetoric plays an important role in the strategy of self-performance.¹²⁸ In employing this particular rhetorical strategy in his collection of “female” letters, and, in particular, in *Letter 21*, Ovid defines himself as well as his audience not only in relation to past literary traditions but, more importantly, to contemporary cultural paradigms. The anticipation and influence of his readers’ perception of him through the construction of his heroines’ *ēthos* reveal the rhetorical techniques that Ovid has explored. The *loci* involved in character construction (in invention and epideictic theory), as well as the different rhetorical techniques of characterisation and self-presentation, inform the conceptualisation of *ēthos*.¹²⁹ The construction of *ēthos* (*ēthopoīia*) is synonymous to *notatio* and characterisation, and is defined by Quintilian and the *progymnasmata* authors as informative *mimēsis* of *ēthos* (*mos*) through performance, namely, action as well as speech.¹³⁰ *Mimēsis* of *ēthos* as a school exercise is significant particularly when it comes to moral characterisation.¹³¹

Ovid’s self-representation through epistolographic images of death may be misleading, as Ovid’s heroines never actually die during their letter writing; like Ovid himself, their letters will have survived long enough to inscribe a powerful message, that of unjust punishment in the sphere of the myth, their one-sided portrayal in literature, and the illegal or immoral causes of their suffering in history. Death in performance acts as a defining element of our perception of the victim’s *ēthos*, but additionally reflects the victim’s perception of the world. Notwithstanding the multiple death threats and suicide announcements, as in Philistine’s engraved sepulchre, the reappropriation of these fictional letters as authorial inscriptions aims eventually to prevent the heroines’ categorical

127 Composing for an implicit as well as an explicit addressee forces the heroine to write ambiguously, as argued by Fulkerson (2003) 124.

128 De Temmerman (2010) 39–40.

129 De Temmerman (2010) 43.

130 Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 15.7 Sp. II; Aphth. *Prog.* 44.21 Sp. II; Nicol. *Prog.* 64.1–3; Priscianus, *Praeexercitamina* 45.

131 Ps.-Cic. *Rh. ad Her.* 4.65; Ps.-Rufinianus, *De schem. dian.* 13.62.

condemnation.¹³² In this way, death appears in Renaissance literature also as paradoxically life-saving, particularly to women who disobeyed conventional authorities, but loyally obeyed Ovidian *mores* by sacrificing the elegiac *amor* in the name of a liberating and often rebellious noble *mors*. The death motif appears then as a powerful tool that invites the addressee to reconsider the fictional women's role in Ovid's historical *persona*. The poet's identification with his praised subjects, whose punitive exile and isolation appears unjust, invites us to read in their writings a foreshadowed epitaph on Ovid's behalf. The provocative disclosure of their unfair *exilium* becomes the cause of the poet's suffering, recalled during his relegation and in his *Tristia* as engraved on his tomb (*Tr.* 3.3.74), whilst he compares his exilic poetry to the songs of a slave girl as she spins (*Tr.* 4.1.13–14), the same verses that would become, as he stated, the cause of his death.

Ovid becomes the reader of his own heroines' letters and responds to their request for readership and reception through historicising their grief, a reply concept the Renaissance writers seem to have embraced in their reception of Ovid's laments. The Ovidian heroines act as rhetorical *exempla* for Ovid's real life and death, long before they can be noticed by his Renaissance readers. Indicative is the story of Medea, Ovid's favourite exiled heroine, recalled by the poet while in *relegatio*.¹³³ The *exemplum* in this context conforms to Quintilian's definition,¹³⁴ according to which the subject matter can be subdivided per its historicity into the truly historical *exemplum* (*verae res*) including historical events or persons, the poetic *exemplum* (divided between *fabula*, the material for tragedy or mythology, and *fabella*), and the *exemplum verisimile* (fictitious events that concern characters from literature).¹³⁵ In Ovid's work, the historical and the poetic *exempla* are interwoven along with the *exemplum verisimile*: the fate of the mythological heroines coincides with both the real poet and his literary *persona*. The Ovidian *exemplum* in its multifaceted dimension is revisited by French Renaissance authors, whose reply to Ovid's text does not only provide an ending to the Roman poet's unfinished verses, but further takes the form of a strategic response to Ovid's eventual fate. The (re-)construction of his heroines' *ēthos* becomes inextricable from that of the exiled poet in reception. As shown below, the female rhetorical *exempla* act,

132 "The realities of family life were necessarily more complex than patriarchal theory would suggest. In practice, family relationships and gender roles both affirmed and subverted the hierarchical and paternalistic lines of authority that in theory governed them," argues Diefendorf (2002) 99–118.

133 *Ov. Tr.* 3.4.

134 Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.6.

135 See Canter (1933).

particularly in Binard's work, as vehicles that facilitate the transition from myth to reality, from past to present, from love to death and "after-death."

The Renaissance writers will have received the heroines' Ovidian letters and will have saved their writer(s) from (literary) death, by remembering them in their compositions as Ovidian readers.¹³⁶ In their reception of Ovid as a rhetorician, authors of early modern texts, particularly Binard, welcome the exiled Ovid to explore his work in the service of the French national and cultural agenda; France becomes Ovid's and his marginalised heroines' asylum, especially in Binard's work, in which Louis XIII, depicted as the benevolent king, offers sanctuary to the victimised poet.¹³⁷ The French language is cast as a refuge, as it reveals in Ovid's writing the polyphonic power of allusion ("sans le dire à personne il le donne à penser"),¹³⁸ in the way Medea and Anne and other Ovidian and Ovidian-like heroines lack words but break through their reticence, empowered by techniques of rhetoric.

The poet's work and life appealed particularly to the writers who were prolific in the genres of "nouvelles historiques" and "nouvelles galantes." Indicative is the work of Marie-Catherine de Villegieu,¹³⁹ who tackles in *Les Exilés de la cour d'Auguste* the relationship between the court and the poet – as far as they are allowed to explore, examine and disclose the negative and threatening facets of the court world, "by going behind the scenes at Augustus' court."¹⁴⁰ Retelling the account of the exiled poet, all the while revisiting the tales of Ovid's exiled mythological women in French literature, also means re-examining the hierarchical power dynamics and the socio-legal and political situation of the court. By presenting an innocent mythological *compendium* of women's tales, the French authors provide a critical depiction of their contemporary political reality. In endowing women with the ability to give their own account of the male-dominated political arena, they explore the dynamics of gender as a platform for political critique; by manipulating, challenging,

136 The similarities between the many voices of Ovid's exile, both his heroines' and his own, are mentioned in Ramsby (2005) 384.

137 This concerns a dedicatory letter to Louis XIII in *Les regrets d'Ovide* (1625): "il n'a point voulu que je l'aie déguisé d'un autre habit que celui avec lequel je l'aie trouvé en son exil. Il m'a permis seulement de luy faire parler françois, afin de montrer que le plus violent de tous ses regrets, est de n'avoir plutost changé la rigueur du climat où il estoit relégué au doux air de votre cour, pour vous tesmoigner, sire, la passion qu'il a d'honorer votre majesté." See Taylor (2017) 48.

138 See Taylor (2017) 50.

139 Taylor (2015) 49–63.

140 Taylor (2017) 79.

and revising their period's and culture's dominant castings of gender in the employment of rhetorical (anti-) *exempla*,¹⁴¹ they too become Ovidian authors.

3 Conclusion

Ovid's *Heroides* in reception reveal the coexistence of multiple letter writers and readers, as the use of rhetorical *exempla* in the Ovidian-like works of the French Renaissance that we have examined allows many stories to emerge as implicitly aligned.¹⁴² If the ambiguous nature of intertextuality reveals its double function as both interpretative tool and creative reception, there too lies its endless hermeneutics. The question is what the meaning of *exempla* in context can teach the reader about the authorial interpretation of the stories involved.¹⁴³ As the "feminine" direct speech becomes inseparable from the master artisan's formal articulation of the literary artifact, by means of not only metrical dexterity but also rhetorical figures,¹⁴⁴ the "haunting familiarity" between real and fictional authors, in terms of experiences such as isolation and abandonment, makes these letters a set of rhetorical pieces that defy the fictional space.¹⁴⁵ The role of rhetoric in character construction lies in the fashioning of a *persona* as a form of textual building of the self and the definition of the role of reader(s) and writer(s), a concern that is rather evident in Ovid's work and commonly appears in early modern letter writing.¹⁴⁶ Ovid, whether as a literary *persona* or as a poet, is received in the French Renaissance as a master rhetorician.

The mythologising of the ancient poet's portrayal through the reworking of his own writing practice emerges as a response to his epistles but also as an assimilation of his rhetoric in character construction. In rewriting Ovid's *Heroides*, and in replying to them, French authors might reflect their aspiration to "enjoy a fame similar to that of their classical predecessors," as argued by scholars.¹⁴⁷ Most importantly, however, they express the desire to deal with the afterlife of Ovid's text and its future reception, and they do so through

141 See another example of the manipulation of the dominant gender patterns with regard to Ovid's Dido in Phillippy (1992) 1.

142 See Demoen (1997) with an illustrative example at 143 n. 66.

143 Demoen (1997) 154 n. 96 and 155 adds that negative or ironical allusions can be revealing.

144 Ciccone (1997) 3.

145 Ramsby (2005) 384.

146 White (2009) 29.

147 LeBlanc (1996) 77. On Ovid's literary succession implied in Ovidian metaphorical language, see Ingleheart (2010) 167.

the exploration of controversial rhetorical *exempla*. These *exempla* concern women that derive from mythology and have been established through time as literary models to be eventually associated with historical women. The French writers' tackling of the afterlife of Ovid's text as a response to the *Heroides*' explicit request to be read encourages us to address specific, diachronically debatable, scholarly issues that concern the propagandistic exploitation of exemplary male and female behaviour in an absolute demystification of matters of love. The Ovidian heroine provides the opportunity – only seemingly renegotiated in its French adaptation – to reveal the shortcomings of literary, rhetorical, and social conventions as the means for interrogating and re-evaluating the politicised world.

The vocabulary of memory, defined in the collection as its poetic signature, is reintroduced in the Renaissance Heroidean-like literary world to foster new debates on these same matters. The Ovidian heroine's demand that the reader of her letter remembers, acknowledges, and inscribes her female contribution in his narration of male achievements (*me quoque narrato sola tellure relictam! / non ego sum titulis subripienda tuis*. "Tell, too, of me, abandoned on a solitary shore – for I must not be stolen from the record of your honours!" 10.129–130) coincides with the author's assertion that (s)he does remember, and elevates the rhetoric of female storytelling to the author's means of salvation, in a still-lasting gendered conflict in which women's issues remain fundamentally political. Writing a letter about women and writing a woman's letter benefit the letter writer, because, if art survives the artist, Ovid's unconventional, controversial, and marginalised women and "their" epistles, reconstructed and reprinted in early modern literature, will have rescued the poet and his poem from oblivion, through an endless process of reception and imitation of Ovidian *mores*. "Saved" in the French Renaissance and beyond, not so much by Christian ethics but more importantly and less evidently by the techniques of ancient rhetoric, Ovid's rhetorical *exempla* will continue to inspire the rewriting of his *Heroides*, as a genuinely Ovidian genre with multiple interpretative paths, proving every time that the letter always arrives at its destination.

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SECTION 5

Religion

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Christians, Ottomans, and Emperors: Demosthenes in European Politics

Maria S. Youni

1 Orator(s) and Politician(s)¹

At the culmination of the election campaign a few days before the British general elections of 2010, Prime Minister Gordon Brown in his Citizens UK speech tried to rouse his voters with an invocation of Demosthenes: “When Cicero turned to the crowds in ancient Rome, people said, ‘great speech.’ When Demosthenes spoke to the crowds in ancient Greece and people turned to each other, they said: ‘Let’s march.’ Let’s march for justice, dignity, and fairness. That’s what we have all got to march for, and let’s march for it together.”² The British politician compared the Athenian orator and politician with Cicero, his Roman counterpart, emphasising the difference between a merely eloquent speaker and a sweeping orator who stirs his audience to action. There is an underlying appropriation here. Brown identifies himself with the sweeping orator and implies that he is not simply a good orator, but, more significantly, he is an efficient politician, capable of leading the march for justice, dignity, and fairness in his country.

In their effort to persuade audiences, public speakers often turn to quotations and apothegms from classical antiquity, and Demosthenes seems to be a long-time favourite. Nor is there any innovation in identifying oneself with Demosthenes or comparing contemporary politicians to the Greek statesman. In the 18th century Lord Brougham considered that William Pitt’s “grandeur of feeling and amplitude of survey on the subject-matters of debate” equalled Demosthenes;³ in the 20th century France’s Prime Minister and President Georges Clemenceau identified himself with Demosthenes; and in the 21st, Britain’s Attorney General Geoffrey Cox, the spokesperson for Theresa May’s

1 I worked on this chapter during my stay at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton as a Willis F. Doney Member of the School of Historical Studies in 2018–2019. I wish to express my gratitude to the Institute for giving me this opportunity.

2 “Gordon Brown Invokes Demosthenes and Cicero – Badly,” *The Guardian*, 4 May 2010.

3 Adams (1927) 156–157.

withdrawal deal in the Brexit debate, was said to have “the intellect of Einstein and the eloquence of Demosthenes.”⁴

There is little wonder in Demosthenes’ enduring popularity. Among the ten orators of the canon, he is the most renowned and influential. In antiquity his rhetorical supremacy was recognised by such authorities as Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Cicero, and Quintilian, followed by many others who praised Demosthenes as the perfect orator. His rhetorical style, ideas, and techniques have been abundantly copied, studied, and reproduced for centuries. But Demosthenes was not only a celebrated orator. As an active politician in a turbulent epoch that witnessed the rise of Macedonian power, he was the emblematic spokesman for Athenian democracy and Panhellenic unity against Philip II’s imperialist politics. With his fervent speeches to the Assembly, he struggled to warn his fellow citizens against the Macedonian threat and to stir the fight for the Greek cities’ independence and autonomy. Ironically, the man who fought for the liberty of the Greek *poleis* and for the protection of Athenian democracy against the Macedonian kings lived to face defeat at Chaeronea and died by his own hand while pursued by Macedonian agents. In the decades following his death Athens surrendered to the king of Macedon whose Athenian mouthpiece, Demetrius of Phaleron, was assigned to the government of the city by Antipater.

Demosthenes’ twofold capacity as an outstanding rhetor and devoted statesman, along with the critical circumstances of his era, sufficed to perpetuate his fame, to spread his influence on literature, rhetoric, politics, art, and education, and to make him readily available as a source of quotations and examples. But the relevance of Demosthenic quotations, references, and appropriations to the pursuits of his political agenda and to the perils of his epoch is another question – one we attempt to throw light on in the pages that follow. The present chapter focuses on the transmission of Demosthenes’ political ideas and oratory in European history by concentrating on some striking examples of subsequent use and abuse. It aims at shedding light on the ideological use of Demosthenes in diverse historical contexts and on the ways his ideas were perceived, adapted, and appropriated.

4 Adam Payne, Thomas Colson, and Adam Bienkov, “MPs Vote Down Theresa May’s Brexit Deal, Jeremy Corbyn Schedules Vote of No-Confidence” (live blog), *Business Insider*, 15 January 2019 <https://www.businessinsider.com/live-brexit-meaningful-vote-liveblog-theresa-may-2019-1#1405-cox-what-are-you-playing-at-18>, loc. 13:20. Retrieved on 25 May 2019.

2 Depictions, Comparisons, and Appropriations

Information about the life and work of Demosthenes comes from references in his own speeches and in the surviving speeches of his opponents, Aeschines, Dinarchus, and Hyperides. In addition, there is rich biographical material. Hellenistic biographies of Demosthenes, such as the one by Hermippus in the 3rd century BCE (now lost), were concerned essentially with his rhetorical merits rather than his political ideas and career, and had a big share in shaping the image and reputation of Demosthenes that was transmitted through the subsequent centuries. The earliest and most influential surviving biography was written by Plutarch around 100 CE. Sometime later, another biography appeared in Pseudo-Plutarch's *Lives of the Ten Orators*, where historical facts are mixed with anecdotes of dubious reliability. Surviving biographies from the Byzantine era include the *Life* by Libanius (4th century CE), Zosimus (late 5th or early 6th century), Photius (9th century), an anonymous Byzantine author in the *Suda* (10th century), and Ioannes Tzetzes (12th century). Discussions about Demosthenes are preserved in the work of Greek and Roman historians, especially Polybius, Diodorus Siculus, and Arrian, while various other sources transmit anecdotes from his life (e.g., Aelian's *Various Histories*) or quotations from his works (e.g., Athenaeus' *Deipnosophists*).

But, despite abundance, the information is of uneven quality because much derives from unreliable sources. Constant repetition of frivolous stories and anecdotes by subsequent authors perpetuated a distorted and contradictory picture of Demosthenes, where truth mingled with legend.⁵ Anecdotes deriving from his political opponents, such as his natural deficiency with speech, which made him train his voice with pebbles in his mouth, or his reluctance to speak extempore, found their way in every biography of Demosthenes and became *loci communes*. A popular later tale demonstrating his purported avarice, was his visit to the courtesan Lais at Corinth, cited by Aulus Gellius (1.8). Although purely imaginary, the story's considerable impact on literature and art is depicted by J.M.W. Turner's painting entitled *Phryne Going to the Public Bath – Demosthenes Taunted by Aeschines* (1838), where Lais is substituted by the Corinthian courtesan Phryne. The effect of these *loci* was to diminish the entire figure of Demosthenes into a caricature, utterly irrelevant in regard to the impact of his political action and rhetoric in his own historical environment.

The bifurcation of Demosthenes' reputation into two contrasting images produced soon after his death involved the opposing political agendas of

5 For example, alleged teachers of Demosthenes include Isaeus, Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Xenocrates: see MacDowell (2009) 202.

anti-Macedonians, among whom the prominent figure was Demochares, and pro-Macedonians, represented by the Peripatetics. Demochares, Demosthenes' nephew, endeavoured to defend the memory of his uncle as orator and politician. He had a decree voted in his honour, and meticulously collected and published his speeches. The Peripatetics, on the other hand, Theophrastus, Critolaus, Demetrius of Phaleron, Theopompus, and Hermippus were the inventors of an entirely different tradition, which criticised severely Demosthenes' rhetorical ability and emphasised themes such as his lack of natural rhetorical gifts or his dishonesty and political unstableness.⁶ Although the Peripatetics concentrated mainly on attacking his character and personality while avoiding criticising directly his political arguments, the anti-democratic and pro-Macedonian undertones are conspicuous in statements such as Theophrastus' claim that Demosthenes was "an orator worthy of his city," whereas Demosthenes' opponent Demades was "too good for his city."⁷

This did not prevent Demosthenes from becoming the model of comparison for politicians and orators in the centuries to come. A few decades after his death, Cineas from Thessaly, an important adviser of King Pyrrhus, who purportedly had heard Demosthenes, was branded as "the only public speaker of his day who was thought to remind his hearers, as a statue might, of that great orator's power and ability."⁸ Comparison of Demosthenes with his contemporary Athenian orators was another favourite theme for rhetorical scholars, especially after the establishment of the "Canon of the ten Attic Orators."⁹ Cleochares from Bithynia, a 3rd-century CE rhetorician who probably lived in Athens, was the author of a treatise in which he maintained Demosthenes' supremacy as compared with Isocrates.¹⁰ The most famous comparison is that between Demosthenes and his Roman counterpart Cicero, which became a classic after Plutarch's influential parallel biographies and comparison of the two men. Afterwards, Demosthenes and Cicero became the personifications of eloquence and rhetoric in scholarship, literature, and art.¹¹ Generations of rhetoricians and philosophers added a multitude of nuances to the doublet,

6 Cooper (2000); Canevaro (2018) 74–76.

7 Plut. *Dem.* 10.1.

8 Plut. *Pyrrh.* 14.1. The story is repeated by Cassius Dio *Rom. Hist.* 9.40.5.

9 The canon was established sometime between the third century BCE and the second century CE: see Worthington (1994) 244–262.

10 Phot. 121b 9–16; Spengel 3, 97. See Lossau (1964) 52–65.

11 One among many examples is Robert Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621): "Alexander's spirit, Tully's or Demosthenes' eloquence, Gyges' ring" (I.2.III.10); "If he be a big man, then he is Samson, another Hercules; if he pronounces a speech, another Tully or Demosthenes" (I.2.III.14).

comparing above all the rhetorical style of Demosthenes and Cicero rather than their political programs or careers, and enunciating verdicts about supremacy, in which Demosthenes was often the champion.¹²

Whereas in the Hellenistic and Roman eras the study of Demosthenes' speeches was primarily focused on his literary and rhetorical virtues,¹³ interest in the political aspect of his speeches was revived in the Renaissance. The editing, study, translation, and commentary of his texts often gave the opportunity for making comparisons or tracing parallels between Demosthenes' Athens and contemporary situations or served as an inspiration for outward political propaganda. Demosthenes' struggle for democracy, liberty, and autonomy against Philip II's hegemony and against his Athenian political opponents became an archetype for constructing political exempla and shaping contemporary oppositions, which had a significant impact on the history of ideas and ideologies. These themes were widely transmitted in the ages to come and served as models and ways of self-identification among subsequent scholars, ecclesiastical authors, emperors, political leaders, and politicians. Thus, in the discourse of later writers and orators, Demosthenes became the personification of unyielding struggle for divergent causes: from independence of states to enhancement of parliamentary democracy, and from the liberty of nations to the triumph of God's kingdom against the secular domination of kings.

3 The Marathon Fighters and Christian Catechism

Demosthenes' *On the Crown* is perhaps the speech that has been exploited the most by a multitude of authors for different purposes. The speech has been considered his masterpiece since antiquity. According to a famous anecdote transmitted by Roman and Greek sources, one of the first admirers of this speech was his adversary in the case, Aeschines.¹⁴ Cicero, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Aelius Aristides were the first in a long series of rhetoricians and philologists who expressed their devoted admiration for *On the Crown*, and labelled it as "the most beautiful of Demosthenes' speeches," "the strongest of his

12 The example par excellence is Aelius Aristides, *On the Sublime*. See Pernot (2006) 151–175.

13 Recent study of *meletai*, fictitious speeches composed by Hellenistic rhetoricians, attests to a political interest in Demosthenes in the third century BCE. Kremmydas (2009); Canevaro (2018).

14 Aeschines, on exile at Rhodes, allegedly read the speech to the students of his rhetorical school, who expressed their admiration, to which Aeschines answered: "And what would you say if you heard the *thērion* himself?" Pliny *Ep.* 2.3.10. Pernot (2001) 85 n. 2. Perpillon (1995) elaborates on *thērion*.

orations," "the most accomplished of his works," "the best and greatest of all his speeches," even "the best of all speeches of ancient oratory."¹⁵ In this highly praised speech, the passage in which Demosthenes swears by the forefathers who fought in the Persian wars and argues that all deserve the same honours, whether victorious or defeated (18.208), has been thought by many as the culmination of his art:

Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἡμάρτετ', ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀπάντων ἐλευθερίας καὶ σωτηρίας κίνδυνον ἀράμενοι, μὰ τοὺς Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων, καὶ τοὺς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς παραταξαμένους, καὶ τοὺς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχῆσαντας καὶ τοὺς ἐπ' Ἀρτεμισίῳ, καὶ πολλοὺς ἐτέρους τοὺς ἐν τοῖς δημοσίοις μνήμασιν κειμένους ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας, οὓς ἅπαντας ὁμοίως ἡ πόλις τῆς αὐτῆς ἀξιώσασα τιμῆς ἔθαψεν, Αἰσχίνῃ, οὐχὶ τοὺς κατορθώσαντας αὐτῶν οὐδὲ τοὺς κρατήσαντας μόνους. Δικαίως. ὁ μὲν γάρ ἦν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔργον ἅπασι πέπρακται. τῇ τύχῃ δ', ἣν ὁ δαίμων ἔνειμεν ἑκάστοις, ταύτη κέχρηται.

But it cannot, it cannot be that you made a mistake, men of Athens, in taking upon yourselves the burden of danger for the freedom and security of all; I swear it by your ancestors in the front lines at Marathon, by those who stood at Plataia, by your naval men at Salamis and Artemisium and by many others who lie in public tombs, good men, all of them, whom the city buried because it thought them worthy of the same honour, not only those of them who were successful and victorious. And justly so. For they all performed the duty expected of brave men, and they accepted whatever fate heaven allotted to them.

Trans. J.J. Keaney in Murphy (1967)

This famous passage's influence, especially since its lengthy commentary in the treatise *Peri Hypsous* (1st century CE), extends from the Hellenistic period to our days. From Seneca the Elder and Ps.-Longinus to Engelbert Drerup, from Gregory of Nazianzus and Cyril of Alexandria to Joseph Rhakendytes, from Plutarch and Lucian to Georges Clemenceau, the oath by the Marathon fighters was widely reproduced, analysed, criticised, and imitated by orators,

15 Theon *Prog.* 61.17; Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 54.6, *Dem.* 14.1, *Amm.* 1.12.4; Cicero *Or.* 26.133; Plin. *Ep.* 6.33.11; Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 25.25; Aelius Aristides *Digr.* (28), 75. Lord Brougham (1840) iii in his introduction to the translation qualified it as "the Greatest Oration of the Greatest of Orators."

philosophers, politicians, and scholars.¹⁶ A neglected yet instructive example of the ways in which Demosthenes' ideas were used to promote values very different from his own is the exploitation of this passage's religious connotations in a Christian context by the early fathers of the church. Clement of Alexandria (c.150–215), Gregory of Nazianzus (c.329–390), and Cyril of Alexandria (c.376–444) alluded to the oath by the Marathon fighters in their writings, although with quite different connotations each. The earliest of the three, Titus Flavius Clemens, or Clement of Alexandria, determined to prove the preponderance of Jewish culture and the lack of originality of Greek culture, in his treatise *Stromata* argued that Greek philosophy and science were but faint copies of foreign originals. Thus, the third chapter of the sixth book of *Stromata* treats “plagiarism by the Greeks of the miracles related in the sacred books of the Hebrews” and the fourth asserts that “the Greeks drew many of their philosophical tenets from the Egyptian and Indian gymnosophists.” The second chapter, devoted to proving that “the Greeks were plagiarising from one another,” contains numerous short passages from literature, including epic, lyric, tragic and comic poets, philosophers, and historians, which allegedly demonstrate that Greek thought from Homer and Pythagoras to Aristotle was simply a product of plagiarism.¹⁷ In this context, Clement claims that Demosthenes stole the phrase *μὰ τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας* from Thucydides, who wrote *Μαραθῶνι τε μόνοι προκινδυνεύσαι*.¹⁸

Whereas Clement of Alexandria approached ancient Greek literature with the zeal of a convert, in the 4th century Gregory of Nazianzus used the oath in Demosthenes' *On the Crown* in an entirely different context.¹⁹ Gregory's *Oration* 15, entitled *In Praise of the Maccabees*, celebrates the memory of the seven Maccabee brothers who died in martyrdom under the reign of the Seleucid King Antiochus IV Epiphanes (175–164 BCE). Gregory praises the young brothers not only for their eagerness to accept torture, but also for the wisdom and dignity of their response to King Antiochus, which he sums up as follows: “For us, Antiochus, and all of you who stand in circle around us, the only king is God, from whom we were born and to whom we shall return, and the only legislator is Moses, whom we shall not betray nor outrage, no, by the dangers this man has faced for virtue, and by his numerous prodigies, even if

16 Pernot (2001) has collected forty-five testimonies. Revised and updated in Pernot (2006) 177–238.

17 The fifth, however, maintains that “The Greeks had some knowledge of the true God.”

18 Migne (1857) 9: col. 233B.

19 On Demosthenic influence on Gregory of Nazianzus, see this volume, chapter 2.

we were threatened by another Antiochus more cruel than you.”²⁰ Despite the lack of any direct reference to Demosthenes or his oration, the resonance of the passage of *On the Crown* is clear. Although Gregory is careful to swear by the dangers faced by Moses instead of swearing by Moses himself, he masterfully puts the persecuted Maccabees in the place of Demosthenes and compares Moses to the Athenians who fought at Marathon. King Antiochus is identified with the Persian king, and the liberty of Christianity is paralleled to the liberty of the Greeks. But there are more implications and transpositions to this ingenious imitation. The brave response of the Maccabees was intended to be read in a contemporary framework.²¹ The Byzantine Emperor Julian (332–363), known for his rejection of Christianity and his preference towards Neoplatonism, was about to visit Nazianzus in 362, and Gregory composed his oration with the intention to prepare his city’s Christian population to face the “Apostate.” The message suggested by Gregory is that the Nazianzen Christians ought to resist Julian in the way the Maccabees resisted Antiochus. Following Demosthenes, who used the paradigm of the Marathon fighters against Persia to arouse his fellow citizens against Philip II of Macedon, Gregory uses the example of the Maccabee brothers against King Antiochus to arouse his fellow Christians against the pagan emperor.

Julian, on the other hand, was a scholar impregnated with Greek education. He thought very highly of Demosthenes and made ample use of references to him in his own writings.²² In 362/3 Julian wrote the *Against the Galileans*, a polemic against Christianity, where he severely criticises Christian practices while expressing his appreciation of the Jewish faith. The work is now lost but extensive fragments from the first three books survive in the *Against Julian*, an oration written by Cyril of Alexandria seventy years after the emperor’s death, with the professed aim to refute Julian’s arguments. Once again, the oath by the Marathon fighters finds its way to the service of the Christian cause. In the *Against the Galileans* Julian had attacked the Christians’ adoration of the dead martyrs; Cyril retorts that even the cultivated Athenians praised their glorious dead and deified their ancestors who had died fighting against the Medes. In support of his argument, he quotes verbatim the Demosthenic passage.²³ By

20 Migne (1857) 35: col. 920 A: Ἡμῖν, Ἀντίοχε, καὶ πάντες οἱ περιεστηκότες, εἰς μὲν βασιλεὺς ὁ θεός, παρ’ οὗ γεγόναμεν καὶ πρὸς ὃν ἐπιστρέψομεν, εἰς δὲ νομοθέτης ὁ Μωϋσῆς, ὃν οὐ προδῶσομεν οὐδὲ καθυβρίσομεν, οὐ μὰ τοὺς ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς κινδύνους καὶ τὰ πολλὰ θανάματα, οὐδ’ ἂν ἡμῖν ἄλλος Ἀντίοχος ἀπειλῇ σου χαλεπώτερος.

21 Bernardi (1995) 132–133; Pernot (2006) 232–233.

22 For example, Julian’s *Message to the Athenians* culminates (287c) with a quotation from the *First Olynthiac* (1.27). See Canfora (2019) 447–448.

23 Migne (1857) 76: col. 1017 C.

stating explicitly that the ancient Greeks deified their dead, Cyril advanced Gregory's idea one step further. Although Gregory, by making the Maccabees swear only by the risks that Moses faced instead of directly swearing by Moses, avoided identifying Moses expressly with the Marathon fighters, Cyril openly defends Christian glorification of martyrs and makes a daring comparison with the deified Marathon fighters.

Demosthenic influence on the fathers of the church had an afterlife of its own. The Byzantine scholar John Sikeliotēs (flourished around 1000 CE in Constantinople), in his *Scholia* on Hermogenes' *Peri Ideōn*, made very extensive use of Gregory Nazianzus' sermons, employing more than two hundred quotations from Gregory to elucidate Hermogenes.²⁴ At many points, including the passage of *In Praise of the Maccabees* mentioned above, Sikeliotēs discusses the impact of Demosthenes on the Nazianzen and juxtaposes passages from Demosthenes' speeches to show the imitation. More significantly, Sikeliotēs explicitly compares Demosthenes with Gregory, to conclude that the latter is preferable as an example over Demosthenes not only in eloquence, but also on moral, religious, and political grounds. As Conley has shown, Sikeliotēs compiled his scholia on Hermogenes' *Peri Ideōn* to promote the thesis that Gregory was superior to Demosthenes for a number of reasons: he was "more eloquent, virtuous, a Christian, and 'politically correct.'"²⁵ This endeavour was part of a further-reaching agenda, in its essence political rather than pedagogical, whose purpose was to consolidate a distinct "Byzantine" identity during the reign of Basil II, as opposed to the "barbarian" peoples surrounding the empire. The two main constituents of this identity were linguistic and religious: "Greekness" and orthodoxy. The scope of the intense literary and linguistic activity during the Byzantine Renaissance of the late 10th and early 11th century, promoted by the Macedonian dynasty, was to revive the Greek language of the remote past, which was the language of both theology and imperial authority. But, at the same time, this language had to be isolated and cleared from its pagan context. And for taking the place of Demosthenes as a model of rhetorical, theological, and moral model, no one was better than Gregory Nazianzus, the man who compared himself with Demosthenes and was given the title of the "Christian Demosthenes" by his contemporaries.

24 See Conley (2002–2003).

25 Conley (2002–2003) 150.

4 Christians and Ottomans

It was in Byzantium that the struggle of Demosthenes against Philip entered contemporary foreign affairs. The first to use it as a paradigm for the promotion of a closer relationship between the Byzantine Empire and the West against the rising Ottoman Empire was Demetrios Kydones (1324–1398), an influential politician, writer, translator, and theologian, who served as prime minister under three Byzantine emperors. Kydones considered that the knowledge of Latin was necessary for promoting diplomacy between the Byzantine Empire, which by his time had been reduced to a small state threatened by hostile neighbours, and the West. After the conquest of Byzantine territories by the Ottomans in the 1350s and 1360s, convinced that the survival of Byzantium depended on western military and financial assistance, Kydones concentrated his efforts on building a religious, political, and military alliance with the West to face the Ottoman threat. In his political and theological writings Kydones fervently supported the reconciliation of the Byzantine and Roman Churches, which he considered an important step to the approach between East and West.

To persuade the Byzantines to resist the Ottomans and turn to Italy for support, Kydones exploited the Demosthenic model and introduced his political thinking, argumentation, and rhetoric into contemporary political debate.²⁶ Two of his prolific political essays, the *Exhortation to the Romans* (*Ρωμαίων συμβουλευτικός*) and the *Exhortation on Callipolis* (*Συμβουλευτικός περί Καλλιπόλεως*) were inspired by Demosthenes' rhetorical style and his arguments against making peace with Philip II. In the *Exhortation to the Romans*,²⁷ written in 1369 during a diplomatic mission to Italy as a counsellor to Emperor John V Palaiologos, Kydones incites the Greeks to terminate civil strife and to turn to Italy for military assistance against the Turks. The entire structure of the essay, which has the form of a Greek oration addressed to his compatriots (*ὦ ἄνδρες*),²⁸ the choice of words, as well as the shaping of the arguments draw heavily on Demosthenes' political speeches. Kydones paraphrases many passages and rephrases celebrated formulas, as the famous *δεῖ δὴ χρημάτων, καὶ ἄνευ τούτων οὐδὲν ἔστι γενέσθαι τῶν δεόντων* (*First Olynthiac* 20), which becomes *δεῖ δὴ πλουσίων ἡμῖν καὶ μεγαλοψύχων συμμαχῶν* (Migne 154 col. 969D). The *Exhortation on Callipolis* (1371) is a fervent polemic against returning Callipolis

26 Düren (2014) 1: 591–594.

27 Migne (1866) 154: col. 961–1008.

28 See e.g., the beginning of the oration: *Πρώτον μὲν, ὦ ἄνδρες, χάρις πολλὴ τῷ Θεῷ τῶν ἀγγε-
λιῶν ὑπὲρ ὧν ἤκομεν βουλευσόμενοι* (Migne [1857] 154: col. 961A).

to Sultan Murat I, following closely Demosthenes' arguments and style in *On the Chersonese*.²⁹ The Byzantine city of Callipolis was captured by the Ottomans in 1354 and recaptured in 1366 by Amadeo of Savoy, who returned it to the Byzantines. In 1371 Murat I sent an embassy to Constantinople demanding Callipolis in exchange for a peace treaty. At many points the paragraphs have the same structure, as for example the turn in the beginning of the speech,³⁰ whereas in the next paragraph Kydones plays with the fact that Callipolis was located on the Thracian peninsula (χερρόνησος) to suggest a comparison of the situation with Sultan Murat demanding Callipolis with Philip II's demand to recover the Chersonese.³¹

One century later, Demosthenes came again to the service of the cause against the Turks by one of the greatest figures of Byzantine and Italian humanism, Bessarion (1403–1472), bishop of Nicaea and later cardinal of the Roman church. In 1437 Bessarion was among the members of the Greek delegation to the ecumenical Council of Ferrara-Florence, led by the Emperor John VIII Paleologos, in which the Latin and Greek churches tried to end the schism between them. The council ended in an agreed decree of reunion, but the reunion was short lived. After Bessarion's return to Constantinople, Pope Eugenius IV named him cardinal of the Roman church in recognition of his theological and philosophical erudition. His prominent role in the agreement of reunion of the two churches eventually caused his retirement from public life and finally, in 1441, his departure to Italy.

In 1453 Sultan Mohamed II conquered Constantinople and dismantled the Byzantine Empire. Most of Greece, including Thrace, Macedonia, and the Peloponnese, was under Ottoman rule, as well as the kingdoms of Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Serbia. The conquest of Negroponte (Chalcis) in 1470, at the time under Venetian rule, made it clear that the Turkish march was not intended to stop at the East. Overwhelmed by the fall of Negroponte, Bessarion tried once again, as he had already done in the past, to warn the Italian princes about the scale of the danger facing the West. He sent to Pope Paul II and the envoys of

29 Migne (1866) 154: col. 1009–1036.

30 Migne (1866) 154: col. 1009A: "Ἐδει μὲν, ὦ ἄνδρες, μὴ περὶ τούτων ἡμᾶς ἦκειν βουλευσομένους, ἐξ ὧν ὁποτέρου συμβάντος, αἰσχύνῃ καὶ κίνδυνον ἀνάγκη τῇ πόλει προσγίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἐνδοξοτέρων τε καὶ βελτιόνων ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸν λόγον. Compare Demosthenes 8.1: "Ἐδει μὲν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς λέγοντας ἅπαντας μῆτε πρὸς ἔχθραν ποιείσθαι λόγον μηδὲνα μῆτε πρὸς χάριν, ἀλλ' ὁ βέλτιστον ἕκαστος ἡγεῖτο, τοῦτ' ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ κοινῶν πραγμάτων καὶ μεγάλων ὑμῶν βουλευομένων.

31 Migne (1857) 154: vol 1009b: "Ἡ μὲν οὖν βουλὴ καὶ ἡ καθημέραν γενομένη πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἀντιλογία περὶ τῶν ἐν Χερρόνησῳ πραγμάτων ἐστὶ καὶ τῆς Καλλιπόλεως, ἣν ὁ Μουράτης παρ' ἡμῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς εἰρήνης αἰτεῖ.

the Italian states at Rome two orations composed in the form of Demosthenes' *Philippics* with an introductory letter explaining the situation of emergency that urged him to make this appeal.³² To his *Orationes* Bessarion appended a Latin translation of Demosthenes' *First Olynthiac*. The impact of this initiative on the Pope, who instructed the Italian ambassadors to refer to their princes and return to Rome with a mandate of commitment to the common defence, urged Bessarion to revise his initial texts, addressing them to all the Italian princes, and to publish them. The book, considered with good reason as "the first political text to be printed in Europe,"³³ was published in Paris in 1471 with the title *Epistolae et Orationes contra Turcos* by the French humanist Guillaume Fichet.³⁴

In the two *Orationes contra Turcos* or "Turkish speeches" Bessarion, following the paradigm of Demosthenes' uncompromising struggle against Philip II, underlines the dangers confronted by the Christian community in view of the Ottomans' expansionism and implores all Christian rulers to reconcile and declare war on Mohamed II, using historical exempla from Greek, Latin, and ecclesiastical sources. In the first speech (*Bessarionis, Episcopis, Sabini, Cardinalis Nicaeni ad Illustrissimos Inclytosque Italiae Principes de Periculis Imminentibus Oratio*) Bessarion discusses the evolution of the Turks from an insignificant tribe into a powerful empire, in a way similar to that of the Macedonians, and argues that they are bound to continue expanding their empire by conquering lands in the West.³⁵ Like Demosthenes, who adamantly strove to demonstrate the danger posed to all of Greece by Philip's attacks, while insisting that it was not too late to confront him, Bessarion uses every means possible to show that Italy is in serious and immediate peril and that that the only way to have peace is by waging war on the Ottomans. The second oration, entitled *De Discordiis Sedantis et Bello in Turcum Decernendo*, is a hymn to the benefits of unity and concord among Christian states and an ardent appeal to starting a crusade against the Ottomans as the only means to maintain peace in Europe.³⁶ In discussing the military and financial situation of Mohamed II in the last part of the speech, Bessarion follows the example of Demosthenes, who played down Philip's military might and urged the Athenians to attack Philip first instead of waiting for his move. Again, in his introduction and epilogue to the translation of Demosthenes' *First Olynthiac*,

32 Düren (2014) 1: 740–761.

33 Meserve (2003) 525–526.

34 Mureşan (2017).

35 Migne (1866) 161: col. 651B–659D.

36 Migne (1866) 161: col. 659D–669C.

Bessarion compares the Athenians' fight for freedom with the Christian states' struggle against the Turks, emphasising the parallel between Philip of Macedon and Sultan Mohamed II, and summons the leaders of Christianity to fight against the barbarians.³⁷

5 Emperors and Protestants

In the West, Ancient Greek studies were introduced during the early Renaissance by the Byzantine scholar Manuel Chrysoloras. Initially sent to Italy by Emperor Manuel II Paleologos to negotiate the dispatch of assistance against the Ottomans, Chrysoloras settled in Italy in 1397 and became the first professor of Greek, active in various Italian cities.³⁸ He probably brought to Italy some manuscripts of Demosthenes' speeches, and in 1423 almost the entire Demosthenic corpus was transported from Constantinople by Giovanni Aurispa. A pupil of Chrysoloras, Leonardo Bruni, made the first Latin translations of Demosthenes; the edition included the *Third Olynthiac*, *On the Chersonese*, and *On the Crown*. In 1504 Aldus Manutius produced the *editio princeps* of the Greek text of Demosthenes, which contained all the speeches ascribed to him, along with the *Introductions* and *Life* by Libanius and the *Life* by Plutarch.

As with the Byzantine scholars' exploitation of the Demosthenic model against the Ottomans, the translations and publications of Demosthenes' political speeches in northern Europe from the late 14th century onwards were employed to face foreign and domestic enemies. The first work by Demosthenes to be translated into German was the *First Olynthiac* by the great humanist Johannes Reuchlin (1495), who later translated also the *First* and *Second Philippics*. In 1495 Reuchlin sent a manuscript of his translation of the *First Olynthiac* to Count Eberhard of Württemberg, who was attending the Diet of Worms, where the foundations were laid for a constitutional reform of the Holy Roman Empire. Reuchlin's initiative has been interpreted as a summons to the Emperor Maximilian I to lead the German princes against the pretensions of the French Emperor Charles VIII, who was campaigning in Italy at the time of the Diet.³⁹ Demosthenes was highly appreciated by the

37 E.g., in the introduction (*Eiusdem ad eosdem persuasio ex auctoritate Demosthenis*), Migne (1866) 161: col. 669D: *Ita enim tunc Graeciae Philippus imminabat, ut nunc Turcus Italiae. Sustineat igitur Philippus Turci personam, Itali Atheniensium, nos Demosthenis.*

38 Cammelli (1941); Wilson (1999).

39 Poland (1899) v–xi.

scholars of the German Reformation in the 16th century. Reuchlin's nephew Philip Melanchthon translated into Latin Demosthenes' political speeches; in his introductions to the translations, he stressed their didactic merits and drew parallels with contemporary perils.⁴⁰ Johannes Sturm, one of the leading figures in designing the Gymnasium system of secondary education, gave to the study of Cicero and Demosthenes the central place in the curriculum.⁴¹

In England, where the teaching of Demosthenes was part of the curriculum at Cambridge from the early 16th century, the promotion of Demosthenes' political *persona* was connected to the royal court and had important political and religious connotations. The prominent figures in adapting Demosthenes to contemporary terms were Sir John Cheke and his students, Roger Ascham and Thomas Wylson. As members of the Lutheran magisterial class, they used Demosthenes as the model of the state counsellor to promote the cause of the Reformation.⁴² Cheke, the first Regius Professor of Greek at Cambridge and private tutor to King Edward VI, translated into Latin the *Olynthiacs*, the *Philippics*, *On the False Embassy*, and *On the Crown*. Ascham, as private tutor to Elizabeth I, initiated the queen into the study of Demosthenes.⁴³ Thomas Wylson, who served as secretary of state to Queen Elizabeth I, was the first to equate England with Athens. In 1570 Wylson published in London the first English translation of Demosthenes with the telling title "*The three Orations of Demosthenes chiefe Orator among the Grecians, in favour of the Olynthians, a people in Thracia, now called Romania: with those his fower Orations titled expressly and by name against King Philip of Macedonie: most nedeful to be redde in these daungerous dayes, of all them that love their Countries libertie and desire to take warning for their better avayle, by example of others.*" The fact that the translation, made according to the injunctions of the queen, was dedicated to her minister, Sir William Cecil, with the incitation to compare Demosthenes' time with his time, clearly suggests the political scope of the book. Wylson's intention was to arouse Protestants against Catholicism, personified in England by Mary, Queen of Scots, and abroad by Philip II of Spain,

40 See for example his introduction to the *Against Aristogeiton*, where he expresses the hope that good youths, by seeing the image of the Aristogeiton depicted in his edition, shall study to show themselves better men, and bring modesty and other virtues to the service of the state. Cf. Düren (2014) 2: 232–237.

41 Adams (1927) 137–138. On Melanchthon and Sturm, see this volume, chapter 3.

42 Harding (2000) 260.

43 For Ascham's famous narration of the queen's admirable comprehension of Demosthenes' *On the Crown*, see Adams (1927) 141–142.

who invaded England eighteen years later.⁴⁴ Interestingly, the 16th-century Scottish politician and reformer William Maitland of Lethington, secretary to Mary, Queen of Scots, also used Demosthenes' *Olynthiac* speeches as a source of advice to be followed "in a like case, which has so great affinity with our cause, that every word thereof might be applied to our purpose."⁴⁵

6 Back to Old Oppositions

In 18th-century Europe, the emergence of new imperial powers and the tense relations between states provided ample grounds for the political exploitation of ancient models. From that time onwards, Demosthenes' political agenda has been constantly used and openly remodelled and adapted to contemporary battles. But, at the same time, the political *persona* of Philip II of Macedon enters the scene loudly. The archetypal opposition between Demosthenes and Philip provided the canvas on which contrasting political agendas were elaborated and the context in which political debate was fiercely carried out. To the image of Demosthenes as the champion of liberty and independence, evoked by advocates of autonomy against foreign tyrants, was contrasted the image of Philip as the charismatic king who strengthened his state and unified an empire. Another version of this old theme, the opposition between Demosthenes and his Athenian adversaries, Aeschines, Phocion, and Isocrates,⁴⁶ established since Plutarch's biographies, was also revived and mobilised to serve the debate. The image of Philip as a successful conqueror and builder of an empire was easily paralleled with the career and ambitions of monarchs such as Frederick II of Prussia, known as Frederick the Great, whose accomplishments during his

44 Adams (1927) 143; Harding (1979); Blanshard and Sowerby (2005); Blanshard (2019) 455–456.

45 In a letter of 20 January 1559, Maitland writes to his "loving friend James": "I will leave to trouble zow after I have geven you this note. I wald wiss that ze, and they that ar learned, sould rede the twa former orations of Demosthenes, called Olynthiacae, and consider quhat counsall that wyse oratour gave to the Athenians, his countrymen, in a lyke case; quhilk hes so great affinite with this cause of ours, that every word thereof myght be applyed to our purpos. There may ze learne of him quhat advise is to be followed, when your nyghbours hous is on fyre." (Letter quoted by Robertson [1824] Appendix, No. II).

46 For the creation of Phocion's reputation in Germany, see Schindel (1963) 61–69. For the revival of the figure of Phocion as a pro-Macedonian politician and friend of Macedon in France, see Harding (2000) 260. An interesting contemporary account of the promotion of Isocrates' program as against that of Demosthenes by German historians of the early nineteenth century is given by Adams (1912).

forty-six-year reign (1740–1786) looked very similar to Philip's.⁴⁷ Like Philip, Frederick reorganised the army, increased his territories with many military victories and united the Prussian states under his sceptre. The iconography of Philip II of Macedon was evoked again in Germany one century later, when an analogy was drawn between the pretensions of Kaiser Wilhelm II of Prussia (reigned 1888–1918) and the politics of the Macedonians. Karl Julius Beloch, in his *Griechische Geschichte* (1893–1904), and Eduard Meyer, in his *Geschichte des Altertums* (1907), were the first in a line of scholars who were keen to glorify Philip's imperialistic vision, while discrediting Demosthenes and diminishing his struggle for the autonomy of the Greek cities.⁴⁸

But while Philip was useful as a model for German unification, Demosthenes was relevant to the struggle against Napoleon. In the early 19th century, the use of Demosthenes for anti-French propaganda was revived by many voices in Germany, and translations of his political speeches served once again as an efficient means to convey political messages. In 1805 Friedrich Jacobs translated the *Philippics* into German with the express purpose of rousing his country against Napoleon, a second Philip of Macedon.⁴⁹ One year later, B.G. Niebuhr published his German translation of the *Philippics* with a dedication to Czar Alexander I of Russia, who was leading the negotiations for a coalition of European states against Napoleon. Niebuhr, who considered Demosthenes as "one of the greatest minds that have existed,"⁵⁰ translated the *First Philippic* after the disaster at Ulm in November 1805. The defeat at Austerlitz, however, limited the circulation of the book, which was reprinted in 1831, after his death. Niebuhr drew a clear analogy between Philip, crushing the free Greek *poleis* at Chaeronea, and Napoleon, occupying the German states and destroying the vision of German unity. Positive depictions of Demosthenes, although from different perspectives, were drawn by other significant figures of 19th-century German scholarship. In 1858, Arnold Schaefer published at Leipzig his three-volume *Demosthenes und seine Zeit* (revised and republished in 1885–1887), which was full of admiration for the Greek orator and politician, as was Friedrich Blass' seminal book *Die attische Beredsamkeit* (1868–1880), whose third volume was dedicated to Demosthenes.

In England, contradictory judgments on Demosthenes' position in Athenian politics reflected the debate between liberalism and conservatism. English parliamentarism had deep roots in the Elizabethan tradition of

47 Gillies (1789).

48 Knipfing (1920–1921).

49 Adams (1927) 148.

50 Niebuhr (1848) 40.

elite statesmen whose political rhetoric was inspired by Demosthenes.⁵¹ This tradition was kept alive by distinguished liberal politicians like William Pitt, Henry Grattan, and Lord Brougham, whose professional careers were deeply informed by Demosthenes' struggle for liberty and democracy.⁵² On the other hand, William Mitford's voluminous *History of Greece*, published in London between 1784 and 1810, was written from the perspective of a staunch Tory. In accordance with his strong belief in monarchy, Mitford depicted Demosthenes as a deceptive orator who flattered the multitudes and manipulated them to act against their true interests.⁵³ Mitford's *History* was severely criticised for partiality and inaccuracies, not least by Thomas Babington Macauley, who in his article "On Mitford's History of Greece," written in 1824, defended Demosthenes and Athenian democracy from the point of view of a progressive Whig politician. George Grote published his *History of Greece* in twelve volumes from 1846 to 1856, an influential book that was full of enthusiasm for the Athenians' struggle to maintain freedom and democracy. Grote, an active liberal, challenged Mitford's interpretation of Demosthenes and depicted the Athenian statesman as a committed patriot and stirring orator whose ideals could inspire British parliamentarism.

The dramatic circumstances of the two World Wars flared up the remodeling of Demosthenes' political imagery in Europe. In 1910, Ulrich Kahrstedt, a young scholar at the time, published his first work, *Die Politik des Demosthenes*, where he argues that Demosthenes was an agent of the Persian king. Perhaps the fiercest attack on Demosthenes since his own time was Engelbert Drerup's book, written during World War I (1916), with the provocative title *Aus einer alten Advokatenrepublik (Demosthenes und seine Zeit)*. The book is a diatribe against Demosthenes, who is identified with Poincaré and Lloyd George. Fourth-century Athens is the worst form of an "Advokatenrepublik," dominated by petty orators, identical to the French republic of his days. After Germany's defeat, Drerup published, in 1923, another book on Demosthenes, who is qualified once again as a "schauvinistische Advokatenpolitiker."⁵⁴ In the introduction, he laments Germany's defeat and persists in his convictions:

The political circumstances, under which I published my "Alte Advokatenrepublik" (1916) have collapsed. The emperors and kings have fled, they were deposed, driven out of the country, they are dead, murdered;

51 Harding (2000) 254–256.

52 Adams (1927) 153–164.

53 Agnew (2016) 19.

54 Drerup (1923) 2.

the advocates have won. Their solidarity, which commanded over fourteen points of lie, made an innocent people hand themselves over, by blindly and stupidly destroying the old orders at critical moments. Nevertheless, the topic of the “lawyers’ republic” is no less relevant for us today than it was before. Because even in our once proud fatherland there is now a republic of alley and demagogues, of which Kleon and Aristophane’s sausage sellers would not be ashamed.

One of the most forceful responses to Drerup came three years later, by Georges Clemenceau, France’s prime minister during World War I, who wrote a biography of Demosthenes. In stark contrast to Drerup’s vilification of Demosthenes, Clemenceau wrote an encomium for the Greek politician, and depicted himself as the modern Demosthenes – a Demosthenes who won the war.

Similar analogies were drawn with the emergence of Nazism. During World War II, Adela Adam, in a paper entitled “Philip Alias Hitler” (1941) presented an emotional reading of Demosthenes’ political speeches, drawing point to point parallels of Philip with Hitler, Athens with France, Olynthus with Vichy, Aeschines with Quisling, the Norwegian leader who collaborated with the Nazis, and the pro-Macedonians’ discourse with Goebbels’ propaganda. It is of little wonder that after so much abuse during the two great wars, the image of Demosthenes the politician during the second half of the 20th century was negative.⁵⁵

7 Conclusions

Centuries of emulations, adaptations, and appropriations have transposed Demosthenes to diverse political contexts, none of which was relevant to his own. After Chaeronea, democracy and autonomy received a fatal blow, from which the Greek cities never truly recovered. In the new era that emerged following Demosthenes’ death, democracy ceased to be a living, ongoing process. The autonomy of the Greek cities was cancelled by the conditions imposed by the Macedonians. In a world where *parrhēsia*, freedom of speech before political assemblies and juries of peers, had lost its meaning, Demosthenes’ discourse was transferred to defend alien causes. While serving as a model upon which crucial political oppositions were shaped, Demosthenes had his image reshaped and reinvented to fit new necessities and new political contexts.

55 Rougemont (1996); Harding (2000) 266.

What of today? The complex circumstances of political and financial crisis of the 21st century have triggered a new discussion on democracy and participation, in which Demosthenes is certainly relevant. An approach that will do justice to the political Demosthenes can be benefited by new tools provided by contemporary research. There is a significant progress in our knowledge of the institutions of the Athenian democracy; the corpus of Demosthenes' speeches is now scrutinised in its entirety, including his long neglected forensic speeches; finally, in the past decades some important studies on the reception of Demosthenes were produced. The new perspectives explored by recent scholarship allow a more comprehensive understanding of both the statesman and his epoch. Have we learned from the mistakes of the past?

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Augustine's Christian Eloquence

Hanne Roer

1 The Egyptian Spoils: Saving Classical Rhetoric for the Future

Augustine is a figure of transition, located at the intersection of classical and medieval rhetoric. His writings transformed classical rhetoric into a new synthesis of Platonic, Ciceronian, and Stoic notions, bearing witness to the omnipresence of rhetoric in classical culture.¹ In his most influential book on rhetorical theory, *De doctrina Christiana*, *On Christian Doctrine* (2.40), Augustine compared the liberal arts to the Egyptian gold captured by the Jews escaping Egypt (*Exodus* 2:22), thus disassociating rhetoric from its classical past and saving it for the Christian future. He advocated a bespoke rhetoric in the service of Christianity, heralding the centrality of theology in the Middle Ages. Generally speaking, Augustine's rhetorical thinking, his meta-rhetoric, is based on the dualistic distinction between an inner and outer language.² His major works on rhetoric in the Christian society, i.e., *De magistro*, *On the Teacher*, *De catechizandis rudibus*, *On Instructing the Unlearned*, *De doctrina Christiana*, *On Christian Doctrine*, and *De civitate Dei*, *On the City of God*, thus reflect the Christian dualistic relation between body and soul, life and death.³ His *Confessions* is the story about his dramatic conversion to Christianity, which

- 1 Augustine's Latin works and translations into English, Italian, Spanish and German are available online at these invaluable sites: <http://www.augustinus.it/> and also at <https://augustinus.de/> (from the Zentrum für Augustinus-Forschung an der Julius-Maximilians-Universität, Würzburg, also providing information on recent research on Augustine). For recent translations into English, see *The Works of Saint Augustine, A Translation for the 21st Century*, trans. Edmund Hill and John E. Rotelle, 1991–. For this article, I have also consulted the translation of *De doctrina Christiana* by Green (1996), the translation of the *Confessions* by Chadwick (1991), the translation of *De trinitate* by Hill (1991), the translation of *De civitate Dei* by Babcock and Ramsey (2012), and the translation of *De catechizandis rudibus* by Madec (1991).
- 2 The term meta-rhetoric refers to Augustine's theory of rhetoric as reconstructed from several of his works, Murphy (1971), (1974) 286–292.
- 3 Most scholars believe that Augustine was not the author of a minor Latin work, *De rhetorica*, that has been ascribed to him. His earliest works on the liberal arts stem from the period following his conversion, in which he spent some months near Como, in the company of close friends and his mother Monica. The dialogues from this period, such as *Soliloquia*, are more Neoplatonic than Christian, but they anticipate the story of conversion in the *Confessions*; cf. Stock (2010).

was also a conversion from ancient rhetoric to the study of the Scriptures. In most of his writings, however, he legitimised the use of rhetoric, stating in *De catechizandis* and *De doctrina* that rhetoric is a universal technique necessary for the Christian teacher and preacher. Augustine recycled the terminology of classical rhetoric, but insisted that the Christian orator imitate the Scriptures, especially Paul. *Imitatio* lent content to rhetorical text production, hence the importance of replacing ancient literature with Christian writers.

In spite of his dissociation from ancient rhetoric, Augustine's awareness of the power of language reveals his affinities with Cicero, and the authority of Augustine's works in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance reinforced the propagation of Ciceronian rhetoric. Cicero and Augustine represent two modes of rhetoric, a humanistic and a theological, but both are based upon a belief in the power of the word. According to Augustine, the human word relies on the Word (*Logos*), the incarnation of Christ, while Cicero believed in the cultivating power of rhetoric and philosophy in human society. In this chapter on Augustine's Christian rhetoric and its reception, a dynamic will appear: in some periods the theological Augustine who banished rhetoric to the servants' room, dominated the scene, while in other periods writers on sacred rhetoric would emphasise the Ciceronian aspects of his rhetorical thinking.

The transmission of the *De doctrina* also points to this dynamic, movable feast of rhetoric, in itself a fluctuating discipline.⁴ The fourth book of his *De doctrina* was quoted from the time of Augustine's death throughout the following millennium, mainly in the form of brief references that legitimated rhetoric. There were no rival theoretical works on preaching until the emergence of the *artes praedicandi* in the 12th century, and few extensive adaptations of his rhetoric, with Rhabanus Maurus as a noteworthy exception in the early Middle Ages. Robert Basevorn is a late medieval example of a more advanced treatment of *De doctrina*. In this period, most writers supported the austere Augustinian view of rhetoric as the maid of theology. In the early 14th century, however, Dante Alighieri used Augustine's definition of the linguistic sign from *De doctrina*, book 2, as impetus for a new theory of vernacular eloquence.

Book 4 of *De doctrina* was among the first printed books and became a fulcrum of the new thriving literature on Christian eloquence in the 15th–18th centuries. The Ciceronian, humanistic aspects of Augustine's rhetoric came to the fore, sometimes obscuring Augustine's rejection of Cicero's relativism in

4 That there is no transhistorical essence of rhetoric which is of a protean, chameleon art, is a point made by MacDonald (2017).

favour of absolute, Christian truth.⁵ Some humanist writers like Petrarch simply conflate Cicero and Augustine into one single figure, thus coining a modern and even idiosyncratic Christian eloquence. Augustine's explicit rejection of ancient literature and culture was an issue for several Christian writers on rhetoric and homiletics in the 16th–18th centuries. Some agreed that rhetoric's main purpose was to serve the communication of theology, whereas others insisted on rhetoric as essential for civilised life in society in general.

Renaissance and 17th- and 18th-century writers discussed his views in more detail and often critically, sometimes preferring rivalling church fathers such as Jerome as stylistic models. In this chapter, I present Augustine's meta-rhetoric in the above-mentioned works, proceeding to the reception of it in later writers such as Robert Basevorn, Francesco Panigarola, Carlo Reggio, Francois de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon, and Giovambattista Noghera. These examples are representative, demonstrating the importance of Augustine's authority while also showing how his Christian rhetoric was used for very different purposes. A central problem for most of these writers was the right way to appeal to emotions and the relation between style and emotional effects. In the 20th century, Augustine was also a major impetus for Kenneth Burke's rhetorical thinking in *A Grammar of Motives* and *The Rhetoric of Religion*, focusing on religious patterns of human language. Augustine still works as a starting point in modern works on homiletics and rhetoric. Before we set out on this long journey, a closer look at the characteristic features of Augustine's meta-rhetoric is needed.

2 New Rhetorical Situations and Audiences

In late antiquity, rhetorical training consisted of exercises in declamation and argumentation, aimed at schools, provincial administration, or the imperial court.⁶ Augustine taught rhetoric in this way, in Madaura and Thagaste in Roman North Africa, until the age of 29, when he moved to Rome. He ended at the top of the career ladder as imperial orator in Milan, where he finally, in 386 and after a protracted period of spiritual struggles, converted to Christianity. His ambivalent attitude to rhetoric is spelled out in his oeuvre, in which violent opposition to rhetoric (e.g., *Letter* 118 and the first books of *Confessions*)

5 While Cicero believes in the stronger argument, Augustine relates to Christian dogmas. In *De doctrina* 1, he lists these Christian truths in advance, emphasising that interpretations and arguments that object to these are mistaken a priori (1.41).

6 Brown (2000) 54–55.

is juxtaposed with a strong belief in the force of the human word, inspired by the divine Word.

In an early work written around the time of his conversion, *De ordine*, Augustine for the first time defines rhetoric as an instrument of theology (2.13). The Platonic dilemma between the moral relativity and the cultivating power of rhetoric sets the frame for Augustine's reflections on rhetoric in *De doctrina* and *De catechizandis*, but Augustine's pragmatic perspective prevails: rhetoric is an important instrument for the Christian teacher, not to be handed over to the enemies of Catholicism. The need for the Christian teacher to know and practise the basic precepts of rhetoric was urgent, as he was confronted with a heterogeneous audience, in contrast to the Greek or Roman orator who spoke to his male peers.⁷ The Christian speaker himself was not necessarily better educated than his audience and most likely found it difficult to read the Bible, hence the need for the new discipline of textual exegesis in combination with rhetoric, as presented in *De doctrina*. Another challenge was the subject matter: the recommendation of humility, poverty, and the love of God and one's neighbour, are tough messages to sell.

Classical rhetoric took place in the city-state, but the Christian preacher was talking in a dual space, the earthly and the celestial cities. Augustine's dualism is nascent in an early work, *De magistro*, *On the Teacher*, in which he distinguishes between an interior and an exterior language, professed by the interior or exterior teacher/man.⁸ This is an early exposition on the relation between the inner, conceptual language and the material, verbal language that Augustine unfolds and elaborates in his major theological work, *De trinitate*, *On the Trinity*. This characteristic dualism is played out on a grand scale in his monumental work, *De civitate Dei*, falling into two blocks: books 1–11 on ancient religion, the earthly city, and books 12–22 on the Christian, celestial city.

Augustine's *Confessions* sets forth a radically new situation, a psychological battle, in which the orator addresses a transcendent God, turning his face from his listeners. It offered a new model for Christian eloquence: the dramatic inner dialogue in the form of a prayer addressed to God in which an *I* talks to God and only indirectly to his readers. The *Confessions* is a *psychomachia*, an almost-lost soul battling with itself in order to reach God, a narrative that will influence the art of preaching in the centuries to come.

7 As noted by Marc Fumaroli in his groundbreaking work *L'âge de l'éloquence* (1980) which has influenced this chapter.

8 This distinction stems from Paul, cf. Fredriksen (2009): «Paul». In Fitzgerald (2009) 621–625.

3 *Confessions: Augustine's Conversion from Rhetoric to Christian Eloquence*

The Confessions, written around 395/6, is the exemplary, autobiographical story of his conversion, followed by reflections on time, memory, and allegory.⁹ Augustine is critical towards the emotional impact of ancient literature, especially Vergil, and he calls his position as official imperial orator a “*cathedra mendacii*” (a cathedra of lies). His condemnation is reminiscent of Plato, who called rhetoric flattery, cosmetics, and seduction. Like Plato, Augustine's main objection to rhetoric is the absence of absolute criteria of truth, but having heard Ambrose preach in Milan, he realised that the formal qualities of his famous oratory could not be separated from the Christian truth professed.¹⁰

The *Confessions* is a passionate refutation of the classical literary and rhetorical legacy. Even at Augustine's time, ancient culture with its violent, sensual pleasures such as the theatre and gladiatorial games was a threat to the Christian church, who had to replace them with the rigorous moral demands of Christianity. One of the many moral anecdotes of the *Confessions* is the story of how Augustine succeeded in convincing his close friend Alypius to give up the circus, his long-time addiction, an example of persuasive language actively promoting virtue.¹¹ Augustine scrutinises the relation between language and emotion; emotion is not condemned as such, only the vain pleasures of poetry and theatre. Finding and appealing to the right emotions, such as love, *caritas*, and moral conscience, is a task of the utmost importance to the Christian orator. In this sense, *inventio* is still an important part of rhetorical practice.¹²

The *Confessions* opens the door for a new Christian eloquence aimed at converting people from their perverted ways, in the form of the display of an inner dialogue.¹³ This rhetorical vision is fashioned in the emblematic scene in which Augustine inadvertently watches Ambrose reading in silence.¹⁴ Silent reading was unknown to Augustine, who was brought up with rhetoric as a public discourse celebrating the virtues of urban civilization.¹⁵ The silently reading Ambrose is the image of the good Christian rhetor, studying the Scriptures in order to be able to explain the Christian message to his

9 According to Kotzé (2004), the *Confessions* is far from an autobiography in the popular, modern sense, but rather a protreptic, exemplary narrative.

10 *Confessions* 6.4.

11 For a time, at least: Alypius lapsed back into his vice in Rome (*Confessions* 6.8).

12 As pointed out by Olmsted (2000).

13 For a subtle analysis of Augustine's puns and etymological figures, see Burke (1961).

14 *Confessions* 6.3.

15 Stock (1996).

congregation. Augustine's conversion in book 8, at the exact middle of the *Confessions*, is prompted by the mystical voice saying: *tolle, lege, tolle, lege* – take and read, take and read. Reading from an arbitrary page in the Bible, Augustine is finally absorbed into Christianity, letting go of sensual desires. The epiphany in the garden in Milan and the conversions of his friends Victorinus and Alypius are witnessed by other people, very different from the isolated Neoplatonic ascent to an interior light.¹⁶ *Confessions* is also the narrative about Augustine learning to read the Scriptures, and the second part, books 10–13, forms a treatise on the philosophy of time, allegory, and methods of exegesis. In terms of genre, the work as a whole is a long prayer, sampling numerous quotations from *The Book of Psalms* into a new polyphonic eloquence in which the breath of the protagonist lends authority to his reflections.¹⁷ The rhetoric of conversion is not a linear movement but cyclical, back and forth, reflecting his spiritual struggles and performed for the Christian community, the implied audience.

4 *De doctrina Christiana*: Rhetoric Becomes the Handmaid of Theology

The first three books of *De doctrina* date from approximately the same time as the *Confessions* (around 396) and deal with the art of interpreting the Scriptures according to a given set of hermeneutical rules.¹⁸ The fourth book, on the art of communicating the Christian teachings, was not finished until late in Augustine's life, around 427.¹⁹ Augustine's most important argument throughout *De doctrina* is that Christians need the art of rhetoric in order to promote the Christian message and combat their enemies. In book 2, Augustine defines rhetoric as a value-neutral discipline that may be used in order to promote good as well as bad, since the essential elements are universal, such as expressions of praise, clear descriptions, brevity, and stylistic variety in order to hold

16 Olmsted (2000).

17 Lyotard (1998) compares it to the modernist phenomenon, *Sprechgesäng*.

18 Scholars have discussed whether *De doctrina Christiana* was intended as a vision of a new Christian culture, as a manual for preachers, a book about exegesis, or as a handbook of Christian rhetoric (a *technē/ars*). The title does not settle this question since *doctrina* has a wide range of meanings. Press (1981) 168 has analysed the content and structure of *De doctrina*, emphasising that *doctrina* has different meanings according to its context, even in *De doctrina*, where it means simultaneously “doctrine,” “teaching,” and “culture.”

19 Cf. the article by O'Donnell: “Doctrina christiana, de.” In Fitzgerald (2009) 278–280.

the attention of the audience (2.36.54). That this was written at the same time as the strong disapprovals in *Confessions*, shows Augustine in the process of rewiring rhetoric to Christian purposes, while also revealing an ambiguity characteristic of his oeuvre.²⁰

In book 2, he defines the sign, and this semiotic theory is the ground upon which he builds his hermeneutics and meta-rhetoric.²¹ He distinguishes between natural and conventional signs, including language, emphasising that the Christian teacher must learn to decode the linguistic signs of the Scripture (*tractatio scripturarum*).²² Words are secondary to things, *res*, the Christian reality, which can be found by interpreting the Scriptures. Hence books 2–3 deal with finding the right material, *modus inveniendi*, according to the list of Christian teachings listed in book 1. The obscurity of certain passages of the Scriptures should not be imitated but admired: they offer stylistic variation and intellectual challenges to the reader.²³ Augustine incorporates the interpretation of tropes and figures into his exegesis of obscure passages in the Bible.²⁴

Book 4 deals with communicating these truths, *modus proferendi*. Rhetoric is a useful tool and should not be left to the enemies of the Christians but used in the battle against pagans and heretics. Though eloquence is defined as secondary to wisdom, it is essential as it has the power to sway the minds of those in the audience. Augustine focuses on the tasks of the orator as well as stylistic issues that take up three-quarters of book 4. However, he rejects the Ciceronian idea that each style corresponds to different kinds of subjects, because he defines all that concerns Christianity as grand, *materia grandis*.

20 Burton (2007) notes that Augustine prefers Latin terms, such as *eloquentia* instead of *rhetoric*, as part of his reappropriation of classical rhetoric.

21 According to Murphy (1974) 287–292 it is Augustine's definition of the sign in *Cat. Rud.* and *De doctrina* that allows him to break with ancient semiotics, thus laying the ground for a new theory of rhetoric.

22 Press (1981) summarises the classification of signs in this way: Book 1 deals with the natural signs, things (realities, truths, doctrine) that are to be understood. Books 2–3 give instruction in the interpretation of the unknown or ambiguous signs (words or expressions) that often lead to misunderstandings of Scriptures. Such signs are either proper or figurative.

23 Clarity and perspicuity are praised by ancient rhetoricians, with Longinus, *On the Sublime*, as an exception. For a study of *obscuritas*, see Mehtonen (2003).

24 Augustine also draws on Stoic philosophy and semiotics when ordering the subject matter of books 1–3 into different categories of signs. His “semiotics” (i.e., his classification and definition of signs) replaces the ancient *inventio*-phase with its loosely organised wealth of detailed advice on argumentation. Some rhetorical topics such as ambiguity find a new place in this system. It may be influenced by the classical textbook characteristic of philosophers (systematically dividing the subject matter into primary and secondary categories): see Pollmann (1996) 180 and 219 ff.

The high style is essential for moving and persuading the audience, and his examples attest to his taste for grandiose language and making the audience cry. Augustine follows Cicero in defining the orator's three offices as teaching (*docere*), reconciling (*conciliare*), and moving (*flectere*), with teaching as the basis allowing the preacher to move and sway the will of the audience. A good Christian who is lacking in oratorical skills is advised to keep silent and lead an exemplary life instead. If he cannot compose a speech, but knows how to give one, he is allowed to read out a sermon written by a colleague.

Many of the precepts in *De doctrina* come from Cicero's *De oratore* and *Orator* (though they are never mentioned), with one exception: Augustine strongly recommends that the Christian orator pray before talking (4.15.32). Prayer is the most important preparation for the Christian orator, whose foremost inspiration comes from God, not from the systematic, Ciceronian procedure of weighing arguments *in utramque partem*. Large parts of book 4 are quotations from Paul, Cyprian, and the book of Amos, authoritative texts replacing Cicero, Vergil, and Terence. The latter two he criticises in *Confessions* because they manipulate the feelings of the audience for the sake of sensual pleasure. While the citations from Cyprian and Amos reveal his love for vehement, polemical language, his interpretations of the long passages from Paul show his predilection for rhythmical, well-structured prose. In this, too, he is a successor to Cicero, who dedicated most of the third book of *De oratore* to rhythm and prose metrics; Augustine's reliance on this work is also evident in his *De musica*, *On Music*.

In *De doctrina* 4, Augustine has a very telling comparison of rhetoric to an uninvited maid that follows right behind Theology: *tamquam inseparabilem famulam etiam non vocatam sequi eloquentiam* (book 4.10).²⁵ In deconstructive terms, rhetoric is the supplement without which there is no essence. Augustine, in fact, when turning traditional *inventio* into a hermeneutical method of interpretation, reinstalled rhetoric as a central cultural and political phenomenon.²⁶ Reading texts and teaching Scriptures to others were essential in the new religio-centric, book-centred society.²⁷ He did not relegate rhetoric to a merely introductory level but insisted on its importance for teaching, preaching and judging.²⁸

25 Most translators translate "non vocatam" as uninvited, but Green (1996: 209) has a slightly different interpretation: "You could visualise it as wisdom proceeding from its own home (by this I mean a wise person's heart) and eloquence, like an ever-present slave, following on behind without having to be summoned."

26 Fumaroli (1980).

27 Brown (2000).

28 Murphy (1974).

5 Augustine Fighting His Enemies: Polemics against Heretics

Augustine's rhetorical theory should be read in the light of his major works on language, theology, and philosophy.²⁹ In Augustine's polemical writings and in the hundreds of surviving letters and sermons, we see another side of his rhetoric, the aggressive and antagonistic polemic, so different from the contemplative eloquence of *Confessions*.³⁰ In his gigantic *On the City of God*, Augustine is fighting his enemies, rejecting Cicero's notion of justice in his works on rhetoric, state, and law. He uses arguments *ad absurdum* and retorts, applying his favourite weapons of debunking, throwing the contradictions back into the face of his readers.

In 410 Rome fell for the first time in eight hundred years, sacked by the German king, Alaric, and conservative Romans blamed the Christians for depriving the city of the protection from the Roman gods. A host of refugees, learned men imbued with Ciceronian humanism and Neoplatonic philosophy, fled to North Africa, and they are the audience that Augustine had in mind.³¹ In the first ten books, Augustine attacks Roman religion in defence of Christianity. History shows, according to Augustine, that the Roman gods had never been capable of defending Rome. The thorough examination of Roman religion, gods, rites, and myths gives the first part a mock-forensic character, constantly comparing Roman deities and practices with the better alternative, Christian morality and faith. The Roman deities simply reflect the Roman lust for power and control. Cicero was wrong to claim that justice disappeared from Rome because of its greed and military expansions: there never was true justice in Rome, because only Christ provides justice.³²

In the second part, books 11–22, he praises the eternal glory of the Christian faith, embraced by the term “the celestial city.” *Civitas Dei*, the city of God, designates the eternal community of the blessed that at the end of times shall become the only existing realm. *Civitas* still has the classical sense of “the community that lives in a city,” but it also designates a society, i.e., a community of people gathered around something. Augustine accepts fundamental ancient ideas on the good and just life in the city-state, but he replaces the classical cardinal virtues (strength, courage, moderation, and wisdom) with the Christian

29 As pointed out by Dodaro (2000).

30 Humfress (2012).

31 Brown (2000).

32 Dodaro (2000) analyses Augustine's conflictual relation to Cicero. In his book, Dodaro has shown by reading across Augustine's many works on politics, theology, and rhetoric, that Augustine rejects the Ciceronian ideal of the wise and eloquent statesman (*vir bonus*), stressing that Christ, the God-man, is the only provider of true justice.

virtues (faith, hope, and love for God and neighbour). The traditional Roman coupling of state, history, and moral-religious values has been dissolved.³³ Augustine claims that kingdoms are nothing but robber bands, and robber bands (*latrocinia*) nothing but small kingdoms (*parva regna*). Augustine tears apart the humanistic vision of the wise orator-statesman, Cicero's *orator perfectus*, and ridicules famous men from Roman history that used to act as role models of virtuous behaviour. In comes Christ, the only provider of true justice, and finally the saints, filling the gap left behind by Scipio, Pericles, and Regulus.³⁴ The praise of the saints will become an important element in Christian and Catholic rhetoric.

Augustine's point is that perfection and justice is beyond the *polis* and only to be found in the faithful imitation of Christ. The imitation of Christ is part of the ongoing process of conversion, converting the soul from the perverted pleasures of the earthly city. The aggressive, polemical style of *On the City of God*, divided into a negative derision of enemies (Romans from the past or contemporary, heretical Christians) and a more positive follow-up in the form of the powerful defence of the Catholic Church, is typical of Augustine and can be seen in several texts, sermons, and letters.

To sum up, it is obvious that although Augustine, like Jerome and several other church fathers, had a complex relationship with classical rhetoric, he was the founder of a proper Christian rhetoric, in theory and in practice. Augustine adjusts Ciceronian ideals to fit this new Christian context, outlining an outward, polemical rhetoric characterised by retorts and debunking, but also an inward eloquence of conversion, aimed at spiritual transformation and good moral behaviour. They are both passionate rhetorics in which emotion is bound up with arguments.³⁵ Augustine's double-sided Christian rhetoric, mild and mysterious, aggressive and sarcastic, Ciceronian and Platonic, became the matrix for Christian rhetoric for centuries. The following examples are chosen from literally hundreds of texts on sacred eloquence, divine rhetoric, or the art of preaching that have been written since Augustine's time, glimpses illuminating a long and to some extent overlooked tradition. While the titles of these works differ, they consistently deal with Christian rhetoric as instituted by Augustine.

33 Pollmann (1996).

34 Dodaro (2000).

35 Shuger (2000).

6 The Middle Ages: Saving the Egyptian Spoils

A century after his death, a paradigm shift had occurred, leaving writers ignorant of the classical culture presupposed by Augustine's writings. The classical treatise on rhetoric (or philosophy) was discontinued and a new genre, florilegia, emerged, featuring collections of quotations from authoritative writers. Augustine was a favourite of these writers who secured the transmission of his works, resulting in numerous medieval manuscripts.³⁶ The fourth book of *De doctrina* is often quoted, as in Prosper of Aquitaine's *Liber sententiarum*.³⁷ Another example of these fragmented texts is Eugippius' much longer *Excerpta ex operibus S. Augustini* in which we find 22 excerpts from *De doctrina*. He quotes the passage on the Egyptian gold in order to legitimise rhetoric (263), as will become standard procedure in the centuries to follow, emphasising the universal character of the liberal arts (262). The long excerpts from *De doctrina* books 1–3 serve as an introduction to scriptural exegesis, especially the interpretation of tropes in the scriptures (264–73).

As pointed out by Murphy, preceptive rhetoric came to be launched in one of two genres, either the exposition of the art in the form of a treatise with Augustine's *De doctrina* as the model, or the compendia having Martianus Capella's (fl. 410–427) *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii* as the model.³⁸ The latter, encyclopaedic tradition was followed up by Cassiodorus (480–575) whose *Institutiones divinarum et saecularium litterarum* was widely used. In order to justify his short chapter on rhetoric, Cassiodorus quotes Augustine on the Egyptian gold, a *locus communis* in medieval texts on rhetoric and treatises on sacred eloquence. *Sacra eloquenza*, the new and long-lasting term for Christian rhetoric, seems to have been coined by the Venerable Bede around 700.

De doctrina as well as *De catechizandis rudibus* were important texts in the Carolingian renaissance, in the 8th–9th centuries at the court of Charlemagne in France. Hrabanus Maurus (776–856), a major Carolingian scholar, included rhetoric in his work on scriptural exegesis. In his *De institutione clericorum* (from 819), especially in the third book on scriptural exegesis and the art of speaking, there are more than fifty direct quotations from book 4 of *De doctrina*. Hrabanus Maurus samples his excerpts from Augustine into a text of his own about style, obscurity, and the *officia* of the orator. He also supports

³⁶ Dolbeau (1996).

³⁷ For more detailed treatment of early medieval rhetoric, see Roer (2013) and Murphy (1974).

³⁸ Murphy (1974) 64.

Augustine's central claim: that the Christian speaker is the medium of God who speaks through His voice. His sampling technique is symptomatic of the loss of Augustine's classical context, and *De institutione clericorum* probably did not gain a wide audience, but it is nevertheless a milestone. The distance to classical learning allows Hrabanus to choose what he finds relevant from patristic and scriptural sources.³⁹

Christianity is the story of the incarnation of the *Logos/Verbum*, the Word of God, hence in itself offering a new theory of communication.⁴⁰ Still, in spite of Christ encouraging his disciples to spread the good news and Paul showing how to take on this obligation, very few treatises on preaching were written in the course of more than a millennium.⁴¹ Around 1200, however, there was an explosion in the production of manuals on preaching, the *artes praedicandi*. Out of hundreds, more than three hundred treatises still survive, written from the first half of the 13th century well into the Renaissance. What is new is the theoretical approach to preaching, with definitions of the art, matter, and form. Robert Basevorn's *Forma Praedicandi, The Form of Preaching*, from 1322 sums up the characteristic features of this new art of preaching, the thematic sermon focusing on certain themes from scripture, subdividing and elaborating on them.⁴² Robert, otherwise unknown, was well read in philosophy, grammar, and rhetoric, as well as theology, and his analytical approach involved the examination of these five authorities: Christ and his precursor, Paul, Augustine, and Bernard. In the chapter on Augustine, he interprets Augustine's works from an Olympic point of view, pointing out Augustine's dependence on Paul, his model for Christian oratory. He claims that Augustine in his sermons follows two ways, either a loose reading of a Gospel, or a passage from scripture, or an extensive, detailed interpretation of a theme to be found in several places in Scripture (p. 130). The first method is useful with people with short memories, whereas the latter requires a greater mastery of Scripture. He also stresses that Augustine advocates the use of reason, even when scriptural authority is unambiguous. He is well versed in Augustine's theological

39 Murphy (1974) 83–87. Hrabanus Maurus does not lean much upon Gregory's *Cura pastoralis, Pastoral care* (from 591), which seems to have been the most popular work on homiletics up until the later Middle Ages, offering instructions on what to say rather than how to say it, in the form of model sermons and ready-made samples: cf. Murphy (1974) 297.

40 Burke (1961); Murphy (1974) 300; Fumaroli (1980) and Peters (1999) 32–51.

41 Murphy (1974) distinguishes between four phases of Christian rhetoric: 1) Christ and Paul; 2) Augustine's *De doctrina Christiana* (426); 3) Gregory the Great (*Cura pastoralis*, 591); and 4) Hrabanus Maurus' *De institutione clericorum* (819), Guibert de Nogent's *Liber quo ordine sermo fieri debeat* (c.1084), and Alain de Lille's *De arte praedicatoria* (c.1199).

42 Murphy (1971) 109–215. Murphy (1974) 343–355 provides a convenient table of contents in Basevorn's *Forma praedicandi*.

works, *On the Trinity*, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, *On Grace and the Free Will*, his sermons, and *On the City of God*.

7 Dante: The Sign as Vehicle of Change

Changing the scene from England and Paris to Italy, we find a strong rhetorical tradition on the basis of Cicero (e.g., Brunetto Latini's *Tesoretto*), and also Augustine, as far as sacred oratory is concerned. But it is in the field of poetics that we find the most interesting use of Augustine's rhetoric. In his *De vulgari eloquentia*, *On Eloquence in the Vernacular*, Dante Alighieri (1265–1321) defends himself against criticisms for writing in Italian, claiming that the vernacular is about to take the place of Latin, which has become the language of a few learned men.⁴³ His treatise is a refined argument in favour of a polished, ideal vernacular, the *vulgare illustre*, formed by the poets (mostly himself). In contrast to the medieval *poetrie*, the rather schematic manuals of writing poetry, *De vulgari* opens with a definition of language and a philosophical discussion of human language as distinct from the language of animals and angels. This discussion leads Dante to the definition of the linguistic sign: "This sign is the noble subject that we talk about: it is sensual as far as it is sound, but rational as far as it seems to signify what we want."⁴⁴

Dante's definition of the sign stemming from *De doctrina Christiana* is the starting point for his revolutionary poetics. Though Augustine's definition was well known in medieval scholastic literature, Dante uses it for his own purpose.⁴⁵ His point is the same as Augustine's: that the verbal sign has an interior, conceptual component, as well as an exterior, material component. These parts of the sign are intertwined, hence the definition of the sign becomes an argument in favour of aiming for the right balance between content and form (matter and form in medieval terms). The interdependence between form and matter is characteristic of Dante's new ideal language based on the work of the best poets. Dante thus imitates Augustine's way of introducing a new theory of rhetoric, although the kind of rhetoric he envisions is a civil discourse. He uses the Augustinian sign definition as a game-changer letting him introduce the idea of vernacular eloquence, something new and outstanding in his time, as

43 The most recent edition is that of Mengaldo (1979). Text with English translation in Botterill (1996).

44 Dante, *On eloquence* 1.3.3.

45 Cf. Maierù (1981); Bettini (1996); Manetti (1987); Eco and Marmo (1989).

he points out himself in the first words in the treatise.⁴⁶ From this Augustinian perspective, *The Divine Comedy*, too, may be read as an epic of conversion, the story of a soul struggling to pull out of sin and move towards salvation and bliss, Dante's medieval version of the Christian eloquence of the *Confessions*.⁴⁷

8 The Ciceronian Augustine of Petrarch

The definition of the sign formed the conceptual basis for Augustine's as well as Dante's innovative adaptations of rhetoric. Francesco Petrarch (1304–1374) apparently did not need excuses for using Augustine's authority for his own agenda. His Latin prose work, *Secretum* (written between 1347–1353), subtitled *De Secretis Conflictu Curarum Mearum*, is a dialogue between Petrarch and Augustine, watched by a silent female figure, an allegory of Truth. *Secretum* is one of Petrarch's most influential Latin texts, based on his profound knowledge of Cicero and abounding in quotations from Roman literature. Petrarch is tortured by his love for Laura and his sense of guilt, as well as by being constantly worried about the fate of his writings. In the allegoric opening, in which Truth approaches him, he declares that he has chosen the dialogue genre out of respect for Plato. Actually the dialogue resembles those of Cicero far more than the Platonic dialogues, with its constant iterations of the same topic discussed from different angles, garnered with polite exchanges and amplifications.⁴⁸

So why did Petrarch not construe the dialogue between himself and Cicero, rather than turning Augustine into something like Cicero? The theme of *Secretum* is the battle of the soul, hence the narrative is similar to that of Augustine's *Confessions*, which is quoted extensively. Petrarch's *psychomachia* resembles the early medieval idea of the sermon as the exposition of inner struggles, but Petrarch's world is completely different.⁴⁹ The Petrarch of the dialogue confides in Augustine, who acts as his moral authority advising him to give up worldly pleasures (of the flesh, vanity, material greed). He lets Augustine harangue against eloquence because it is vanity and worldly pleasure: eloquence seeks the approval of men, but ought to be anchored in the conscience of the orator (in the beginning of the second book). While

46 Dante proudly highlights his originality: "Neminem ante nos," "nobody before us," are the very first words of this treatise. *De vulgari eloquentia* abounds in biblical references, presenting a theological narrative of the lost, universal language of Babel, finally about to re-emerge in the form of a new common vernacular language in Italy.

47 Freccero (1988).

48 See De Giorgio (2012) for an interpretation of these rituals in Cicero's *De oratore*.

49 Mazzotta (1993).

this sounds severe enough and hence Augustinian, the treatise is in itself a denial of his rejection of the rhetorical culture. Petrarch's Augustine is a lover of the Latin literature that is the object of the real Augustine's contempt in the *Confessions* as well as *De doctrina*.

At the end of *Secretum*, Augustine tries to steer Petrarch's thoughts towards God, but the most remarkable thing about the dialogue is the absence of Christ and life after death, in other words, the secular atmosphere of this psychomachia. It is striking that the Petrarch-figure does not reach a state of conversion but remains stuck in his depressive tendencies (*acedia*, one of the seven mortal sins). His very human love story is that of a modern individual not happily absorbed into a Christian collective. Petrarch's fusion of classical literature and Augustine lived on in the European humanism of the following two centuries.

9 Augustinian Rhetoric in the Age of the Reformations

Book 4 of *De doctrina* was among the earliest printed books (three times in the 1460s), and the complete work was printed seven times before 1501 and seventeen times in the 16th century.⁵⁰ Most humanists did not follow Petrarch in transforming Augustine into a Ciceronian figure. Augustine, in fact, does not seem to have had a huge impact on the humanists' theories of sacred eloquence, apart from Guarino of Verona's (1374–1460) commentary on *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (Monfasani 172–88). Erasmus of Rotterdam's (1466–1536) *Ecclesiastes, aut De Ratione Concionandi* (1535) is typical of this tendency of simply referring to *De doctrina* as legitimisation of the discipline of homiletics. Renaissance humanists and educators did, however, find teaching so important that they assigned a special genre to it (George of Trebizond [1395–1473], Rodolphus Agricola [1443–85], Philip Melanchthon [1497–1560]), maybe influenced by Augustine's highlighting of teaching as the first and fundamental *officium*.⁵¹ It was an age of Ciceronianism, in which sacred oratory was hard to distinguish from classical Roman oratory (the ideal was *imitatio ciceroniana*). The constant traveller, Erasmus, who visited Rome and the Roman curia in 1509, wrote many years later in his *Ciceronianus* that while Cicero was mentioned all the time, one rarely heard about the crucified Christ.⁵²

Erasmus was not the only one who was indignant and upset, having witnessed the secular atmosphere, to say the least, of the Roman curia. So was

50 Gorman (1985) and Roer (2013). For an overview of Renaissance rhetoric, see Mack (2011).

51 Monfasani (1994) 177–180.

52 O'Malley (1979).

an Augustinian monk, Martin Luther, who initiated the evangelical reformation around 1520. His vehement attacks on the Roman curia, his speeches – the most famous held in Worms 1521 – and the mass-produced printed leaflets invigorated the genre of Christian polemic, of which Augustine was a prominent representative.⁵³ Though Luther turned to Augustine for his doctrine of the free will and grace, he does not refer to *De doctrina*. Luther was not a rhetorical theorist, rather the opposite, believing in the naked language of Scripture for communicating truth, morality, and the road to salvation.⁵⁴

Erasmus and Luther were the most prominent rhetoricians of the first decades of the 16th century, the latter in practice, the former both in theory and practice. Erasmus wrote several treatises on rhetoric, and so did Philip Melancthon, Luther's close collaborator.⁵⁵ In their wake schools and universities were founded or reorganised and, generally speaking, reformers of schools and universities in the Protestant north as well in the Catholic south based their new study programs and curricula on the Greek and Latin literature that was edited, translated, and commented on by humanist scholars. Classical rhetoric was no longer a propaedeutic discipline, but again at the centre of education, propagating the Ciceronian ideal of the wise and eloquent statesman.

10 Sacred Rhetoric: Panigarola and Fénelon

While Augustine's rhetoric was not important in this school context, it was essential in the theory of preaching encouraged by the counter-Reformation, or Catholic revival, at the end of the 16th century. After the Council of Trent (1545–1563), priests and bishops in the Catholic Church were obliged to preach on a regular basis.⁵⁶ This became the impetus for writing new textbooks on preaching, such as those by Carlo Borromeo (1538–1584), and eventually also more theoretical treatises on sacred eloquence. Federico Borromeo, his nephew, wrote a *De Sacris Nostrorum Temporum Oratoribus Libri Quinque*, Five

53 Edwards (1994).

54 Conley (1990) 122–124; Krey (2009).

55 Conley (1990) 135–137, 148–149.

56 1) *Decretum de Lectoribus et Praedicatoribus*, chapt. II. In 1911 (1546). *Concilium Tridentinum. Diariorum, Actorum, Epistolarum, Tractarum. Nova Collectio*, tomus 5: 73, 125, 127.

2) *Decretum de Reformatione Lectorum*. In 1924 (1563). *Concilium Tridentinum. Diariorum, Actorum, Epistolarum, Tractarum. Nova Collectio*, ed. Societas Goerresiana, tomus 9: *Actorum Pars Sexta*. Fribourg-en-Brisgau: 981.

For convenient access to these volumes: https://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/03d/1545-1563_Concilium_Tridentinum_Canones_et_Decreta_LT.pdf.

Books on the Sacred Speeches of Our Times (Milano 1631). Giovanni Botero, his secretary, wrote *De Praedicatione Verbi*, On Preaching the Word (1585). Both of them and their followers celebrated the Augustinian view of rhetoric as the uninvited but indispensable maid of theology.⁵⁷

One of the most popular Italian preachers of this period was Agostino Valiero (1531–1606) whose *De Ecclesiastica Retorica* (1573) was widely used. Another and even more popular preacher was Francesco Panigarola (1548–94), who preached in major Italian cities, attracting crowds of listeners, before becoming bishop of Asti in 1587. His major work on the theory of rhetoric is to be found in his commentaries to his translation of Demetrius of Phaleron: *Il predicatore, ovvero DEMETRIO FALEREO dell'ELOCUTIONE con le parafrasi, commenti, e discorsi di MONSIGNOR PANIGAROLA, vescovo d'Asti* (1609). His reflections are typical of this period. After having settled that expertise in eloquence is necessary for the preacher, referring opinions pro et contra from the church fathers, in particular Jerome and Augustine (as often in this period), he argues in favour of a vehement eloquence. The preacher must proffer the words of God with fire and burning sincerity, and in oratorical formats adapted to the character of the audience. His words should be like charcoal igniting a fire in the souls of his listeners, resembling the forcefulness of Demosthenes. While the words of God are the seeds, eloquence is the nurturing water that will make them grow strong. Panigarola distinguishes between secular and sacred oratory, thus sounding even sterner than Augustine, while at the same time accepting Augustine's recommendations for good preaching. He advocated and practised a passionate, pointed oratory, which was typical of the late 16th and most of the 17th century.⁵⁸

Jumping to the end of the 17th century, sacred rhetoric and literature were flourishing in France. The famous French sacred orators did not write theoretical treatises but triumphed in their churches and at court.⁵⁹ The exception was Francois de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon (1651–1715), bishop and author, and his *Dialogues sur l'éloquence en général et sur celle de la chair en particulier avec une lettre écrite à l'Academie francaise*. By choosing the dialogue genre Fénelon pays tribute to the humanist, rhetorical tradition that had been under attack from severe Jesuit and Jansenist voices. The three interlocutors, one of

57 Fumaroli (1980) 135–139.

58 Shuger (1988).

59 Prominent preachers such as Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, Valentin Esprit Fléchier, Jean-Baptiste Massillon, and Louis Bourdaloue gave new life to sacred oratory, while theoreticians such as Nicholas Caussin and Fénelon discussed its historical roots and modern justifications. Augustine was the corner-stone of these often fierce discussions: cf. Sellier (2012).

whom seems to be a preacher, discuss the ends and means of rhetoric and preaching, browsing through ancient literature and rhetoric. The goal of eloquence is defined as proving and appealing to the emotions of the audience and the offices of the orator as proving, moving, and painting (*prouver, mouvoir/toucher, peindre*). Painting is Fénelon's original contribution to rhetorical theory by which he exhorts the orator/preacher to paint with words, rather than simply stating arguments and teachings. More than an emphasis on the visual force of words (well known in classical rhetoric and a popular device in the 17th century), Fénelon thus distinguishes between (in modern terms) showing and telling. Augustine plays an important role in the dialogues. In the first book he is quoted for saying that words should be used for the sake of human beings, not the other way around. It is Augustine, the communicator of Christianity to the unlearned, that Fénelon invokes, quoting in the third dialogue the story from *De doctrina* on Augustine's successful conversion of the people in Caesarea.⁶⁰ In the third dialogue on preaching, Augustine is constantly referred to: his apology of the style of the scriptures, his interpretations of Paul's eloquence, his deep understanding of the Bible, and his awareness of his audience. Fénelon follows Augustine in setting Paul's letters as models for imitation and warns of excessive, secular philosophising in sermons. The church fathers should be imitated for their erudition but not their Second Sophistic style, overloaded with complicated figures and empty word-plays (as was Isocrates and contemporary preaching). Fénelon's *Dialogues sur l'éloquence* was written at the end of the 17th century but not published until 1718, and became a success translated into several languages and often reprinted in the following centuries.

11 The Augustine of Jesuit Rhetoric

The Society of Jesus was founded in 1540 with a special mission of improving education. Their missionary activities were directed at the evangelical "heretics" in northern Europe and pagans in the New Worlds, but even more at young seminarians in the Catholic countries.⁶¹ Their educational activities were immense: in the course of one hundred years they founded more than

60 Augustine tells how he managed, preaching in the grand style, to stop the people in the city of Caesarea from exerting an ancient, gruesome ritual. It was their tears that convinced him of the sincerity of their conversion (*De doctrina* 4.24-53).

61 Ginzburg (1999). See Eybl (1998) for an introduction to Jesuit rhetoric.

five hundred schools (*collegia*) and forty-nine seminaries for the education of priests.⁶²

The successful Jesuit program consisted of three classes: grammar, humanities, and rhetoric. The study program, the *Ratio Studiorum* of 1599, was centred on the reading of the Greek and Latin classics (literature, rhetoric, history, and philosophy), and it has been called the extroverted supplement to the *Spiritual Exercises* of Ignace de Loyola, the founder of the order. The *Ratio studiorum* prescribed in details the curricula to be studied, and extensive readings of ancient texts on rhetoric were the essence of not just the rhetoric class, but also of the humanities class. Cyprianus Soarez's compilation of excerpts from classical texts, commentaries, and exercises, *De Arte Rhetorica* (1562), was the standard textbook in the Catholic world for decades.⁶³

Sacred rhetoric was not taught in schools or seminaries, and in fact theology, too, was reserved for higher education, e.g., at the Collegio Romano, the Jesuit university and headquarters in Rome.⁶⁴ At the Collegio Romano, sacred eloquence flourished in theory and practice. Many distinguished professors wrote theoretical treatises on the art of preaching/sacred eloquence, in which they mustered their immense learning of classical, patristic, and humanist literature, rhetoric, and philosophy, e.g., Pedro Juan Perninan (1530–66), Francesco Benci (1542–94), and Famiano Strada (1572–1649). Strada's *Prolusiones Academicæ* is a collection of elegant lectures on rhetoric and other liberal arts in a sublime, emotional style, based on his opening lectures at the beginning of the academic year.

The greatest of these treatises on sacred rhetoric was the *Orator Christianus, in quo e sacrarum litterarum doctrina, sanctorumque pp. auctoritate ostendit quæ concionatoris sint partes, ut rite munus illud apostolicum sustineat Libri X* (830 pages, Rome 1612) by a professor at the Collegio Romano, Carlo Reggio (1540–1612). He joined the company in 1556 and was appointed head of the college in Palermo and later Messina, and eventually named professor at Collegio Romano. He died in Rome 1612, the year his *magnum opus* was published. This impressive oeuvre is the most ambitious work on sacred rhetoric before the French Jesuits, notably Nicolas Caussin, wrote their extensive treatises. Carlo Reggio offers a coherent theoretical discourse defining the characteristics of a Christian rhetoric based on Scripture, the church fathers and his favourite Catholic preachers. Reggio's work is an important milestone in the long story of adaptations and transformations of Augustine's Christian rhetoric. He

62 Scaglione (1986).

63 English translation, Flynn (1955).

64 Scaglione (1986); Moss (1986); Bizzell (2016).

acknowledges that communicating to a greater audience is a very important task for the Christian orator. At the same time, he warns against the temptations of adapting too much to the taste of the broad audience. Reggio points out that such tensions are inherent to Christian rhetoric that has an introverted as well as an extroverted side. Reggio discusses the tension between the need for mass communication and the mystical experience at heart of Christianity throughout the work. The opposition is connected to similar contrasts in Reggio's systematic theory of rhetoric, such as the opposition between being seen and being understood. Ultimately, he relies on the Christian and Augustinian dualism between body and soul, this world and the next.⁶⁵

The Jesuit study programs, textbooks, and theoretical treatises were a crucial factor in the establishment of *sacra eloquenza/divina rhetorica/divine eloquence* as an autonomous theoretical field of its own, a meta-rhetoric in Augustine's sense. They flourished in the 16th and 17th centuries, but in the 18th-century sacred eloquence was hard pressed due to critique from rationalist and empiricist philosophers. In Italy, however, the *sacra eloquenza* survived as a theoretical field. The first reason was that Latin rhetoric was considered a part of the national cultural heritage and hence indispensable for establishing a national identity. The second reason was the Catholic Church and the many ecclesiastical institutions in Italy teaching Christian rhetoric.

A little-known example is a very ambitious Jesuit treatise from the middle of the 18th century, Giovambattista Noghera's (1719–1784) *Della moderna eloquenza sacra e del moderno stile profano e sacro. Ragionamenti* (second revised and augmented edition 1753).⁶⁶ Noghera was writing under the threats against the Society, witnessing its dissolution in 1773. Noghera is particularly interested in ordinary people (*il popolo*), emotional appeals as the way to reach common people, the revival of Italian oratory in comparison with the great French

65 Fumaroli (1980) and Mouchel (1990), who have written several pages on Reggio, seem to disagree on his interpretation of the Augustinian heritage. Fumaroli's conclusion to his reading of *Orator Christianus* is that Reggio departs from the severe rhetoric of Augustine that prioritises the moral lifestyle of the preacher and his divine inspiration. Though Reggio quotes extensively from Augustine's *De doctrina Christiana*, leaning on his authority, he nevertheless prefers a more subtle Ciceronian rhetoric. He prefers Cicero's urban style to Augustine's dramatic, late antique style, according to Fumaroli. He defines Reggio's theory of rhetoric as a Ciceronian version of sacred rhetoric, analogous to the Ciceronianism of his colleague at Collegio Romano, Famiano Strada. Mouchel, on the other hand, stresses the seriousness of Reggio's work.

66 Zanlonghi (2002) and (2006). Noghera was part of a Jesuit circle in Milan that tried to invigorate theology and rhetoric under the attacks from Cartesian philosophy. I use the second edition (in Venezia 1753, seconda edizione notabilmente accresciuta, e migliorata dall'autore).

preachers of the last century, and the challenges from Descartes and modern science. Noghera insists that human intellect does not function independently from language, as Descartes and Locke would have it (cf. Conley 1990). Noghera is in many ways congenial with his namesake Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), who also regarded common sense and the imaginative fantasy as essentially different from logical reasoning and more important for human society. Noghera is focused on style (because stylistic figures impact the feelings of the audience), particularly on the “modern style,” comparing profane and sacred oratory. The orator should work on the inner moral life of his listeners. Much to his own surprise he finds only few examples of descriptions of this subjective inner life, and the best book is still Augustine’s *Confessions*, from which he quotes extensively.⁶⁷

12 Recent Time: Kenneth Burke

Noghera inadvertently put the finger on a weak spot in rhetorical theory that was losing touch with 18th- and 19th-century philosophy, proposing a new understanding of the subject. Because of its reliance on Aristotelian categories and virtue ethics, now being perceived as obsolete, rhetoric lost its status in the 19th and early 20th centuries. One exception is the oeuvre of Kenneth Burke (1897–1993), a founding author of modern rhetorical studies. Burke was essentially a literary critic who turned to classical rhetoric because he was interested in literature as signifying forms, rather than as expressions of subjective feelings. Whereas the New Criticism of the first half of the 20th century defined art works as autonomous units, Burke thought of literature as “equipment for living.” In his last major work, *The Rhetoric of Religion* (1961), he turned to theology, convinced that the study of theology – the study of the Word – would cast light on the study of language, i.e., the study of words. One chapter is dedicated to a close reading of Augustine’s *Confessions* in which Burke traces the subtle movements of the text, such as the repetitions of words with the root *-vert*, forming signifying clusters of such terms. He also points to the open structure of the narrative, the cyclical structures signalling the unending process of conversion. Burke’s close reading is still a rare example of a literary interpretation of the *Confessions*.

67 To what extent, if any, Augustine in *Confessions* anticipates Cartesian and modern notions of subjectivity, has been discussed by historians of philosophy, e.g., Taylor (1989); Stock (1996) and (2010); Cary (2000); Gill (2006) and Cavadini (2007).

13 Conclusion

Without Augustine's monumental reinterpretation of the ancient liberal arts, important knowledge of classical rhetoric would have been lost – the Egyptian gold. He reappropriated Ciceronian rhetoric for Christian purposes, using Stoic theories of the linguistic sign in order to reframe the context of these ancient prescripts. His own practice was dualistic, extroverted as well as introverted: the polemical style used against his adversaries and the new contemplative rhetoric of conversion. He was used extensively in the centuries to follow, and perhaps as a consequence of the complexity of his oeuvre, his Christian rhetoric was used for many purposes: simple textbooks, humanist dialogues, and books of poetics, as well as theoretical works on the nature of rhetoric. His influence has been constant, peaking in the 16th and 17th centuries, and recent homiletics have also turned to his rhetorical theory.

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SECTION 6

Science

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Rhetoric of Mathematics: The Case of Diophantus of Alexandria

Jean Christianidis and Michalis Sialaros

Socrates: Thus, arithmetic too is a creator of persuasion?

Gorgias: Apparently¹



1 Introduction: Contextualising Diophantus' Project

Over the past few decades, historians of Greek mathematics have tried to overcome one of the fundamental problems of the field, namely the scarcity of the extant sources, by exploring the cultural frameworks within which the extant mathematical treatises were produced.² In this research direction, recent studies have shed light on rather unexpected links between ancient rhetoric and ancient Greek mathematics.³ By picking up the threads of these discussions, we propose to examine the particularly challenging case of Diophantus of Alexandria, a late antique mathematician who probably lived around the end of the 3rd century CE.⁴

According to tradition, Diophantus wrote several treatises, some of which have perished.⁵ The *Arithmetica* (Ἀριθμητικά), his *magnum opus*, originally consisted of thirteen books. Six books are preserved in Greek while a version of additional four books survives in an Arabic translation prepared around the mid-9th century by Qusṭā ibn Lūqā (died c.910), a Christian polymath and

1 Plato, *Gorgias* 453e 7–8; our translation.

2 For a survey of recent research, see Sidoli (2014), Saito (1998), and Berggren (1984).

3 Most notably, Bernard (2003a) and (2003b); see, also, Doxiadis and Sialaros (2012). For the relationship between early modern French mathematics and rhetoric, see Cifoletti (1992), (1995), (2006a), and (2006b).

4 For a brief note on the relationship between Diophantus and rhetoric, see Bernard, Proust, and Ross (2015) 50–51.

5 See Heath (1910) 3–4, Christianidis (1991), and Knorr (1993).

translator. *Arithmetica* is structured as a collection of worked-out problems, preceded by a comprehensive preface in which Diophantus introduces the terminology of his method, explains how the operations with the technical terms should be performed, and, more importantly, describes the two most important stages in a solution of a problem by his method: the setting up of an equation out of a problem, and its simplification.⁶ The influence of the *Arithmetica* was immediate: throughout late antiquity, Diophantus was recognised as an upmost authority in arithmetic in the Greek-speaking world; further, the *Arithmetica* was accessible to scholarly circles in Byzantium, constituting part of the erudition of Byzantine humanists (especially in the last centuries), while its influence on classical Islam, the Renaissance, and early modern mathematics can hardly be exaggerated.⁷

The question regarding the proper understanding of the method employed by Diophantus in the *Arithmetica* has received much scholarly attention, especially in the wake of the discovery of the four Arabic books of the *Arithmetica* around 1970.⁸ Despite the fact that Diophantus himself never employed the term “algebra,” for the mathematicians of the classical Islam, the mathematicians of the Renaissance, and the mathematicians of the early modern period, the *Arithmetica* was clearly a work on algebra. The same idea was also maintained by historians of mathematics during the better part of the 20th century, albeit for different reasons. Let us clarify this point. On the one hand, premodern mathematicians (who understood algebra in its *premodern* sense) recognised the great similarity between their practice and Diophantus’. On the other hand, historians of mathematics of the previous century (among which some leading scholars like Paul Tannery and Thomas Heath) approached the *Arithmetica* through the viewpoint of *modern* algebra; thus, inevitably, their accounts were often exposed to anachronism. The latter approach led some contemporary historians of mathematics to hesitate to adopt the anachronistic narratives of the traditional historiography, while others, more sceptical,

6 For the latest discussion on Diophantus’ method of solution, see Christianidis (2007), (2018a), (2018b), and Christianidis and Oaks (2013).

7 For the late antique scholars who mention Diophantus, see Christianidis and Megremi (2019). For the reception of Diophantus in Byzantium, see (with reservations for some of the author’s claims) Herrin (2000). For the reception of Diophantus in classical Islam, see Sesiano (1982), while for the reception of the *Arithmetica* among the Humanists, see Morse (1981) and Reich (2003).

8 For the Arabic books of the *Arithmetica*, see Sesiano (1982) and Rashed (1984).

deny any relation of Diophantus' practice to algebra.⁹ Over the past few years, the development of the new historiographical category of "premodern algebra" has allowed us (a) to gain a better understanding between "premodern" and "modern" algebra, in terms of their goals, scope, and methodology;¹⁰ and (b) to classify Diophantus' *Arithmetica* as a treatise on "premodern algebra."

In this chapter, we wish to supplement the latest historiographical research on Diophantus by proposing an additional context for reading the *Arithmetica*. More particularly, we shift focus from the fact that the *Arithmetica* is a collection of problems solved with the method of "premodern algebra," and rather place emphasis on its pedagogical character.¹¹ Based on the observation that the practices of *solving problems* and *teaching how to solve problems* are not identical, we show that the *Arithmetica* is a book in which Diophantus wishes to teach how algebra should be used to solve problems in numbers. In the first part of this chapter (Section 2: 'Diophantus, the Teacher'), we argue for the didactic character of the *Arithmetica*, based on the preface of the treatise and selected examples from the hundreds of worked-out problems of which the book is composed. In the second part (Sections 3 and 4), we examine Diophantus' phraseology in relation to "literaturisation"; namely, a process, visible throughout antiquity, by which rhetorical language, forms, and techniques were transposed into other literary compositions. On this basis, we conclude that Diophantus was not only a genius mathematician, but probably also a cultured scholar, well educated according to the norms of late antique *paideia*, which included, of course, rhetoric.

9 For a (non-exhaustive) list of recent scholarship on Diophantus, see the works in footnotes 6–7, and Bashmakova (1966), (1974), (1981); Allard (1979), (1980), (1981), (1982–1983), (1983), (1985); Christianidis (1991), (1996), (2015); R. Rashed (1994); Pérez Martín (2006); Barner (2007a), (2007b); Acerbi (2009), (2011), (2013a), (2013b); Bernard and Christianidis (2012); Christianidis and Skoura (2013); M. Rashed (2013); and Rashed and Houzel (2013). For the traditional view on Diophantus and algebra, see Heath (1910) and the relevant studies in Tannery (1912–1915).

10 On the historiographical concept of "premodern algebra," see Christianidis (2018b), and Christianidis and Oaks (2013).

11 It is worth mentioning that the didactic character of the *Arithmetica* has not received any scholarly attention until recently. Even, for example, in Mansfeld's (1998) detailed study on the introductions of ancient Greek mathematical texts, we read: "Diophantus has been excluded because he has nothing to offer in our present context" (1). To our knowledge the first attempt to bring the didactic aspect of the *Arithmetica* to the fore is Bernard and Christianidis (2012).

2 Diophantus, the Teacher

In this section, we examine the pedagogical character of Diophantus' *Arithmetica*, by examining the two textual components of the treatise; that is (i) the preface, and (ii) the solved problems.¹² Regarding the former, we offer three types of evidence in support of our argument: namely, (i.a) explicit references, (i.b) the role of practice, and (i.c) the gradual increase in difficulty. Now, in relation to the latter part, we offer two types of evidence: (ii.a) reminders and explanations and (ii.b) constructive dead ends.

2.1 *The Preface of the Arithmetica: Explicit References*

Unlike other Greek mathematical works (most notably, Euclid's *Elements*), the *Arithmetica* opens up with an extended introduction, addressed to a certain Dionysius. The very first lines of the treatise reveal Diophantus' interest in teaching Dionysius how to develop his capacity for "invention" in arithmetical problems (2.3–13):

Knowing that you are anxious, my most honourable Dionysius, to learn the "invention" (εὑρεσιν) of problems in numbers, I have tried (to expose how) to hypostasise the nature and power (subsisting) in numbers, beginning with the foundations on which the subject is built. Well, perhaps the subject appears rather difficult, in as much as it is not yet familiar – and the souls of beginners have little hope for successful accomplishment. But you, with your enthusiasm and my teaching (ἀπόδειξις),¹³ will find it easy to master; for keenness supported by teaching is a swift road to knowledge.

A few lines further down, Diophantus makes the aim of his project more explicit; that is to teach Dionysius a way (ὁδός) to solve arithmetical problems (4.7–11.):

¹² There are two modern editions of the Greek text of the *Arithmetica*: by Tannery (1893–1895) and by Allard (1980); the latter has not been published. All references to the *Arithmetica* are given according to Tannery (by providing only the page and line numbers); all translations are ours.

¹³ As a rule, the term ἀπόδειξις in Greek mathematical texts denotes a proof, most often a postulatory-deductive demonstration; see, for example, Netz (1999). Diophantus usually employs the term either at the end of a solution to denote a verification process (καὶ ἢ ἀπόδειξις φανερά) or to denote the resolutive procedure (see, for example, 256.12 and 430.17). In this single case, nevertheless, Diophantus wishes to state that his teaching will provide Dionysius a swift road to knowledge. In other words, the term ἀπόδειξις is employed here as synonymous to the rhetorical term ἐπίδειξις; see *LSJ* s.v. ἐπίδειξις.

It is from the addition, subtraction, or multiplication of these (numbers), or from the ratio which they bear with one another, or, even, each one with its own side, that most arithmetical problems are formed (πλέκεσθαι); and they can be solved if you follow the way that I will show (τὴν ὑποδειχθισομένην ὁδόν).

All basic features of a teaching process are evident in the passages above: there exists a beginner filled with apparent enthusiasm (Dionysius); a master willing to share his knowledge (Diophantus); and, in between, a difficult subject (the art of mastering a method for solving arithmetical problems). We shall return to these passages later on.

2.2 *Theory and Practice*

The elements of Diophantus' readiness to teach Dionysius are, in fact, evident throughout the preface of the *Arithmetica*. In several places, like the following example (14.1–10, our emphasis), he appears to give Dionysius specific teacher-to-student advice:

And the multiplications having been clarified for you, the divisions of the species just described are obvious. Then, *it is good that you who are beginning this study should have acquired practice* (γεγυμνάσθαι) in addition, subtraction and the multiplications concerning the species; and how to add extant and lacking species, not of the same multitude, to other species, themselves either extant or likewise extant and lacking, and how from extant and other lacking species to subtract other (species), either extant or likewise extant and lacking.

Remarks such as the above reveal that Diophantus is not only willing to share his knowledge with Dionysius; he has also a particular teaching plan in mind. Two further points should be stressed here: first, Diophantus emphasises that theory learning should be accompanied by practice; and, second, he maintains that theoretical knowledge should not be provided all at once, but gradually. The latter point reveals a central aspect of Diophantus' didactic approach; namely, that a beginner should start from the simpler topics and then, only after having mastered these, proceed to the more advanced ones. Let us further examine this point.

2.3 *The Gradual Increase in Difficulty*

The introduction of the *Arithmetica* concludes with Diophantus reminding Dionysius that the project is extremely challenging. Thus, in order to facilitate

mathēsis in the best possible way, Diophantus proposes to organise his material in a specific manner, starting from the simpler problems and gradually proceeding to the most difficult ones (14.25–16.6):

Since (the things involved) are many in number and large in size, and for this reason they are mastered slowly by those who acquire them, and (since) they include things that are difficult to memorise, I thought it worthwhile to divide those that are amenable (to being divided), and moreover to arrange those at the beginning, as elements, from the simpler to the more complex, as it seems convenient to do. In this way, indeed, they will be easier to follow for the beginners and their working out will be memorised.

At this point, a reasonable question emerges: is the overall large-scale organisation of the *Arithmetica* in agreement with Diophantus' description? According to Bernand and Christianidis (2012), who meticulously examined the structure of Books 1–3 of the *Arithmetica*, the answer is affirmative. *Grosso modo*, Diophantus' assignment techniques – described in the article as “methods of invention” – when arranged in columns in a table whose lines progress from problem to problem present a remarkably linear diagonal progression. It is, thus, evident that the problems were arranged, not only according to their enunciations but, most importantly, in a way that would enable one to study one method of assignment after the other.¹⁴ In other words, Diophantus' promise as stated in the preface of the *Arithmetica* is indeed materialised in the main part of the treatise.

To conclude this brief section, Diophantus' preface of the *Arithmetica* offers the grounds to view his project in pedagogical terms. In particular, the preface: (a) explicitly states that the aim is to teach; (b) is written with an eye towards a student; (c) contains pieces of advice for improvement; (d) claims that the general structure of the *Arithmetica* is appropriate for *mathēsis*. Let us now proceed to examine whether the main part of the book is in accordance with the introduction.

14 For example, assignments in the first problems of book 1 are made by the more simple techniques, which may be called “direct” and “derivative” (in the sense that an assignment derives from a previous assignment and an operation on it); a new technique (which Arab algebraists designated “*al-istiḡra*”) is introduced after problem II.8; another technique, which might be called “method of simulation” (in which assignments are modelled on known arithmetical rules), appears after problem II.11; see Bernand and Christianidis (2012) 64–67.

2.4 *The Main Part of the Arithmetica: Reminders and Explanations*

Let us begin with a simple example. In problem III.19, it is required to find four numbers such that if any of them is added to or subtracted from the square of their sum, the result is a square. At some point during the solution of the problem, Diophantus proclaims (182.22–184.4, our emphasis):

Since, in any right-angled triangle, the square on the hypotenuse, if it receives in addition twice the (product of the sides) about the right angle, or if it lacks (it), makes a square, I search first for four right-angled triangles having equal hypotenuses; this is the same as dividing a square into two squares (in four ways); *but we learned how to divide a given square into two squares in an unlimited number of ways.*

The last sentence is a reference to the most famous problem of the *Arithmetica*, problem II.8.¹⁵ One can find numerous sentences such as the above, in which Diophantus speaks directly to Dionysius. Upon occasion, he provides explanatory remarks to simplify resolutive steps or gives references to previous problems. In these ways, he wishes to make sure that the reader is following his arguments and to provide a helpful hand in case of confusion.

To illustrate this point better, it is worth exposing an example in some detail. The table below presents the text of problem II.30, arranged into two columns. The left column includes the steps of the resolutive procedure, while the right one presents the passages that contain didactic, heuristic, and other material whose connection with the resolutive procedure is indirect, whatever its importance might be for practising problem-solving.

To find two numbers such that their product, if it receives in addition or if it lacks the sum of both, makes a square.

Since for any two numbers, their squares, being added together, if they receive or lack the double of their product, make a square,

we set out two numbers, 2 and 3.

15 Problem II.8 inspired the French mathematician Pierre de Fermat (1607–1665) to formulate the so-called “Fermat’s Last Theorem.”

And it is manifest that the sum of their squares, together with the double of their product, which yields 25 units, makes a square, and again if one subtracts from the sum of their squares the double of their product it results in a square, (namely) a unit.

Accordingly, I assign their product to be 13 powers. So, let the one be assigned to be 1 number, and the other 13 numbers, and so their product becomes 13 powers.

Therefore, 13 powers, if they receive or lack 12 powers, make a square.

Thus, 12 powers should be equal to the sum of the two. But the sum of the two is 14 numbers. Thus, 12 powers are equal to 14 numbers, and the number becomes 14 12ths, that is 7 6ths.

So, the one is 1 number, it will be 7 6ths; the other, 13 numbers, it will be 91 6ths; and they solve the problem.

Let us now describe the resolutive procedure. The problem asks to find two numbers such that:

$$(\text{1st sought-after number}) \times (\text{2nd sought-after number}) + (\text{1st sought-after number} + \text{2nd sought-after number}) \rightarrow sq_1,$$

and

$$(\text{1st sought-after number}) \times (\text{2nd sought-after number}) - (\text{1st sought-after number} + \text{2nd sought-after number}) \rightarrow sq_2$$

Diophantus solves the problem by premodern algebra. This method entails: assigning names to the unnamed sought-after numbers, working through the operations stipulated in the enunciation *on the names*, setting up an equation framed in the language of the names, and, finally, simplifying and solving the

equation. To find the names, Diophantus resorts to two arithmetical rules, which are described in modern algebra as the identities $m^2 + n^2 \pm 2mn = (m \pm n)^2$. Diophantus chooses the values 2 and 3 for n and m , respectively, and he explains that $3^2 + 2^2 + 2 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 = 5^2$ and $3^2 + 2^2 - 2 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 = 1^2$. Thus, two equalities are produced: $13 + 12 = 5^2$ and $13 - 12 = 1^2$. These equalities are structured as the conditions of the problem, with the product (1st sought-after number) \times (2nd sought-after number) corresponding to 13 and the sum (1st sought-after number) + (2nd sought-after number) corresponding to 12. From these arithmetical equalities, Diophantus passes to the algebraic equalities we write in modern algebra as $13x^2 + 12x^2 = 25x^2$ and $13x^2 + 12x^2 = 1x^2$, which preserve the same structure, and on this basis he assigns the names to the unnamed sought-after numbers. He assigns the product (1st sought-after number) \times (2nd sought-after number) to be $13x^2$ (i.e., what in the text appears as “13 powers”), and, accordingly, he assigns the one sought-after number to be $1x$ (i.e., what he writes as “1 number”), the other $13x$ (i.e., “13 numbers”). Now, by virtue of the structural similarity, $12x^2$ must be the sum of the two sought-after numbers. Yet, the sum of them is $1x + 13x = 14x$. Therefore, $14x$ must be equal to $12x^2$, and thus the equation $12x^2 = 14x$ arises, whose solution is $x = \frac{14}{12}$, i.e., $\frac{7}{6}$. Having found the value of x , the numerical values of the sought-after numbers are calculated by means of their names: the one, which was named $1x$, found to be $\frac{7}{6}$, the other, which was named $13x$, $\frac{91}{6}$.

The discussion of problem II.30 shows that Diophantus does not simply provide a solution to the requested arithmetical problem (left column of the table above). He enriches the text with a non-negligible amount of auxiliary material, which includes heuristic explanations and reminders of milestones of the procedure (right column of the table above). The reader may find it useful to compare Diophantus' text with the solution that the Byzantine scholar Maximus Planudes (ca. 1260–ca. 1310) included in his commentary on that problem (presented below using the notation of modern algebra):

	2		3
<i>setting-out</i>	$1x$		$13x$
	$13x^{216}$		
	$12x^2$	<i>eq.</i>	$14x$
	$12x$	<i>eq.</i>	$14x$

16 Tannery's text has $6x^2$ instead of $13x^2$, which is a mistake. The most ancient manuscript of Planudes' commentary (*Marcianus gr.* 308, end of the 13th century, f. 156v) preserves the correct value.

<i>division</i>	$1x$	$\frac{14}{12}$, i.e., $\frac{7}{6}$
<i>hypostases</i>	$\frac{7}{6}$	$\frac{91}{6}$

It is evident that Planudes presents the solution by reproducing, in a highly abbreviated manner, what appears in the left column of the table above; that is, the resolutory steps.

2.5 *Constructive Dead-Ends*

Let us, finally, expose a didactic technique which is occasionally employed in the *Arithmetica*, and which we shall describe as “constructive dead-ends.” In problem 27 of the Greek book 4, for example, Diophantus seeks two numbers which have the property to produce cubes when combined in the following two ways:

(1st sought-after number) \times (2nd sought-after number) – (1st sought-after number),

and

(1st sought-after number) \times (2nd sought-after number) – (2nd sought-after number).

Diophantus begins by assigning the following names to the sought-after numbers: he sets the first number “8 numbers” (our $8x$) and the second number “1 power, 1 unit” (our $1x^2 + 1$). Then, the first condition of the problem gives, in our notation, $8x(1x^2 + 1) - 8x$, or $(2x)^3$, which is indeed a cube. The second condition, however, leads to the expression $8x^3 + 8x - 1x^2 - 1$, which must be a cube. Diophantus says that this is impossible (250.15).¹⁷ So, since the path he has followed leads to a dead-end, it requires some modification. Thus, he returns to the beginning of the procedure to assign new names:

1st sought-after number: = $8x + 1$ (“8 numbers, 1 unit”),
2nd sought-after number: = $1x^2$ (“1 power”).

With these names, the second condition is fulfilled, while the first condition leads to the expression $8x^3 + 1x^2 - 8x - 1$, which must be a cube. This is done by

¹⁷ As Heath points out, the expression $8x^3 + 8x - 1x^2 - 1$ can be turned into a cube by positing the side of the cube either $3x - \frac{1}{12}$ or $\frac{8}{3}x - 1$; see Heath (1910) 186 n. 1.

making it the cube $(2x - 1)^3$.¹⁸ From the resulting equation he finds the value of x and, from it, the values of the two sought-after numbers. Given that the first attempt to solve the problem was sterile, a natural question emerges: Why would Diophantus include this in his book? If his purpose was merely to solve the problem, write it down and present the solution, his choice makes no sense. The answer to this question is that Diophantus incorporated the unsuccessful attempt in his text because his intention was not merely to solve the problem. He was acting as a teacher towards a student; thus, the inclusion of the sterile attempt in the text of the *Arithmetica* can be interpreted as a didactic technique, the aim of which is to draw the reader's attention to a choice of names for the sought-after numbers which is appropriate for a successful solution.

To conclude section 2, the main part of the *Arithmetica* comes to confirm the didactic aspect already highlighted in the preface of the text. Diophantus solves the problems with an eye towards his student. In other words, he is not interested solely in solving the problems, but also in making sure that the student will learn to grasp the methodology of solving.¹⁸ Now, according to Bernard's conclusions: "*Learning* (not convincing) is the most essential scope of ancient rhetorical practice, at least in the Greek context."¹⁹ This observation, combined with the deductive aspect of Diophantus' project that section 2 demonstrated, allows us to search for further evidence regarding possible rhetorical influence on Diophantus.

3 Towards a Rhetorical Contextualisation of Diophantus

The term "literaturisation" denotes a process, visible throughout antiquity, by which rhetorical language, forms, and techniques were transposed into other literary compositions. Our aim in this section is twofold: first, through an examination of some of the terms that Diophantus employs, to support the idea that the process of "literaturisation" can be traced not only in fields such as literature and philosophy, but also in scientific treatises, like the *Arithmetica*.²⁰ Second, to offer a new hypothesis that may help explain the way Diophantus' problems were formulated. Overall, we propose that the field of rhetoric may function as a legitimate historical context for Greek mathematical texts and,

18 For the didactic character of other Greek mathematical treatises, see Sidoli (2015).

19 See Bernard (2003b) 410 (his emphasis).

20 Pernot mentions that scientific treatises could be included in "literaturisation," without, however, providing any examples; see Pernot (2005) 196–197. Also, see Webb (2001) 289.

thus, provide answers to open questions regarding Diophantus' enterprise and, perhaps, other Greek mathematicians' as well.

The *Arithmetica* contains numerous terms that are rare (if not unique) in the Greek mathematical corpus; for example, "most honourable" (τιμιώτατε), "hypostasis" (ὑπόστασις), *psychē* (ψυχή), "twist" (πλέκεσθαι),²¹ or even terms which denote a different than usual meaning (for example, ἀπόδειξις "proof/demonstration").²² This unique phraseology constitutes a peculiar phenomenon by itself, worthy of its own investigation. For the needs of the present, however, we will restrain our research to a few terms that seem to hold rhetorical connotations.

Let us begin with εὑρεσις, a term which appears in the opening line of the *Arithmetica* (2.3): "Knowing that you are anxious, my most honourable Dionysius, to learn the εὑρεσιν of problems in numbers." The proper translation of Diophantus' εὑρεσις has troubled historians of the past century. Thus, we find a variety of different translations: "solution" (Tannery, Heath), "discovery" (Heath), "investigation" (Heath), or even "à trouver (finding)" (Ver Eecke). The wording of the Greek text, nevertheless, indicates that none of the aforementioned translations are fully satisfactory;²³ this is why the latest studies prefer to translate εὑρεσις as "invention."²⁴ The term "invention" originates in ancient rhetoric.²⁵ To be more precise, "invention" refers to the finding of the arguments with which the rhetor will prepare his answer to a question and is the first of the five distinct, sequential parts into which the task of the orator to compose and deliver a speech is divided – the other parts being: τάξις (*dispositio*), λέξις (*elocutio*), μνήμη (*memoria*), and ὑπόκρισις (*pronuntiatio*).²⁶

Let us return to the preface of the *Arithmetica* (16.5–16.6): "In this way, indeed, they will be easier to follow for the beginners and their working out will be

21 "Hypostasis" appears 127 times in the Greek books of the *Arithmetica* (n.b. the term is virtually abolished in the Arabic translation); for the meaning of hypostasis in Diophantus, see Christianidis (2015). "Twisting" denotes here the formation of arithmetical problems, thus why in the passage quoted in section 2.ia we adopted for the verb πλέκεσθαι the translation "to form." Interestingly enough, several terms seem to hold Christian connotations.

22 Riedlberger (2013) 34–38.

23 The Greek word for "solution" is λύσις, a term which is, in fact, employed by Diophantus on several occasions to indicate the solution of the arithmetical problems; see the discussion in Christianides (2007) 292–294.

24 The term also appears in Pappus' *Collection*. See Christianidis (2007) 292–293; cf. Bernard (2003b) 406–408.

25 Among the several books on invention that were produced in antiquity, almost all of them shared the title *De inventione* (Περὶ εὐρέσεως); see, for example, the popular *De inventione* by Cicero.

26 See Bernard (2003a) and (2003b).

memorised.” What would the “invention” that Dionysius must learn and memorise be? Evidently, not merely the solution (i.e., the final result) of each and every problem in the *Arithmetica* – after all, on several occasions, Diophantus does not even pursue the solution of the problems till the end. As discussed in section 2, the aim of Diophantus in the *Arithmetica* was to teach Dionysius *how* to conduct the “invention” of arithmetical problems, within the context of his own method of solution, that is of premodern algebra. Now, again as discussed in section 2, premodern algebra comprises several tasks: setting-up an equation out of a problem, resolution of the equation, calculation of the numbers, the finding of which the problem calls for, and verification. If “invention” refers to a single task, this must be clearly the establishment of the equation. It is the stage in the accomplishment of which Diophantus shows all his artfulness and resourcefulness, both as practitioner and teacher of mathematics. Under such an interpretation of “invention,” one would expect to find in the *Arithmetica*: (a) the description of the theoretical background suitable for conducting the invention of arithmetical problems, (b) an explanation of what the resolution of a problem further comprises, (c) a presentation of a body of techniques through which the invention can proceed, and (d) a series of demonstrations of all the above in particular examples. All these can be traced in the text.²⁷ On these grounds, an analogy appears between the rhetorical “invention” and Diophantus’ εὑρεσις: the latter is the first part of the process of solving a problem by premodern algebra, while the former is the first part of the working out of an oration responding to a posed rhetorical question (*questio*).²⁸

Second comes ἀντίδοσις (giving in return/exchange). Diophantus employs the term in three problems (I.22–23 and II.18). In the first of these problems, it is required (50.21–52.3):

To find three numbers such that, if each gives a proposed part of itself to the next one, givers and receivers become equal. Now, let it be proposed that the first gives to the second its third, the second to the third a fourth, and, moreover, the third to the first a fifth, and after the ἀντίδοσιν they become equal.

Now, ἀντίδοσις was a specific legal procedure which was in effect in Athens in the 4th century BCE, providing the possibility of integral or partial exchange

27 For a detailed discussion, see Christianidis (2007).

28 On how the algebraic enterprises of later mathematicians, such as Jacques Peletier and Guillaume Gosselin, were influenced by the rhetorical categories of “invention” and “disposition,” see Cifoletti (1992), (1995).

of properties between parties.²⁹ While the usages of the term in rhetoric are too numerous to mention here,³⁰ the term does not appear in mathematical treatises.

Let us now come to the term *παρισότης* (and its cognate *πάρισιος*). Again, the terms do not appear in any Greek mathematical treatise, but are employed four times in the *Arithmetica* (problems 11 and 14 of the fifth Greek book). In these cases (344.18, 346.2), it is required to split a given number in a sum of two or three square numbers, respectively, under the condition that the square numbers must

be “almost equals” (*πάρισοι*). Thus, in problem 9, we have $13 = \left(\frac{257}{101}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{258}{101}\right)^2$,

while in problem 11 we have $10 = \left(\frac{1321}{711}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{1288}{711}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{1285}{711}\right)^2$. The process of

transforming a number into an addition of almost equal numbers is called by Diophantus “*παρισότητος ἀγωγή*.” As suspected, the term “*παρίσῳσις*” comes from classical rhetoric. It belongs to the “figures of style” and denotes a succession of a number of co-ordinate clauses which have approximately the same length, based on their number of words or syllables.³¹

A final point: in the preface of the *Arithmetica*, Diophantus urges Dionysius, in order to learn the invention of arithmetical problems, to practise and imitate his method: (4.10–11.): “and they can be solved if you follow the way that I will show.” The pedagogical method of imitation (*μίμησις*), to which Diophantus refers, also originates in rhetoric. Now, there is a significant difference between imitation in rhetoric and imitation in mathematics: while the former consisted mainly on inverting, modifying, or reapplying ancient rhetorical locutions, the latter focuses on the method, the *ὁδός* (way) or *ἀγωγή* (working out), which is demonstrated and taught through a series of worked-out examples.³² It is exactly in the latter sense that Diophantus speaks about the memorisation of the “working out” at the end of the preface (our emphasis): (14.25–16.6):

Since (the things involved) are many in number and large in size, and for this reason they are mastered slowly by those who acquire them, and (since) they include things that *are difficult to memorise*, I thought it worthwhile to divide those that are amenable (to being divided),

29 See, for example, Apostolakis (2006) 93; Todd (1993); Goligher (2007).

30 As a simple example, we mention the two speeches on this topic by Isocrates (*Antidosis*) and Demosthenes (*Against Phaenippus in the Matter of an Antidosis*).

31 Rowe (1997) 137. An example of *παρίσῳσις* is the famous phrase *Veni vidi vici* (I came; I saw; I conquered), attributed to Julius Caesar (e.g., Suet. *Iul.* 37.2).

32 See Morse (1981) 34 ff.

and moreover to arrange those at the beginning, as elements, from the simpler to the more complex, as it seems convenient to do. In this way, indeed, they will be easier to follow for the beginners and their working out *will be memorised*.

Still, a strong similarity appears: both distinguish skills from results. Both lay emphasis not on particular results but on the skills through which these results were produced. Moreover, both share the assumption that the teacher's authority lies first and foremost in his capacity to teach and explain the skills and not so much in presenting particular results.

To conclude this very brief survey, we observe that Diophantus' phraseology in the *Arithmetica* is unusual compared with other Greek mathematical texts. Several of the employed terms have no parallel in the classical Greek mathematical corpus; at the same time, these terms are found in abundance in rhetorical texts. Could this mean that Diophantus himself was a rhetor?³³ Probably not. But his phraseology clearly points towards the influence of higher culture and rhetorical training on the structure of the treatise.³⁴ Thus, Diophantus was most probably not only a genius mathematician, but also a highly cultured intellectual, who was well educated according to the norms of late antique *paideia*.³⁵

33 The testimony of the Syrian Jacobite scholar Barhebraeus (1225/26–1285), who places Diophantus in the time of the emperor Flavius Claudius Julianus (born 331/332 CE, reigned 361–363), is not enough to identify our Diophantus with “Diophantus of Arabia,” the teacher of Libanius, who professed rhetoric at Athens at that time; see Heath (1910) 1.

34 The fact that mathematical texts of late antiquity present linguistical, structural, and cognitive similarities compared to philosophical and rhetorical texts of the time indicates that the mathematicians of late antiquity received training in these subjects; see Bernard (2003a), (2003b); Riedlberger (2013) 34–38. Cf. Bernard, Proust, and Ross (2015) 47. For the view that mathematical sciences were included in a liberal arts curriculum, see Marrou (1971); Clarke (1971). For a more sceptical approach, see Hadot (2005): 436–443, 252–253; cf. Sidoli (2015) 387–388. For the usefulness of mathematics in the training of an orator, see Quintilian, *Inst.* 1.10; Isocrates, *Antid.* 258–269.

35 The term *paideia*, according to Bernard (2003a) 99, “does not simply refer to the education of the child ... it also refers to the ideal of the whole life of the civilised man at the time.” Penella (2015) 160 points out that a person became fully *pepaideumenos* only after going through the entire literary-rhetorical curriculum.

4 The Rhetorical Distinction *Thesis-Hypothesis* and the Abstract Formulation of Problems

It is commonly accepted that Diophantus draws on earlier traditions, especially on pre-existing collections of arithmetical problems usually described as works of “logistic.”³⁶ Nevertheless, the problems in the *Arithmetica* present a crucial difference compared with the problems of logistic: the former are presented as abstract and general,³⁷ while the latter are framed as short stories, drawing on themes from Greek mythology, trading, family situations, etc. In order to grasp this difference better, let us examine a logistic problem, *Epigram* 29 from book 14 of the *Palatine Anthology*:³⁸

Blessed Zeus, are these deeds pleasing in thy sight that the Thessalian women do in play? The eye of the moon is blighted by mortals; I saw it myself. The night still wanted till morning twice two-sixths and twice one-seventh of what was past.

The problem seeks to divide a night – that is a time period of 12 hours – into two parts, such that one part is “twice two-sixths and twice one-seventh” the other. As regards mathematics, this problem is identical with Diophantus’ problem I.2 which seeks “to divide a proposed number into two numbers having a given ratio” (16.24–25). Nevertheless, there is a crucial difference between the two: unlike the “pure” and abstract formulation of Diophantus’ problem, the problem stated in the epigram is presented as a short story under particular circumstances. Thus, a legitimate question arises: why would Diophantus abandon the older forms? Or, stated differently, why would he formulate the arithmetical problems he had received from tradition in the abstract form we find in the *Arithmetica*?

The only answer to this question was proposed by Tannery in a study published in 1896 under the title “Sur la religion des derniers mathématiciens de l’antiquité.”³⁹ Jacob Klein provides a summary of Tannery’s views:⁴⁰

36 See, for example, Klein (1968) 126: “The material assimilated in Diophantine problems is to be found already in Thymaridas, in Plato (*Laws* 819 B, C), in the Charmides scholium, in the ‘arithmetical’ epigrams of the *Palatine Anthology*, and in Heron of Alexandria.”

37 The sole exception to this rule is problem V.30.

38 Paton (1918) 103. For a discussion of this and other similar epigrams of the *Palatine Anthology*, see Christianidis and Megremi (2019).

39 Reprinted in Tannery (1912–1915) 2: 527–539.

40 Klein (1968) 128–129.

Tannery attempted to give an explication of the “abstract” character of Diophantine problems ... which rests on highly controversial presuppositions. Basing his argument on the relation of Diophantus to Anatolius, the bishop of Laodicea, a relation supposedly implied by the Psellus fragment discovered by Tannery (printed in the second volume of the Tannery edition of Diophantus, pp. 37 ff.), he thought that he could identify the Dionysius to whom the Diophantine *Arithmetic* is dedicated with St. Dionysius, the bishop of Alexandria, and he concluded from this that the Diophantine textbook was intended for use in the Alexandrian catechumenical school; it followed that Diophantus must have been a Christian. This thesis seemed to him to find particular support in the special form of the Diophantine *Arithmetic*. For the usual verbal problems composed in terms of pagan mythology, as we know them from the *Palatine Anthology* and the Archimedean *Cattle Problem*, would obviously be unsuitable for instruction at a Christian school. But to relinquish such verbal formulations would immediately produce that thoroughgoing “abstractness” which the Diophantine problems in fact have. (Note, in addition, that the verbal formulation of the thirtieth problem of the fifth book is not of a mythological sort, apart from the fact that this problem at the end of the book may perhaps be a later addition.)

Tannery’s conclusion rests on a series of hypotheses, most of which are highly speculative. It is not within our scope to discuss the drawbacks of his interpretation. In what follows, we wish to offer a second explanatory hypothesis regarding the formulation of Diophantus’ problems, based on different premises; namely, the framework of ancient rhetoric.

It is well established that rhetoric occupied a central place within classical Greek and Roman education.⁴¹ Despite the lack of uniformity in terms of consistency and codification, it is certain that some fundamental methodological approaches and basic linguistic patterns of rhetorical pedagogy persisted throughout antiquity.⁴² Among the central ideas around rhetorical pedagogy was the belief that theoretical training should be accompanied by practice. As a result, numerous rhetorical exercises were composed and assigned to students. By the last centuries BCE (if not earlier), rules of rhetorical practice

41 See, for example, Marrou (1971); Too (2001); and Watts (2017) 27.

42 See Webb (2001) 297; Penella (2015) 160. For the existence of schools offering grammatical rhetorical, mathematical, and philosophical instruction in Alexandria up the 5th century CE, see Watts (2017) 37; cf. Athanassiadi (1999) 20 ff.

together with exercises were embodied in textbooks, some of which have survived. These were known as *progymnasmata*.⁴³

Two features of *progymnasmata* are particularly interesting. First, they were arranged according to increased difficulty;⁴⁴ and, second, they were highly influential. This is how the Alexandrian sophist Aelius Theon (*floruit* probably in the 1st century CE) presents the usefulness of preparatory exercises like *progymnasmata* to fields besides rhetoric:⁴⁵

Training in the [*pro*]gymnasmata is absolutely necessary not only for those who are going to practise rhetoric, but also if one wishes to undertake the function of poets or historians or any other writers. These exercises are, as it were, the foundation of every kind (*idea*) of discourse, and, depending on how one instills them in the minds of the young, necessarily the results make themselves felt in the same way later.

In the same line of thought, Penella writes: “the progymnasmata were not only a central element in ancient education; their influence on the graduates of ancient schools was also felt in all modes of literary culture. Thus, if we seek to understand ancient education and its impact on ancient culture, it is crucial to grasp the nature, purpose, and role of the progymnasmata in the literary-rhetorical curriculum.”⁴⁶

Now, one of the most advanced exercises in the *progymnasmata* was the one about “thesis” and “hypothesis.”⁴⁷ On the one hand, a “thesis” is an argumentative treatment of a general subject without any specifications of person or circumstances; on the other, a “hypothesis” is a specification of a thesis, dealing with the particularities of a person or a situation. To draw on Quintilian (*Inst.* 3.5.5–18), the question “Should one marry?” is a thesis, while the question “Should Cato marry?” is a hypothesis. This is how (Ps.-)Hermogenes describes the two terms:⁴⁸

They have given a definition of thesis (*thesis*) to the effect that it is a consideration of some subject viewed apart from any specific circumstance;

43 Forms of *progymnasmata* appear already in the Classical period; see Penella (2015) 160–161.

44 See Webb (2001) 298.

45 Kennedy (2003) 13.

46 Penella (2015) 161.

47 See Penella (2015) 165 and Clarke (1951).

48 Kennedy (2003) 87. For the authenticity of the work, its author, and the date of composition, see the introduction of Patillon (1997), especially 35–44.

for thesis seems to take the place of a general piece of advice, not directed to any specified person but with quite general application to any person, basing its development solely on the attributes of things. Whenever we investigate whether one should marry we do not apply what we say to such and such a person, for example, to Pericles or Alcibiades, or to particular circumstances or at a particular age or in a certain fortune in life, but we look at the matter in itself, simply setting aside all these things and making an examination of the attributes of the subject; for example, whether someone ought to do this because the results are of a certain sort for those engaging in it. Thus, if we choose a specific person and some circumstance and give an account of reasons in this way, it will be a hypothesis, not a thesis.

Similar descriptions appear in every treatise on *progymnasmata* produced in antiquity. The excerpt below comes from Theon's *Progymnasmata*.⁴⁹

What would one say about thesis? It differs not at all from hypothesis except that it lacks specific persons and place and time and manner and cause; for example, the thesis whether it is appropriate for those who are besieged to send an army abroad and the hypothesis whether it is appropriate for the Athenians when besieged by the Peloponnesians to send an army to Sicily.

According to tradition, the theory on “thesis” and “hypothesis” goes back to Hermagoras of Temnos, a rhetor of the 2nd century, and it was further elaborated by both Greek and Latin rhetors in the subsequent centuries. In the Latin rhetorical tradition, the two terms were rendered, probably by Cicero, as *questio infinita* and *questio finita* respectively. It is crucial to notice, in view of the comparison with Diophantus which we will propose below, that the scope of “thesis” is not confined to the field of rhetoric, but it also appears in philosophy and science. More particularly, theses dealing with philosophical and scientific matters were characterised as “theoretical,” while the others, which *par excellence* belong to rhetoric, are characterised either as “political” (in the sense that they refer to the city, πόλις) or as “practical.” The following passage from the *Progymnasmata* of (Ps.-)Hermogenes is illuminating:

Some theses are “political,” some not. “Political” are those falling among common thoughts; for example, whether one should teach rhetoric and

49 Kennedy (2003) 5.

things like that. Those are not political which belong to some field of science and are appropriate for those versed in it; for example, whether the sky is spherical, whether there are many worlds, whether the sun is made of fire. These subjects belong to philosophers, while orators should practice the others. Some call these “practical” theses and the others “theoretical”; for the former concern things that can be done, whereas the purpose of the latter is speculation.⁵⁰

In the light of the discussion above, we are now ready to return to the *Arithmetica* to offer a suggestion regarding Diophantus’ possible motivation to formulate the arithmetical problems in an abstract and general way.

Through this framework, let us propose a hypothesis regarding the explanation of the difference between Diophantus’ abstract problems and the concrete problems of the logistic, through some examples. Let us begin by providing an example of a Diophantine problem.

In problem I.2 of the *Arithmetica* it is required “to divide a proposed number into two numbers in a given ratio” (16.24–25). The enunciation of the problem is both general (as the givens of the problem are not mentioned) and abstract. In modern symbolism, the problem is equivalent with the system of equations:

$$\begin{cases} x+y=a \\ x=ny \end{cases}.$$

In order to solve the problem, Diophantus proceeds to the setting-out (ἔκθεσις), that is he chooses to investigate a particular case of this problem. Here, he chooses $a = 60$ and $n = 3$, thus the problem becomes:

$$\begin{cases} x+y=60 \\ x=3y \end{cases}.$$

At this stage, the problem is no longer general; nevertheless, it remains abstract. Now let us see an example of a logistic problem from the *Palatine Anthology*:

What violence my brother has done me, dividing our father’s fortune of five talents unjustly! Poor tearful I have this fifth part of the seven-elevenths of my brother’s share. Zeus, thou sleepest sound.⁵¹

50 Kennedy (2003) 87. Cf. Patillon’s (2002) lxxxiii point of view: “Dans la doctrine d’Hermagoras de Temnos la thèse se partage entre la matière de la rhétorique et celle de la philosophie (y compris ce que nous appelons la science).”

51 Paton (1918) 95.

The enunciation of the problem above is neither general nor abstract. It is not general, since particular numerical values are assigned to the given data (the fortune is five talents, and the ratio is $\frac{1}{5} \cdot \frac{7}{11}$), and it is not abstract, since it includes a series of particularities: two brothers, a heritage problem, and a summoning to Zeus. In modern translation, the problem can be written as a system of equations:

$$\begin{cases} x + y = 5 \\ x = \frac{1}{5} \left(\frac{7}{11} y \right) \end{cases}$$

This system presents the same structure as problem I.2 of Diophantus. In fact, the similarity was recognised by an unknown late antique commentator of the *Palatine Anthology* who writes:⁵²

It is supposed that someone is complaining because he has found himself being wronged by his brother on the partition of the paternal inheritance. The brothers were two in total, one of who was the most potent. And the total paternal inheritance was 5 talents. The problem is resolved according to the second ⟨problem⟩ of the first book of Diophantus: to divide a proposed number, as in the present case the 5, into two numbers such that the one be the fifth part of the 7 11ths of the other.

We have, therefore, here the same mathematical problem, formulated in two different manners: as an abstract problem, empty of any specification on persons or circumstances – this is the problem of Diophantus; and another formulation, pregnant of specifications – the problem of the *Palatine Anthology*.

Let us examine another case, again from the *Palatine Anthology*:

Myrto once picked apples and divided them among her friends; she gave the fifth part to Chrysis, the fourth to Hero, the nineteenth to Psamathe, and the tenth to Cleopatra, but she presented the twentieth part to Parthenope and gave only twelve to Evadne. Of the whole number a hundred and twenty fell to herself.⁵³

The story goes that Myrto picked up some apples and then offered them to her friends. To Chrysis she gave a fifth, to Hero a fourth, to Psamanthe a

⁵² ii. 61.22–25. Cf. the discussion in Christianidis and Megremi (2019) 29.

⁵³ Paton (1918) 87.

nineteenth, to Cleopatra a tenth. Next, she gave a twentieth to Parthenope and twelve apples to Evadne. At the end, she kept one hundred and twenty apples to herself. The unknown commentator provides a remark in Diophantus' style: "To find a number such that if it lacks a 5th, a 4th, a 19th, a 10th, a 20th remains with 120 units."⁵⁴

Indeed, it is not difficult to see that there is an analogy between the two types of arithmetical problems (Diophantus' problems and the problems of traditional logistic) on the one hand, and the two types of questions that rhetoric examines (theses/hypotheses). If one takes a problem of the logistic tradition and remove its particularities, a Diophantus-style problem will result. Similarly, if one removes the particularities of a hypothesis, a thesis will result. Returning to Tannery's original question regarding the motivation behind the abstract formulation of Diophantus' problems, we propose that the rhetorical training that Diophantus, or the general intellectual context of late antique *paideia*, might have played a significant role.

5 Conclusion

Over the past few years, several studies have hinted at the existence of a multifaceted interaction between ancient mathematical practice and the art of rhetoric. In this chapter, we have tried to explore this idea further by examining the challenging case of Diophantus of Alexandria. Within this framework, we have attempted to supplement the relevant research on Diophantus, by proposing an additional context for reading his text. We shifted focus from the fact that the *Arithmetica* is a collection of problems solved by premodern algebra, and rather placed emphasis on its pedagogical character. In section 1, we have argued that there is enough evidence to support a reading of the *Arithmetica* as also a pedagogical treatise. In section 2, we have proposed that "literaturisation" is evident in the text of the *Arithmetica*, where Diophantus employs several rhetorically flavoured terms which are rare (if not unique) in the Greek mathematical corpus. Next, we have investigated the possibility of employing the rhetorical context in order to provide a hypothesis regarding the abstract manner in which Diophantus' problems are formulated. The conclusion of our research reveals that Diophantus should not be seen only as a genius mathematician, but also as a cultured scholar, well educated according to the norms of late-antique *paideia*. On this basis, we maintain that the field of rhetoric may function as a legitimate and promising historical context for reading ancient

54 ii. 54.23–24.

Greek mathematical texts and, thus, it may provide answers to open historical and historiographical questions.

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Philosophia naturalis: Ancient Rhetoric and Early Modern Science

Johanna Luggin

In 1667, Thomas Sprat, historian of the Royal Society of London for Improving Natural Knowledge, one of the most influential institutions for natural philosophical endeavours (as they were called at the time), presented its fellows' resolution on the appropriate style for scientific writing. They had agreed, he wrote,

To reject all the amplifications, digressions, and swellings of style: to return back to the primitive purity, and shortness, when men deliver'd so many *things*, almost in an equal number of *words*. [...] bringing all things as near the Mathematical plainness, as they can: and preferring the language of Artizans, Countrymen, and Merchants, before that, of Wits, or Scholars.¹

From this quote, and the whole passage on the “manner of Discourse,” one might expect early modern scientific treatises, as the forerunners of modern scientific texts, to be similar to the latter: dry enumerations of facts, formulas and charts, reflecting supposed objectivity in form and content. But a closer look at early modern scientific works – be they prose treatises or dialogues, experiment reports or letters – shows that the majority of them display a completely different form and style. While we do find presentations of empirical data, charts, and diagrams in early modern scientific texts, the major part of these works consists of humanist literary prose, or even verse, which is greatly influenced by classical models and their style – by ancient rhetoric. For early modern scientists, this style was a natural choice, since it was precisely how they had learned to write at school.² At the same time, it was the perfect device for persuading the audience of their new findings, having at its disposal the entire arsenal of ancient rhetoric, which experienced a historically

1 Sprat (1667) 113; cf. Cluett (1971); Campbell (2006) 759–760; Serjeantson (2006) 153–154.

2 Paulsen (1919).

unique upswing in the early modern period.³ Important scientific texts such as Nicolaus Copernicus' *De Revolutionibus* (1543), introducing a whole new conception of the world, or Isaac Newton's *Principia Mathematica* (1687), laying the groundwork for the modern laws of gravity and mechanics, were therefore permeated with classical rhetoric. Their readers were well educated in classical studies and expected no less from a prose text which was designed to win them over to its new and exciting views.

The present chapter will shed light on some characteristic cases of reception of ancient rhetorical devices in selected natural philosophical works, focusing mainly on the 17th century, the height of the so-called scientific revolution.⁴ After some preliminary general considerations, several examples from the numerous genres in which early modern science presented itself – prose texts, dialogues, academic orations, didactic poems, and more – will be presented according to their use of modes of persuasion to win the reader over to unconventional, controversial, or completely revolutionary new insights.

1 The Literary Scientist

This reception of ancient rhetorical devices in early modern scientific texts was particularly encouraged by the development of education, as well as general interest in rhetorical texts and compendia until the 18th century.⁵ Humanist literature, with its focus on the imitation and emulation of ancient models, was from the beginning making the best use of rhetorical devices to persuade the reader, focusing more and more on the written word and less on spoken delivery.⁶ Because of their education in logic and rhetoric, which, very broadly speaking, taught natural philosophers to differentiate between certain proof in the former and probable reasoning in the latter, many scientists professed their intent not to resort to persuasion, but to adhere to demonstration.⁷ Despite these explicit declarations, numerous scientists made full use of the possibilities of demonstration, probable argument *and* persuasion through rhetoric.

3 Green and Murphy (2006); Mack (2011).

4 I do not mean to suggest that earlier or later scientific authors did not similarly borrow from the system of ancient rhetoric. Examples from the 18th century are given below, and there are many from earlier times. At the moment, I am preparing an extensive study of persuasion through ancient rhetoric in early modern scientific prose texts.

5 Blair (2006); Grafton (2006); Serjeantson (2006) 136.

6 Monfasani (1988); Green and Murphy (2006); Mack (2009); Mack (2011) 1–12; Serjeantson (2006) 133. Cf. Till's contribution in this volume.

7 Moss (1993) 3; Serjeantson (2006) 135; 153.

This was especially relevant to cases where the causes of observations could not be proven with certainty, but had to remain in the realm of probability. In these instances, dialectical and rhetorical reasoning could go hand in hand to formulate a persuasive argument.⁸ For their audience, accustomed to reading and producing highly rhetorical humanist literary prose and verses, this use of dialectic and rhetoric was not especially surprising, even though *proprietas* was a crucial virtue in this respect.⁹

When Johannes Kepler (1571–1630) published his ground-breaking treatise *Astronomia Nova* in 1609, supporting and developing the Copernican idea of heliocentrism further and containing two of the author's famous laws of planetary motion, he began this highly influential work with the surprising statement: *Durissima est hodie conditio scribendi libros mathematicos, praecipue astronomicos* ("It is a very hard task in these times, to write a work on mathematics, and especially on astronomy").¹⁰ What follows is Kepler's contemplation of the stylistic challenges of contemporary scientific literature. Without question, one should strive to be accurate and precise in explanations, demonstrations, and conclusions; otherwise, the work could not be called mathematical. This would, however, result in a very difficult read, especially in Latin, and therefore repel readers. Conversely, long-winded descriptions and explanations would have a similar effect, distracting readers because of their verbosity.¹¹

How was the early modern scientist, then, to write a book on astronomy, mathematics, biology, physics, or medicine so that he would not bore the reader, but also not overwhelm him intellectually – not to mention persuade him of the conclusions laid out in the book?¹² We already find similar musings about the style of scientific works in the 16th century, e.g., in Georgius Agricola's influential 1556 mining treatise *De Re Metallica*, where the author defends his choice of writing in the *genus tenue* in order to keep his descriptions, explanations, and conclusions reasonably comprehensible.¹³ Could the answer to this question then be, as insinuated also by Thomas Sprat's stylistic guidelines

8 Serjeantson (2006) 136; 143.

9 Moss (1993) 1; Kennedy (1994) 85.

10 Kepler (1609) fol. (***) 2r.

11 Kepler (1609), fol. (***) 2r: *Et habet ipsa etiam prolixitas phrasium suam obscuritatem, non minorem quam concisa brevis. Haec mentis oculos effugit, illa distrahit; eget haec luce, illa splendoris copia laborat.* Cf. Koyré (1973) 166.

12 I am using the male pronoun here to indicate that the overwhelming number of early modern scientists writing in Latin were men, as education in the classical languages was usually restricted to all-male schools until the 19th century; see Fuhrmann (2001); Bowen (2003); on "Women of Natural Knowledge," see Schiebinger (2006).

13 Agricola (1556) fol. 33r.

for the Royal Society, to avoid the *genus grande* and possibly also *medium*, to refrain from excessive rhetorical flourish as well as prolixity of expression, long-winded explanations and similar digressions, and to be as brief as possible and concentrate on mathematical demonstration, on providing concise descriptions and explanations? Even though a look at some explicit statements of early modern scientists regarding the style of their works might give this impression, even a brief glance at the actual production of natural philosophical works until well into the 18th century offers a completely different picture. Despite Kepler's hesitation to overload his work with digressions, the *Astronomia Nova* is so full of classicising language, *ekphraseis*, and copious narratives of the author's investigations that modern scholars describe it as a text of unusual style and rhetorical ambitions.¹⁴

Kepler's use of rhetorical devices, however, conforms to the practice of early modern scholars. While the *Astronomia Nova* undoubtedly shows an abundance of *narrationes* within Kepler's reasoning and demonstration,¹⁵ the majority of natural philosophers of the time who composed Latin works made use of their rhetorical skills. In Galileo Galilei's *De Motu* (ca. 1590), we read a largely classicising language and style, modelled on Cicero, but without overly complex syntax.¹⁶ Athanasius Kircher's (1602–1680) many and varied scientific works, ranging from geological explanations of natural disasters to scientific demonstrations of biblical events, make for a colourful read, including many ekphrastic digressions, description in grand style and emotional outbursts, but also sections of a brief, seemingly detached, technical style.¹⁷ Numerous didactic poems present us with scientific questions and phenomena – the barometer, gunpowder, magnets, gold, earthquakes, fire, comets, the rainbow, syphilis, and more – all modelled on the ancient tradition of didactic poetry, especially Lucretius' *De rerum natura* and Vergil's *Georgics*, displaying a poetic and vivid language, grand style, numerous rhetorical figures, and innovative borrowings from their ancient models, as well as genuine poetic descriptions and explanations of those phenomena.¹⁸ Additionally, numerous scientific Latin works were written in the form of an antique, usually Platonic or Ciceronian, dialogue. Galileo's *De Motu* is only one example of a presentation of scientific content in the form of a dialogue;¹⁹ others include Georgius Agricola's *Bermannus*,

14 Moss (1993) esp. 70–71; Voelkel (2001).

15 Koyré (1973) 165–166; Voelkel (2001) *passim*.

16 Finocchiaro (1980); Jardine (1991) 101–121; Gal (1994).

17 See for example his *Mundus Subterraneus* (1665), available e.g., at <https://archive.org>; cf. Breidbach (2003); Findlen (2004); Parcell (2009).

18 Haskell (2003); Korenjak (2019); Markevičiūtė and Roling (2021); Luggin (2021).

19 Galilei (1890) 367–408.

his first work on mining and geology,²⁰ the famous humanist Pietro Bembo's (1470–1547) text on Mount Aetna and volcanoes in general,²¹ and numerous medical works, such as the physician Jean Fernel's (1497–1558) influential *On the Hidden Causes of Things* (*De Abditis Rerum Causis*).²² Such works modelled themselves on the tradition of ancient dialogues in terms of their language, style, and use of rhetorical figures. We find exuberant wording, abundant use of metaphor and other figures of speech, complex syntax, many digressions, and more in the Italian physician Hippolytus Guarinonius' (1571–1654) *Cylosophia Academica*, a medical dialogue treating the nourishing fluid produced in the process of digestion (*chylus*).²³

Another genre of paramount importance in the context of the development of the modern scientific disciplines was the oration, written accounts of speeches given before scientific academies, academic circles, or at university or school events, as well as funeral orations, posthumous apologies of natural philosophers, and more.²⁴ It is presumably not surprising that we find abundant use of rhetorical devices in this *genus*, as it is the genre which suggested itself most of all for such a combination of rhetorical ambition and scientific content. Thus, Tycho Brahe (1564–1601), a distinguished astronomer supported heavily by the Danish king, gave a passionate Ciceronian oration in defence of astrology before the Danish Royal Academy in 1574.²⁵ That such rhetorical flourishes were not limited to the 16th or even the 17th century is shown by an oration in exuberant style given by Horace Bénédict de Saussure (1740–1799) in 1764 on the topic of glaciers.²⁶ And Daniel Bernoulli (1751–1834), nephew of the 18th-century Swiss mathematician and physicist of the same name, issued a highly stylised funeral oration praising the life of his famous uncle as late as 1787, which includes not only rolling Ciceronian periods, but also, for example, quotations from the works of Vergil.²⁷

It appears, then, that early modern scientific texts could display a high level of stylisation, whether they were written in genres that were still widely in use for discussing scientific topics (e.g., dialogue and oration), traditionally composed in the middle or high style and with more rhetorical flourish and literary ambitions than other genres, or whether they were prose treatises, which

20 Agricola (1530).

21 Bembo (1495–1496).

22 Fernel (1548).

23 Guarinonius (1648); cf. Korenjack *et al.* (2012) 571–576.

24 Grafton (2006); Moran (2006).

25 Brahe (1621); Dreyer (1890) 70–87; see below p. 808.

26 Carozzi and Newman (1995) 44–48.

27 Bernoulli (1787).

could still exhibit the author's literary ambitions, as well as use the strategies of persuasion provided by the rhetorical system. It seems, then, as if early modern scientists found a way to cope with Kepler's problem of writing books on difficult, technical subjects through the prudent and artful application of the system of ancient rhetoric. Beginning in the 1970s, a subdiscipline of rhetoric, the "rhetoric of science," has sought to explore the general notion that scientific texts are rhetorical and make use of persuasive methods. Important studies include analyses of early modern figures such as Galileo Galilei or Isaac Newton, or of rhetorical figures in science.²⁸ A more general study of rhetorical strategies of persuasion in early modern scientific texts, however, is still a *desideratum*.

2 Winning the Reader over with Aristotelian Means of Persuasion

As this chapter offers a general, but also representative, glimpse of the rhetorical character of early modern scientific texts, it will discuss examples from various influential works. Most of the analysis will focus on *argumentatio* and be structured along the system of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, particularly his modes of persuasion (λόγος, ἦθος, and πάθος, or, following Quint. 12.10.59, *docere, delectare, and movere*). Aristotle, after all, was one of the most influential ancient authorities, still respected and taught in the early modern classroom, and thus fresh in the mind of most natural philosophers at the time.²⁹ The influence of Aristotle on early modern science in general cannot be overestimated: his works and those of his successors shaped philosophical endeavours in form and content through antiquity and the Middle Ages, and continued to do so also in early modern times, especially through teaching at order schools and universities. Even though from the 15th century onwards, more and more ground-breaking works started to criticise Aristotle as the most important ancient authority, and other ancient thinkers such as Galen, Hippocrates, Pliny, Strabo, and others alongside him, Aristotle and Aristotelianism constituted the most important philosophical framework until the 18th century.³⁰

Examples concerning various scientific controversies, inventions, and discoveries, from different authors and genres of each mode of persuasion, reveal the extensive use of ancient rhetorical devices in early modern scientific Latin texts. Aristotle's modes of persuasion appeared in the early modern rhetoric

28 E.g., Dear (1991); Pera and Shea (1991); Harris (1997); Fahnestock (1999); Gross (2006).

29 See, for example, Papi's contribution in this volume, pp. 192–222.

30 Blum (2012).

classroom by way of their absorption into Cicero's and Quintilian's system of rhetoric. But his *Rhetoric* itself was also widely disseminated, read, and taught all over Europe.³¹ With its focus on deliberate and epideictic rhetoric, it served as the model for the many emerging genres of post-classical Latinity, including scientific treatises and monographs – especially after numerous commentators found ways to integrate Aristotle's ideas into the systems of even more influential authors such as Cicero, Quintilian, and the anonymous author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*.³² It is reasonable, then, to presume that most educated scholars knew about Aristotle's modes of persuasion and how to employ them. This certainly does not mean that these devices, or Aristotle's work, formed the most influential rhetorical system for early modern scientists. They had many authoritative systems and ideas at their disposal: ancient texts like Cicero's and Quintilian's, as well as new inspiration, such as Erasmus' thoughts on style in his *De Copia* or Philipp Melanchthon's close connection of rhetoric and dialectic and his invention of the *genus didascalicum*.³³ A look at the modes of persuasion, however, will have to suffice for the purpose of this chapter.

3 *Logos or the Rational Argument*

The successful employment of effective proofs was, naturally, also vital to the persuasion of readers of scientific texts in the early modern world. The use of rhetorical *signa*, *argumenta*, and *exempla* was therefore nothing extraordinary in these works. Not only were these artificial proofs applied by the new scientists, but also non-artistic arguments gave these authors the chance to persuade their readers in a compelling and innovative way. The most important non-artistic device is, unsurprisingly, the experiment, which will serve as our case study here. Representing empirical knowledge in its most apparent form, advocates of the “new sciences” used experiments as indisputable evidence in controversies and as powerful arguments against authoritative texts. As with all non-artistic proofs, experimental knowledge did not speak for itself, but had to be incorporated into the reasoning with careful deliberation: an experiment without explanation of the circumstances or exposition of the significance of its results did not have much persuasive power.³⁴

31 Mack (2011) 24–26.

32 Mack (2011) 26.

33 Mack (2011) 80–88; 106–122.

34 Dear (1985); Dear (1991); Dear (2006).

For most early modern scientists, cognitive assumptions and expectations of texts included the use of persuasive rhetorical devices. In many cases, experiments were interwoven with mathematical demonstration or with careful narration of the circumstances of its execution.³⁵ Another non-artistic argument could additionally be used, namely witnesses.³⁶ William Harvey (1578–1657), English physician and discoverer of the circulatory system, established his trustworthiness by referring to his colleagues as faithful witnesses of his observations, made mainly through dissections, in his dedication to the president of the Royal College of Physicians and his colleagues in general:

Quem nisi vobis transmissum egregis doctoribus minus sperarem prodire posse integrum et tutum, cum pene omnium illarum observationum, ex quibus aut veritatem colligo, aut errores redarguo, e vobis plurimos et fide dignos appellare possum testes.

The booklet's appearance under your aegis, excellent Doctors, makes me more hopeful about the possibility of an unmarred and unscathed outcome for it. For from your number I can name very many reliable witnesses of almost all those observations which I use either to assemble the truth or to refute errors.³⁷

In any case, a careful contextualisation and interpretation of the empirical evidence and its consequences for the case at hand was necessary for an experiment report to be persuasive. We will take a closer look at some attempts to employ experiments as non-artistic proof.

One of the first early modern scientific works to use experiments systematically and successfully as part of the central argumentation is English physician William Gilbert's 1600 treatise *De Magnete* ("On the Lodestone").³⁸ It analyses the properties of magnetic bodies, such as the lodestone, a naturally magnetised form of iron ore, and exposes a new theory of magnetism, including explanations of phenomena on earth, as well as of the movements of heavenly bodies, because of the magnetic field of the globe. The treatise proved very influential; it was used by Galileo Galilei and Johannes Kepler, and

35 This is the case in Kepler's *Astronomia Nova*, cf. Gingerich (1989) 61–69; Voelkel (2001) 211–254; Wootton (2015) 262–268.

36 Holmes (1991) 165.

37 Harvey (1628) 6; see Harvey (1993) 4 for translation.

38 I have presented Gilbert's strategy of persuasion in more detail in Luggin (forthcoming).

laid the foundations for the understanding of magnetism until well into the 19th century.³⁹

Gilbert used numerous experiments, most of which he carried out by himself over decades of hard labour, as part of his argumentation. This is announced in the title of the work itself: *De Magnete Magneticisque Corporibus et de Magno Magnete Tellure Physiologia Nova **Plurimis et Argumentis et Experimentis Demonstrata*** (*New Physiology of the Lodestone and Other Magnetic Bodies and of the Great Magnet, the Earth, Demonstrated in Numerous Arguments and Experiments*; emphasis, indicated by bold letters, is mine).⁴⁰ He thus presented a new theory of the magnetic earth, in large part through evidence gained from his many experiments. This led historian Henry Hallam to call Gilbert “the father of experimental philosophy in this island.”⁴¹ Gilbert not only uses experience and experiments as arguments, in his preface he rejects all use of excessive rhetorical ornament.⁴² While sometimes such statements are mere formalities and treatises are then somewhat surprisingly full of rhetorical flourish, the language and style of the *De Magnete* indeed adhere to this: Gilbert’s Latin is classicising, even though he introduces numerous neologisms to explain phenomena unknown to the ancients. The work is written largely in the middle style appropriate for a text which is meant to inform, but contains digressions in high style.

The usage of experiment is only one aspect of Gilbert’s intricate program, but it holds the most weight in his strategy of persuasion and is also the most apparent feature of his work. The sheer number of experiments reported in *De Magnete*, most of them supposedly conducted by the author himself, has no parallel in the works of his contemporaries.⁴³ Gilbert makes this very clear from the beginning, mentioning it in the title and underlining the importance of empirical knowledge and his use of experiments repeatedly in the preface, thus calling attention to the virtues of his experimental knowledge and stressing the deficiency of book knowledge or the disadvantages of faulty

39 Gilbert (1600); see Gilbert (1893) for translation; cf. Pumfrey (2002), (2004); Yamamoto (2018) 535–598.

40 The title “New Physiology” might be an analogy to similar claims of innovation by natural philosophers such as Giordano Bruno, who called his new knowledge system “New Philosophy,” which was however still based mostly on textual authorities; cf. Knox (2018).

41 Hallam (1882) 323.

42 Gilbert (1600) iii: *Nec huic operi ullum eloquentiae fucum aut verborum ornatum attulimus* (“And in this work we have not employed any of the disguises of grandiloquence or rhetorical flourish”).

43 Gilbert’s predecessors had also made use of simple experiments, but described several dozen at the most, cf. Wootton (2015) 327–332.

experiments.⁴⁴ In his preface, Gilbert explains his method of deliberately using experiments and demonstration to get to stronger arguments and reasoning:

In arcanis inveniendis, et abditis rerum causis perquirendis, ab experimentis certioribus, et argumentis demonstratis, validiores existant rationes, quam a probabilibus coniecturis, et vulgo Philosophantium placitis [...].

Since in the discovery of secret things and in the investigation of hidden causes, stronger reasons are obtained from sure experiments and demonstrated arguments than from probable conjectures and the opinions of philosophical speculators of the common sort [...].⁴⁵

Throughout the work, he also marks experiments and observations with smaller or larger asterisks, according to the importance of the respective operation.⁴⁶ All in all, he provides the reader with more than two hundred of his own *inventa et experimenta*, as well as reports of other scholars' investigations.⁴⁷ While there is considerable evidence that Gilbert adopted a number of experiments, including some providing significant new knowledge, from earlier works, such as Girolamo Cardano's *De Subtilitate* and Robert Norman's *The Newe Attractive*,⁴⁸ the author hardly ever mentions such an appropriation of another's empirical knowledge. The aim is clear: the force of his arguments, resting upon such an extraordinary number of experiments, should be without parallel.

The individual experiments themselves are also equipped with persuasive power through different strategies. After providing an overview of earlier opinions on magnetism, Gilbert discusses the properties of magnetic bodies and their "natural movements" (e.g., magnetic variation, inclination, and declination) in four books. These contain the largest number of experiments. Some of them are decidedly brief and precise and follow one after another, forming chains of experiment reports of four, five, or more to reinforce an argument.⁴⁹

44 Gilbert (1600) esp. fol. *ii^r–*iii^v.

45 Gilbert (1600) fol. *ii^r; Gilbert (1893) xlvii.

46 This marking of experiments is very peculiar – I have not found it in any similar scientific work of the time.

47 In the whole book, 202 *inventa et experimenta* are marked with an asterisk, and many more reported as investigations made by other scholars.

48 Gilbert (1600), 2; 7–8; 107; 161–162; 169; cf. Gilbert (1893) xvi: It would indeed be a miracle if all Dr. Gilbert's general inferences were just, or all his experiments accurate.

49 E.g., Gilbert (1600) 139–142.

Many are introduced not only by the purpose of the operation or some historical background, but by methodological or methodical musings on the achievement and use of empirical knowledge, ranging from abstract criticism of book knowledge to concrete guidelines and instructions. In book one, which describes the characteristics of magnetic bodies, the author includes one of his many judgments of textual authorities, in this case concerning familiarity with iron:

Deploranda est humana in rebus naturalibus inscientia et tamquam in tenebris somniantes, excitandi sunt moderni philosophi et ad rerum usum et tractationem educendi, ab otiosa ex libris tantum quaesita doctrina, probabilium rationum nugamentis et coniecturis tantum suffulta.

Men are deplorably ignorant with respect to natural things, and modern philosophers, as though dreaming in the darkness, must be aroused and taught the uses of things, the dealing with things; they must be made to quit the sort of learning that comes only from books, and that rests only on vain arguments from probability and upon conjectures.⁵⁰

Later on, in book three, he criticises scholars who do use experiments, but, because of their problematic methods, reach and defend the wrong conclusions:

Sed caveant naturalium rerum scrutatores, ne illi suis experimentis male observatis amplius decipiantur, et literariam rem publicam erroribus et ineptis perturbent.

But let searchers of the things of nature beware lest they be further deluded by their own faultily observed experiments, and lest, with errors and blunders, they throw into confusion the republic of letters.⁵¹

This *confutatio* of others' opinions is usually either preceded or followed immediately by Gilbert's own, better method of experimentation and his more trustworthy conclusions:

Hoc quidem contrarium esset regulis nostris magneticis. Ob eamque causam periculum nos fecimus septuaginta adamantibus praestantibus,

⁵⁰ Gilbert (1600) 28; Gilbert (1893) 47.

⁵¹ Gilbert (1600) 143; Gilbert (1893) 218.

coram multis testibus, in plurimis obelis et filis, arte accuratissima, in undarum superficie (per suos nimirum cortices traiectis) fluitantibus. Nunquam tamen hoc cernere licebat.

Now this is contrary to our magnetic rules. And hence we made the experiment ourselves with seventy-five diamonds in presence of many witnesses, employing a number of iron bars and pieces of wire, manipulating them with the greatest care while they floated in water, supported by corks. Yet never was it granted me to see this effect.⁵²

Through this particular refutation of Cardano's methods, the confirmation of the author's own expertly achieved evidence, and the general methodological criticism of his predecessors, Gilbert's conclusions should seem all the more persuasive to the reader. In this particular case, the use of witnesses as an additional means of making experiments persuasive is especially highlighted. Another chapter of Gilbert's is even called "*Terrae motum negantium rationes, et earum confutatio*."⁵³

Generally, Gilbert goes to great lengths to show his mastery of all the operations discussed, while at the same time providing experimental reports in an impersonal, descriptive, or prescriptive style. This could conceal the identity of the experimenter, were it not for the many personal statements about his laborious search for truth through empirical investigation that precede and follow most of the reports. While this might seem paradoxical at first glance, it stems from early scientists' endeavours to combine self-fashioning, or *ēthos*, with a persuasive use of non-artistic proof. As other texts of the 17th century show, experiments were considered more effectively persuasive if they seemed as general (and generally applicable) and as impersonal as possible, while at the same time providing as many details as possible.⁵⁴

Another particular characteristic of Gilbert's employment of empirical knowledge, and part of the reason for his concrete methodical advice, is the author's efforts to make his experiments replicable. Time and again, he comments on particular conditions which are vital to the outcome of the experiment, and gives the reader clear instructions on what to do and what to avoid. This is just another strategy of persuasion through the use of experiments,

52 Gilbert (1600) 143; Gilbert (1893) 218.

53 "Arguments of those, who deny the earth's motion, and their refutation," Gilbert (1600) 225.

54 Dear (1985); Dear (1991) 162.

which pertains to discussions of the general epistemology of experiments in the 17th century.⁵⁵

Interconnected with this particular use of experiments as part of the argumentation is Gilbert's strict rejection of textual authorities. He criticises, dismisses, and ridicules the opinions of not only classical thinkers such as the Peripatos, Pliny, Ptolemy, Galen, and Alexander of Aphrodisias, but also more recent ones such as Paracelsus, Marsilio Ficino, Julius Caesar Scaliger, Francesco Maurolico, Girolamo Cardano, and many more. This complete dismissal of the *auctoritas* of ancient as well as more contemporary writers seems harsh, but it has parallels in other scholars' writings of Gilbert's time. Giordano Bruno, to name only one example, similarly criticises many authoritative texts in order to present and promote his new philosophy. Gilbert, it seems, models his own ideas on such bold undertakings, and aims to replace the old textual authorities with his innovative *physiologia nova*. The exceptional way of marking experimental evidence with asterisks – which has no apparent parallel in earlier or contemporary writing – besides being a device to reinforce both the power of cumulative empirical evidence and Gilbert's self-fashioning as a hard-working scientist, also serves as a rejection and replacement of textual authorities. Traditionally, the reader would have found mentions of Aristotle, Paracelsus, Girolamo Cardano, and others in the margin, next to passages quoting or paraphrasing their opinions. In his effort to replace textbook knowledge with empirical knowledge, this was just another innovative device to employ these non-artistic proofs.

While this arrangement seems to reinforce the claim that textual authorities and rhetorical argumentation are simply replaced by empirical knowledge, the picture is more complex. A close reading of his reasoning shows that Gilbert's attempts at persuasion use a threefold strategy. First, he mentions as many experiments as possible as cumulative evidence, highlighting them with asterisks throughout the work and using different strategies to make them more persuasive – generalising events, giving as many details as possible, providing instructions for repeating them, and mentioning methodical and methodological issues. Secondly, he fashions himself as a hard-working, devoted scientist, who spares neither effort nor trouble to get to the secrets lying behind things hidden thus far. Finally, he rejects, dismisses, and ridicules authorities – ancient and medieval as well as contemporary – and those who trust them implicitly. Thus, he succeeds in deconstructing earlier authorities

55 Cf. Dear (1991) 162: "For the singular experiment to stand for the universal experience, an appropriate kind of argumentative framework needs to be in place, explicitly or implicitly, within which it can play that role."

and constructing himself as the new expert, and his scientific findings as the new authority on magnetism.

4 Persuasive Self-Fashioning or *ēthos*

To persuade a reader, an author has to do much more than present hard evidence, which should speak for itself. Trained in classical and Renaissance rhetoric from their schooldays and drawing upon authorities using ancient rhetorical devices, the overwhelming majority of natural philosophers understood this as a fundamental fact of the written word. Besides rational arguments, hard facts, empirical evidence, and their strategic employment within the *argumentatio*, one mode of persuasion was provided by the construction of ῥήθoς (Arist. *Rhet.* 1.2.4; 2.12–17) – of sympathy for the speaker/author and his case, of bridging the differences of affect between author and readership.⁵⁶ Possible approaches could be the promise of novelty, frequently made by scientists of the 17th century; the insistence on one's own personal and professional integrity and virtue; and an assumed neutrality.⁵⁷

Reading early modern scientific Latin texts, one can identify attempts at constructing an appropriate scientific *ēthos* in several parts of these works: on title pages, in paratexts, images and charts as well as in the main body of the text. Traditionally, the construction of *ēthos* is predominant in the *exordium*, to secure the speaker's self-fashioning and the audience's sympathy from the beginning.⁵⁸ A reception of this tradition can be detected in the parts of early modern scientific texts which correspond to ancient *prooimia* or *exordia*: their paratexts. Even a brief glance at the paratextual tradition of early modern Latin scientific writing should suffice to dispel any doubts that these works were not objective, dry enumerations of facts and evidence. The title pages of many works aim to display the speaker's character, his knowledge, or his virtue, or all three. Early modern titles are often much longer and more revealing than either modern or ancient ones. They typically run over several lines, giving the reader information not only about the content of the book, but often the circumstances of its creation and also, frequently, its author. It was thus not unusual for early modern scientists to include statements about themselves and their status in the *res publica litteraria*. Hence, Galileo Galilei issued his revolutionary observations of the heavens, made with the newly invented

56 Lausberg (2008) 141–142. Steel (2009) 81.

57 Cf. Dear (1985); Jardine (1991); Serjeantson (2006) 147–148.

58 Lausberg (2008) 141–142; Kennedy (1994) 58–59.

telescope, under the title *Sidereus Nuntius Magna Longeque Admirabilia Spectacula Pandens, Suspiciendaque Proponens Unicuique [...] Quae a Galileo, Patricio Florentino, [...] Sunt Observata in Lunae Facie, Fixis Innumeris, Lacteo Circulo, Stellis Nebulosis, Apprime Vero in Quatuor Planetis circa Iovis Stellam Disparibus Intervallis atque Periodis Celeritate Mirabili Circumvolutis, Quos, Nemini in Hanc Usque Diem Cognitos, Novissime Auctor Deprehendit Primus Atque Medicea Sidera Nuncupandos Decrevit*.⁵⁹ In the title alone, he dedicates his work to his patrons, the Medici family; promotes his extraordinary findings (*Admirabilia Spectacula*, “miraculous phenomena”) and fashions himself as a hard-working scientist and discoverer of the moons of Jupiter. Johannes Kepler issued his “New Astronomy” of 1609 under the full title *Astronomia Nova AITIOΛOΓHTOΣ seu Physica Coelestis, Tradita Commentariis de Motibus Stellae Martis ex Observationibus G.V. Tychonis Brahe, Iussu et Sumptibus Rudolphi II. Romanorum Imperatoris Etc. Plurimum Annorum Pertinaci Studio Elaborata Pragae, Sacrae Caesaris Maiestatis Suae Mathematico Joanne Keplero*, emphasising his close connection to the famous astronomer Tycho Brahe and his own arduous work over many years in Prague, which led him to the conclusions laid out in the book.⁶⁰

Frontispieces and illustrated title pages could play a similar role. In the 17th century, they could be used to underline the *ēthos* of the author, as in the case of the astronomical and mathematical works of Christoph Clavius, which were printed in five books in Mainz in 1612 and showed the author using astronomical instruments for his research on the title page, accompanied by a quote from the Wisdom of Solomon praising his knowledge (cf. fig. 27.1).⁶¹ Johannes Kepler showed even less modesty when he incorporated himself into the history of astronomy illustrated in the frontispiece of his 1627 *Tabulae Rudolphinae* (cf. fig. 27.2). The messages of these title pages and frontispieces were underlined by numerous panegyric poems praising the author and the work, written by distinguished colleagues, teachers, friends, family, and sometimes patrons. In these texts, the new scientists could be lauded beyond all measure. Johannes Hevelius, a Polish astronomer of the 17th century, is praised in a panegyric poem accompanying his *Selenographia (Description of the Moon)* as a revolutionary discoverer and explorer akin to Christopher Columbus.⁶² Similarly, the physician Nicolaus Steno is praised in his *Observationes Anatomicae* as a

59 Printed in Venice in 1610.

60 Kepler (1609); cf. Voelkel (2001) 97–129.

61 Remmert (2011) 45–50.

62 Kinner (1647).



FIGURE 27.1 Christophorus Clavius: *Opera Mathematica ab Auctore Revisa et Aucta*, Moguntiae, 1611–1612, vol. 1, title page (Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Sign. 9.N.26. (Vol. 1) ALT PRUNK)

heroic explorer of the human body and discoverer of its functions.⁶³ Such paratexts testify to the network of the early modern scientist within and beyond the “scientific community” of the time, hence his symbolic capital. Some outstanding figures of early modern science, such as Tycho Brahe, Isaac Newton, or Pierre Gassendi, could even be elevated to the status of scientific heroes.⁶⁴

Before an early modern reader reached the main body of a scientific treatise, didactic poem or dialogue, the *ēthos* of the author had thus already been established. The *prooimia* often aimed to emphasise this picture, presenting the author’s character and explaining his work and his role in the endeavour described in the book. Thus William Gilbert in his letter to the reader highlights his arduous and expensive studies of magnetic bodies through numerous

63 Maar (1910) 1: 225–226.

64 Korenjak (2018).



FIGURE 27.2 Kepler Johannes: *Tabulae Rudolphinae*, Ulm 1617, frontispiece (Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Sign. *48.C.78 ALT PRUNK)

experiments, as well as explaining his harsh rejection of previous authorities and fashioning himself as the only expert on magnetism.⁶⁵ Similarly, but more modestly, William Harvey, in his monograph on blood circulation, stresses his continuous hard work over many years of anatomical lectures, including many public dissections, as well as his scholarly dedication in arguing for his conclusions and facing the objections of other anatomists:

Meam de motu et usu cordis et circuitu sanguinis sententiam, egregi doctores, antea sepius in praelectionibus meis Anatomicis aperui novam: sed iam per novem et amplius annos multis ocularibus demonstrationibus in conspectu vestro confirmatam, rationibus et argumentis illustratam

65 Gilbert (1600) fol. ii^r–iii^r.

et ab obiectionibus doctissimorum et peritissimorum Anatomicorum liberatam, toties ab omnibus desideratam, a quibusdam efflagitatam, in lucem et conspectum omnium hoc libello produximus.

Excellent Doctors! On several earlier occasions in my anatomical lectures I revealed my new concept of the heart's movement and function and of the blood's passage round the body. Having now, however, for more than nine years confirmed it in your presence by numerous ocular demonstrations, and having freed it from the objections of learned and skilful anatomists, I have yielded to the repeated desire of all and the pressing request of some, and in this small book have published it for all to see.⁶⁶

As Harvey published his *Exercitatio Anatomica* on the continent, in Frankfurt, and in Latin, his intended readership was clearly the European Republic of Letters. With his dedication to the president of the Royal College of Physicians in London and his esteemed colleagues there, Harvey placed himself in a respected and trustworthy position within the scientific community of the time. His emphasis on his own long-standing work, which relied on empirical observation as well as diligent reflection, likewise served to highlight this *ēthos* from the beginning of his work on. In addition, the author includes a modest *captatio benevolentiae* at the end of the dedication letter, stressing that he does not want to dazzle the reader with the usual claims of authority and expertise other scientists made.⁶⁷

This does not only represent a silent *reiectio* and judgement of the traditional construction of scholarly *ēthos* through the authority of book knowledge. Harvey also establishes another form of scientific *ēthos*: the image of a hard-working scientist focusing exclusively on his own empirical investigation, gathering data through serious, exhausting, long-term investigation. After some decades of dispute over the motion of the heart, in which he reinforced this self-fashioning strategy, Harvey's discoveries were accepted by most natural philosophers. His use of the rhetorical device of *ēthos* was subsequently adapted to illustrate the virtues of whole communities through Harvey's achievements: the ingenious Englishmen on the one hand; the new scientists, relying on experiments and empirical observation, on the other.⁶⁸

The construction of the scientist's *ēthos* as a crucial means of persuasion is vital not only in paratexts, but in the main body of the text as well. Harvey's

66 Harvey (1628) 5–6; Harvey (1993) 4.

67 Harvey (1628) 8.

68 Harvey (1993) xxv; cf. Schreiner (2009).

book includes two dedications, followed by a short chapter right at the beginning of his work discussing his reasons for writing and publishing it. In this chapter, he fashions his task as difficult and arduous and himself as a hard-working anatomist, starting the new work of relying only on himself and his observations rather than trusting in authorities:

Cum multis vivorum dissectionibus [...] animum ad observandum primum appuli, quo cordis motus usum et utilitates in animalibus per autopsiam et non per libros aliorumque scripta invenirem: Rem arduam plane et difficultatibus plenam continuo reperi, ut [...] motum cordis soli Deo cognitum fuisse, pene opinarer. [...] Tandem maiori indies et disquisitione et diligentia usus, multa frequenter et varia animalia viva introspeciendo, multis observationibus collatis et rem attigisse et ex hoc labyrintho me extricatum evasisse, simulque motum et usum cordis et arteriarum, quae desiderabam, comperta habere me existimabam.

When in many dissections, carried out as opportunity offered upon living animals, I first addressed my mind to seeing how I could discover the function and offices of the heart's movement in animals through the use of my own eyes instead of through books and the writings of others, I kept finding the matter so truly hard and beset with difficulties that I all but thought, [...] that the heart's movement had been understood by God alone. [...] At length, through ever wider and more meticulous inquiry, involving frequent examinations of the insides of the many different living animals and the collation of many observations, I considered that I had achieved my object and got clear from this tangle, while at the same time acquiring exact knowledge about the movement and function of the heart and – insofar as I needed – about the arteries.⁶⁹

Again, and quite soon after the first emphasis in the preface, Harvey stresses the difficulty and burden of his task (*rem arduam plane et difficultatibus plenam*), but also its novelty, its interest for the scientific community, and his own worthiness as a scientist by virtue of his frequent, meticulous inquiries (*indies et disquisitione et diligentia; multa frequenter et varia*), even when the answers to his questions seemed far out of reach. While Harvey employed the possibilities of establishing *ēthos* in a more modest way than William Gilbert had, his aim of presenting himself as an expert in his field is nevertheless evident and was successful. Through his approach of modestly promoting himself and his

69 Harvey (1628) 20–21; Harvey (1993) 17.

work without criticising fellow scholars too harshly or overtly, Harvey gained the trust of many readers, both in his home country and on the continent. This was one important step for his findings to be acknowledged as revolutionary new knowledge about the motion of the heart and the circulation of the blood.

Johannes Kepler similarly used the preface to his influential *Astronomia Nova* to reflect on his role as the writer of an astronomical and mathematical book and his place in the scientific community. The *topos* of the difficulty of the subject was addressed by Kepler in an unusual way, as we have already seen above. The astronomer stresses this difficulty numerous times throughout his work, elaborating how expensive and burdensome, but, interestingly, also how frequently boring his tasks have been. Sometimes this leads him to apologise to the reader for boring him with such repetition.⁷⁰ His frequent inclusion of careful *narratio* within his reasoning, relating how he had achieved the results presented in the work, but also how he initially failed, makes his achievement seem all the more impressive, as this exhausting, long, and burdensome search for the truth has ultimately led to the existence of the *Astronomia Nova*. That this supposed modesty is merely rhetorical can be seen by the self-assurance with which Kepler presents himself as a new astronomical authority in the frontispiece of his *Tabulae Rudolphinae*, as seen above.

René Descartes (1596–1650) takes a different approach to constructing his *ēthos* and getting the reader's sympathy in his *Meditationes de Prima Philosophia* about the existence of God and the nature of the soul and body. Before the publication of the first edition in Paris in 1641, the author had sent copies of the work to several scholars to get their opinion of his views on immaterial souls and material bodies. Seven of these distinguished colleagues studied Descartes' work diligently and sent objections back to the author. Descartes used six of those objections (the seventh had arrived too late) to show his supposed openness towards criticism⁷¹ and his readiness to confront all possible faults found by adversaries. He appended the six sets of objections, together with detailed responses, to the second edition of his work, printed in Amsterdam only one year after the first edition.⁷² Looking at Descartes' earlier reactions to criticism – such as when his physical theories on the reflection and refraction of light were publicly denounced in a disputation at the Jesuit College of Clermont and he sent harsh letters of complaint to the college's

70 Kepler (1609) 95.

71 Already in the *Discours de la Méthode* Descartes had asked for possible objections to be sent to him; cf. Fowler (1999) 21.

72 Fowler (1999) 7–53; 378–395.

rector and the professor who presided over the *disputatio*⁷³ – it becomes clear that this request for criticism was a strategy to augment the author's *ēthos* within the printed work. Descartes took this opportunity to construct an argument by presenting not only his critics' objections, but also an extensive refutation of each one.

The examples shown all demonstrate considerable effort on the part of the authors in promoting both themselves and their work. While William Gilbert shows no modesty at all either in his self-praise or his refutation and critique of others, other scientists' efforts to construct a relationship of trust with the audience include a rhetoric of modesty. William Harvey refuses to criticise other scholars too harshly, too harshly and concentrates instead on his own on his own self-presentation as a diligent scholar and expert in his field. René Descartes offers us an interesting case of fictitious modesty, asking for detailed criticism of his theses, which merely offer him a chance to add a second round of proofs to his work. The majority of early modern natural philosophical authors made a substantial attempt to present their *ēthos* as self-reflective, open-minded, hard-working, efficient, and expert labourers. While this self-presentation alone was surely not sufficient to convince the audience of obviously wrong assumptions, it assisted authors' strategies of persuasion considerably and helped reach and win over a larger number of readers.

5 *Pathos* or Overwhelm the Audience with Emotions

In his 1575 oration on the mathematical disciplines, Tycho Brahe composed an intricate defence of astronomy and especially astrology. His reasoning focused on a blend of "scientific" arguments, based on both observations of the heavens and earth and religious beliefs. Astronomy and astrology, he reasoned, were ways of gaining insight into the wonders of creation, to perceive the heavens as part of God's omnipotence and mastery. His defence of astrology, quite appropriately, was delivered with a considerable amount of *pathos*, aiming to arouse similar emotions in his audience, and thus persuade listeners and readers of the usefulness and righteousness of the astrological discipline.⁷⁴ After a summary of the history of the mathematical disciplines, Brahe starts his defence of astrology:

73 Fowler (1999) 18–21.

74 Dreyer (1890) 70–87.

Quorsum vero sapiens ille et providus rerum universitatis auctor, tam admirandas et perpetuas motuum coelestium leges, tanta diversitate, et tam continua harmonia effinxisset, si eas ab hominibus, quorum causa omnia visibilia condidit, ignorari voluisset? [...] Quamvis enim in hac inferiori natura mirabilia extent divinae eius sapientiae testimonia: tamen nusquam magis elucet eius sapientia et maiestas, quam in aeterno illo immenso coeli stellarumque omnium theatro.⁷⁵

But to what end would this wise and provident originator of all things have fashioned such admirable and everlasting laws of the motion of the heavens, with such diversity, such constant harmony, if he would have wanted them to be unknown to humans, for the sake of whom he composed every visible thing? [...] For even in this lower nature miraculous witnesses of his divine wisdom stand out: still, his judgement and dignity shine forth nowhere brighter than in this immense eternal theatre of the heaven and all stars.

Such a discussion of the grandeur of the topic is a common feature of early modern scientific texts and a key strategy of argumentation, usually conducted in the *genus grande*. We find it in a large number of scientific texts prior to the 18th century, even though it seems to be in opposition to the supposedly new methods and virtues of the proponents of the scientific revolution: objectivity, brevity, clarity, and precision. Many early modern scientists were, unsurprisingly, enthusiastic about their topic, especially if they had to fight for their new and controversial convictions. In many cases, as in Brahe's, such ardour was accompanied by a deep reverence for God's powers. Some of these natural philosophers saw the investigation of nature as a study of creation, and the results they got as a testament to the existence and omnipotence of its creator. The works of these so-called physico-theologists are consequently full of enthusiasm about natural phenomena as a sign of God's influence on earth.⁷⁶

The English theologian Thomas Burnet (1635–1715) provided an influential example for such enthusiastic scientific prose, which often aimed to reconcile biblical stories with scientific findings, with his *Telluris Theoria Sacra* (1681). This text attempts to reconcile recent geological, physical, and cosmological findings – especially Cartesian theories – with the biblical account of Genesis, explaining, for instance, the creation of mountains and oceans as a

75 Brahe (1621) 14.

76 On physico-theology cf. Blair (2000); Michel (2008); Blair and Greyerz (2020).

consequence of Noah's Flood.⁷⁷ In numerous descriptions, especially in the sections on mountains and hills, which Burnet interprets as consequences of the Flood and a testament to the sins of the earth's former inhabitants, the work makes use of grand style. Burnet's arguments are laid out with the help of numerous figures of speech.⁷⁸ One example will have to suffice to illustrate Burnet's style. He introduces chapter nine, "De montibus," with the following contemplation:

Praeter coelorum faciem, et immensa spacia aetherea, stellarumque gratissimum aspectum, oculos meos atque animum nihil magis delectare solet, quam Oceanum intueri, et magnos montes terrae. Nescio quid grande habent et augustum uterque horum, quo mens excitatur ad ingentes affectus et cogitationes: summum rerum authorem et opificem inde facile contuemur et admiramur, mentemque nostram, quae cum voluptate res magnas contemplatur, non esse rem parvam cum gaudio recognoscimus.⁷⁹

Beyond the appearance of the heavens, and the immense celestial expanse, nothing usually delights my eyes and my mind more than looking at the ocean and the huge mountains. I don't know what loftiness and magnificence – or both – they have, by which the mind is incited to grand feelings and thoughts: for that reason we easily contemplate and wonder at the greatest originator and constructor of things, and we joyfully acknowledge that our mind, which with pleasure examines great things, is no inferior thing itself.⁸⁰

At the beginning of this chapter, Burnet uses an overwhelming number of appeals to the reader's emotion, combining emotional outbursts (*gratissimum aspectum; ingentes affectus et cogitationes; admiramur*) and emphasis on his delight (*nihil magis delectare solet; cum voluptate; cum gaudio*) with praise of the Lord and emphasis on the grandeur of his subject. Looking at the ocean and the mountains as proof of the omnipotence of God fills the viewer with strong positive emotions as well as admiration of the works of the Lord. This section, additionally composed in the *genus grande*, is clearly meant to inspire in the audience the same emotions the author describes feeling, in accordance

77 Poole (2010) 55–63.

78 Haller (1940); Nicolson (1959) 194.

79 Burnet (1681) 82.

80 Barton (2017) 149.

with Aristotle's idea of *pathos*.⁸¹ Burnet's treatise, in both its Latin and English versions, is full of such grandeur, baroque formulations and, especially, similar constructions of *pathos* as an emotional connection between author and reader.⁸² With this strategy, Burnet succeeds in creating a heavily discussed controversy about the role of Genesis and the natural world. While many of his readers were persuaded by his ideas, others harshly criticised his opinions on the history of the earth.⁸³

Another 17th-century natural philosopher who successfully and extensively employed *pathos* as a mode of persuasion in his works was the German Jesuit Athanasius Kircher (1602–1680), a professor at the Collegio Romano and a prolific writer of natural philosophical works. He published over forty scientific works and has been called “master of a hundred arts”⁸⁴ and “the last man who knew everything,”⁸⁵ because his works spanned a wide range of fields: archaeology, Egyptology, physiology, medicine, geology, botany, musical theory, optics, and more.⁸⁶ With his two-volume *Mundus Subterraneus* (“*The Underworld*”), first published in 1665, Kircher produced one of the most successful geological treatises of the 17th century. Much has been written about Kircher's representation of knowledge, showing how he uses visual content such as pictures and charts to present and explain his knowledge.⁸⁷ But while these visualisations are impressive and essential to his representation of knowledge, he also makes use of impressive and effective strategies at the textual level, which show us how he used classical models to present his insight into the study of nature. That Kircher, like Burnet, praises nature as God's wonderful creation is clear from the many instances of emotional religious outbursts within the text.

Book four of *Mundus Subterraneus*, which concerns itself with the origin and impact of subterranean fires, is especially enlightening in this respect. The author focuses particularly on two volcanoes, Mount Aetna and Mount Vesuvius, which he had visited in 1638. Central ethical features of modern science are recurring themes in this book and Kircher's work as a whole. At the beginning, the author underlines his ideal of scientific precision in the preface, while describing his field trip to several volcanoes:

81 Arist. *Rhet.* B 2–11; Lausberg (2008) 142–146.

82 For an analysis of Burnet's style cf. Haller (1940) esp. 114–148.

83 Poole (2010) 55–74.

84 Reilly (1974); Woods (2005) 108.

85 Findlen (2004).

86 Krafft (1977) 641–645.

87 Breidbach (2003).

Ante omnia quod maxime desideraram Aetnam, omnium prodigiosorum in universa Sicilia sese exerentium effectuum fontem conscendi, ut admiranda, quae de eo omnium seculorum historici scripserant, proprio experimento *kata tēn autopsian* comperirem. Deinde Aeolias sive Hephestias insulas et prae caeteris Strongylum [...] summo studio exploravi.⁸⁸

First I ascended Aetna, which I desired above all things, the fountain of all other prodigious effects in Sicily. So that I might, by my own experience, and *with my own eyes*, find out the wonderful things, of which historians of all ages have written. Then, with utmost diligence, I explored the Aeolian or Hephaestian Islands and, above all the rest, Stromboli [...].

Empiricism, reports of experiments and dry enumeration of facts also feature in Kircher's description of Mount Aetna and other volcanoes. But in addition to these supposed characteristics of the new science, we find a considerable number of classical rhetorical devices. The rhetorical strategies which most apparently set Kircher's work apart from modern scientific texts are his application of *ekphrasis* and *pathos*. In his descriptions of Mount Aetna, Kircher paints a vivid picture of the volcano for his readers:

Est ergo Aetna mons unicus, verticem [...] in altum erigens; [...] ad summum vero verticem instabili cinere pumiceque confragosus, per vastissimum 12 milliarium in ambitu, fatiscit craterem, qui arduo antrorsum clivo sese in tartara usque angustuat.⁸⁹

Aetna, therefore, is one mountain only, rearing up on high its top or spire [...]; but the utmost top is broken and cragged, with unstable cinders and pumice stones, and cleaves open with a vast crater or deep mouthed cup of twelve miles in compass, which in a steep descent straightens itself narrower, even to the bottom of hell, as it were.

As Kircher goes on with the description, powerful emotions begin to complement the picture:

Visu horribile praecipitium, flammis, fumo, tum ex imo, tum ex lateribus montis cum horrendo mugitu, tonitruis non absimili erumpentibus adeo formidandum, ut vel ipsa imaginatio iam iam instantis ignis ac ruinae

88 Kircher (1665) fol. **2^r.

89 Kircher (1665) 186.

neminem quantumvis audacissimum et intrepidum, non primo statim occursu consternat, atque a quodam veluti infernali barathro avertat.⁹⁰

A most horrible precipice to behold, most formidable with flames, fumes, both from the very bottom, and from the sides of the mountain; with an horrendous roaring and bellowing, not unlike thunders. That the very imagination and thoughts of the fire and ruins so close by could, at the first encounter, amaze and frighten any man, even the most audacious and fearless, and make him turn away as if from a certain infernal pit.

Quite clearly, in this instance Kircher, like Burnet, imagines the audience to at least relate to the powerful emotions supposedly felt by the observer of such wondrous phenomena. Later on, in his account of an enormous eruption of Mount Aetna, not only do powerful emotions and personification of nature come into play, but so do enthusiastic spiritual outbursts. Here, Kircher praises God as the creator of such miracles of nature, citing Romans 11:33:

Vorago numquam sine fremitu et mugitibus est, quos subinde tam horrendos edit, ut vel ipsum montem tremefaciant. Verbo, qui admirandam DEI Opt. Max. potentiam intueri desiderat, is huiusmodi montes adeat, et naturae miraculorum effectibus ineffabilibus attonitus stupefactusque identidem intimo cordis affectu pronunciare cogetur: *O altitudo divitiarum et sapientia DEI, quam incomprehensibilia sunt iudicia tua, et quam investigabiles viae tuae, quibus mundum constituisti.*⁹¹

This voracious pit is never without roaring and bellowing, which now and then are so horrendous, that they make the very mountain itself quake and tremble. In a word, whoever desires to behold the power of the only great and good God, let him make his way to these kind of mountains, and he will be so astonished and stupefied with the ineffable effects of the miracles of nature, that he will be constrained to pronounce, from the most intimate affection of his heart: *O the depth of the riches and wisdom of God! How incomprehensible are your judgements, and how unsearchable your ways, by which you have constituted the world.*

With this powerful evidence of emotions, many but not all related to his physico-theological beliefs, Kircher created an engaging and persuasive

90 Kircher (1665) 186.

91 Kircher (1665) 187.

description of the wonders of the earth, and especially its subterranean phenomena, which proved influential to geological works of all kinds for many decades.⁹² That Kircher was not the only scientist using such an emotional and baroque style, and that such a style was not considered atypical or inappropriate for scientific texts of the period, has already been proven by the previous examples of Brahe and Burnet. It is shown, in addition, by the huge success his work proved to be within the scientific community of the time, praised and cited by Baruch Spinoza, John Locke, Robert Boyle, and many others.⁹³

6 Conclusion

Most modern scholarship paints a rather different picture of the authors discussed in this chapter. Kircher, for example, has been regarded as a figure of transition between what is called the “old” and the “new” science, meaning before and after the scientific revolution at the end of the 17th century. Some of his works have been called “pseudo-science,” as opposed to the “proper science” practised after the scientific revolution.⁹⁴ If we examine the criticisms levelled against Kircher’s works, we can identify two major points, which both stem from a misconception of early modern scientific texts. Some of Kircher’s works deal with topics which, in the eyes of modern scholarship, do not belong to the realm of the natural sciences, but rather to that of theology. For example, he wrote a treatise on the Tower of Babel, in which he demonstrates, with meticulous calculations and detailed construction plans, that it could not have reached the moon as the Bible states.⁹⁵ To call such treatises “proper science” might cause problems for modern scholars; for Kircher and his contemporaries, however, the difference between this work and Newton’s *Principia Mathematica* was not so great. After all, our distinct scientific disciplines and their respective topics were only slowly emerging in Kircher’s time. More importantly for the purpose of this chapter, the second point of criticism against Kircher’s scientific works concerns his style, specifically his use of symbols, analogies, allegory, and metaphor, as well as *pathos* and many more rhetorical devices. These features supposedly stand against the ethics of modern science: empiricism, inquiry, precision and objectivity.⁹⁶ On the basis of the

92 Findlen (2004) 8–9.

93 Parcell (2009) 64–65.

94 Glassie (2012) xiv.

95 Kircher (1675); (1679).

96 Parcell (2009) 63–74.

aforementioned examples, from Gilbert to Burnet, I would like to argue against this criticism and suggest that the use of these rhetorical devices is common to many early modern scientific texts, *and* that this does not prevent authors from using the new scientific standards as well. On the contrary, it proved a useful and highly successful tool to win the audience over to new, radical ideas and findings, by presenting them in a form which was already familiar to them from their school days.

That high style, ample rhetorical ornamentation, and the uses of figurative language, self-presentation and powerful emotion were considered germane to early modern scientific writing is also shown by texts which stem from genres with higher literary ambitions, which were nonetheless crucial in disseminating and promoting the new scientific ideas of the era. These include numerous didactic poems, usually written in hexameter and full of mythological allusions, ekphrasis, figures and tropes, as well as emotion, describing new technological inventions as well as discoveries of the natural world. The tradition of scientific poetry, in Latin as well as in the vernacular until the 19th century, complements this picture.⁹⁷ The idea that scientific works should display a low, highly technical style, without much rhetorical ornament, reflecting, if not always successfully, a high level of objectivity, was only gradually developed during the 18th and 19th centuries, when new standards of scientific work as well as writing were established, and classical rhetorical education experienced a distinct decline. That the rhetorical character of scientific works remains relevant to this day is shown by the efforts of scholars of the rhetoric of science who try to pinpoint the role of persuasive speech in scientific writing.

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97 Seidenschnur (1847) 772–806; Nicolson (1946); Nicolson (1948).

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